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  1. Internalism and Externalism in Mind.Sarah Sawyer - 2011 - In James Garvey (ed.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. London, UK: pp. 133-150.
    This companion is aimed at specialists and non-specialists in the philosophy of mind and features 13 commissioned research articles on core topics by leading figures in the field. My contribution is on internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. I.
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  2. Truth and Objectivity in Conceptual Engineering.Sarah Sawyer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Paradigm cases of conceptual engineering involve topic preservation through semantic change. The challenge (known as Strawson's challenge) is to explain how this is possible. In previous work, I have responded to the challenge by advocating an externalist metasemantic framework that distinguishes the linguistic meaning of a term from the concept the term expresses. In this paper I argue that the topics of interest to conceptual engineers are underpinned by objective properties and that in conceptual engineering we aim for truth. I (...)
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  3. Identity Without Supervenience.John Gibbons - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):59-79.
  4. Demotivating Intentional Mentalism.Joachim Lipski - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):298-318.
    Intentional Mentalism is the view that mental intentionality is primary to non-mental intentionality and that the latter is derived from the former. In this article I examine three views which have been taken to motivate Intentional Mentalism: conventionalism as invoked by Searle, Gricean pragmatism, and the language of thought hypothesis. I argue that none of these views motivates Intentional Mentalism, and that, in fact, the former two imply its rejection.
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  5. Intentionality: Past and Future.Gábor Forrai & George Kampis (eds.) - 2005 - Rodopi.
    This book contains eleven original papers about intentionality. Some explore current problems such as the status of intentional content, the intentionality of perception and emotion, the connections between intentionality and normativity, the relationship between intentionality and consciousness, the characteristics of the intentional idiom. Others discuss the work of historical figures like Locke, Brentano, Husserl and Frege.
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  6. Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences - Cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. A forthcoming companion volume Genes and (...)
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  7. Sosa on Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism.Timothy Williamson & John Greco - 2004 - In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Blackwell.
    A kind of intellectual project characteristic of Ernest Sosa is to resolve an apparently flat-out dispute by showing that it is not after all a zero-sum game. His irenic goal is to do justice to both sides and give each of them most of what it wants. In his subtle paper ‘Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism’ he applies this strategy to the dispute between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. It is a pleasure to engage in discussion with a (...)
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  8. Can Cognition Be Factorized Into Internal and External Components?Timothy Williamson - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Blackwell. pp. 291-306.
    This book chapter is not currently available in ORA. Citation: Williamson, T. Can cognition be factorised into internal and external components? In: Stainton, R. Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 291-306.
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  9. Can Cognition Be Factorized Into Internal and External Components?Timothy Williamson - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Blackwell. pp. 291-306.
    This book chapter is not currently available in ORA. Citation: Williamson, T. Can cognition be factorised into internal and external components? In: Stainton, R. Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 291-306.
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  10. The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes.Mark Rowlands - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Mark Rowlands challenges the Cartesian view of the mind as a self-contained monadic entity, and offers in its place a radical externalist or environmentalist model of cognitive processes. Cognition is not something done exclusively in the head, but fundamentally something done in the world. Drawing on both evolutionary theory and a detailed examination of the processes involved in perception, memory, thought and language use, Rowlands argues that cognition is, in part, a process whereby creatures manipulate and exploit (...)
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  11. I—M Ust a S Emantic M Inimalist Be a S Emantic I Nternalist&Quest.Emma Borg - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):31-51.
    I aim to show that a semantic minimalist need not also be a semantic internalist. §I introduces minimalism and internalism and argues that there is a prima facie case for a minimalist being an internalist. §II sketches some positive arguments for internalism which, if successful, show that a minimalist must be an internalist. §III goes on to reject these arguments and contends that the prima facie case for uniting minimalism and internalism is also not compelling. §IV returns to an objection (...)
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  12. Ecological Content.Josefa Toribio - 1997 - Pragmatics and Cognition 5 (2):253-281.
    The paper has a negative and a positive side. The negative side argues that the classical notions of narrow and wide content are not suitable for the purposes of psychological explanation. The positive side shows how to characterize an alternative notion of content that is suitable for those purposes. This account is supported by a way of conceptualizing computation that is constitutively dependent upon properties external to the system and empirical research in developmental psychology. My main contention is that an (...)
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  13. Character (Alone) Doesn't Count: Phenomenal Character and Narrow Intentional Content.Preston J. Werner - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):261-272.
    Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. If this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. Using a twin-earth style case, I argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After describing and defending the case, I conclude by considering a few objections that help to (...)
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  14. Ernest Sosa: And His Critics.John Greco (ed.) - 2004 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  15. The Third Meditation on Objective Being: Representation and Intentional Content.Amy Schmitter - 2014 - In David Cunning (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 149-67.
  16. Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism.Chris Tillman - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):419-440.
    At first pass, internalism about justification is the view that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Externalism about mental content is the view that there are differences in mental content without an internal difference. Assuming mental contents are the primary bearers of justificatory features, the two views are in obvious tension. The goal of this paper is to determine how the tension is best resolved. The paper proceeds as follows. In §1 I explain the threat to justificatory (...)
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  17. Who's Afraid of the Big, Bad Wolf? Naturalizing Empty Concepts.Dan Ryder - unknown
    Externalist theories of representation (including most naturalistic psychosemantic theories) typically require some relation to obtain between a representation and what it represents. As a result, empty concepts cause problems for such theories. I offer a naturalistic and externalist account of empty concepts that shows how they can be shared across individuals. On this account, the brain is a general-purpose model-building machine, where items in the world serve as templates for model construction. Shareable empty concepts arise when there is a common (...)
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  18. Reduction, Externalism and Immanence in Husserl and Heidegger.Felix O’Murchadha - 2008 - Synthese 160 (3):375-395.
    This paper argues that the Husserl—Heidegger relationship is systematically misunderstood when framed in terms of a distinction between internalism and externalism. Both philosophers, it is argued, employ the phenomenological reduction to immanence as a fundamental methodological instrument. After first outlining the assumptions regarding inner and outer and the individual and the social from which recent epistemological interpretations of phenomenology begin, I turn to the question of Husserl's internalism. I argue that Husserl can only be understood as an internalist on the (...)
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  19. Phywa Pa's Argumentative Analogy Between Factive Assessment (Yid Dpyod) and Conceptual Thought (Rtog Pa).Jonathan Stoltz - 2009 - Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 32:369-386.
    This paper delves into one particular topic within this Buddhist theory of cognition. I examine a single argument by Phywa pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169) contained within his famous epistemology text, the Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel, drawing out the philosophical implications that this argument has on his theory of cognition and his account of ontological dependence. I make the case that Phywa pa’s argument fails to explain adequately the nature of the relation between certain cognitive episodes and (...)
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  20. Note on Mark Rowland's Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again.Yujin Nagasawa - unknown
    The book has two di sti ncti ve features. One is that while philosophers’discussions of externalism tend to be very technical, Rowlands presents his own discussion in an accessible manner. The second, more distinctive than the first, is that Rowlands treats the concept of externalism as a topic in both analytic and continental traditions of philosophy. In Chapter 2 Rowlands introduces the Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, which appears inconsistent with externalism. Rowlands claims that Cartesianism consists of three types (...)
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  21. Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):61-64.
  22. The Skeptic, the Content Externalist, and the Theist.Robert Howell - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):173-180.
    Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is that such a strong consequence is not desirable for the content-externalists, and that the availability of this argument therefore casts doubt on the anti-skeptical position. I argue that all content externalists should be troubled by (...)
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  23. Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma.Maciej Witek - 2003 - In W. Löffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    It can be said that Wittgenstein"s Private Language Argument initiated the internalism-externalism dilemma. In one of its interpretations the argument is read as a criticism of methodological solipsism. Internalism, in turn, assumes that methodological solipsism is an adequate account of mental content. Therefore some externalists refer to Wittgenstein as their forerunner. I argue, first, that the Private Language Argument does not support the claim of externalism that meanings are not in the head, even though it undermines methodological solipsism. I also (...)
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  24. Was Descartes an Individualist? A Critical Discussion of W. Ferraiolo's" Individualism and Descartes".Carlos J. Moya - 1997 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):77-85.
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  25. Review of The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. [REVIEW]Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):749-753.
  26. The Extended Mind.Richard Menary (ed.) - 2010 - MIT Press.
    Leading scholars respond to the famous proposition by Andy Clark and David Chalmers that cognition and mind are not located exclusively in the head.
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  27. The Encyclopedia of the Mind.Hal Pashler (ed.) - forthcoming - Sage Publications.
  28. Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. R. - 1994 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  29. Philosophy and the Sciences of Mind.Peter K. Machamer & Martin Carrier (eds.) - forthcoming
  30. Perspectives On Mind.Norton Nelkin - 1988 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  31. The Mind and the Machine.S. Torrance (ed.) - 1987 - Horwood.
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  32. Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind.Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2002 - Blackwell.
  33. Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
    In this paper, I challenge a widely presupposed principle in the epistemology of inference. The principle, (Validity Requirement), is this: S’s (purportedly deductive) reasoning, R, from warranted premise-beliefs provides (conditional) warrant for S’s belief in its conclusion only if R is valid. I argue against (Validity Requirement) from two prominent assumptions in the philosophy of mind: that the cognitive competencies that constitute reasoning are fallible, and that the attitudes operative in reasoning are anti-individualistically individuated. Indeed, my discussion will amount to (...)
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  34. Causal Theories of Intentionality.Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - In Hal Pashler (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications.
    This entry surveys a range of proposed solutions to the problem of intentionality, that is, the problem of explaining how human thoughts can be about, or be directed toward, objects. The family of solutions described here takes the content of a mental representation—what that concept represents or is about—to be a function of causal relations between mental representations and their typically external objects. This emphasis on causal relations should be understood broadly, however, so as to cover theories couched in terms (...)
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  35. Intuitions, Externalism, and Conceptual Analysis.Jussi Haukioja - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):81-93.
    Semantic externalism about a class of expressions is often thought to make conceptual analysis about members of that class impossible. In particular, since externalism about natural kind terms makes the essences of natural kinds empirically discoverable, it seems that mere reflection on one's natural kind concept will not be able to tell one anything substantial about what it is for something to fall under one's natural kind concepts. Many hold the further view that one cannot even know anything substantial about (...)
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  36. Getting Clear About Equivocal Concepts. [REVIEW]Nicholas Shea - 2002 - Disputatio 1 (13):1 - 14.
    Just how far can externalism go? In this exciting new book Ruth Millikan explores a radically externalist treatment of empirical concepts (Millikan 2000). For the last thirty years philosophy of mind’s ties to meaning internalism have been loosened. The theory of content has swung uncomfortably on its moorings in a fickle current, straining against opposing ties to mind and world. In this book Millikan casts conceptual content adrift from the thinker: what determines the content of a concept is not cognitively (...)
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  37. The Subject's Point of View – Katalin Farkas. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):743-747.
    Farkas’ ambitious agenda is to advance a strongly internalist account of the mental. She makes impressive strides towards achieving this goal. Along the way, she presents important new arguments on a number of topics, including: how best to understand the ‘twin’ cases used in debates about content, the alleged incompatibility of content externalism and privileged access, and the prospects for defending Frege’s claim that sense determines reference. In this review, I survey a number of her arguments and raise some questions (...)
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  38. Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (4):317-336.
    In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, (...)
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  39. On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
    In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are consciously aware, the (...)
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  40. Review of Mark Rowland's Externalism. [REVIEW]Yujin Nagasawa - unknown
    The book has two di sti ncti ve features. One is that while philosophers’discussions of externalism tend to be very technical, Rowlands presents his own discussion in an accessible manner. The second, more distinctive than the first, is that Rowlands treats the concept of externalism as a topic in both analytic and continental traditions of philosophy. In Chapter 2 Rowlands introduces the Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, which appears inconsistent with externalism. Rowlands claims that Cartesianism consists of three types (...)
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  41. Methodology, Not Metaphysics: Against Semantic Externalism.John Collins - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):53-69.
    Borg (2009) surveys and rejects a number of arguments in favour of semantic internalism. This paper, in turn, surveys and rejects all of Borg's anti-internalist arguments. My chief moral is that, properly conceived, semantic internalism is a methodological doctrine that takes its lead from current practice in linguistics. The unifying theme of internalist arguments, therefore, is that linguistics neither targets nor presupposes externalia. To the extent that this claim is correct, we should be internalists about linguistic phenomena, including semantics.
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  42. Psychological Essentialism and Semantic Externalism: Evidence for Externalism in Lay Speakers' Language Use.Jussi Jylkk - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):37 – 60.
    Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are experimentally testable. We examine Braisby, Franks, and Hampton's (1996) study which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and (...)
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  43. Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession.Derek Ball - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472.
    It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.
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  44. Intentionality and Belief de Re: A Critical Study of Searle's Representative Internalism.G. Bar-Elli - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (1):65-85.
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  45. The Mind of Donald Davidson.Johannes L. Brandl (ed.) - 1989 - Netherlands: Rodopi.
    WHAT IS PRESENT TO THE MIND? Donald DAVIDSON The University of California at Berkeley There is a sense in which anything we think about is, ...
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  46. Individualism, Externalism and Idiolectical Meaning.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):95-128.
    Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of its use. I here show (...)
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  47. A Furry Tile About Mental Representation.Deborah J. Brown - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):448-66.
  48. Cartesian Inner Space.David Brooks - 1995 - South African Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):135-144.
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  49. Externalism and the Fregean Tradition.Jessica Brown - 2003 - In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 431--458.
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  50. How to Believe the Impossible.Curtis Brown - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 58 (3):271-285.
    Can we believe things that could not possibly be true? The world seems full of examples. Mathematicians have "proven" theorems which in fact turn out to be false. People have believed that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, that they themselves are essentially incorporeal, that heat is not molecular motion--all propositions which have been claimed to be not just false, but necessarily false. Some have even seemed to pride themselves on believing the impossible; Hegel thought contradictions could be true, and Kierkegaard seems (...)
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