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  1. Causal Idealism.Sara Bernstein - forthcoming - In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper argues that causal idealism, the view that causation is a product of mental activity, should be considered a competetitor to contemporary views that incorporate human thought and agency into the causal relation. Weighing contextualism, contrastivism, or pragmatism about causation against causal idealism results in at least a tie with respect to the virtues of these theories.
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  2. Assessment Relativism.Filippo Ferrari - forthcoming - In Martin Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook to Relativism.
    Assessment relativism, as developed by John MacFarlane, is the view that the truth of our claims involving a variety of English expressions—‘tasty’, ‘knows’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘might’, and ‘ought’—is relative not only to aspects of the context of their production but also to aspects of the context in which they are assessed. Assessment relativism is thus a form of truth relativism which is offered as a new way of understanding perspectival thought and talk. In this article, I present the main theses of (...)
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  3. The Liar Without Relativism.Poppy Mankowitz - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Some in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and semantic relativism: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi :913–928, 2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Łukowski propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural (...)
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  4. Illocutionary Force and Attitude Mode in Normative Disputes.Teresa Marques - forthcoming - Metaphilosophy:1-29.
    In this paper, I assess recent Stalnakerian views of communication in moral and normative domains. These views model context updates with normative claims. They also aim to explain how people disagree when they follow different norms or values. I present four problems for these Stalnakerian views. I conclude that the problems require a new conception of how common ground relates to illocutionary force and attitude mode, which is still lacking.
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  5. A Direction Effect on Taste Predicates.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (27):1-22.
    The recent literature abounds with accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of so-called predicates of personal taste, i.e. predicates whose application is, in some sense or other, a subjective matter. Relativism and contextualism are the major types of theories. One crucial difference between these theories concerns how we should assess previous taste claims. Relativism predicts that we should assess them in the light of the taste standard governing the context of assessment. Contextualism predicts that we should assess them in the (...)
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  6. Recensione di Making the Social World di John Searle (2010) (recensione rivista 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Benvenuti all'inferno sulla Terra: Bambini, Cambiamenti climatici, Bitcoin, Cartelli, Cina, Democrazia, Diversità, Disgenetica, Uguaglianza, Pirati Informatici, Diritti umani, Islam, Liberalismo, Prosperità, Web, Caos, Fame, Malattia, Violenza, Intellige. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 9-29.
    Prima di commentare in dettaglio su making il mondo sociale (MSW) offrirò prima alcuni commenti sulla filosofia (psicologia descrittiva) e il suo rapporto con la ricerca psicologica contemporanea come esemplificato nelle opere di Searle (S) e Wittgenstein (W), dal momento che sento che questo è il modo migliore per posizionare Searle o qualsiasi comportamento commentatore, nella giusta prospettiva. Aiuterà molto vedere le mie recensioni di PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW e altri libri di questi due geni della psicologia descrittiva. S (...)
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  7. Faultless Disagreement.Dan Zeman - 2020 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge. pp. 486-495.
    In this entry, I tackle the phenomenon known as "faultless disagreement", considered by many authors to pose a challenge to the main views on the semantics of subjective expressions. I first present the phenomenon and the challenge, then review the main answers given by contextualist, absolutist and relativist approaches to the expressions in question. I end with signaling two issues that might shape future discussions about the role played by faultless disagreement in semantics.
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  8. Reflection Principles and the Liar in Context.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Contextualist approaches to the Liar Paradox postulate the occurrence of a context shift in the course of the Liar reasoning. In particular, according to the contextualist proposal advanced by Charles Parsons and Michael Glanzberg, the Liar sentence L doesn’t express a true proposition in the initial context of reasoning c, but expresses a true one in a new, richer context c', where more propositions are available for expression. On the further assumption that Liar sentences involve propositional quantifiers whose domains may (...)
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  9. Elaboration and Intuitions of Disagreement.Alex Davies - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):861-875.
    Mark Richard argues for truth-relativism about claims made using gradable adjectives. He argues that truth-relativism is the best explanation of two kinds of linguistic data, which I call: true cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict. Richard claims that such data are generated by an example that he discusses at length. However, the consensus is that these linguistic data are illusory because they vanish when elaborations are added to examples of the same kind as Richard’s original. In this paper I (...)
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  10. Objective Truth in Matters of Taste.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1755-1777.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. (...)
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  11. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications.Dilip Ninan - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):439-447.
  12. Disagreements.Daniel Cohnitz & Teresa Marques - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):1-10.
    This special issue of Erkenntnis is devoted to the varieties of disagreement that arise in different areas of discourse, and the consequences we should draw from these disagreements, either concerning the subject matter and its objectivity, or concerning our own views about this subject matter if we learn, for example, that an epistemic peer disagrees with our view. In this introduction we sketch the background to the recent philosophical discussions of these questions, and the location occupied therein by the articles (...)
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  13. Audience in Context.Dan López de Sa - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):241-253.
    In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitivity motivates a content relativist version of radical relativism, according to which a sentence as said at a context can have different contents with respect to the different perspectives from where it is assessed. The first aim of this note is to illustrate how this is not so. According to Egan himself, the phenomenon motivates at least refinement of the characteristic moderate contention that features of a single context determine (...)
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  14. Doxastic Disagreement.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):121-142.
    This paper explores some alternative accounts of doxastic disagreement, and shows what problems each faces. It offers an account of doxastic disagreement that results from the incompatibility of the content of doxastic attitudes, even when that content’s truth is relativized. On the best definition possible, it is argued, neither non-indexical contextualism nor assessment-relativism have an advantage over contextualism. The conclusion is that conflicts that arise from the incompatibility (at the same world) of the content of given doxastic attitudes cannot be (...)
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  15. Relative Correctness.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373.
    John MacFarlane defends a radical form of truth relativism that makes the truth of assertions relative not only to contexts of utterance but also to contexts of assessment, or perspectives. Making sense of assessment-sensitive truth is a matter of making sense of the normative commitments undertaken by speakers in using assessment sensitive sentences. This paper argues against the possibility of making sense of such a practice. Evans raised a challenge to the coherence of relative truth. A modification of the challenge (...)
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  16. Disagreement About Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination.Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):701-723.
    The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal to metalinguistic (...)
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  17. The Role of Pragmatics in (Re)Constructing the Rational Law-Maker.Alessandro Capone - 2013 - Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (2):399-414.
    The recent debate on pragmatics and the law has found ways to circumvent an important distinction, originally drawn by Dascal and Wróblewski, between the historical law-maker, the current law-maker, and the ideal/rational law-maker.1 By insisting on the relationship between the rational law-maker and contextualism and textualism, I want to redress this fault in current discussions. In this paper, I start with general considerations on pragmatics, intentionality in ordinary conversation, and intentionality in the context of judiciary proceedings and legal texts. I (...)
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  18. Coming True: A Note on Truth and Actuality.Richard Dietz & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):403-427.
    John MacFarlane has recently presented a novel argument in support of truth- relativism. According to this, contextualists fail to accommodate retrospective reassessments of propositional contents, when it comes to languages which are rich enough to express actuality. The aim of this note is twofold. First, it is to argue that the argument can be effectively rejected, since it rests on an inadequate conception of actuality. Second, it is to offer a more plausible account of actuality in branching time, along the (...)
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  19. Contexts, Fiction and Truth.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - In A. Capone, M. Carapezza & F. Lo Piparo (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Springer. pp. 489-500.
    In this paper I want to hold that contextualism – the position according to which wide context, i.e., the concrete situation of discourse, may well have the semantic role of assigning truth-conditions to sentences – may well accommodate (along with some nowadays established theses about the semantics of proper names) three data about fiction, namely, the facts that as far as discourse involving fiction is concerned, i) sentences about nothing are meaningful ii) they may be true in fiction iii) yet (...)
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  20. Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.
    Predicates of taste, such as?fun? and?tasty?, have received considerable attention in recent debates between contextualists and relativists, with considerations involving disagreement playing a central role. Considerations involving disagreement have been taken to present a problem for contextualist treatments of predicates of taste. My goal is to argue that considerations involving disagreement do not undermine contextualism. To the extent that relativism was supposed to be motivated by contextualists being unable to deal with disagreement, this motivation is lacking. The argument against contextualism (...)
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  21. Faultless Disagreement, Assertions and the Affective-Expressive Dimension of Judgments of Taste.Filip Buekens - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):637-655.
    Contextualists and assessment relativists neglect the expressive dimension of assertoric discourse that seems to give rise to faultless disagreement. Discourse that generates the intuition makes public an attitudinal conflict, and the affective -expressive dimension of the contributing utterances accounts for it. The FD-phenomenon is an effect of a public dispute generated by a sequence of expressing opposite attitudes towards a salient object or state of affairs, where the protagonists are making an attempt to persuade the other side into joining the (...)
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  22. ¿ Qué podemos aprovechar del análisis austiniano del significado y de la verdad?Juan José Colomina Almiñana - 2010 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 42 (2):197 - 218.
    In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of truth using the (...)
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  23. The Chrysippus Intuition and Contextual Theories of Truth.Jay Newhard - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345-352.
    Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. I conclude that the philosophical (...)
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  24. Una solución materialista a la corazonada "zombie".Juan José Colomina Almiñana - 2008 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 33 (2):161-174.
    In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of truth using the (...)
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  25. Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth.Marian David - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press.
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  26. El papel del significado en una noción pragmática de la verdad.Juan José Colomina Almiñana - 2007 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 32 (1):85-108.
    In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of truth using the (...)
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  27. The Truth in Contextual Semantics.Michael P. Lynch - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):173-195.
    In a series of papers written over the last two decades, Terence Horgan has articulated a radical position on truth and metaphysics that he calls contextual semantics. According to Horgan, we can abandon referentialism – or the idea that truth is always and everywhere understood in terms of the referential relations between words and world – while still sensibly believing in a mind-independent world. The centerpiece of contextual semantics is that it allows for some flexibility about truth: statements of different (...)
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  28. A Note On Truth, Deflationism And Irrealism.Pierluigi Miraglia - 1995 - Sorites 3:48-63.
    The paper deals with a problem about irrealist doctrines of content, according to which there are no real properties answering to content-attributing expressions. The central claim of the paper is that the distinction between factual and non-factual discourse is independent from particular conceptions of truth, and is thus compatible with a deflationary conception. This claim is sustained by an examination of what I take to be significant aspects of the deflationary conception. I argue therefore directly against Paul Boghossian's paper «The (...)
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  29. Truth in Context.Gertrude Ezorsky - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (5):113-135.
  30. What is True. Gettier Cases and the Problem of Truth.Henk bij de Weg - manuscript
    One of the most discussed articles in the theory of knowledge is Edmund Gettier’s article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, published in 1963. In this article Gettier undermined the view that knowledge is justified true belief. I think that Gettier’s analysis has consequences not only for the question what knowledge is but also for our idea of truth. In this paper I argue that an analysis in the sense of Gettier shows that a statement can be both true and not (...)
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  31. A Defence of the Kaplanian Theory of Sentence Truth.Paula Sweeney - unknown
    When David Kaplan put forward his theory of sentence truth incorporating demonstratives, initially proposed in ‘Dthat’ and later developed in ‘Demonstratives’ and ‘Afterthoughts’, it was, to his mind, simply a matter of book-keeping, a job that had been pushed aside as a complication when a truth conditional semantics had been proposed. The challenges considered in this thesis are challenges to the effect that Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth is, for one reason or another, inadequate. My overarching aim is to defend (...)
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  32. False Truths.Isidora Stojanovic - unknown
    One of the most interesting and fruitful applications of logics, classical or other, has been in supplying formal frameworks for the semantics of natural language. In this paper, I discuss the following puzzle: there seem to be arguments that are logically valid - more precisely, that are instances of the rule of universal instantiation, and yet, the utterance of the premise is intuitively true while the conclusion is false. I will discuss two strategies, developed in response to different sorts of (...)
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