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  1. added 2019-08-27
    Conspiring with the Enemy: The Ethic of Cooperation in Warfare.Yvonne Chiu - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press.
    Although military mores have relied primarily on just war theory, the ethic of cooperation in warfare (ECW)—between enemies even as they are trying to kill each other—is as central to the practice of warfare and to conceptualization of its morality. Neither game theory nor unilateral moral duties (God-given or otherwise) can explain the explicit language of cooperation in developing and enforcing principles of military ethics and the law of armed conflict. -/- The ethic of cooperation is borne of various motivations: (...)
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  2. added 2019-06-06
    Rationality and Coordination.Margaret Gilbert & Cristina Bicchieri - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):105.
    How is one to act so as to do as well as possible according to one’s ranking of the possible outcomes? How—as it may be put—is one to act rationally? Sometimes the possible outcomes are not under one’s own control: an outcome is a combination of one’s own and another agent’s action. Often, then, one must try to work out what the other agent will do, in order to do as well as possible in one’s own lights. It is situations (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-05
    Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games.Jurgis Karpus & Mantas Radzvilas - 0201 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (1):1-30.
    The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interacting players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team – a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but (...)
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  4. added 2019-03-07
    Explaining Universal Social Institutions: A Game-Theoretic Approach.Michael Vlerick - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):291-300.
    Universal social institutions, such as marriage, commons management and property, have emerged independently in radically different cultures. This requires explanation. As Boyer and Petersen point out ‘in a purely localist framework would have to constitute massively improbable coincidences’ . According to Boyer and Petersen, those institutions emerged naturally out of genetically wired behavioural dispositions, such as marriage out of mating strategies and borders out of territorial behaviour. While I agree with Boyer and Petersen that ‘unnatural’ institutions cannot thrive, this one-sided (...)
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  5. added 2019-03-04
    Review of Herbert Gintis’s Individuality and Entanglement: The Moral and Material Bases of Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 357 Pp. [REVIEW]Michiru Nagatsu - 2018 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (1):117-124.
    In his own words, Herbert Gintis’s latest book is “an analysis of human nature and a tribute to its wonders” (3).1More prosaically, it is a collection of essays, some of which are original and others published elsewhere. Instead of being structured around topics in decision and game theory,like his previous book (2009), this book develops interrelated themes, such as the evolutionary origins of moral sense, its central role in political games, and the socially entangled nature of human rationality and individuality. (...)
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  6. added 2019-01-01
    Hume's Natural History of Justice.Mark Collier - 2011 - In C. Taylor & S. Buckle (eds.), Hume and the Enlightenment. Pickering & Chatto. pp. 131-142.
    In Book III, Part 2 of the Treatise, Hume presents a natural history of justice. Self-interest clearly plays a central role in his account; our ancestors invented justice conventions, he maintains, for the sake of reciprocal advantage. But this is not what makes his approach so novel and attractive. Hume recognizes that prudential considerations are not sufficient to explain how human beings – with our propensities towards temporal discounting and free-riding – could have established conventions for social exchange and collective (...)
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  7. added 2018-07-27
    Book Note: Danielson, P. Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games.Luc Bovens - 1993 - Political Studies 41:719.
  8. added 2018-07-23
    The Minimalistic Definition of Conventions: One Step Beyond Millikan’s Approach.Vojtech Zachnik - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (3):378-394.
    The study proposes a new approach towards a social phenomenon called convention and submits a minimalistic definition of convention, which provides a promising basis for future analysis unburdened by contra-Lewisian objections. The definition itself, based on the insights of Ruth Millikan in the study Language Conventions Made Simple, represents a simple and efficient means of delimiting essential components of conventional behaviour (stripped of most of the controversial issues from previous debates on Lewis’s notion) solely by means of the role of (...)
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  9. added 2018-07-18
    On Arguments From Self-Interest for the Nash Solution and the Kalai Egalitarian Solution to the Bargaining Problem.Luc Bovens - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (3):231-260.
    I argue in this paper that there are two considerations which govern the dynamics of a two-person bargaining game, viz. relative proportionate utility loss from conceding to one's opponent's proposal and relative non-proportionate utility loss from not conceding to one's opponent's proposal, if she were not to concede as well. The first consideration can adequately be captured by the information contained in vNM utilities. The second requires measures of utility which allow for an interpersonal comparison of utility differences. These considerations (...)
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  10. added 2018-07-13
    The Tragedy of the Commons as a Voting Game.Luc Bovens - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments. Cambridge University Press. pp. 156-176.
    The Tragedy of the Commons is often associated with an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. But it can also have the structure of an n-person Game of Chicken, an Assurance Game, or of a Voting Games (or a Three-in-a-Boat Game). I present three historical stories that document tragedies of the commons, as presented in Aristotle, Mahanarayan and Hume and argue that the descriptions of these historical cases align better with Voting Games than with any other games.
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  11. added 2018-03-23
    The Unilateralist’s Curse and the Case for a Principle of Conformity.Nick Bostrom, Thomas Douglas & Anders Sandberg - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (4):350-371.
    In some situations a number of agents each have the ability to undertake an initiative that would have significant effects on the others. Suppose that each of these agents is purely motivated by an altruistic concern for the common good. We show that if each agent acts on her own personal judgment as to whether the initiative should be undertaken, then the initiative will be undertaken more often than is optimal. We suggest that this phenomenon, which we call the unilateralist’s (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-17
    How to Make Sense of the Com M on P Ri or Assumption Under Incomplete Information.Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring - 1999 - International Journal of Game Theory 28 (3):409-434.
    The Common Prior Assumption (CPA) plays an important role in game theory and the economics of information. It is the basic assumption behind decision-theoretic justifications of equilibrium reasoning in games (Aumann, 1987, Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995) and no-trade results with asymmetric information (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Recently several authors (Dekel and Gul, 1997, Gul, 1996, Lipman, 1995) have questioned whether the CPA is meaningful in situations of incomplete information, where there is no ex ante stage and where the primitives of (...)
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  13. added 2017-12-14
    Coordination Technology for Active Support Networks: Context, Needfinding, and Design.Stanley J. Rosenschein & Todd Davies - 2018 - AI and Society 33 (1):113-123.
    Coordination is a key problem for addressing goal–action gaps in many human endeavors. We define interpersonal coordination as a type of communicative action characterized by low interpersonal belief and goal conflict. Such situations are particularly well described as having collectively “intelligent”, “common good” solutions, viz., ones that almost everyone would agree constitute social improvements. Coordination is useful across the spectrum of interpersonal communication—from isolated individuals to organizational teams. Much attention has been paid to coordination in teams and organizations. In this (...)
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  14. added 2017-11-23
    Review of Francesco Guala "Understanding Institutions". [REVIEW]Christopher Clarke - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  15. added 2017-10-21
    Team Reasoning: Theory and Evidence.Jurgis Karpus & Natalie Gold - 2017 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 400-417.
    The chapter reviews recent theoretical and empirical developments concerning the theory of team reasoning in game theoretic interactions.
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  16. added 2017-07-05
    Making New Ideophones in Siwu: Creative Depiction in Conversation.Mark Dingemanse - 2014 - Pragmatics and Society 5 (3):384-405.
    Ideophones are found in many of the world’s languages. Though they are a major word class on a par with nouns and verbs, their origins are ill-understood, and the question of ideophone creation has been a source of controversy. This paper studies ideophone creation in naturally occurring speech. New, unconventionalised ideophones are identified using native speaker judgements, and are studied in context to understand the rules and regularities underlying their production and interpretation. People produce and interpret new ideophones with the (...)
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  17. added 2017-04-08
    The Logic of Joint Ability in Two-Player Tacit Games.Peter Hawke - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (3):481-508.
    Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move (...)
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  18. added 2017-02-10
    You Better Play 7: Mutual Versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-Link Experiment.Giovanna Devetag, Hykel Hosni & Giacomo Sillari - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1351-1381.
    This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both (...)
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  19. added 2017-02-07
    The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):215.
    Hume is rightly credited with giving a brilliant, and perhaps the best, account of justice as convention. Hume's importance as a forerunner of modern economics has also long been recognized. However, most of Hume's readers have not fully appreciated how closely Hume's analysis of convention foreshadows a particular branch of economic theory, namely, game theory. Starting with the work of Barry, Runciman and Sen and Lewis, there has been a flowering of literature on the informal game-theoretic insights to be found (...)
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  20. added 2017-02-02
    A Difference of Some Consequence Between Conventions and Rules.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):87-99.
    Lewis’s view of the way conventions are passed on may have some especially interesting consequences for the study of language. I’ll start by briefly discussing agreements and disagreements that I have with Lewis’s general views on conventions and then turn to how linguistic conventions spread. I’ll compare views of main stream generative linguistics, in particular, Chomsky’s views on how syntactic forms are passed on, with the sort of view of language acquisition and language change advocated by usage-based or construction grammars, (...)
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  21. added 2017-02-02
    Social Ontology as Convention.Mark H. Bickhard - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):139-149.
    I will argue that social ontology is constituted as hierarchical and interlocking conventions of multifarious kinds. Convention, in turn, is modeled in a manner derived from that of David K. Lewis. Convention is usually held to be inadequate for models of social ontologies, with one primary reason being that there seems to be no place for normativity. I argue that two related changes are required in the basic modeling framework in order to address this (and other) issue(s): (1) a shift (...)
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  22. added 2017-02-01
    Hands Invisible and Intangible.Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit - 1993 - Synthese 94 (2):191 - 225.
    The notion of a spontaneous social order, an order in human affairs which operates without the intervention of any directly ordering mind, has a natural fascination for social and political theorists. This paper provides a taxonomy under which there are two broadly contrasting sorts of spontaneous social order. One is the familiar invisible hand; the other is an arrangement that we describe as the intangible hand. The paper is designed to serve two main purposes. First, to provide a pure account (...)
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  23. added 2017-01-25
    Rule-Following and Coordination: A Game-Theoretic Perspective.Giacomo Sillari - 2010 - Rivista di Filosofia 101 (3):355-386.
  24. added 2017-01-19
    Social Convention Revisited.Margaret Gilbert - 2008 - Topoi (1-2):5-16.
    This article will compare and contrast two very different accounts of convention: the game-theoretical account of Lewis in Convention, and the account initially proposed by Margaret Gilbert (the present author) in chapter six of On Social Facts, and further elaborated here. Gilbert’s account is not a variant of Lewis’s. It was arrived at in part as the result of a detailed critique of Lewis’s account in relation to a central everyday concept of a social convention. An account of convention need (...)
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  25. added 2017-01-19
    Do Conventions Need to Be Common Knowledge?Ken Binmore - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):17-27.
    Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action (...)
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  26. added 2017-01-19
    Common Knowledge and Convention.Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):29-39.
    This paper investigates the epistemic assumptions that David Lewis makes in his account of social conventions. In particular, I focus on the assumption that the agents have common knowledge of the convention to which they are parties. While evolutionary analyses show that the common knowledge assumption is unnecessary in certain classes of games, Lewis’ original account (and, more recently, Cubitt and Sugden’s reconstruction) stresses the importance of including it in the definition of convention. I discuss arguments pro et contra to (...)
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  27. added 2017-01-19
    The Unconventional, but Conventionalist, Legacy of Lewis’s “Convention”.Olivier Favereau - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):115-126.
    The philosopher David Lewis is credited by many social scientists, including mainstream economists, with having founded the modern (game-theoretical) approach to conventions, viewed as solutions to recurrent coordination problems. Yet it is generally ignored that he revised his approach, soon after the publication of his well-known book. I suggest that this revision has deep implications (probably not perceived by Lewis himself) on the analytical links between coordination, uncertainty and rationality. Thinking anew about these issues leads me to map out an (...)
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  28. added 2016-12-12
    Utilitarianism and Truthfulness.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):17-19.
    D. H. Hodgson has argued that among highly knowledgeable and rational act-Utilitarians there is no non-Circular reason to be truthful or to expect truthfulness from others; wherefore these utilitarians forfeit the benefits of communication. I reply that hodgson goes wrong by tacitly assuming that his utilitarians have no premises to reason from except those that hodgson lays down in specifying the example under consideration.
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  29. added 2016-12-08
    Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge.Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri - 1995 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...)
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  30. added 2016-09-29
    A New Debate on an Old Question. Introductory Note to 'Can the Social Contract Be Signed by an Invisible Hand'.Bernd Lahno - 2013 - RMM 4:39-43.
  31. added 2016-09-29
    Institutional Trust: A Less Demanding Form of Trust?Bernd Lahno - 2001 - Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Avanzados 15:19-58.
    With increasing complexity of the networks of social interaction new and more abstract forms of trust are in need. A conceptual analysis of different forms of trust, namely interpersonal trust, trust in groups and institutional trust is given. It is argued that institutional trust cannot totally replace interpersonal trust. Institutional trust rather builds on more personal forms of trust in that it is primarily formed in personal encounters with salient representatives of the institution and presupposes trust in others trusting in (...)
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  32. added 2016-09-28
    Spiele mit Zeichen.Bernd Lahno - 2001 - Zeitschrift Für Semiotik 23 (3-4):347-364.
    Kommunikation kann als eine besondere Form der strategischen Interaktion verstanden werden. Die Spieltheorie stellt ein formales Instrumentarium zur Analyse strategischer Probleme zur Verfügung. Einige Grundkonzepte der Spieltheorie werden vorgestellt, und ihre Anwendung auf Probleme der Kommunikation an einfachen Modellen vom Typ des Signalspiels illustriert. Es wird argumentiert, dass Kommunikation durch ein typisches Dilemma individueller Rationalität gefährdet sein kann. Obwohl eine korrekte Anwendung von Regeln, die die Verwendung eines verfügbaren Zeichens festlegen, für alle Akteure vorteilhaft wäre, gelingt es rationalen Akteuren unter (...)
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  33. added 2016-09-27
    Norms as Reasons for Action.Bernd Lahno - 2009 - Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 95 (4):563-578.
    Social norms are based on social standards. The relevant standards come in two forms. Compliance with social standards of evaluation may be understood as goal-oriented behavior under the constraints of external and internal sanctions. Compliance with norms, which directly refer to specific ways of conduct, may not. Therefore, although norm-guided behavior may be consistent with utility maximizing, no satisfying account of norm compliance can be given within a Rational Choice framework or any other framework solely based on instrumental rationality.
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  34. added 2016-09-27
    Rational Choice and Rule-Following Behavior.Bernd Lahno - 2007 - Rationality and Society 19 (4):425-450.
    While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of delibera- tion. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximiza- tion principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules in decision making, especially tie-breaking rules and (...)
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  35. added 2016-09-11
    The Topology of Communities of Trust.Mark Alfano - 2016 - Russian Sociological Review 15 (4):30-56.
    Hobbes emphasized that the state of nature is a state of war because it is characterized by fundamental and generalized distrust. Exiting the state of nature and the conflicts it inevitably fosters is therefore a matter of establishing trust. Extant discussions of trust in the philosophical literature, however, focus either on isolated dyads of trusting individuals or trust in large, faceless institutions. In this paper, I begin to fill the gap between these extremes by analyzing what I call the topology (...)
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  36. added 2016-02-25
    On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Cristina Bicchieri, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):3-22.
    A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms.
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  37. added 2015-09-02
    Social Norms and Unthinkable Options.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2519–2537.
    We sometimes violate social norms in order to express our views and to trigger public debates. Many extant accounts of social norms don’t give us any insight into this phenomenon. Drawing on Cristina Bicchieri’s work, I am putting forward an empirical hypothesis that helps us to understand such norm violations. The hypothesis says, roughly, that we often adhere to norms because we are systematically blind to norm-violating options. I argue that this hypothesis is independently plausible and has interesting consequences. It (...)
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  38. added 2014-12-23
    Social Norms, The Invisible Hand, and the Law.Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan - 2014 - University of Queensland Law Journal 33 (2).
  39. added 2014-11-12
    Team Reasoning and Shared Intention.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2014 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer. pp. 279-295.
  40. added 2014-06-03
    On Knowledge and Convention.Tyler Burge - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):249-255.
    It is argued that david lewis' account of convention in "convention" required too much self-Consciousness of parties participating in a convention. In particular, It need not be known that there are equally good alternatives to the convention. This point affects other features of the definition, And suggests that the account is too much guided by the "rational assembly" picture of human conventions. (edited).
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  41. added 2014-04-18
    Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence.Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Public Reason 5 (1):3-13.
  42. added 2014-04-16
    Disagreement About Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination.Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):701-723.
    The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal to metalinguistic (...)
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  43. added 2014-04-02
    Game Theory and Scalar Implicatures.Daniel Rothschild - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):438-478.
  44. added 2014-04-02
    Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?Cedric Paternotte & Jonathan Grose - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):551-587.
    Recent years have witnessed an increased number of game-theoretic approaches to social norms, which apparently share some common vocabulary and methods. We describe three major approaches of this kind (due to Binmore, Bicchieri and Gintis), before comparing them systematically on five crucial themes: generality of the solution, preference transformation, punishment, epistemic conditions and type of explanation. This allows us to show that these theories are, by and large, less compatible than they seem. We then argue that those three theories struggle (...)
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  45. added 2014-03-31
    Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-Ordination: Recent Lessons From Game Theory. [REVIEW]Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin - 1997 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):171-90.
    The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.
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  46. added 2014-03-30
    Convention as Correlated Equilibrium.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (1):65 - 87.
    Aconvention is a state in which agents coordinate their activity, not as the result of an explicit agreement, but because their expectations are aligned so that each individual believes that all will act so as to achieve coordination for mutual benefit. Since agents are said to follow a convention if they coordinate without explicit agreement, the notion raises fundamental questions: (1) Why do certain conventions remain stable over time?, and (2) How does a convention emerge in the first place? In (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-27
    Ultimatum Decision-Making: A Test of Reciprocal Kindness.David L. Dickinson - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (2):151-177.
    While fairness is often mentioned as a determinant of ultimatum bargaining behavior, few data sets are available that can test theories that incorporate fairness considerations. This paper tests the reciprocal kindness theory in Rabin (1993 Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, The American Economic Review 83: 1281-1302) as an application to the one-period ultimatum bargaining game. We report on data from 100 ultimatum games that vary the financial stakes of the game from 1 to 15. Responder behavior is strongly (...)
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  48. added 2014-03-27
    Evolution of Communication in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds.Patrick Grim - 2000 - World Futures 56 (2):179-197.
    We extend previous work on cooperation to some related questions regarding the evolution of simple forms of communication. The evolution of cooperation within the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has been shown to follow different patterns, with significantly different outcomes, depending on whether the features of the model are classically perfect or stochastically imperfect (Axelrod 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1985; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1990, 1992; Sigmund 1993). Our results here show that the same holds for communication. Within a simple (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-27
    Bi-Directional Optimality Theory: An Application of Game Theory.P. Dekker - 2000 - Journal of Semantics 17 (3):217-242.
    Optimality Theory catches on in linguistics, first in phonology, then in syntax, and recently also at the semantics/pragmatics interface. In this paper we point to some parallels between principles employed in optimality theoretic interpretation, and notions from the wellestablished field of Game Theory. Optimality theoretic interpretation can be defined as what we call an ‘interpretation game’, and optimality itself can be viewed as a solution concept for a game. More in particular, optimality can be characterized in terms of the game-theoretical (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-23
    Coordination in an Email Game Without ``Almost Common Knowledge''.Nicola Dimitri - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (1):1-11.
    The paper presents a variation of the EMAIL Game, originally proposed byRubinstein (American Economic Review, 1989), in which coordination ofthe more rewarding-risky joint course of actions is shown to obtain, evenwhen the relevant game is, at most, ``mutual knowledge.'' In the exampleproposed, a mediator is introduced in such a way that two individualsare symmetrically informed, rather than asymmetrically as in Rubinstein,about the game chosen by nature. As long as the message failure probabilityis sufficiently low, with the upper bound being a (...)
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