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  1. Can Wittgenstein’s Philosophy Account for Uncertainty in Introspection?Pablo Hubacher Haerle - 2021 - Wittgenstein-Studien 12 (1):145-163.
    What happens when we are uncertain about what we want, feel or whish for? How should we understand uncertainty in introspection? This paper reconstructs and critically assess two answers to this question frequently found in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein: indecision and self-deception. Such approaches seek to explain uncertainty in introspection in a way which is completely distinct from uncertainty about the ‘outer world’. I argue that in doing so these readings fail to account for the substantial role the intellect (...)
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  2. Denialism: What Do the so-Called Consciousness Deniers Deny?Orly Shenker - 2020 - Iyyun 68:307-337.
    Some philosophers consider that some of their colleagues deny that consciousness exists. We shall call the latter ‘deniers’, adopting a term that was initially meant pejoratively. What do the deniers deny? In order to answer this question, we shall examine arguments, both of some deniers and of their critics, and present denialism as a systematic highly non-trivial position that has had some interesting achievements. We will show that the denialist project concerns the epistemology of the mind and specifically of consciousness: (...)
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  3. Gödel, Searle, and the Computational Theory of the Mind.Marco Buzzoni - 2018 - In Alessandro Giordani & Ciro De Florio (eds.), From Arithmetic to Metaphysics: A Path Through Philosophical Logic. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 41-60.
    Marco Buzzoni Gödel, Searle, and the Computational Theory of the (Other) Mind According to Sergio Galvan, some of the arguments offered by Lucas and Penrose are somewhat obscure or even logically invalid, but he accepts their fundamental idea that a human mind does not work as a computational machine. His main point is that there is a qualitative difference between the principles of the logic of provability and those of the logic of evidence and belief. To evaluate this suggestion, I (...)
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  4. Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies?Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (8): 389-415.
    This paper explores the idea that many “simple minded” invertebrates are “natural zombies” in that they utilize their senses in intelligent ways, but without phenomenal awareness. The discussion considers how “first-order” representationalist theories of consciousness meet the explanatory challenge posed by blindsight. It would be an advantage of first-order representationalism, over higher-order versions, if it does not rule out consciousness in most non-human animals. However, it is argued that a first-order representationalism which adequately accounts for blindsight also implies that most (...)
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  5. Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.) - 2004 - Peter Lang Verlag.
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  6. Malcolm on Criteria.Charles Sayward - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):349-358.
    Consider the general proposition that normally when people pain-behave they are in pain. Where a traditional philosopher like Mill tries to give an empirical proof of this proposition (the argument from analogy), Malcolm tries to give a transcendental proof. Malcolm’s argument is transcendental in that he tries to show that the very conditions under which we can have a concept provide for the application of the concept and the knowledge that the concept is truly as well as properly applied. The (...)
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  7. “Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence”.Edoardo Zamuner - 2004 - In Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
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  8. Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence.Edoardo Zamuner (ed.) - 2004 - Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the idea (...)
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  9. “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”.Edoardo Zamuner - 2004 - In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag.
    This paper is concerned with the issue of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In the manuscripts published as Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie – Das Innere und das Äußere, the German term Echtheit is mostly translated as ‘genuineness’. In these manuscripts, Wittgenstein frequently uses the term as referring to a feature of the expression of feeling and emotion: -/- […] I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of pain (...)
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  10. Blue Book Ways of Telling: Criteria, Openness and Other Minds.Maximilian De Gaynesford - 2002 - Philosophical Investigations 25 (4):319–330.
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  11. Making Sense of the Other: Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein.William Cornwell - 1998 - Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Conference Proceedings).
    Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem: how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Other's experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Other's feelings and sensations. Carnap's solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate (...)
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  12. The Real Problem of Others: Cavell, Merleau‐Ponty and Wittgenstein on Scepticism About Other Minds.Marie McGinn - 1998 - European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):45-58.
  13. Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
    Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is (...)
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  14. McDowell Against Criterial Knowledge.Paul Robinson - 1991 - Ratio 4 (1):59-75.
  15. Wittgenstein on Criteria and Other Minds.Jack Temkin - 1990 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):561-593.
  16. Criteria and Entailment.Robert L. Arrington - 1979 - Ratio (Misc.) 21 (June):62-72.
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  17. Wittgenstein and Other Minds.J. C. Garvey - 1978 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 26:72-95.
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  18. Criteria, Perception and Other Minds.Harrison Hall - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (June):257-274.
    The paper uses thompson clark's theory of the relation of perceptual parts and wholes to illuminate certain aspects of our knowledge of other minds. The thesis is that the traditional problem can be usefully broken down into two parts--One of which calls for a better understanding of the logic of perceptual concepts; the other, For a closer look at what happens when we try to take the epistemological skeptic seriously.
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  19. Criteria and Other Minds.Alec Hyslop - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):105-14.
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  20. Criteria and Necessity.Richard Rorty - 1973 - Noûs 7 (4):313-327.
  21. Persons, Criteria, and Skepticism.John Turk Saunders - 1973 - Metaphilosophy 4 (April):95-123.
  22. Theories, Analogies, and Criteria.William Hasker - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3):242-256.
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  23. Other Minds on Evidential Necessity.W. D. Glasgow & G. W. Pilkington - 1970 - Mind 79 (315):431-35.
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  24. Evidential Necessity and Other Minds.Anne H. Narveson - 1966 - Mind 75 (January):114-121.
  25. The Philosophical Concept of a Human Body.Douglas C. Long - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (July):321-337.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution. The concept of a "body" which may or may not be the (...)
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  26. Criteria, Analogy, and Knowledge of Other Minds.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (20):533 - 546.
  27. I. Knowledge of Other Minds.Norman Malcolm - 1958 - Journal of Philosophy 55 (23):969.