Critical Theory, Misc

This is a critical examination of Zizek's concept of ideology in his work on the Sublime of Ideology. His account on this connotes that people are basing only in the conscious state without considering the unconscious "I." This framework in psychology has led Zizek to relate it in the process of economics which is greatly manifested in the contradictory poles of the oppressor and the oppressed and its relationship to the process of commodities. Looking into this orientation, this leaves the (...) author to incorporate the ideological character of Zizek through the lens of Anti-Terrorism Law which is not seen in the naked eye. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s psychological theory of the drives calls into question two common assumptions of ideology critique: 1) that ideology is fetishistic, substituting false satisfactions for true ones, and 2) that ideology is falsification; it conceals exploitation. In contrast, a Nietzschean approach begins from the truth of ideology: that capitalism produces an authentic contentment that makes the concealment of exploitation unnecessary. And it critiques ideology from the same standpoint: capitalism produces pleasures too efficiently, an overproduction of desire that is impossible to sustain (...) indefinitely. Nietzsche’s concept of the drives (Trieben) is grounded in his theory of the will to power. In contrast to Freud’s view that drives aim at satiation, pleasure through stimulus reduction, in Nietzsche’s view, they aim primarily at the “feeling of power” and the “happiness of high tension.” Nietzsche sees the desire for satiation as a symptom of weakness, a secondary, contingent aim that is incompatible with the fundamental drive to sustain and heighten the feeling of tension that accompanies strong desire. While the Freudian subject desires satisfaction, the Nietzschean subject is paradoxically frustrated by satisfaction, finding happiness in desire sustained by resistance and tension. If individuals desire desire as such, then exploitation and immiseration are not necessarily incompatible with their happiness. Consequently, we must reject the view that ideology is fetishistic: capitalism does not depend on an ersatz satisfaction in the commodity, a transferal of value from quality to quantity, use value to exchange value. Capitalism authentically satisfies desire precisely through its exploitative economic structure. The independence and unpredictability of the value of commodities and the immiseration of laborers produces discontents that enhance rather than frustrate desire. By continually introducing new, initially inaccessible commodities, then overcoming their inaccessibility through overproduction, capitalism sustains and intensifies desires. It promotes happiness not by satisfying wants but generating them, feeding the desire for desire, for the intensity of feeling that the brief pleasures of satiation would destroy. The commodity is not, then, a fetish, not a false satisfaction or aim, but a means, a prop that supports and sustains satisfaction as continued desire. Consequently, we must also reject the view that ideology is falsification: capitalism’s efficient production of happiness obviates the need to conceal its nature. Individuals tolerate capitalism not out of ignorance of exploitation but indifference to it; they prefer real happiness to a merely possible justice that might come at its expense. The critique of ideology must begin by acknowledging its truth. Rather than deny the real satisfactions of capitalism, it must demonstrate that they are unsustainable. (shrink)

At first blush values such as diversity appear to be worth striving for. The question is whether or not such values—which have become increasingly prevalent the institutional credos of academia—are values as such, that being that they are things of moral worth (Value, n.d.), or if they are something else altogether. My unpopular suspicion leans toward the latter. Personal opinions, of course, can hardly be said to be good justification for a withering critique, however, these opinions of mine mirror similar (...) concerns held by moderate and conservative opinions of the matter (Pew Research Center, 2017). As such it is beneficial to examine these issues rigorously separated from the pathological rhetoric that typically insulates them from outside reproach. Anecdotally speaking, since "diversity" seems to be the chief concern among these groups both in the academic setting and the world at large, the crux of this article will be anchored by a Marx-influenced assessment of the actuality of diversity as a social work in the academic environment, and the effect such projects might have if my suspicions prove to be correct. (shrink)

From the outset, critical social theory has sought to diagnose people’s participation in their own oppression, by revealing the roots of irrational and self-undermining choices in the complex interplay between human nature, social structures, and cultural beliefs. As part of this project, Ideologiekritik has aimed to expose faulty conceptions of this interplay, so that the objectively pathological character of what people are “freely” choosing could come more clearly into view. The challenge, however, has always been to find a way of (...) doing this without arrogantly assuming special access to what is good for people. And this danger of paternalism is one to which social theorists have all too often fallen prey. In this brief essay, I focus on contemporary instances of clearly self-defeating behavior in contexts of complex choices. I begin by discussing a recent attempt to diagnose and solve these failures of choices, namely the public policy recommendations of behavioral economist Richard Thaler and reform-minded legal theorist Cass Sunstein. Their influential “libertarian paternalist” approach is particularly interesting, both in what it includes (attention to the socially constructed nature of choice situations and the roots of the problems in human nature) and in what it leaves out (an understanding of the social construction of human nature and an adequate appreciation of the value of autonomy). After discussing it, I consider a broadly perfectionist alternative, to the effect that the problem lies in a failure to adequately appreciate the importance of developing autonomy. I then turn to sketching the outlines of a new approach, based on the concept of “autonomy gaps,” which approaches overly demanding policies in relational and action-theoretical terms. In the final section, I show how this provides the basis for an analysis both in terms of a critique of ideology and of social pathology. (shrink)

Introduction to and critical examination of Theodor Adorno's essay "Resignation." Deals with the theory/praxis debate, Adorno's confrontation with the radical student movements in the 1960's, and the charge that Adorno was either politically conservative or an ineffective pessimist.

Presentazione del curatore italiano (C.Corradetti): È possibile conciliare il pluralismo culturale con la dimensione pubblica della deliberazione? Partendo dall’analisi critica di Rawls e Habermas, James Bohman offre una risposta innovativa alla questione dell’accordo democratico. In tale proposta, parallelamente al rigetto di soluzioni meramente strategiche, viene riabilitata la nozione di compromesso morale nel quadro di un accordo normativo. Mantenendo fede ad una prospettiva composta da elementi normativi e fattuali, l’autore si propone di ampliare le opportunità democratiche nella riconciliazione tra conflitti culturali (...) profondi propri delle società contemporanee. L’elemento civico partecipativo risulta essere dunque una componente essenziale per la produzione di una sfera pubblica vibrante. Ne emerge una ricostruzione convincente volta non solo a respingere le critiche degli scettici sulle reali possibilità d’inclusività democratica, ma diretta soprattutto a suggerire un più efficace modello deliberativo per la garanzia della stabilità sociale. Questo testo è diventato ormai un riferimento internazionale classico nella discussione sul tema della deliberazione pubblica. L’autore ha inoltre sviluppato in ambito post-nazionale il suo modello deliberativo senza tuttavia ridiscutere i fondamenti concettuali della sua proposta teorica qui enunciati.Vista la rilevanza del tema e considerata la centralità del testo proposto, sembrerebbe dunque auspicabile rendere il testo disponibile anche al lettore italiano. (shrink)

The article focuses on the scholarly career of German sociologist, philosopher, and musicologist Theodor W. Adorno. Examined are his leading publications, his notable teachers and collaborators, and his time in exile in the United States, among other places. Special emphasis is placed on his negative dialectics, including how this perspective formed a method of communication in itself. Adorno's contributions to the Frankfurt School, and to 20th-century Continental philosophy, sociology, and musicology, are also covered.

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article reconstructs and defends Theodor Adorno’s social theory by motivating the central role of abstract domination within it. Whereas critics such as Axel Honneth have charged Adorno with adhering to a reductive model of personal domination, I argue that the latter rather understands domination as a structural and de-individualized feature of capitalist society. If Adorno’s social theory is to be explanatory, however, it must account for the source of the abstractions that dominate (...) modern individuals and, in particular, that of value. While such an account remains undeveloped in Adorno, Marx provides resources for its development, in positing the constitution of value neither in production nor exchange alone, but in the social totality. This article argues that Marx’s account is compatible with Adorno’s, and that it may be used to render Adorno’s theory of domination more credible on explanatory grounds. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to discuss Jürgen Habermas' thoughts of the relationship between right and power. Habermas neither advocates the separation of right and power as liberals, nor advocates the absolute integration of the two as republicans. In his view, the right to be the outcome of citizens’ spontaneous interaction must rely on coercive political power to enter into force. At the same time, political power can only obtain the legitimacy of existence in accordance with the principle of “people’s (...) sovereignty” of the discourse theory, and this legitimacy foundation is precisely reflected in the right system of communication cycle. In short, right and power restrict each other and depend on each other. (shrink)

In this book, the contributors examine how various religious traditions engage with transhumanism and its vision for the future.

Jaakko Nevasto has offered a number of thoughtful criticisms of our attempt to show that Adorno’s work can fruitfully be brought to bear on topics in business ethics. After welcoming his constructive clarifications, we attempt to defuse Nevasto’s main objections and defend our application of Adorno, focusing in particular on the topics of moral epistemology, needs, and the possibility of genuine activity – and thus good work – within capitalist society.

This chapter discusses the controversy over the legacy of Kantian moral philosophy in Dewey’s German Philosophy and Politics. It argues that the polemical reaction to Dewey’s book by Julius Ebbinghaus, reiterated through Axel Honneth and Ebbinghaus’s student Georg Geismann, is based on talking at cross-purposes. While Dewey’s reading of Kant is, indeed, flawed, Ebbinghaus and Geismann misconceive Dewey’s argumentative intent. Nevertheless, the controversy serves to clarify Dewey’s line of argument and to discuss parallels with and differences from the world war (...) genealogy and the Frankfurt School’s theory of immanent critique. Furthermore, the chapter suggests that the role of Hegel’s Emptiness Charge in German Philosophy and Politics should be considered in light of Dewey’s theory of growth. Accordingly, Dewey’s book is not merely a piece of “world war literature”, first, because its line of argument also appears in books by Dewey, which are surely not part of this category, and second, because the Hegelian Emptiness Charge is a variant of what Dewey calls a philosophical fallacy. (shrink)

Analytic metaphysics has become increasingly extended into the social domain. The aim of this article is critical self-reflection on the challenges of transferring the tools of analytic metaphysics from classical cases such as the very existence of abstract or composed objects to socially-contested phenomena such as gender and race. In reflecting on the status of metaphysics of race, I formulate a polemical hypothesis of misalignment according to which the tools of analytic metaphysics are not suitable for engaging with complex racial (...) phenomena and politics. In addressing this challenge of misalignment, the article sketches a perspective on critical metaphysics of race as interdisciplinary action research. (shrink)

Presentation to the translation of Max Horkheimer's "On the Sociology of Class Relations".

Was meinen wir, wenn wir soziale Konstellationen als »möglich« bezeichnen? Diese Frage wurde allzu oft nur randständig beleuchtet, obwohl »Möglichkeit« seit Aristoteles zum grundbegrifflichen Repertoire der praktischen Philosophie zählt. Umso unverständlicher wirkt die Zurückhaltung von Horkheimer und Adorno, den Begriff gesellschaftstheoretisch zu explizieren. Gösta Gantner zeigt, inwiefern die Vorstellungen des »Andersseinkönnens« und der »Potentialität« die Kritische Theorie nahezu unbemerkt dominieren. Als Schlüsselbegriff trägt »Möglichkeit« dazu bei, aktuelle Varianten kritischen Denkens in ihrem leitenden Erkenntnisinteresse und ihrer praktischen Ausrichtung zu schärfen: Im (...) Lichte der Kritik des Gegebenen geht es um das, was anders sein kann. (shrink)

Roberto Frega’s Pragmatism and the Wide View of Democracy reformulates the question of democracy posed by our current historic conjuncture using the resources of a variety of pragmatic thinkers. He brings into the contemporary conversation regarding democracy’s fortunes both classical and somewhat neglected figures in the pragmatic tradition to deal with questions of power, ontology, and politics. In particular, Frega takes a social philosophical starting point and draws out the consequences of this fundamental shift in approach to questions of democratic (...) and political theory. This turn to social philosophy as a theoretically more sufficient conceptual vocabulary, extended in detail by Frega, raises questions regarding the work that a social ontology does in clarifying the role of economic and political approaches to democracy that are worth further exploration. Likewise, the practical proposals for moving beyond methodological nationalism with respect to forming publics for the sake of problem-solving, while providing a clarifying and fresh starting point, are still too beholden to models of agency and expressions of coordinated action that themselves are the very fruit of those systems which undermine democratic power in the first instance. (shrink)

According to a frequent objection coming from the tradition of political realism, deliberative democracy is impotent in the face of actors who, wielding power and money, refuse to engage in deliberation, or seek to distort deliberative processes. With the aim of disproving this objection, in this essay I proceed in three steps: first of all, I show that the realpolitik objection is based on a dyadic, two-person theoretical model of argumentative speech acts. To this model, considered limited and unsatisfactory by (...) many sociolinguists, I counter a more complex and articulated framework. Second, I aim to demonstrate that this latter framework is capable of accounting for a temporally and spatially enlarged democratic deliberation which can be rejected or distorted barely, if at all, by agents relying on positions of power. In the third section, I highlight the many and important differences in grounding, nature and finalities between the model of enlarged democratic deliberation and forms of power politics based on strategic calculations and tactical alliances. Finally, I focus on the application of the model to societies characterized by structural injustices and distortions, with the aim of showing how it can help marginalized and victimized groups have their requests heard and discussed in the public sphere and in deliberative settings. (shrink)

This study theorizes vulnerability as a dual affective relation between subjects and their surroundings. I argue that an account of the affective aspects of vulnerability can respond to two challenges related to theories of vulnerability. The first challenge is to offer a critique of vulnerability as an effect of harmful social formations while not assuming an account of vulnerable subjects as living lessened lives. The second challenge is to provide an improved understanding regarding how vulnerability may operate as an available (...) affective resource for political subjects. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, I assert that vulnerability is a dual affective relation. As an aspect of social precarity, vulnerability is the affective pattern that stems from affective encounters with power formations, which limit and hinder life. However, I assert that vulnerability is also an affective response that marks the micro vital connections of bodies as they allow transformation and creativity to surpass the limits of stable subject positions. This duality of vulnerability yields political significance as an affective navigating tool for political subjects. (shrink)

This review of Bernard Harcourt’s "Critique & Praxis" focuses on the book’s two guiding ideas that (a) critical theory has been on an “epistemological detour” which has separated it from critical praxis, and that (b) the lesson critical theory should learn from its “epistemological detour” is a heightened reflexivity in its action imperative, that Harcourt reformulates as “What more am I to do?” The review suggests that this historical account of critical theory is not quite right and that the reformulated (...) action imperative runs into well-known objections from the feminist debate about representation or the abolishment thereof. (shrink)

Although Amy Allen’s critique of contemporary Frankfurt School critical theory has been widely discussed, her concern for an adequate conceptualization of reason’s intertwinement with power has not received the attention it deserves. The article shows that the diagnosis of a too idealistic account of reason forms the backbone of Allen’s charges against Habermas, Honneth and Forst, before it discusses her criteria for an adequate conceptualization of the intertwinement of reason and power. It demonstrates that Allen’s attempt to formulate such a (...) conceptualization falls short of two of her own criteria, namely the basic commitments of essentially impure reason and radical self-reflexivity. Taking seriously Allen’s proposal for a radical self-reflexive genealogical critique would force her to question the very terms in which she formulates her critique of critical theory, namely the search for “normative foundations,” and the article sketches a way for doing so. (shrink)

False consciousness requires a general explanation for why, and how, oppressed individuals believe propositions against, as opposed to aligned with, their own well-being in virtue of their oppressed status. This involves four explanatory desiderata: belief acquisition, content prevalence, limitation, and systematicity. A social constructionist approach satisfies these by understanding the concept of false consciousness as regulating social research rather than as determining the exact mechanisms for all instances: the concept attunes us to a complex of mechanisms conducing oppressed individuals to (...) mistake social understandings of themselves as natural self-understandings—the limits lie where these overlap (sometimes), or are entirely absent. (shrink)

In this article, I argue for the necessary organicism of immanent critique and the resulting limits and applicability of immanent critique as elaborated in Rahel Jaeggi’s account of Lebensformen. Through a historical review of the problem of natural purposiveness between Kant, Schelling and Hegel, I show that the notion of immanent critique that Hegel produced, and Jaeggi adopts, was an intrinsically organic notion. With this conceptual connection, I demonstrate that Jaeggi’s elaboration of Lebensformen is consistent with this organicism, but also (...) explicate how this property limits critique where the criterion is the long-term stability of Lebensformen. Aligning the organicism of immanent critique with similar projects of social criticism citing the organic, namely eco-Marxism and cybernetics, I show that the cases of capitalism and bureaucracy are not practically vulnerable to immanent critique without supplement. I conclude by suggesting further research requires articulating a hybrid external-immanent form of criticism. (shrink)

In order for the concept, 'recognition', to play a critical role in social theory, it must be possible to draw a distinction between due recognition and failures of recognition. Some recognition theorists, including Axel Honneth, argue that this distinction can be preserved only if we presuppose that due recognition involves a rational response to "evaluative qualities" that can be rightly perceived in the context of social interaction. This paper points out a problem facing recent defenses of this "perception model" and (...) proposes a solution. I begin by making explicit three criteria broadly shared by recognition theorists: an adequate theory of recognition must be (a) critical, capable of drawing a distinction between due recognition and recognitive failure; (b) minimally idealist, able to accommodate the mediating role of subjectivity in human receptivity to value; and (c) historicist, should not rule out a priori that the values involved in recognitive practice are historically emergent. I then argue that Honneth's version of the perception model cannot fulfill these criteria simultaneously. Drawing upon an Aristotelian notion of evaluative perception and working through an example from Zadie Smith's On Beauty, I defend an alternative view that is, I argue, better equipped to meet these three criteria. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

The recent call for a conceptual and intellectual decolonization in the humanities critiques the conventional, all-white, largely male philosophical canon. Its critique is directed at the centering of the experiences of this specific group in global knowledge transmission practices. Its proponents focus on the canon’s implicit claim, namely that only one social group is able to think thoroughly and accurately about all problems of philosophical significance across varying spatiotemporal contexts. In this short article, I will use two different debates to (...) make some aspects of this call more meaningful: the US-American discourse in academic philosophy on deracializing the knowing subject and the post-Holocaust German understanding of public intellectual spaces (sections 2 and 3 respectively). (shrink)

This study presents the Accra Confession as a theological response to the ecological crisis from a Reformed perspective while also addressing its critical weakness, namely the problem of universality in both Reformed ecclesiology and global approaches to ecological destruction. Because of a fragile universality, both Reformed churches and global institutions find it difficult to agree on a concrete plan to address climate change. Theologically, this difficulty arrives not primarily from disagreement with the existence or causes of climate change but how (...) Christian theological values translate concretely to acts of justice. This study proposes a way to ground these discussions on the concept of dangerous memory by resourcing the theology of Johann Baptist Metz. Dangerous memories allow stories of the suffering vanquished to be constitutive to the construction of caritas, which in turn serves as a suitable theological foundation for addressing differing approaches to engaging climate issues. Reading the Accra Confession as dangerous memory, then, provides a valuable resource to the Reformed community by allowing the testimonies of those affected adversely by climate change to substantially inform theological discourses on climate justice. (shrink)

Jacques Rancière presents much of his work as a political intervention, exposing the ways in which so-called critical theory gets “recuperated” in service of oppression and the status quo. But Rancière’s own interventions are ambiguously situated with respect to these same issues. A major source of frustration for Rancière’s readers is locating any kind of positive claim about the role theory could or should play within politics. I argue that, while Rancière’s later work depoliticizes itself, we might look to his (...) earlier work for resources that might a) help us rethink the role of critical theory; and b) take better advantage of Rancière’s later critical work. (shrink)

In this article, I expose the psychologically oriented techniques a core leader of the right extremist Identitarian Movement in the German-speaking context, Martin Sellner, uses to capture new followers. I show that such techniques offer the prospective followers irrational gratifications and release their feelings of failure and frustration of not living up to capitalist and patriarchal values, thereby distracting them from the Identitarian Movement's destructive aims. I also engage with Theodor W. Adorno's psychoanalytically inspired writings on fascist agitators and their (...) followers in my analyses. (shrink)

Rahel Jaeggi è uno dei nomi più noti e discussi nell’ambito dell’at­tuale teoria critica di tradizione francofortese. Merito, in particolare, del suo volume del 2005, Entfremdung [“Alienazione”, tr. it. 2015], ma anche dell’opera Kritik von Lebensformen [2014a], dedicata al tema della critica delle forme di vita. Obiettivo del presente articolo è offrire un quadro generale della teoria critica di Jaeggi, a partire dall’articolo Che cos’è la critica dell’ideologia? [2009a, tr. it. 2016] (1) che, come sosterremo, costituisce una sorta di tratto (...) d’unione tra le riflessioni dell’autrice sull’alienazione, culminate nell’omonimo volume del 2005 (2), e quelle relative alla critica delle forme di vita, intraprese negli anni successivi (3). (shrink)

This dissertation thematizes the reception of Nietzsche's philosophy in Horkheimer's critical theory from the 1930s and 1940s, investigating how it is appropriated for an analysis of the obstacles to social emancipation situated in subjectivity, with reference to the concept of internalization [Verinnerlichung]. In the 1930s, the fixation of the individuals on authority and the manipulation of the masses are investigated through an analysis of the effects of the renunciation and the internalization of instincts, in the context of an anthropology of (...) the bourgeois society. In the 1940s, Horkheimer and Adorno explicit the entailment of enlightened reason on domination, arising from the domination of oneself and of others that permeated the subjective formation since its pre-history, described with the resource to the idea of internalization of sacrifice. This dissertation intends to disclose the role of Nietzsche's philosophy in Horkheimer's thought, arguing, in the first place, that it goes back to the 1930s and it is not a consequence of Adorno's influence in the process of elaboration of the Dialects of Enlightenment, and, secondly, that the contradictions internal to this philosophy and its contradictions with critical theory are productive for Horkheimers philosophy. (shrink)

Reification is a concept of critical theory that denotes certain problematic, habitualised forms of objectification. In this article, I examine whether the concept can be applied in environmental philosophy and what value it has for environmental critical theory. I begin by introducing the concept and the two senses in which reification of the non-human world has been discussed in the literature: first, denoting the misrecognition of others’ attitudes towards the natural world; and second, denoting a misconceived relationship between humans and (...) their environment. After this, I introduce two potentially new subjects of reification: non-human animals and non-human nature. I also discuss two phenomena that could count as reification: industrial meat production and the commodification of ecological systems. (shrink)

Reformed ecclesiology suffers from a lack of a concrete sense of catholicity, a lack that easily shatters unity in the church. This article broadly sketches a way in which Reformed confessions and the practice of confessing can help fill that lack, drawing from Robert Schreiter's The New Catholicity. By understanding confessing in terms of remembering dangerous memories, Reformed catholicity has the potential for enabling the church to be a unifying witness in an age where globalizing forces have fragmented societies and (...) inflamed troubling sentiments. (shrink)

While Jacques Rancière has never been affiliated in any way with the Institute for Social Research, this article examines the extent to which his work could be considered “Critical Theory” in the sense most closely associated with the Frankfurt School tradition. I argue that Rancière’s work is not critical theory in this narrow sense; I further lay out a kind of “Rancièrean” criticism of the very project of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This in turn allows me to sketch out a (...) version of Critical Theory that might survive a Rancièrean critique. Even by this renewed conception, however, I argue that Rancière’s own work still cannot be considered a project of Critical Theory; but I finish the essay by laying out what a possible “Rancièrean” Critical Theory might look like, and why I think such a project would be valuable. (shrink)

This chapter shows that taboos erected around crimes inhibit individuals and nations' work of mourning for the victims of crimes. The work of mourning is the precondition that individuals and nations take responsibility for past crimes, show solidarity with the victims and their descendants, and make sure that such crimes are not repeated. I bring Theodor W. Adorno and Sigmund Freud in conversation to explain the connection between taboos and the failure to mourn. I further detail this connection with Antigone (...) as an example of taboo and denied mourning. I also explain that the taboos erected around the National Socialist genocide on Roma and Sinti ("gypsies") do not allow Austrians to mourn the loss of this population. As a result, their taking responsibility for this crime remains stifled, and they fail to show solidarity with the Roma and Sinti genocide victims. (shrink)

Augustine posed two questions that go to the heart of the nature of law. Firstly, what is the difference between a kingdom and a band of robbers? Secondly, is an unjust law a law at all? These two questions force us to consider whether law is simply a means of social control, distinguished from a band of robbers only by its size, or whether law is a social institution justified by its orientation towards justice. The End of Law applies Augustine’s (...) questions to modern legal philosophy as well as offering a critical theory of natural law that draws on Augustine’s ideas. McIlroy argues that such a critical natural law theory is realistic but not cynical about law’s relationship to justice and to violence, can diagnose ways in which law becomes deformed and pathological, and indicates that law is a necessary but insufficient instrument for the pursuit of justice. Positioning an examination of Augustine’s reflections on law in the context of his broader thought, McIlroy presents an alternative approach to natural law theory, drawing from critical theory, postmodern thought, and political theologies in conversation with Augustine. (shrink)

*the article is in Italian* This article focuses on Axel Honneth's latest book, Recognition: A European History of Ideas. I summarize Honneth's reconstruction of the three models of recognition that he associates respectively with the French, the British and the German theoretical tradition, and his attempt at integrating the German model with the other two. In retracing Honneth's itinerary through the development of the idea of recognition , I also present some objections: these concern Honneth's neglect, in Recognition, of the (...) philosophy of the first French and British socialists, as well as the fact that the one expounded in Recognition is only a philosophical, intellectual history of this idea, and not also, as in my opinion would have been advisable, a social history of recognition (with reference to authors such as E.P. Thompson, Barrington Moore, George Rudé). These omissions are even more paradoxical considering that Honneth's previous book, The Idea of Socialism, extensively focused on the ideas of the first French socialists, while his reflections on recognition dating from the '80 and the '90 owe much to social history. (shrink)

Capitalism, uscito lo scorso anno negli Stati Uniti, è un corposo saggio in forma di dialogo scritto da due delle maggiori rappresentanti dell’attuale teoria critica: Nancy Fraser e Rahel Jaeggi. Nel volume le due autrici si propongono di tracciare «una teoria critica della società capitalistica» capace di connettere in una cornice unitaria le diverse crisi che pervadono le società contemporanee: crisi ambientale, economica, del la riproduzione sociale e della democrazia. A guidare l’opera vi è l’intuizione, comune sia a Fraser che (...) a Jaeggi, che tali crisi possano, nell’insieme, «essere lette precisamente come una crisi della società capitalistica, o, piuttosto, come una crisi della specifica forma di capitalismo in cui oggi viviamo». (shrink)

This essay examines the cultural phenomena of noise in its perceived social constructions and demonstrates its emergence as a form of resistance against prevailing dominant hegemonic codes of culture. In particular, the paper explores the ability of noise to be enacted as a tool to escape the shackles of heteronormative constructions of sexuality and gender in the cultural landscape of the United States. Examined to support this argument are the contrasting works of two American artists: John Cage and Emilie Autumn. (...) Through Cage and his avant-garde articulations of sound, covert acts of resistance against the dominant heteronormative constructions of masculinity are explored, and through Autumn’s classical crossover work, a more overt and explicit form of resistance to subvert gender stereotypes and structures of normality and patriarchy are illuminated. Additionally, the paper explores possibilities for artists to engage with other movements, such as disability activism to create new possibilities for change. -/- . (shrink)

This paper examines the justice of unconditional basic income (UBI) through the lens of the Hegel-inspired recognition-theory of justice. As explained in the first part of the paper, this theory takes everyday social roles to be the primary subject-matter of the theory of justice, and it takes justice in these roles to be a matter of the kind of freedom that is available through their performance, namely ‘social’ freedom. The paper then identifies the key criteria of social freedom. The extent (...) to which the introduction of an UBI would meet these criteria is then examined, with a focus on the social role that stands to be most affected by an UBI, namely that of the worker-earner. It is argued that while an UBI is likely to be only partially effective as an instrument of specifically social freedom, its main justification lies not here, but in securing a basis for the subjective freedom that social freedom presupposes. (shrink)

In Capitalism, Alienation and Critique Asger Sørensen offers a wide-ranging argument for the classical Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, thus endorsing the dialectical approach of the original founders (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse) and criticizing suggested revisions of later generations (Habermas, Honneth). Being situated within the horizon of the late 20th century Cultural Marxism, the main issue is the critique of capitalism, emphasizing experiences of injustice, ideology and alienation, and in particular exploring two fundamental subject matters within this horizon, namely economy (...) and dialectics. Apart from in-depth discussions of classical political economy and Hegelian dialectics, the explorative and inclusive argument also takes issues with Émile Durkheim’s theory of value, the general economy of Georges Bataille and the dialectics of Mao Zedong. -/- - See below External Links to the book's homepage at the publisher Brill and to the Introduction. - See also External Links to a Youtubevideo from a seminar on the book in Belgrade, November 2019 and two Author Meet Critics sections from 2020 and 2021. (shrink)

n this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that her framework is a two-sided one, since it involves an understanding of forms of life both as inert bundles of practices and as having a normative structure. Here I argue that this approach is based on an a priori argument which assumes normativity as the condition of intelligibility of social criticism. I show that the intimate tension between these two sides is reflected in the (...) socio-ontological model of the constitution of social phenomena, which on the one side is understood in terms of habituation and materialization, and on the other side in terms of constitution through norms. The second side in the end prevails and leads to some sort of normative essentialism which involves a prescriptive meta-theoretical understanding of normativity combined with a socio-ontological model of constitutive rules. I then analyse two arguments that Jaeggi offers in support of her assumption that normative constitution is the deep structure of social practices. I name these the functional- teleological argument, and the crisis developmental argument, and argue that neither succeeds in proving that practices are not normatively underdetermined. (shrink)

A new book by Leonardo Caffo, Fragile Umanità, is reviewed. Fragile Umanità serves as a primer intended to introduce both professionals and non-professionsals to the concepts of contemporary posthumanism and the failures of humanist philosophies. The book's core methodology is to outline the differences between humanist and posthumanist philosophies and show how the latter is less contentious and favourable. The book is stylistically engaging, lucid and academically current, providing both novice readers and seasoned scholars with an easy-to-read introduction to posthumanist (...) theory for Italian scholars. (shrink)

When talking about how cinema is affected by late-stage capitalism we have to look at the overall meaning of the film. But on occasion, these films incorporate stylistic but also temporal context. In this paper, I will use a traditional and contemporary phenomenological approach not just on the temporality aspect but the over the condition of cinema in late-stage capitalism. I will use Children Of Men to open up the ideas of how time within itself such as Heideggerian terms. Such (...) as the single shot sequences can not only reveal to us how time can be disjointed from the comprehensive understanding of personal time. Also the use of narrative as a vehicle for disclosing and the emergence of the true nature of the world and the state that it is in. Not just Being-in-the-world but the actualization of how late-stage capitalism brings about this disconnection with time and ontological narrative. Within this tension I will unpack it so we can see how time is both suffering from reification in the terms that Georg Lukács establishes and how being present-at-hand create a natural tension were capitalism exploits our own disjointed time but film is able to capture it in a manner that is not only presentable but it relates even though all experiences are unique in this fragmented reality. (shrink)

Starting with the observation that transparency has become a concept so familiar that one hardly ever stops to consider the presuppositions and consequences of its usage, the chapter analyses transparency demands as a specific way of exercising power. By doing so, the author shows that the intrinsic logic of transparency leads to paradoxical effects. Any attempts to realize complete transparency undermine its own preconditions. As Vogelmann argues, instead of providing more visibility and clarity, transparency makes its objects “invisible” and the (...) intensification of transparency demands produces self-censorship. The chapter concludes that transparency claims undermine the distinction between the private and the public and threaten the individual autonomy. (shrink)

Although seldom examined and not explained by Robert Brandom himself, the concept of responsibility is as important as the concept of inference for Brandom’s account of discursivity. Whereas ‘inference’ makes explicit the propositional content of concepts as the inferentially structured totality of their relations of material incompatibility, ‘responsibility’ makes explicit the normative force of these relations. ‘Responsibility’ thus becomes the paradigm of understanding normativity’s binding force – and my critical reading demonstrates that it fosters a moralizing, juridifying and economizing understanding (...) of normativity’s binding force. Furthermore, a diagnostic interpretation of Nietzsche’s genealogy of ‘responsibility’ reveals that Brandom’s concept of ‘responsibility’ is not an exception but exemplary for how ‘responsibility’ is used in philosophy. (shrink)

Over three decades, Axel Honneth has developed one of the most fully-structured recognition paradigms in the field of social philosophy. Although it has undergone considerable theoretical changes, this paradigm retains a strong unity. I will analyze it in light of the Frankfurt school critical social theory research program. By so doing, I aim, first, to outline a defense of Honneth’s theory against growing criticisms, which tend to see depletion of its critical insights in his most recent works. Secondly, I aim (...) to highlight that most of the weaknesses pointed out by his critics derive from the methodology with which Honneth frames the concept of recognition, and which he explicitly related to the Frankfurt school critical social theory. Thirdly, I argue that, insofar as we are at present witnessing a transformation in the nature of current struggles for recognition, it is precisely one of the premises of this methodology that runs the risk of being undermined (i.e. the classical relation between theory and “praxis”). (shrink)