Critical Thinking

As we have seen in the transition form Part I to Part II of this book, the inductive riskiness of doxastic methods applied in testimonial uptake or prescribed as exemplary of religious faith, helpfully operationalizes the broader social scientific, philosophical, moral, and theological interest that people may have with problems of religious luck. Accordingly, we will now speak less about luck, but more about the manner in which highly risky cognitive strategies are correlated with psychological studies of bias studies and (...) human cognitive ecology. Chapter Four is concerned with connections between psychological study of biases and heuristics, and the comparative study of fundamentalism. The first section looks at work by psychologists and philosophers on our bias blind spot. Later sections ask, ‘In what ways might biases and heuristics play a special role in aiding our understanding of, and response to, fundamentalist orientation?’. The judgments we make in ignorance of our own biases Montaigne calls our importunate presumptions, and he suggests a host of practical factors that make them appealing. Montaigne, as I discuss in the first section, associates many of our errors with one or another kind of presumption, often about our similarity or differences from others, or from God. Our obvious psychographic diversity, and the polemical ground dynamics involved in our ‘culture wars’ are compounded on the agential side by the invisibility of our biases to ourselves. A number of person and social biases are described that plausibly affect all of our beliefs in domains of controversial views, religious views included. The second section continues to study of how etiological symmetry (similar patterns of belief-uptake) gives rise to religious contrariety (diverse narratives and theologies) in testimonial faith traditions, and what the implications of this are for philosophy of religion, generally, and for an improved comparative study of fundamentalism, in particular. Utilizing the work of philosophers such as Rachel Fraser and psychologists such as Emily Pronin and her co-authors, I offer a four-step genealogical account for how etiological symmetry so easily gives rise to religious contrariety. This account begins with the narrative nature of testimony in the Abrahamic family of religions, and how narrative content confounds our “source monitoring.” My genealogy also introduces what I term biased-closure inferences (BCI) as one of the key enablers of religious exclusivism and absolutism. These are the seemingly ‘logical’ but actually very self-serving inferences people often make, inferences from their own belief being true, to any belief contrary to it being false. Those who claim unique truth, epistemic access, and/or virtue and religious value for the home religion are no exception to the broad pertinence of bias studies across domains of controversial view. The proximate causes of belief are all that we can study, and in these there may be significant etiological symmetries. Yet those groups themselves, especially to the extent that they are exclusivist, are tunnel-visioned on claims of doctrinal uniqueness: on content differences of a theological sort. Comparative philosophy is met with the puzzlement that symmetric or essentially similar doxastic strategies should give rise not just to cognitive diversity, but to what we can call polarized or polemical contrariety, contrariety of a kind where each view adamantly rejects all others. Arguably, the more that theologies offer explanations of a counter-inductive sort, or profess counter-inductive thinking as exemplary of faith, the better evidential ground there for inferring that bias involved in the acquisition or maintenance of beliefs. This provides more substance to the question of when censure, and etiological challenges to faith-based beliefs are philosophically well-motivated. (shrink)

The topic of fake news has received increased attention from philosophers since the term became a favorite of politicians (Habgood-Coote 2016; Dentith 2016). Notably missing from the conversation, however, is a discussion of fake news and conspiracy theory media as a market. This paper will take as its starting point the account of noxious markets put forward by Debra Satz (2010), and will argue that there is a pro tanto moral reason to restrict the market for fake news. Specifically, we (...) begin with Satz’s argument that restricting a market may be required when i) that market inhibits citizens from being able to stand in an equal relationship with one another, and ii) this problem cannot be solved without such direct restrictions. Our own argument then proceeds in three parts: first, we argue that the market for fake news fits Satz’s description of a noxious market; second, we argue against explanations of the proliferation of fake news that are couched in terms of “epistemic vice”, and likewise argue against prescribing critical thinking education as a solution to the problem; finally, we conclude that, in the absence of other solutions to mitigate the noxious effects of the fake news market, we have a pro tanto moral reason to impose restrictions on this market. At the end of the paper, we consider one proposal to regulate the fake news market, which involves making social media outlets potentially liable in civil court for damages caused by the fake news hosted on their websites. (shrink)

Argument mapping is a way of diagramming the logical structure of an argument to explicitly and concisely represent reasoning. The use of argument mapping in critical thinking instruction has increased dramatically in recent decades. This paper overviews the innovation and provides a procedural approach for new teaches wanting to use argument mapping in the classroom. A brief history of argument mapping is provided at the end of this paper.

We are often urged to figure things out for ourselves rather than to rely on other people’s say-so, and thus be ‘epistemically autonomous’ in one sense of the term. But why? For almost any important question, there will be someone around you who is at least as well placed to answer it correctly. So why bother making up your own mind at all? I consider, and then reject, two ‘egoistic’ answers to this question according to which thinking for oneself is (...) beneficial for the autonomous agent herself. I go on to suggest that the reason we should (sometimes) think for ourselves is that doing so (sometimes) increases the collective reliability of the epistemic community to which we belong. In many cases, this will do nothing at all to increase our own chances of forming correct beliefs. So, at least in this respect, the rationale for being epistemically autonomous is entirely ‘altruistic’. (shrink)

We examine a contribution L. Susan Stebbing made to the understanding of critical thinking and its relation to formal logic. Stebbing took expertise in formal logic to authorise logical intervention in public debate, specifically in assessing of the validity of everyday reasoning. She held, however, that formal logic is purely the study of logical form. Given the problems of ascertaining logical form in any particular instance, and that logical form does not always track informal validity, it is difficult to see (...) how she could justify her belief in logical interventionism. Her answer to this problem is the contribution we explore here. It involves the view that although the logician’s expertise is not sufficient to assess arguments made in everyday contexts on its own, it nevertheless plays a unique role in giving systematicity and direction to the critique of such arguments, in particular, in public debate. (shrink)

El relativismo moral es una tesis convincente para muchas personas. En este ensayo presentaremos la argumentación general del relativismo moral y, después, mostraremos que esta argumentación es inválida. Luego, defenderemos la idea de que los conflictos morales surgen por discrepancias entre creencias fácticas y no por una disensión entre creencias morales, pues es necesario que existan un conjunto de normas morales universales. Finalmente, defenderemos una propuesta de objetivismo ético que se fundamenta en la ética naturalizada.

Yaşadığımız çağ bize emsalsiz miktarda bilgi, bir o kadar da karmaşa getiriyor. Düşüncelerimizi sağlıklı biçimde kurmak, safsatalara düşmekten kaçınmak hiç olmadığı kadar zor. Eleştirel düşünce başlı başına bir disipline dönüşmüş durumda. Yasin Ramazan, tüm bu keşmekeş içinde yolunu kaybetmeden tutarlı düşünceler üretmeye çalışan okura rehberlik etmeyi hedefliyor. Düşünmenin Alfabesi nasıl mantıklı düşüneceğinizi öğretmeyi hedeflese de bir mantık kitabı değil. Teorikten ziyade pratik, anlayarak yola koyulmayı teşvik eden bir metin. Sadece başkalarının düşüncelerini kritik etmeyi değil, kendi öğrenme ve düşünme serüvenimizi de (...) takip etmeyi ve gerekli iyileştirmeleri yaparak zenginleştirmeyi salık veriyor. Tutarlı düşüncelerin yanı sıra sağlam inançlar elde etmemizin de yolu yine eleştirel düşünceden geçiyor. -/- “Bu kitap, size eleştirel düşünmeyi sevdirmeyi hedeflemiyor. Zaten, kitabı elinize alıp karıştırdığınıza veya internet kitapçısında sepete eklediğinize göre sistematik ve disiplinli düşünme eksikliğini hissediyor veya bildiğiniz halde bu alandaki gelişmeleri merak ediyorsunuz demektir. Buradaki amacımız, günlük hayatta alışkanlıkla yaptığımız ve zaman zaman başarılı olduğumuz düşünme faaliyetini, profesyonel veya akademik hayata nasıl taşıyabileceğimizi görmekten ibaret. Bu kitabı bir rehberden çok bir tecrübe aktarımı gibi düşünürseniz, kendi düşünme serüveninizde size eşlik etmesine izin verebilirsiniz.”. (shrink)

Built in the centre of Copenhagen, and noted for its equestrian stairway, the Rundetaarn (Round Tower), was intended as an astronomical observatory. Part of a complex of buildings that once included a university library, it affords expansive views of the city in every direction, towering above what surrounds it. The metaphor of the towering figure, who sees what others might not, whose vantage point allows him to visualize how things fit together, and who has an earned-stature of respect and authority, (...) fits another Danish stalwart, Hans Vilhelm Hansen, whose contributions to the fields of informal logic and argument theory have earned the gratitude of his colleagues, and inspired this collection of essays, written to express the appreciation of its authors and of the many, many colleagues they represent. (shrink)

In the scientific communities most criticisms are constructive, while they are destructive in the humanistic circles. Indeed, scientists circulate their drafts among colleagues and students, hoping to elicit their comments and suggestions before submitting their work to publication. In contrast, philosophers and political thinkers attack their rivals, without sparing arguments ad hominem or even insults. The reason for this difference is that scientists are after the truth, whereas most humanists fight for more or less noble causes, from swelling their own (...) curricula to joining crusades for or against rationality, realism, justice, or what have you. (shrink)

Chez les scientifiques, la plupart des critiques sont constructives, alors qu’elles sont destructrices chez les humanistes. En effet, les scientifiques font circuler leurs brouillons entre collègues et étudiants, dans l’espoir de recueillir leurs commentaires et suggestions avant de soumettre leurs travaux à la publication. En revanche, les philosophes et les penseurs politiques attaquent leurs rivaux à coup d’arguments ad hominem et d’insultes. La raison de cette différence est que les scientifiques recherchent la vérité, alors que la plupart des humanistes se (...) battent pour des causes plus ou moins nobles, allant de la promotion de leur propre programme à la participation à des croisades pour ou contre la rationalité, le réalisme, la justice ou autre. (shrink)

Jeśli można mówić o modzie w badaniach naukowych, to semantyka jest od prawie wieku niewątpliwie jedną z bardziej modnych dziedzin w nauce. Badają ją nie tylko logicy i filozofowie języka, lecz także kulturoznawcy, antropologowie, filologowie, kognitywiści czy informatycy. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu zbadanie roli, jaką odgrywa semantyka w teorii argumentacji, a dokładniej — zarysowanie pewnego modelu argumentacji, który modyfikuje znaczenia terminów dla celów argumentacyjnych. Najpierw przedstawię kilka przykładowych argumentów semantycznych, analizując każdy z nich na tyle, aby wydobyć pewne subtelności (...) potrzebne do zbudowania modelu argumentu semantycznego. W ten sposób pokażę, jak nomen omen znaczący wpływ na argumentację ma znaczenie słów, a także na ile sposobów może ono wpływać na przebieg argumentacji. Na samym końcu zarysuję definicję argumentu semantycznego, która może wytyczyć kierunek dalszych badań nad semantyką w teorii argumentacji. (shrink)

Critical thinking deserves both imaginative teaching and serious theoretical attention. Studies in Critical Thinking assembles an all-star cast to serve both.

Reasons.js is an open-source, loosely-coupled, web-based argument mapping library that can be integrated into a range of online coursewares and websites. The javascript library can be embedded into any HTML page and allows users to create, edit, share, and export argument maps . The API is designed to permit the integration of the three stages of informal logical analysis — identification of truth claims within arguments, the analysis of logical structure, and synthesis of logical structure into written form.

Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011) – is that it must provide regulative normative guidance for good thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists (most notably Baehr, 2013) have held that virtue epistemology not only can provide regulative normative guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the primary epistemic aim of all education as (...) the inculcation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr’s picture contrasts with another well-known position – that the primary aim of education is the promotion of critical thinking (Scheffler 1989; Siegel 1988; 1997; 2017). In this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both philosophy of education and epistemology and, a fortiori, epistemology of education – we challenge this picture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of education must meet and hold that it is the aim of critical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellectual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis, we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epistemology, next to the well-known empirically-driven ‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues approach does not have available a suitably effective pedagogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue as the primary aim of education. This is because the pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach (borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, without much further development in virtue-based theory, logic and critical thinking must still play the primary role in the epistemology of education. (shrink)

This book is the result of rethinking the standard playbook for critical thinking courses, to include only the most useful skills from the toolkits of philosophy, cognitive psychology, and behavioral economics. -/- The text focuses on: -/- - a mindset that avoids systematic error, more than the ability to persuade others - the logic of probability and decisions, more than than the logic of deductive arguments - a unified treatment of evidence, covering statistical, causal, and best-explanation inferences -/- The unified (...) account of evidence I offer is a broadly Bayesian one, but there aren’t any daunting theorems. (Without knowing it, students are taught to use a gentle form of the Bayes factor to measure the strength of evidence and to update.) It’s also shown how this framework illuminates aspects of the scientific method, such as the proper design of experiments. -/- The link above allows Anonymous Guest Access without an account. (shrink)

This article proposes a phenomenological interpretation of nostalgia for communism, a collective feeling expressed typically in most Eastern European countries after the official fall of the communist regimes. While nostalgia for communism may seem like a paradoxical feeling, a sort of Stockholm syndrome at a collective level, this article proposes a different angle of interpretation: nostalgia for communism has nothing to do with communism as such, it is not essentially a political statement, nor the signal of a deep value tension (...) between governance and the people. Rather, I propose to understand this collective feeling as the symptom of a deeper need at a national level for solidarity and ultimately about recapturing a common feeling of identity in solidarity. This hypothesis would be in line with a phenomenological approach to memory as a process of establishing shared codes by rewriting the past in such a way as to strengthen social bonds and make possible a reimagining of a common future. Nostalgia for communism does not need to be ultimately an uncritical stance as it has been depicted, instead one could interpret it as a form of critical reflexion about our current forms of life. Instead of seeing communism nostalgia as a specific form of being stuck in the past, one could explore its potential for pointing at the things that are still not working in the current neo-liberal regime. (shrink)

Публикация (#5) из научно-популярного цикла: "Структурная онтология познания с доктором Шимко".

Materialismo, reducionismo, behaviorismo, funcionalismo, teoria dos sistemas dinâmicos e computacionalismo são visões populares, mas eles foram mostrados por Wittgenstein para ser incoerente. O estudo do comportamento abrange toda a vida humana, mas o comportamento é em grande parte automático e inconsciente e até mesmo a parte consciente, principalmente expressa em linguagem (que Wittgenstein equivale com a mente), não é perspicaz, por isso é fundamental ter um quadro que Searle chama a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR) e eu chamo a psicologia (...) descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT). Depois de resumir a estrutura trabalhada por Wittgenstein e Searle, como estendido pela pesquisa de raciocínio moderno, eu mostro as inadequações nas visões de Carruther, que permeavam a maioria das discussões de comportamento, incluindo a conduta comportamental contemporânea Ciências. Eu mantenho que seu livro é um amálgama de dois livros, um um sumário da psicologia cognitiva e o outro um sumário das confusões filosóficas padrão na mente com algum jargão novo adicionado. Eu sugiro que este último deve ser considerado como incoerente ou como uma visão dos desenhos animados da vida e que tomar Wittgenstein em sua palavra, podemos praticar a autoterapia bem sucedida, em relação à questão da mente/corpo como uma questão de linguagem/corpo. -/- Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia- Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

The literature on critical thinking (CT) in counselling and therapy generally posits higher quality outcomes when CT is applied in therapeutic treatment. We critically examine support for the claim that CT improves clinical outcomes. The purported effects of CT are first identified by arguments in favour of using CT in therapeutic treatment, both in terms of its general efficacy and with regard to its applicability in professional counselling. We then underscore limitations in the current literature, highlighting mainly a gap between (...) theory and practice. Overall, our results suggest that available evidence provides primarily inferential, rather than direct, support for the claim that CT positively influences therapy outcomes. We close the paper by proposing research questions to guide further empirical investigation. (shrink)

This volume reflects the development and theoretical foundation of a new paradigm for critical thinking based on inquiry. The field of critical thinking, as manifested in the Informal Logic movement, developed primarily as a response to the inadequacies of formalism to represent actual argumentative practice and to provide useful argumentative skills to students. Because of this, the primary focus of the field has been on informal arguments rather than formal reasoning. Yet the formalist history of the field is still evident (...) in its emphasis, with respect to both theory and pedagogy, on the structure and evaluation of individual, de-contextualized arguments. It is our view that such a view of critical thinking is excessively narrow and limited, failing to provide an understanding of argumentation as largely a matter of comparative evaluation of a variety of contending positions and arguments with the goal of reaching a reasoned judgment on an issue. As a consequence, traditional critical thinking instruction is problematic in failing to provide the reasoning skills that students need in order to accomplish this goal. Instead, the goal of critical thinking instruction has been seen largely as a defensive one: of learning to not fall prey to invalid, inadequate, or fallacious arguments. (shrink)

This textbook is not a textbook in the traditional sense. Here, what we have attempted is compile a set of assignments and exercise that may be used in critical thinking courses. To that end, we have tried to make these assignments as diverse as possible while leaving flexibility in their application within the classroom. Of course these assignments and exercises could certainly be used in other classes as well. Our view is that critical thinking courses work best when they are (...) presented as skills based learning opportunities. We hope that these assignments speak to that desire and can foster the kinds of critical thinking skills that are both engaging and fun Please feel free to contact us with comments and suggestions. We will strive to correct errors when pointed out, add necessary material, and make other additional and needed changes as they arise. Please check back for the most up to date version. Rebeka Ferreira and Anthony Ferrucci. (shrink)

How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our (...) rational agency—our ability to conform our attitudes to our reasons, and to commit ourselves to those attitudes through avowals. This paper has two goals. The first is exegetical: to identify agentialism's defining thesis and precisely formulate the agentialist challenge to empiricism. The second goal is to defend empiricism from the agentialist challenge. I propose a way to understand the role of agency in reasoning and avowals, one that does justice to what is distinctive about these phenomena yet is compatible with empiricism about self-knowledge. (shrink)

We are pleased to publish this WSIA edition of Trudy’s Govier’s seminal volume, Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Originally published in 1987 by Foris Publications, this was a pioneering work that played a major role in establishing argumentation theory as a discipline. Today, it is as relevant to the field as when it first appeared, with discussions of questions and issues that remain central to the study of argument. It has defined the main approaches to many of those issues (...) and guided the ways in which we might respond to them. From this foundation, it sets the stage for further investigations and emerging research. This is a second edition of the book that is corrected and updated by the author, with new prefaces to each chapter. (shrink)

This article brings forth a new perspective concerning the relation between stupidity and thinking by proposing to conceptualise the state of non-thinking in two different ways, situated at the opposite ends of the spectrum of thinking. Two conceptualisations of stupidity are discussed, one critical which follows a French line of continental thinkers, and the other one which will be called educational or ascetic, following the work of Agamben. The critical approach is conceptualised in terms of seriality of thinking, or thinking (...) captured by an apparatus, whereas the ascetic-educational approach is discussed by tracing the links between studying and stupidity. Both accounts assume that stupidity as non-thinking is a condition for thinking, either placed before thinking emerges or as an after-thought. However, the political implications concerning the role of philosophy in the public realm are divergent: for the critical approach, the task of the philosopher is to criticise the world, whereas for the ascetic approach, the task is to work on one’s own self and hope that the world will be changed through thinking. The wider aim of this article is to contribute to the debate concerning the public role of the intellectual starting from the assumption that there is a duty to think publicly and then clarifying what this duty entails in relation to the self and the others. (shrink)

Публикация (#1) из научно-популярного цикла: "Структурная онтология познания с доктором Шимко".

Публикация (#2) из научно-популярного цикла: "Структурная онтология познания с доктором Шимко".

This tribute to the breadth and influence of Trudy Govier’s philosophical work begins with her early scholarship in argumentation theory, paying special attention to its pedagogical expression. Most people first encounter Trudy Govier’s work and many people only encounter it through her textbooks, especially A Practical Study of Argument, published in many editions. In addition to the work on argumentation that has continued throughout her career, much of Govier’s later work addresses social philosophy and the problems of trust and response (...) to moral wrongs. The introduction by Catherine Hundleby situates Govier’s research along the path of her unusual academic life. While following the timeline of Govier’s research publication, in this collection the authors build on her work and suggest certain new connections between her argumentation theory and social philosophy. A Practical Study of Argument, first published in 1985, situates Govier among a distinct segment of informal logicians whose concerns about teaching reasoning to post-secondary students orient their research, Takuzo Konishi argues. Moira Kloster evaluates Govier’s progress in the challenge of providing critical thinking education to diverse and changing social contexts. Shifting gears to social philosophy but still addressing education, Laura Elizabeth Pinto explores the significance of Govier’s work on trust for explaining the problem of “audit culture” for teaching. At the centre of this volume, social philosophy receives an abstract meta-ethical defense from Linda Radzik. Moving solidly into the domain of normative social philosophy, Alice MacLachlan reconsiders Govier’s condemnation of revenge by viewing it as a form of moral address, but she notes how revenge as an act of communication contrasts with argumentation in lacking the respect that Govier maintains is intrinsic to argumentation. MacLachlan ultimately agrees that revenge is morally indefensible. The practical challenges of addressing others in the aftermath of wrongdoing, especially in public contexts, can make it difficult to distinguish between victims and combatants or wrongdoers, Alistair Little and Wilhelm Verwoerd explain, and Kathryn Norlock argues that forgiveness is psychologically vexed too. People may recognize transformation to be in principle possible for all people, Norlock argues, and yet we may find the evidence regarding some particular evildoer sufficient to count that person as an exception. Finally Govier responds to the various papers. (shrink)

يتمحور البحث حول نقد صادق جلال العظم للتابوهات، عمومًا، وللتابو الجنسي، خصوصًا، وينطلق البحث من التشديد على أهمية النقد في فكر العظم، على مستويي؛ التنظير له، وممارسته في معظم أو جل أعماله، ليحاول، بعد ذلك، إبراز تلك الممارسة النقدية في ميدان التابوهات عمومًا، وتابو الجنس خصوصًا، وانطلاقًا من ذلك؛ تتمثل الأسئلة الأساسية التي يحاول البحث الإجابة عنها، في الآتي: ما أهمية النقد عمومًا، ونقد التابوهات خصوصًا، في فكر العظم؟ ما العلاقة بين النقد والتحريم، من منظور العظم؟ وإلى أي حدٍّ، وبأي (...) معنىً سعى العظم إلى تجاوز (الخطوط الحمر) في نقده لثالوث التابوهات (الجنس والدين والسياسة)؟ ما الذي ينقده العظم، تحديدًا، في ميدان التابو الجنسي؟ وما هي الإشكاليات الأساسية التي يتضمنها ويثيرها هذا النقد؟ للإجابة عن هذه الأسئلة؛ ستتجسد مقاربتنا المنهجية لنصوص العظم، في ما يمكن تسميته ﺒـ "الهيرمينوطيقا النقدية"؛ فهي هيرمينوطيقا، أو تتّصف بالسمة الهيرمينوطيقية، ليس بسبب بعدها التأويلي الصريح، أو اعتمادها على التأويل فحسب، (فبهذا المعنى، كل مقاربةٍ أو دراسةٍ هي هيرمينوطيقيةٌ، لأنها تأويليةٌ بالضرورة)؛ وإنما بسبب افتراضها، أيضًا، أن هذه النصوص تتضمن دلالاتٍ متكاملةً، تجسِّد كليةً متسقةً أو متناسقة العناصر، يمكن الإمساك بها، انطلاقًا من "المقاصد المعلنة" للكاتب، وعلى هذا الأساس، سنحاول، في عرضنا ومناقشتنا لنقد التابو (الجنسي) عند العظم، أن نستند، بالدرجة الأولى، إلى تنظير العظم نفسه حول هذه المسألة؛ أي إلى أقواله المحدَّدة وآرائه الصريحة في هذا الخصوص، قبل أن نضع هذه الرؤية النظرية في مواجهةٍ ثنائيةٍ: مع ذاتها من جهةٍ، (ضمن إطار ما يمكن تسميته بالنقد المحايث)، ومع انتقادات بعض المفكرين الذين دخلوا في حوارٍ أو سجالٍ معه، ومع رؤيتنا للواقع أو الفكر الذي يحاول العظم دراسته، (في إطار ما يمكن تسميته بالنقد الخارجي)، من جهةٍ أخرى. وهذه المواجهة النقدية المزدوجة مع ما هو محايث لفكر العظم، ومفارقٌ له، هي التي تمثِّل أساس البعد النقديِّ في دراستنا لهذا الفكر. (shrink)

على الرغم من المحاولات الحثيثة أو المستمرة، في الفكر الغربي، كما في الفكر العربي، للتمييز بين النقد والانتقاد، ولتأكيد إيجابية النقد، لا سلبيته، ما زال الخلط أو اللبس بين النقد والانتقاد قائمًا وبارزًا، في كثيرٍ من الأحيان، حتى في بعض النصوص التي تتضمن محاولة القيام هذا التمييز¬، ولا زالت النظرة السلبية إلى النقد طاغيةً أو حاضرةً بقوةٍ، لدرجةٍ سمحت لفيصل دراج بالقول: «النقد في زماننا شبهة، ممارسة مشبوهة، فعل سيء الصيت.» وقبل مناقشة هذه النظرة السلبية للنقد، وربطها بالفكر النقدي عند (...) العظم، لا بد من التأكيد أن الخلط أو الالتباس بين النقد والانتقاد ليس قائمًا في اللغة العربية والفكر العربي فحسب، بل هو موجودٌ وبقوةٍ في اللغات الأجنبية (الإنكليزية والفرنسية والألمانية) والفكر الغربي عمومًا. -/- وإذا عدنا إلى "معجم اللغة العربية المعاصرة"، نجد في مادة "ن ق د": «نقد الشيء: بيَّن حسنه ورديئه، أظهر عيوبه ومحاسنه [...].» هنا يبدو أن النقد يتناول السلبيات والإيجابيات، لكن سرعان ما نجد: «نقَد الناس: أظهر ما بهم من عيوب [...].» هنا يصبح النقد مختصًّا بما هو سلبيٌّ فقط. والأمر ذاته نجده في شرح فعل "انتقد" والكلمات المرتبطة به اشتقاقيًّا (انتقاد، انتقادي ...إلخ): «انتقد الكتاب وغيره: أظهر عيوبه ومحاسنه، [...]. انتقد سلوك صديقه: استنكره وأبدى رأيًا شاجبًا له [...]. أسلوب انتقادي: يتميز بحدة النقد وإظهار المساوئ دون الالتفات إلى نقاط القوة.» فتارةً يتجسَّد الانتقاد في "إظهار العيوب والمحاسن"، وتارةً أخرى يتمثَّل في "إظهار المساوئ" فقط. -/- والالتباس ذاته تقريبًا موجودٌ في المصطلحات أو المفردات الإنكليزية والفرنسية والألمانية المعبرة عن النقد و/أو الانتقاد، ومعظم ترجماتها العربية. فإذا قبلنا التمييز الشائع بين مفردتي "critique" و"criticism" الإنكليزيتين (وسنقتصر هنا على وضع المقابل الإنكليزي، مع الإشارة إلى انطباق هذا التحليل اللغوي، انطباقًا كاملًا تقريبًا، على اللغتين الفرنسية والألمانية) على أساس أن الأولى تعني النقد (بمعنى إظهار الإيجابيات والسلبيات)، والثانية تعني الانتقاد (الاقتصار على إظهار السلبيات)، فإن هذا التمييز – الذي يستسهل بعض الكتَّاب( ) تبسيطه وإخفاء إشكاليته، أو يوحون، قصدًا أو عن غير قصدٍ، بوجود هذه البساطة – يتداعى إلى حدٍّ كبيرٍ، إذا أخذنا بعين الاعتبار، ليس فقط السيرورة التاريخية لنشوء واستخدام هذين المصطلحين( )، وإنما أيضًا دلالاتهما المتداخلة حاليًّا (من المعلوم أن "criticism"( ) تعني أيضًا النقد المختص أو "النقد الأدبي")، وإحالتهما، في اللغات الإنكليزية والفرنسية والألمانية، إلى فعلٍ واحدٍ "criticize أو criticise"، للتعبير عن فعلي "نَقَدَ" و"انتَقد" في اللغة العربية، وإلى صفةٍ واحدةٍ "critical"، للإشارة إلى ما هو "نقدي" و"انتقادي"، وإلى فاعلٍ، أو اسم فاعلٍ، واحدٍ "critic"، للإشارة إلى "الناقد" و"المنتقد". -/- كيف تعامل العظم - وهو المتقن للغات الأجنبية الثلاث المذكورة آنفًا - مع هذا التداخل الدلالي بين النقد والانتقاد؟ وإلى أيّ حدٍّ، وبأيّ معنىً، اتخذ، أو لم يتَّخذ، النقد عنده طابعًا أحاديًّا، من خلال الاقتصار على السلبيات فقط، أو على الإيجابيات فقط؟ وهل يمكن للتركيز على السلبيات، وإهمال الإيجابيات، أن يكون إيجابيًّا، أو ألا يكون سلبيًّا في المحصلة، على ما في ذلك من مفارقةٍ أو تناقضٍ ظاهريٍّ؟ إنَّ الإجابة عن هذه الأسئلة وغيرها يستلزم التحديد الدقيق والمتعدد المستويات أو الأبعاد، في الوقت نفسه، لمعاني كلٍّ من "النقد" و"الانتقاد" و"الإيجابي" و"السلبي"، إلخ. ويمكن لتعدد التحديدات أو التعريفات أن يسمح بإجابةٍ مركبةٍ وغنيةٍ متعددة المستويات عن هذه الأسئلة السابقة وما يماثلها، بحيث يكون النقد، على سبيل المثال، عند العظم، سلبيًّا على مستوىً أو أكثر، وإيجابيًّا على مستوىً أخر أو أكثر. وهذه الإجابات التي تأخذ شكل "نعم ولا" هو الأقرب إلى ما يمكن أن نسميه ﺒـ "الإجابة الفلسفية"، وهي في كل الأحوال، ليست غريبةً على الفلسفة، كما يؤكِّد العظم. -/- ولتوضيح مدى سلبية و/أو إيجابية النقد عند العظم، ومعنى أو معاني هذه السلبية و/أو الإيجابية، عمومًا، والعلاقة بين بعض صيغ النقد و/أو الانتقاد خصوصًا، سنستند إلى أربعة معايير مختلفةٍ أو متمايزةٍ نسبيًّا: التسويغ أو عدم التسويغ، المحايثة أو المفارقة، التركيز المتوازن على السلبيات والإيجابيات معًا، أم التركيز على السلبيات أو الإيجابيات فقط، وجود أو عدم وجود غرض أو هدف إيجابي. إن المحاكمات أو التقييمات التي تتسم بأنها مسوَّغة، و/أو محايثة، و/أو تركز، تركيزً "متوازنًا، على السلبيات والإيجابيات، و/أو التي تستهدف تحقيق أمر إيجابيٍّ، هي أقرب إلى ما يمكن تسميته، في هذا السياق، بالنقد؛ أما المحاكمات أو التقييمات التي تتسم بأنها غير مسوَّغةٍ، و/أو مفارقةٌ أو خارجيةٌ أو غير محايثةٍ، و/أو تقتصر على التركيز على السلبيات، و/أو لا تستهدف تحقيق أمرٍ إيجابيٍّ، فهي أقرب إلى ما يمكن تسميته، في هذا السياق، بالانتقاد. ومن الواضح أنه، واستنادًا إلى كل المعايير المذكورة، يكون النقد إيجابيًّا، أو أقرب إلى ما هو إيجابيٌّ، مقارنةً بالانتقاد الذي يكون سلبيًّا أو أقرب إلى ما هو سلبيٌّ. لكن تغير معاني السلبي والإيجابي أو "ماصدقاته"، يسمح لنا بزحزحة إشكالية العلاقة بينها (بين قيم السلب والإيجاب ومعانيها) بما يساعدنا على إبراز إيجابية ما نعدُّه، من منظورٍ آخر، سلبيًّا، وإبراز سلبية ما نعده، من منظورٍ آخر، إيجابيًّا. ويبقى أن نلفت الانتباه إلى أن محاولة التمييز بين مفهومي أو فكرتي النقد والانتقاد لا تهدف، ولا ينبغي أن تهدف، إلى الفصل الحاد أو الكامل بينهما؛ إذ يمكن النظر إلى بعض (وربما كل) صيغ الانتقاد على أنها مجرد أنواعٍ متميِّزةٍ من النقد، بوصفه حكمًا تقييميًّا في خصوص موضوعٍ ما. (shrink)

Christian Kock’s essays show the essential interconnectedness of practical reasoning, rhetoric and deliberative democracy. They constitute a unique contribution to argumentation theory that draws on – and criticizes – the work of philosophers, rhetoricians, political scientists and other argumentation theorists. It puts rhetoric in the service of modern democracies by drawing attention to the obligations of politicians to articulate arguments and objections that citizens can weigh against each other in their deliberations about possible courses of action.

This innovative text is psychologically informed, both in its diagnosis of inferential errors, and in teaching students how to watch out for and work around their natural intellectual blind spots. It also incorporates insights from epistemology and philosophy of science that are indispensable for learning how to evaluate premises. The result is a hands-on primer for real world critical thinking. The authors bring a fresh approach to the traditional challenges of a critical thinking course: effectively explaining the nature of validity, (...) assessing deductive arguments, reconstructing, identifying and diagramming arguments, and causal and probabilistic inference. Additionally, they discuss in detail, important, frequently neglected topics, including testimony, including the evaluation of news and other information sources, the nature and credibility of science, rhetoric, and dialectical argumentation. The treatment of probability uses frequency trees and a frequency approach more generally, and argument reconstruction is taught using argument maps; these methods have been shown to improve students’ reasoning and argument evaluation. (shrink)

_Giving Reasons_ prepares students to think independently, evaluate information, and reason clearly across disciplines. Accessible to students and effective for instructors, it provides plain-English exercises, helpful appendices, and a variety of online supplements.

Locally-developed measures represent great tools for institutions to use in assessing student outcomes. Such measures can be easy to administer, can be cost-effective, and can provide meaningful data for improving student learning. However, many institutions struggle with questions surrounding the quality of their locally-developed assessments. Are their instruments reliable? Are their instruments valid? Can the data generated from these instruments be trusted to drive change and improvement? The good news for faculty, staff, and assessment professionals is that there are steps (...) they can take to address these concerns and help to ensure the validity and reliability of their processes. This article describes the development and testing of a novel research instrument of students’ attitudes and abilities relating to critical thinking, metacognition, and intellectual humility. Using a $1,000 assessment grant from Sam Houston State University (SHSU), Dr. Glenn Sanford and Dr. David Wright devised the early drafts of the instruments, collaborated with colleagues, and joined with Mr. Jeff Roberts, Director of Assessment at SHSU, to develop and to test this new instrument. What follows is a description of the development of the resulting research instrument, results from the factor analysis and reliability testing of that instrument, and an overview of how those results have been used to make further instrument improvements. (shrink)

: This paper develops four related claims: 1. Critical thinking should focus more on decision making, 2. the heuristics and bias literature developed by cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists provides many insights into human irrationality which can be useful in critical thinking instruction, 3. unfortunately the “rational choice” norms used by behavioral economists to identify “biased” decision making narrowly equate rational decision making with the efficient pursuit of individual satisfaction; deviations from these norms should not be treated as an irrational (...) bias, 4. a richer, procedural theory of rational decision making should be the basis for critical thinking instruction in decision making. (shrink)

This article is a general introduction to the psychology of reasoning. Specifically, it focuses on the dual process theory of human cognition. Proponents of the said two-system view hold that human cognition involves two processes (viz., System 1 and System 2). System 1 is an automatic, intuitive thinking process where judgments and reasoning rely on fast thinking and ready-to-hand data. On the other hand, System 2 is a slow, logical cognitive process where our judgments and reasoning rely on reflective, careful (...) analysis and data evaluation. Supposedly, these two cognitive processes are at play in every thinking task, and they sometimes work together and sometimes go against each other. (shrink)

Research into the cognition of conditionals has predominantly focused on conditional reasoning, producing a range of theories which explain associated phenomena with considerable success. However, such theories have been less successful in accommodating experimental data concerning how agents assess the probability of indicative conditionals. Since an acceptable account of conditional reasoning should be compatible with evidence regarding how we evaluate conditionals’ likelihoods, this constitutes a failing of such theories. Section 1 introduces the most dominant established approach to conditional reasoning: mental (...) models theory. Surveying a range of experimental results, I show that mental models theory (along with competing theories) is incapable of fully accounting for findings regarding judgements about conditionals’ probabilities. Section 2 introduces an alternative account of deductive reasoning, the erotetic theory, recently proposed by Koralus and Mascarenhas (2013). Section 3 argues that, given a natural extension, this theory is able to explain the otherwise unaccounted for data. (shrink)

The subject of the paper is a polemic between Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer mainly concerning the understanding of the critical method in philosophy. Nelson refutes the accusation of psychologism and attacks the core of the philosophy of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. In response to those allegations, Cassirer feels obliged to defend the position of his masters and performs this task brilliantly. The present paper considers similarities and differences in the positions of both sides in this debate. I try (...) to evaluate the arguments of both sides and argue that they took basically the same positions, while the existing discrepancies did not justify such an intense polemic. If the disputing sides had approached the discussion in a less emotional way, it could have led to substantive and interesting conclusions. (shrink)

This book (128 pp.) serves as an introduction and manual to guide students through the interdisciplinary research process. We are becoming increasingly aware that, as a result of technological developments and globalisation, problems are becoming so complex that they can only be solved through cooperation between multiple disciplines. Healthcare, climate change, food security, energy, financial markets and quality of life are just a few examples of issues that require scientists and academics to work in a crossdisciplinary way. As a result (...) of these developments, an interdisciplinary approach is becoming increasingly popular in higher education and must be considered an absolute necessity. Young academics are being called on to step beyond the boundaries of traditional disciplines in order to contribute to addressing fundamental problems and solving challenges facing society. There is a need for people who are not afraid to ask critical questions, who can work together well and can look beyond the boundaries of their own field. This means students need to learn more about how they can integrate and apply knowledge, methods and skills from different fields. Interdisciplinary research projects and practical training courses offer students more than one perspective on the same subject. Comparing and contrasting, connecting, adding and adapting concepts, theories and methodologies from different disciplines ultimately results in new insights and better answers to complex problems. (shrink)

In his book, On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes what he regards as a chronic tendency in philosophy towards inflating the significance of reflection in ways that manifest a combination of philosophical naiveté and scientific ignorance about how reflection actually works. In these comments, I respond to Kornblith's challenge by sketching an account of the philosophical significance of reflection in the theory of epistemic justification.

لا جدال في مركزية أو أهمية ممارسة النقد والتنظير له في فكر العظم. وللوصول إلى فهمٍ أوليٍّ لهذه الأهمية وتلك المركزية، سنعمل، في هذا النص، على إبراز الصلة الوثيقة لممارسة النقد والتنظير له، في فكر العظم، بخلفيته أو نزعاته العلمية أو العلموية والتنويرية واليسارية – الماركسية؛ ثم سنقوم بتوضيح أو تأكيد الارتباط الوجودي أو الضروري، لهذه الممارسة وذاك التنظير، بسمة أو بحالة «الأزمة» الملازمة للواقع والفكر العربيين المعاصرين.

Aristotle's epistemology is related to his dialectical method, whose steps are 1- collect the endoxa (accepted opinions of wise and philosophers), 2- contrast endoxa each other, 3- make his own observations over the objects/animals, 4- preserve the corrections and eliminate the errors, 5- conclusion. This method is very similar to what is today called "scientific method", based on the recollection of previous contributions, observations and experiments, and testing of hypotheses.

The protests at the Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA) that began in November 2014 as a reaction to severe cuts in the department of humanities have sparked a broad debate nationally and even internationally about the future of the university and the values and ideals that should define it. It turned out that dissatisfaction was much more widespread in different parts of the university than some had previously thought, and many turned out to share the concerns first put forward in the (...) humanities department, to extend beyond the borders of the university and the country. Increasing focus on getting as many students as possible to graduate promptly has shifted the attention ever more towards quantitative indicators for the evaluation of education rather than qualitative ones, leading to raising the question of whether the quality of education has suffered from these priorities. How did this come about and what could be done to improve this quality? In this essay we briefly consider the history of the university as an institute that aims to combine research and education, subsequently mentioning some more recent challenges for the university, finishing it with a brief description of a ‘circulation model of education’ that we consider to be a fruitful source for answering some of the challenges we identified from the current discussions. In this model circulation rather than unidirectional traffic occurs between different elements: circulation between research and education, between insights of teachers and of students, between disciplines, between general and contextualized knowledge, between disciplinary and experi- ential knowledge, between doing research and (meta-)reflection upon research, and so on. (shrink)

La oposición a una estricta separación entre las dimensiones dialéctica y retórica de la actividad argumentativa es una de las aportaciones más destacadas y peculiares de la denominada escuela holandesa sobre argumentación. Frans H. van Eemeren y Peter Houtlosser reaccionaron contra una separación estricta entre dialéctica y retórica en varios trabajos, pero uno de los más inspiradores es sin duda su artículo “William the Silent’s argumentative discourse” (1998) presentado en la ciudad de Ámsterdam con ocasión de la cuarta conferencia organizada (...) por la International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). Sobre este tema siguieron investigando para presentar un análisis de la perspectiva dialéctica inherente al caso de Guillermo I de Orange en un congreso de la Japan Debate Association en Tokio (van Eemeren y Houtlosser, 2000). (shrink)

This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. In section one, I propose an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. In section two, I use this analysis in arguing for a form of access internalism on which one has justification to believe (...) a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. In section three, I distinguish between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism and argue that the propositional version avoids familiar objections to the doxastic version. In section four, I argue that the propositional version of access internalism also explains and vindicates internalist intuitions about cases. In section five, I conclude with some reflections on the relationship between critical reflection, responsibility and personhood. (shrink)

This review essay discusses three articles from the Palgrave Handbook of Critical Thinking in Higher Education concerned with outlining the connection between cognitive science and critical thinking. All of the authors explain how recent findings in cognitive science, such as research on heuristics and cognitive biases might be incorporated into the critical thinking curriculum. The authors also elaborate on how recent findings in metacognition can reshape critical thinking pedagogy. For instance, the essays articulate how critical thinking instructors would be wise (...) to broaden the scope of traditional critical thinking content by instructing students in the metacognitive strategies of self-regulation, cognitive monitoring, and evaluation in order to encourage better decision making both inside and outside the classroom. (shrink)

In an attempt to reduce dangerous driving behavior of those students enrolled in an upper level course at Sam Houston State University, students performed a series of critical thinking assignments and completed a survey to record their behavior and habits related to driving and the project. The project included a lab experiment, lecture, class discussion, video, and a culminating paper to synthesize the scientific information with real world and classroom experiences. Inspired by the approach to critical thinking put forward by (...) Duron, Limbach, and Waugh, critical thinking for each assignment was implemented through instructions and feedback. Results showed that the critical thinking led to behavior changes in the students’ driving during the semester. It was also determined that the students chose to reduce their distracted driving behaviors based on what they learned and experienced through the project. Within this small sample, using critical thinking to apply conceptual knowledge to real world behaviors led to behavioral changes and real learning. (shrink)