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  1. Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness.David Bennett & Chris Hill (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
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  2. Bodily Awareness and Novel Multisensory Features.Robert Eamon Briscoe - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
    According to the decomposition thesis, a subject’s total perceptual experience at a time is an aggregate of discrete, modality‐specific experiences. Contrary to this view, I argue that certain cases of multisensory integration give rise to experiences that represent features of a novel type. Through the coordinated use of bodily awareness – understood here as encompassing both proprioception and kinaesthesis – and the exteroceptive sensory modalities, one becomes perceptually responsive to spatial features whose instances couldn’t be represented by any of the (...)
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  3. Synesthetic Binding and the Reactivation Model of Memory.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - In Ophelia Deroy (ed.), Sensory Blending: On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena. Oxford University Press.
    Despite the recent surge in research on, and interest in, synesthesia, the mechanism underlying this condition is still unknown. Feedforward mechanisms involving overlapping receptive fields of sensory neurons as well as feedback mechanisms involving a lack of signal disinhibition have been proposed. Here I show that a broad range of studies of developmental synesthesia indicate that the mechanism underlying the phenomenon may involve reinstatement of brain activity in different sensory or cognitive streams in a way that is similar to what (...)
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  4. Multisensory Consciousness and Synesthesia.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Oxford: Routledge.
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  5. High-Level Perception and Multimodal Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    What is the correct procedure for determining the contents of perception? Philosophers tackling this question increasingly rely on empirically-oriented procedures in order to reach an answer. I argue that this constitutes an improvement over the armchair methodology constitutive of phenomenal contrast cases, but that there is a crucial respect in which current empirical procedures remain limited: they are unimodal in nature, wrongly treating the senses as isolatable faculties. I thus have two aims: first, to motivate a reorientation of the admissible (...)
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  6. What Was Molyneux's Question A Question About?Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook on Molyneux's Question. London: Routledge.
    Molyneux asked whether a newly sighted person could distinguish a sphere from a cube by sight alone, given that she was antecedently able to do so by touch. This, we contend, is a question about general ideas. To answer it, we must ask (a) whether spatial locations identified by touch can be identified also by sight, and (b) whether the integration of spatial locations into an idea of shape persists through changes of modality. Posed this way, Molyneux’s Question goes substantially (...)
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  7. A Puzzle About Aftertaste.Akiko Frischhut & Giuliano Torrengo - forthcoming - In Andrea Borghini & Patrik Engisch (eds.), Philosophy of Recipes. Making, Experiencing, Valuing.
    When we cook, by meticulously following a recipe, or adding a personal twist to it, we sometimes care not only to (re-)produce a taste that we can enjoy, but also to give our food a certain aftertaste. This is not surprising, given that we ordinarily take aftertaste to be an important part of the gustatory experience as a whole, one which we seek out, and through which we evaluate what we eat and drink—at least in many cases. What is surprising (...)
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  8. Molyneux’s Question and Interpersonal Variations in Multimodal Mental Imagery Among Blind Subjects.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - In Brian Glenney (ed.), Molyneux's Question. London: Routledge.
    If the sight of cortically blind people were restored, could they visually recognize a cube or a sphere? This is Molyneux’s question. I argue that the answer to this question depends on the specificities of the mental setup of these cortically blind people. Some cortically blind people have (sometimes quite vivid) visual imagery. Others don’t. The answer to Molyneux’s question depends on whether the blind subjects have had visual imagery before their sight was restored. If they did, the answer to (...)
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  9. Explaining “Spatial Purport of Perception”: A Predictive Processing Approach.Wiktor Rorot - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    Despite the large interest in the human ability to perceive space present in neuroscience, cognitive science and psychology, as well as philosophy of mind, the issues regarding egocentric space representation received relatively less attention. In this paper I take up a unique phenomenon related to this faculty: the “spatial purport” of perceptual experiences. The notion was proposed by Rick Grush to describe the subjective, qualitative aspects of egocentric representations of spatial properties and relations. Although Grush offered an explanation of the (...)
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  10. Sensory Modalities and Novel Features of Perceptual Experiences.Douglas C. Wadle - forthcoming - Synthese:1-32.
    Is the flavor of mint reducible to the minty smell, the taste, and the menthol-like coolness on the roof of one’s mouth, or does it include something over and above these—something not properly associated with any one of the contributing senses? More generally, are there features of perceptual experiences—so-called novel features—that are not associated with any of our senses taken singly? This question has received a lot of attention of late. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question (...)
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  11. Multisensory Perception in Philosophy.Amber Ross & Mohan Matthen - 2021 - Multisensory Research 34 (3):219-231.
    This is the editors' Introduction to a special issue of the journal, Multisensory Research. European philosophers of the modern period found multisensory perception to be impossible because they thought that perceptual ideas are defined by how they are experienced. Under this conception, the individual modalities are determinables of ideas—just as colour is a determinable that embraces red and blue, so also the visual is a determinable that embraces colour and (visually experienced) shape. Since no idea is experienced as, for example, (...)
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  12. Coordinating Attention Requires Coordinated Senses.Lucas Battich, Merle T. Fairhurst & Ophelia Deroy - 2020 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 27 (6):1126-1138.
    From playing basketball to ordering at a food counter, we frequently and effortlessly coordinate our attention with others towards a common focus: we look at the ball, or point at a piece of cake. This non-verbal coordination of attention plays a fundamental role in our social lives: it ensures that we refer to the same object, develop a shared language, understand each other’s mental states, and coordinate our actions. Models of joint attention generally attribute this accomplishment to gaze coordination. But (...)
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  13. Molyneux’s Question and Somatosensory Spaces.Tony Cheng - 2020 - In Brian Glenney Gabriele Ferretti (ed.), Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy.
  14. Many Molyneux Questions.Mohan Matthen & Jonathan Cohen - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):47-63.
    Molyneux's Question (MQ) concerns whether a newly sighted man would recognize/distinguish a sphere and a cube by vision, assuming he could previously do this by touch. We argue that (MQ) splits into questions about (a) shared representations of space in different perceptual systems, and about (b) shared ways of constructing higher dimensional spatiotemporal features from information about lower dimensional ones, most of the technical difficulty centring on (b). So understood, MQ resists any monolithic answer: everything depends on the constraints faced (...)
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  15. The Role of Attention in Multisensory Integration.Christopher Mole - 2020 - Multisensory Research 31 (3):337–349.
    Evidence concerning the relationship between attention and multisensory integration has long been thought to lead us into a paradox. The paradox has its roots in evidence that seems to show that attention exerts an influence on integration, and that integration also exerts an influence on attention. This creates an appearance of paradox only if it is understood to imply that particular instances of the integration process must occur both before and after particular instances of the attention process. But this appearance (...)
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  16. Multimodal Mental Imagery and Naturalized Epistemology.Bence Nanay - 2020 - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Epistemology of Nonvisual Perception. New York: Oxford University Press.
    There has been a lot of discussion about how the cognitive penetrability of perception may or may not have important implications for understanding perceptual justification. The aim of this paper is to argue that a different set of findings in perceptual psychology poses an even more serious challenge to the very idea of perceptual justification. These findings are about the importance of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality (such as amodal completion (...)
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  17. Multisensory Evidence.Casey O'Callaghan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):238-256.
    It is tempting to think that one’s perceptual evidence comprises just what issues from perceiving with each of the respective sensory modalities. However, empirical, rational, and phenomenological considerations show that one’s perceptual evidence can outstrip what one possesses due to perceiving with each separate sense. Some novel perceptual evidence stems from the coordinated use of multiple senses. This paper argues that some perceptual evidence in this respect is distinctively multisensory.
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  18. Molyneux Problem.Mark Paterson - 2020 - In D. Jalobeanu & Charles T. Wolfe (eds.), Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and Sciences. New York:
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  19. Is Bálint's Syndrome a Counterexample of the Kantian Spatiality Thesis?Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Tony Cheng, Ophelia Deroy & Charles Spence (eds.), Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science. pp. 31-45.
  20. On the Very Idea of a Tactile Field, Or: A Plea for Skin Space.Tony Cheng - 2019 - In Ophelia Deroy, Charles Spence & Tony Cheng (eds.), Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science. pp. 226-247.
  21. Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science.Tony Cheng, Ophelia Deroy & Charles Spence (eds.) - 2019 - Routledge.
    This collection of essays brings together research on sense modalities in general and spatial perception in particular in a systematic and interdisciplinary way. It updates a long-standing philosophical fascination with this topic by incorporating theoretical and empirical research from cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology. The book is divided thematically to cover a wide range of established and emerging issues. Part I covers notions of objectivity and subjectivity in spatial perception and thinking. Part II focuses on the canonical distal senses, such (...)
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  22. Molyneux, Neuroplasticity, and Technologies of Sensory Substitution.Mark Paterson - 2019 - In Brian Glenney & J. F. Silva (eds.), The Senses and the History of Philosophy. New York: pp. 340-352.
  23. A New Method for Establishing High-Level Visual Content: The Conflict Cross-Modal Approach.Daniel Tippens - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):169-191.
    Restrictivists hold that visual experience only represents low-level properties such as shape, spatial location, motion, color, etc. Expansionists contend that visual experience also represents high-level properties such as being a pine tree. I outline a new approach to support expansionism called the conflict cross-modal argument. What I call the conflict cross-modal effects occur when at least two perceptual systems disagree about some property belonging to a common stimulus, and this disagreement causes a change in the representational and phenomenal content of (...)
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  24. Multimodal Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Cortex 105:125-136.
    When I am looking at my coffee machine that makes funny noises, this is an instance of multisensory perception – I perceive this event by means of both vision and audition. But very often we only receive sensory stimulation from a multisensory event by means of one sense modality, for example, when I hear the noisy coffee machine in the next room, that is, without seeing it. The aim of this paper is to bring together empirical findings about multimodal perception (...)
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  25. An Argument for Shape Internalism.Jan Almäng - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):819-836.
    This paper is a defense of an internalist view of the perception of shapes. A basic assumption of the paper is that perceptual experiences have certain parts which account both for the phenomenal character associated with perceiving shapes—phenomenal shapes—and for the intentional content presenting shapes—intentional shapes. Internalism about perceptions of shapes is defined as the claim that phenomenal shapes determine the intentional shapes. Externalism is defined as the claim that perceptual experiences represent whatever shape the phenomenal shape reliably tracks. The (...)
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  26. Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism.David Bourget - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268.
    Intermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are nonrepresentational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that provides evidence for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much (...)
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  27. Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part II.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (12):1-13.
    The first part of this survey article presented a cartography of some of the more extensively studied forms of multisensory processing. In this second part, I turn to examining some of the different possible ways in which the structure of conscious perceptual experience might also be characterized as multisensory. In addition, I discuss the significance of research on multisensory processing and multisensory consciousness for philosophical debates concerning the modularity of perception, cognitive penetration, and the individuation of the senses.
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  28. Sensory Substitution and Multimodal Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2017 - Perception 46:1014-1026.
    Many philosophers use findings about sensory substitution devices in the grand debate about how we should individuate the senses. The big question is this: Is “vision” assisted by (tactile) sensory substitution really vision? Or is it tactile perception? Or some sui generis novel form of perception? My claim is that sensory substitution assisted “vision” is neither vision nor tactile perception, because it is not perception at all. It is mental imagery: visual mental imagery triggered by tactile sensory stimulation. But it (...)
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  29. Beyond Vision: Philosophical Essays.Casey O'Callaghan - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Beyond Vision brings together eight essays by Casey O'Callaghan which draw theoretical and philosophical lessons about perception, the nature of its objects, and sensory awareness. O'Callaghan focuses on auditory perception, perception of spoken language, and multisensory perception.
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  30. Grades of Multisensory Awareness.Casey O'Callaghan - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):155-181.
    Psychophysics and neuroscience demonstrate that different sensory systems interact and influence each other. Perceiving involves extensive cooperation and coordination among systems associated with sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. Nonetheless, it remains unclear in what respects conscious perceptual awareness is multisensory. This paper distinguishes six differing varieties of multisensory awareness, explicates their consequences, and thereby elucidates the multisensory nature of perception. It argues on these grounds that perceptual awareness need not be exhausted by that which is associated with each of (...)
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  31. Synesthesia Vs. Crossmodal Illusions.Casey O'Callaghan - 2017 - In Ophelia Deroy (ed.), Sensory Blendings: New Essays on Synaesthesia. Oxford, UK: pp. 45-58.
    We can discern two opposing viewpoints regarding synesthesia. According to the first, it is an oddity, an outlier, or a disordered condition. According to the second, synesthesia is pervasive, driving creativity, metaphor, or language itself. Which is it? Ultimately, I favor the first perspective, according to which cross-sensory synesthesia is an outlying condition. But the second perspective is not wholly misguided. My discussion has three lessons. First, synesthesia is just one of a variety of effects in which one sense modality (...)
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  32. Switching to the Rubber Hand.S. L. Yeh & Timothy Joseph Lane - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Inducing the rubber hand illusion (RHI) requires that participants look at an imitation hand while it is stroked in synchrony with their occluded biological hand. Previous explanations of the RHI have emphasized multisensory integration, and excluded higher cognitive functions. We investigated the relationship between the RHI and higher cognitive functions by experimentally testing task switch (as measured by switch cost) and mind wandering (as measured by SART score); we also included a questionnaire for attentional control that comprises two subscales, attention-shift (...)
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  33. Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part I.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (2):121-133.
    Multisensory processing encompasses all of the various ways in which the presence of information in one sensory modality can adaptively influence the processing of information in a different modality. In Part I of this survey article, I begin by presenting a cartography of some of the more extensively investigated forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus on two distinct types of multisensory integration. I briefly discuss the conditions under which these different forms of multisensory processing occur as well as (...)
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  34. Investigating What Felt Shapes Look Like.Sam Clarke - 2016 - I-Perception 7 (1).
    A recent empirical study claims to show that the answer to Molyneux’s question is negative, but, as John Schwenkler points out, its findings are inconclusive: Subjects tested in this study probably lacked the visual acuity required for a fair assessment of the question. Schwenkler is undeterred. He argues that the study could be improved by lowering the visual demands placed on subjects, a suggestion later endorsed and developed by Kevin Connolly. I suggest that Connolly and Schwenkler both underestimate the difficulties (...)
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  35. Philosophy of Perception: A Road-Map with Many Bypass Roads.Bence Nanay - 2016 - In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. London: Routlegde.
    An introduction to contemporary debates in philosophy of perception.
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  36. Objects for Multisensory Perception.Casey O’Callaghan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1269-1289.
    Object perception deploys a suite of perceptual capacities that constrains attention, guides reidentification, subserves recognition, and anchors demonstrative thought. Objects for perception—perceptual objects—are the targets of such capacities. Characterizing perceptual objects for multisensory perception faces two puzzles. First is the diversity of objects across sensory modalities. Second is the unity of multisensory perceptual objects. This paper resolves the puzzles. Objects for perception are structured mereologically complex individuals. Perceptual objects are items that bear perceptible features and have perceptible parts arranged to (...)
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  37. Speech Perception.Casey O'Callaghan - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Is speech special? This paper evaluates the evidence that speech perception is distinctive when compared with non-linguistic auditory perception. It addresses the phenomenology, contents, objects, and mechanisms involved in the perception of spoken language. According to the account it proposes, the capacity to perceive speech in a manner that enables understanding is an acquired perceptual skill. It involves learning to hear language-specific types of ethologically significant sounds. According to this account, the contents of perceptual experience when listening to familiar speech (...)
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  38. Not All Perceptual Experience is Modality Specific.Casey O'Callaghan - 2015 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-165.
    This paper presents forms of multimodal perceptual experience that undermine the claim that each aspect of perceptual experience is modality specific. In particular, it argues against the thesis that all phenomenal character is modality specific (even making an allowance for co-conscious unity). It concludes that a multimodal perceptual episode may have phenomenal features beyond those that are associated with the specific modalities.
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  39. The Multisensory Character of Perception.Casey O’Callaghan - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (10):551-569.
    My thesis is that perceptual awareness is richly multisensory. I argue for this conclusion on the grounds that certain forms of multisensory perceptual experience are incompatible with the claim that each aspect of a perceptual experience is associated with some specific sensory modality or another. First, I explicate what it is for some feature of a conscious perceptual episode to be modality specific. Then, I argue based on philosophical and experimental evidence that some novel intermodal features are perceptible only through (...)
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  40. Commentary: “Multimodal Theories of Recognition and Their Relation to Molyneux's Question”.John Schwenkler - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  41. Is Consciousnes Multisensory?Tim Bayne & Charles Spence - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Stephen Biggs & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-132.
    Is consciousness multisensory? Obviously it is multisensory in certain ways. Human beings typically possess the capacity to have experiences in at least the five familiar sensory modalities, and quite possibly in a number of other less commonly recognised modalities as well. But there are other respects in which it is far from obvious that consciousness is multisensory. This chapter is concerned with one such respect. Οur concern here is with whether consciousness contains experiences associated with distinct modalities at the same (...)
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  42. Sorting the Senses.Stephen Biggs, Mohan Matthen & Dustin Stokes - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-19.
    We perceive in many ways. But several dubious presuppositions about the senses mask this diversity of perception. Philosophers, scientists, and engineers alike too often presuppose that the senses (vision, audition, etc.) are independent sources of information, perception being a sum of these independent contributions. We too often presuppose that we can generalize from vision to other senses. We too often presuppose that vision itself is best understood as a passive receptacle for an image thrown by a lens. In this essay (...)
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  43. Multisensory Perception as an Associative Learning Process.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1095.
    Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and you hear the clang. But in addition seeing the cymbal jolt and hearing the clang, you are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. Casey O’Callaghan (forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding awareness.” Psychologists have long assumed that multimodal perceptions such as this one are the result of a subpersonal feature binding mechanism (...)
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  44. Making Sense of Multiple Senses.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer.
    In the case of ventriloquism, seeing the movement of the ventriloquist dummy’s mouth changes your experience of the auditory location of the vocals. Some have argued that cases like ventriloquism provide evidence for the view that at least some of the content of perception is fundamentally multimodal. In the ventriloquism case, this would mean your experience has constitutively audio-visual content (not just a conjunction of an audio content and visual content). In this paper, I argue that cases like ventriloquism do (...)
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  45. Active Perception and the Representation of Space.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 44-72.
    Kant argued that the perceptual representations of space and time were templates for the perceived spatiotemporal ordering of objects, and common to all modalities. His idea is that these perceptual representations were specific to no modality, but prior to all—they are pre-modal, so to speak. In this paper, it is argued that active perception—purposeful interactive exploration of the environment by the senses—demands premodal representations of time and space.
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  46. Intermodal Binding Awareness.Casey O'Callaghan - 2014 - In David J. Bennett & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 73-103.
    It is tempting to hold that perceptual experience amounts to a co-conscious collection of visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory, and olfactory episodes. If so, each aspect of perceptual experience on each occasion is associated with a specific modality. This paper, however, concerns a core variety of multimodal perceptual experience. It argues that there is perceptually apparent intermodal feature binding. I present the case for this claim, explain its consequences for theorizing about perceptual experience, and defend it against objections. I maintain that (...)
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  47. A Methodological Molyneux Question: Sensory Substitution, Plasticity and the Unification of Perceptual Theory.Mark Paterson & Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford: pp. 410-430.
  48. Non Sense-Specific Perception and the Distinction Between the Senses.Louise Richardson - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (2):215-239.
    How should interaction between the senses affect thought about them? I try to capture some ways in which non sense-specific perception might be thought to make it impossible or pointless or explanatorily idle to distinguish between senses. This task is complicated by there being more than one view of the nature of the senses, and more than one kind of non sense-specific perception. I argue, in particular, that provided we are willing to forgo certain assumptions about, for instance, the relationship (...)
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  49. The First Sense, by Matthew Fulkerson. [REVIEW]John Schwenkler - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.
  50. Perception and Its Modalities.Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume is about the many ways we perceive. Contributors explore the nature of the individual senses, how and what they tell us about the world, and how they interrelate. They consider how the senses extract perceptual content from receptoral information. They consider what kinds of objects we perceive and whether multiple senses ever perceive a single event. They consider how many senses we have, what makes one sense distinct from another, and whether and why distinguishing senses may be useful. (...)
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