Dance

Is the relationship of self-moving to itself a direct pre-reflective self-awareness, or is it mediated through an Other? This article attempts to address this question, taking the phenomenon of dance as a point of departure, since in dance, movement steps out of its everyday background function to become the principal theme. Rudolf zur Lippe extracts from a dance step of the dances of the Quattrocento, the posa, a concept of sensual reflection. Rather than a conceptual reflection, the posa can be (...) understood as an awareness of one’s own movement. In this article, in a dialogue between critical philosophy, dance science, and phenomenology, terms of a possible sensual reflection in dance will be discussed. (shrink)

This article focuses primarily on improvisation in the arts as discussed in philosophical aesthetics, supplemented with accounts of improvisational practice by arts theorists and educators. It begins with an overview of the term improvisation, first as it is used in general and then as it is used to describe particular products and practices in the individual arts. From here, questions and challenges that improvisation raises for the traditional work-of-art concept, the type-token distinction, and the appreciation and evaluation of the arts (...) will be explored. This article concludes with the suggestion that further research and discussion on improvisation in the arts is needed, particularly in the areas of non-jazz improvisation. (shrink)

This paper provides an account of improvisational artistry in live dance performance that construes the contribution of the dance performer as a kind of agency. Andy Clark’s theory of the embodied and extended mind is used in order to consider how this account is supported by research on how a thinking-while-doing person navigates the world. I claim here that while a dance performer’s improvisational artistry does include embodied and extended features that occur outside of the brain and nervous system that (...) this can be construed as “agency” rather than “thought.” Further I claim that trained and individual style accounts for how this agency acquires its artistic nature. This account thus contributes to the philosophy of improvisation in dance performance in a way that includes motor as well as cognized intentions. (shrink)

One kind of government-supported censorship of the arts targets not the expressive content of any particular artwork but instead seeks to suppress the activity of a group of people based on some feature of the group’s human identity such as race, gender or class. Using examples from the history of the development of black music in the United States that followed from the legal oppression of slavery and from evidence of changes in the Punjabi theatre in Pakistan following state-sanctioned suppressions (...) of women this paper demonstrates that human-identity-related arts censorship not only harms but can actually serve to spur and enhance, rather than suppress, artistic innovation. (shrink)

One kind of government-supported censorship of the arts targets not the expressive content of any particular artwork but instead seeks to suppress the activity of a group of people based on some feature of the group’s human identity such as race, gender or class. Using examples from the history of the development of black music in the United States that followed from the legal oppression of slavery and from evidence of changes in the Punjabi theatre in Pakistan following state-sanctioned suppressions (...) of women this paper demonstrates that human-identity-related arts censorship not only harms but can actually serve to spur and enhance, rather than suppress, artistic innovation. (shrink)

Ontologies are today being applied in almost every field to support the alignment and retrieval of data of distributed provenance. Here we focus on new ontological work on dance and on related cultural phenomena belonging to what UNESCO calls the “intangible heritage.” Currently data and information about dance, including video data, are stored in an uncontrolled variety of ad hoc ways. This serves not only to prevent retrieval, comparison and analysis of the data, but may also impinge on our ability (...) to preserve the data that already exists. Here we explore recent technological developments that are designed to counteract such problems by allowing information to be retrieved across disciplinary, cultural, linguistic and technological boundaries. Software applications such as the ones envisaged here will enable speedier recovery of data and facilitate its analysis in ways that will assist both archiving of and research on dance. (shrink)

This essay aims to answer a simple question: why dance matters to us. I will argue that of all the philosophical approaches to aesthetics, it is phenomenology that is best equipped to answer this question satisfactorily. Other approaches, which derive from poststructuralism, critical theory, semiotics or historicist hermeneutics tend to assimilate meaning in dance to the specific sociocultural and historical contexts in which dance works were produced, and hence to methodologies aligned with the linguistic or literary turns in intellectual history (...) and the human sciences. These approaches neglect the foundational nature of dance as movement, the distinctive way in which it reveals and epitomizes our animate nature. Whilst other theories attempt to explain what a dance means or could mean, a phenomenological approach shows how it comes to be meaning-bearing at all, why it is that it seems to us that dance has something to say to us, without our being able to necessarily put this into words. Above all, the phenomenological approach taken here aims to explicate the intrinsic, intuitive and aesthetic significance of dance by showing how it, in common with other artforms, “aesthetically exemplifies factors which are basic to our cognitive and metaphysical inherence in the world”. I will aim to explain why dance engages our attention at all, prior to any semiological (or other) abstractions of its content. This will involve explicating how some of the basic factors at work in our movement, perception and spatial positioning are exemplified and transformed through dance, seen as both a visual and kinesthetic medium. (shrink)

In an essay entirely devoted to the subject of dance in Alain Badiou's Handbook of Inaesthetics [Petit manuel d'inesthétique (Badiou 2005b)], we find the following contentious statement: “Dance is not an art, because it is the sign of the possibility of art as inscribed in the body” (69). At first glance, this statement seems strangely familiar to the reader versed in writing about dance, particularly philosophical writing. “Dance is not an art”: Badiou critiques Mallarmé as not realizing this as the (...) true import of his ideas. It is familiar because it attests to a certain problem in aesthetic thinking, one that relates to the placement and position of dance and the works that comprise its history into what can be seen as certain evaluative hierarchies, particularly vis à vis the relation of dance to other art forms, and in particular, those involving speech and writing. Dance seems to suffer from a certain marginalization, subtraction, or exclusion, and its practice seems to occupy a place of the perennial exception, problem, or special case. The strangeness of the statement, on the other hand, relates to the widespread view outside of academic writing that the status of dance “as art” is actually completely unproblematic. What follows therefore is a critical commentary on this assertion of Badiou, placed both in the context of Badiou's writing, and in the wider one pertaining to the problem of exclusion just outlined. (shrink)

A common approach to movement creation amongst contemporary choreographers involves dancers being asked to create movement in response to instructions that require them to form mental images, and then to make decisions in response to the internal feedback loops these images generate. The formation of these images is also facilitated in many cases by the use of digital technologies, via data representation and visualization. This article explores connections between technology, choreographic praxis, cognitive science and related topics in the philosophy of (...) perception, all of which concern the content of mental imagery, and the ways in which it is formed. In particular, we focus on how choreographers have exploited dancers’ innate ability to form kinesthetic images, which are derived from the qualitative dynamics of both actual and imagined bodily movement. We also propose that such images are historically classifiable in terms of their intrinsic geometries. (shrink)

One of the most important aspects of Gilles Deleuzes philosophy is his criticism of the traditional concept of praxis. In Aristotelian philosophy praxis is properly oriented towards some end, and in the case of human action the ends of praxis are oriented towards the agents good life. Human goods are, for both Aristotle and contemporary neo-Aristotelians, determined by the potentials of human life such as rationality, communality, and speech. Deleuzes account of action, by contrast, liberates movement from an external end. (...) In his books on cinema Deleuze argues that we need to think of events in terms of their power, and not as movements within an already determined image of life. In order to think events as such we need to confront the power of the virtual. This is achieved by a philosophy of life in which becoming is not a means towards the realisation of some end. Rather, becomings are best seen as counter-actualisations: ways in which the already-constituted actual world always bears a power to become other than it already is. If we consider dance in this new context, then dance is neither expressive of an already existing life, nor a pure act that is self-sufficient and self-constituting. Rather, dance is a confrontation with life as a plane of open and divergent becomings. (shrink)

Jeder Wahrnehmung liegen Kinästhesen zugrunde, doch tritt die Bewegung am deutlichsten im Tasten hervor. Untersucht wird hier die phänomenologische Auffassung vom Zusammenhang zwischen Tasten und Kinästhesen bei Husserl und Erwin Straus, im Vergleich zu der Tanzwissenschaft . Diese Interpretation wird teilweise durch andere Perspektiven ergänzt, die aus der pränatalen Anthropologie, Psychiatrie und den Ingenieurwissenschaften stammen. Das Vorbild ist bei Husserl die mechanische Bewegung zu Erkenntniszwecken; Straus entdeckt die Tierwelt und ihre appetitiven Bewegungen. Keine von diesen Analysen entspricht völlig dem Phänomen (...) des Tanzes als Ausdruck der propriozeptiv empfundenen Harmonie zwischen dem Leib und seiner Welt. (shrink)

Introduction Robin Grove and Shirley McKechnie In, the Australian Research Council (ARC) funded a project named Unspoken Knowledges, the aim of which was to ...

Ever since I first saw a dance performance I have wondered why it is that I am sometimes fascinated and touched by some people moving about on a stage, while at other times it leaves me completely indifferent. I will argue that an answer to this question has to be searched for in the way sensory stimuli are processed in the brain. After all, all our actions, perceptions and feelings are mediated and controlled by the brain. The thoughts and feelings (...) evoked by a dance performance are no exception and thus they too have a neural substrate in the brain. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the relationship between dance and the work of Nelson Goodman, which is found primarily in his early book, Languages of Art. Drawing upon the book’s first main thread, I examine Goodman’s example of a dance gesture as a symbol that exemplifies itself. I argue that self-exemplifying dance gestures are unique in that they are often independent and internally motivated, or “meta-self-exemplifying.” Drawing upon the book’s second main thread, I retrace Goodman’s analysis of dance’s relationship to (...) both notation in general and also Labanotation in particular. My argument is that dance gives the false impression of being notational, or is “meta-notational.”. (shrink)

Dance as art has been philosophically characterized as involving the natural expressiveness of human movements. But while some authors find the defense of expressiveness essential, others claim that it is not relevant to the understanding of dance and favour instead a focus on style, a supposedly more significant artistic feature. This paper is an attempt to provide an alternative account to both these positions, with the first (namely, that the dancers are supposed to convey emotions to us by their naturally (...) expressive movements) seeming too naturalistic and the second (that dance only consists in the performance of complicated gestures of a certain style) overly stylistic. (shrink)

« La philosophie de la danse ? Cela existe ? » est une question à laquelle celui ou celle qui s’y consacre doit faire face. Une première manière d’y répondre est de montrer en quoi une telle philosophie peut consister, en énumérant rapidement une série de questions et de problèmes. Bien sûr, les tentatives de définition en font partie. Qu’est-ce que la danse ? Peut-elle être définie en termes de conditions nécessaires et suffisantes3 ? En comptant parmi ces conditions l’expressivité (...) intense du mouvement dansé, son absence de finalité pratique et l’intention de susciter des émotions au moyen de la perception de l’espace et du rythme, on soulève des problèmes philosophiques plus spécifiques, liés notamment aux propriétés émotionnelles, spatiales et musicales exemplifiées par la danse. Comment catégoriser une performance qui, conçue par un ou une chorégraphe, est composée exclusivement de mouvements ordinaires ? En quoi l’expression dansée diffère-t-elle des gestes des chanteurs d’opéra ou des comédiens ? De quelle manière exprime-t-elle des émotions qu’un danseur n’éprouve pas nécessairement ? La danse ne peut-elle exprimer que des émotions ? (shrink)

Une réflexion philosophique sur l’art de la danse peut être enrichie par la thèse selon laquelle les émotions ne s’opposent pas à la rationalité. C’est du moins la conception qui sera développée ici. Loin d’être en lutte perpétuelle contre la raison, nos émotions témoignent de la complexité propre aux êtres humains que nous sommes : libres, réfléchis, capables de percevoir, de comprendre et de réagir aux choses qui nous entourent de manière objective et rationnelle – dans un sens large du (...) terme qui n’exclut pas la vie émotionnelle. Les mouvements dansés rendent également compte de cette complexité. L’objet de ce chapitre n’est cependant pas l’expression des émotions dans la danse. Il s’agit plutôt d’examiner la nature des mouvements eux-mêmes, dans la danse artistique, avec un intérêt particulier pour les styles de danse occidentale qui font un usage important du poids du corps dans les déséquilibres, les mouvements de rebond, les chutes, et la force d’inertie qui suit certains élans. Une grande partie de la danse contemporaine ou des danses dites actuelles est constituée par ce genre de mouvements dont la présence était par exemple bien plus réduite, voire nulle, dans le ballet classique connu pour son goût de la légèreté et de l’apesanteur. (shrink)

En posant avec clarté des questions de philosophie de l’esprit, d’ontologie et d’épistémologie, ce livre témoigne à la fois de l’intérêt réel de la danse comme objet philosophique et du rôle unique que peut jouer la philosophie dans une meilleure compréhension de cet art. Qu’est-ce que danser ? Que nous apprend le mouvement dansé sur la nature humaine et la relation entre le corps et l’esprit ? À quelles conditions une œuvre est-elle correctement interprétée par les danseurs et bien identifiée (...) par les spectateurs ? (shrink)

© British Society of Aesthetics 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society of Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comBarbara Gail Montero’s Thought in Action: Expertise and the Conscious Mind is an important contribution to the philosophy of expertise and a rewarding read. The main purpose of the book is to undermine three commonplace assumptions about a subclass of skilled individuals that Montero refers to as ‘experts’. These assumptions are that, when performing well, (...) expert performers across a wide array of domains ‘just do it’, automatically and effortlessly, without deliberate thought; that if experts were to think while performing, it would interfere with their performance; so they should not, at least when all is going well. These assumptions form the ‘just do it’ principle, spelled out in Chapters 1... (shrink)

Methodologically, philosophical aesthetics is undergoing an evolution that takes it closer to the sciences. Taking this methodological convergence as the starting point, I argue for a pragmatist and pluralist view of aesthetic explanations. To bring concreteness to discussion, I focus on vindicating genre explanations, which are explanations of aesthetic phenomena that centrally cite a work's genre classification. I show that theoretical resources that philosophers of science have developed with attention to actual scientific practice and the special sciences can be used (...) to make room for genre explanations in aesthetics. In turn, making room for genre explanations also demonstrates the plausibility of the pragmatist and pluralist view of aesthetic explanations. (shrink)

This article attempts to answer a question that many dancers and non-dancers may have. What is dance according to the media? Furthermore, how does the written word portray dance in the media? To answer these ques-tions, this research focuses on the role that the discourse of dance in media plays in the public sphere’s knowledge construction of dance. This is impor-tant to study because the public sphere’s meaning of dance will determine whether dance education is promoted or banned in schools (...) and in society. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the existing literature of dance in the media. One limitation of this contribution is that the research uses only newspaper articles as a source of analysis. Future research should include an analysis of visual and audio clips of dance as portrayed in the media. (shrink)

The idea that choreographic movements communicate to audiences by kinetic transfer is a commonplace among choreographers, dancers, and dance educators.1 Moreover, most dance lovers can cite their own favorite examples—the bounciness of the Royal Danish Ballet, the stomping of Bharata Natyam performers, the stag leaps in the thundering Greek chorus in Martha Graham’s Night Journey, or the contagious rhythmic transfer that takes over our feet when we watch classic tap dancers like Buster Brown. The perceptual capacity for kinetic transfer was (...) succinctly identified and theorized by John Martin. He called this capacity metakinesis. Martin was influenced by Theodor Lipps’s earlier theory of empathy. Lipps introduced his notion of empathy as a way to characterize our muscular responses to the perceived internal dynamics of inanimate objects under stress and tension, for example, weight-bearing columns and cantilevered boulders. Martin argued analogously about dance. -/- In what follows, we explore and evaluate three general challenges to the existence and significance of kinetic transfer in dance: challenges to the very possibility of kinesthetic understanding in dance, questions about the relevance of kinetic transfer to explanations of artistic communication in dance, and concerns about the relevance of kinetic transfer to evaluative questions germane to dance appreciation. We do not subscribe to every aspect of Martin’s story. Nevertheless, we think that Martin was exceedingly prescient. His speculations appear to be supported by recent research in neuroscience and psychology.We feel as a result that Martin’s comments are highly suggestive of what might be going on in ordinary dance consumers (or at least moderately informed ones). Critically, however, we do not model these contributions in terms of a discrete, stand-alone kinesthetic sense as Martin did. Rather, we argue that metakinesis and kinetic transfer refer to a general crossmodal sensorimotor perceptual capacity that contributes to our understanding and experience of actions in everyday contexts. Nor do we claim that audiences recognize and understand dance solely on the basis of kinetic transfer. Rather, we argue that this sensorimotor capacity is a contributing factor in our perceptual engagement with dance works, one of a range of tools ready to hand to choreographers and dancers for conveying information critical to the content of their works. (shrink)

Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...) IT is a deeply iconic-dependent process. We exemplify our approach by means of literature to dance IT and we explore some implications for the development of a general model of IT. (shrink)

I argue for the possibility of a proprioceptive art in addition to, for example, visual or auditory arts, where aspects of some martial arts will serve as examples of that art form. My argument is inspired by a thought of Ted Shawn’s, one of the pioneers of American modern dance: "Dance is the only art wherein we ourselves are the stuff in which it is made.” In a first step, I point out that in some practices of martial arts (in (...) the paper I will introduce “hyongs” & “katas”), we are, too, the stuff these performances are made of. Second, I show that we, as martial arts practitioners, are not in the first place visual or auditorial observers (as common in painting or music or ballet) but introspective, proprioceptive perceivers of our bodies and their movements. (As a corollary we get that we are, in such a case, necessarily our exclusive audience.) In an third crucial step, I show that the martial arts practices referred to, hyongs & katas, and especially the proprioceptive aspects thereof, can indeed count as art. Thus, proprioceptive art is possible because some practices of some martial arts are actual existing examples of that art form. (shrink)

The neuroscience of dance is a vibrant, fast growing field which embodies the promise of a genuine and productive interdisciplinary rapprochement between neuroscience and art. The strength of this field lies in the way it ties the experience of dance to sensorimotor processes that underwrite our ordinary perceptual engagement with the environment. Motor simulation and mimicry enhance our capacity to interpret the goals, motives, and emotions of others. Recent studies demonstrate that these same processes enable us to recognize abstract dance (...) movements as intentional actions with emotionally expressive and semantic content constitutive of their meaning. In what follows I examine this research with an eye to the potential contribution neuroscience can make to our understanding of dance as an artform. (shrink)

The collaborative projects described in this e-book have already produced thrilling new danceworks, new technologies, and innovative experimental methods. As the papers collected here show, a further happy outcome is the emergence of intriguing and hybrid kinds of writing. Aesthetic theory, cognitive psychology, and dance criticism merge, as authors are appropriately driven more by the heterogeneous nature of their topics than by any fixed disciplinary affiliation. We can spy here the beginnings of a mixed phenomenology and ethnography of dance practice (...) and choreographic cognition, which is deeply informed and empirically inspired by the best current theory in the sciences of the embodied mind [footnote 1]. These sciences must themselves increasingly deal with culture and cognition all at once: questions about pleasure in movement, habit and skill, and kinaesthetic memory, for example, require neuroscientific, physiological, psychological, sociological, and anthropological investigation simultaneously. These then are essentially collaborative enterprises, and the active interpenetration of the concerns of dance practitioners and academic researchers is one remarkable success of Unspok en Knowledges and Conceiving Connections. (shrink)

The principal object of my investigation throughout this dissertation is the aesthetic object of dance. I have utilized the phenomenological method as a descriptive tool so as to allow the phenomenon to give itself in person and become an object for consciousness for me. This immediately brings me to an important point, namely, that the stance I have adopted is that of the spectator or perceiving subject. The phenomenon of dance does not give itself fully to the dancer. The dancer (...) engaged in the act of dancing is in the midst of a total experience which he or she cannot fully gauge, that is, he or she cannot adequately objectivate. The issue is one of constitution. The phenomenon of dance is for the spectator. It is the spectator who is in a position to effect the proper degree of objectivating vis a vis the object in its autonomy. And this applies, actually, to any aesthetic object: the aesthetic object is for the spectator or perceiving subject. This is, then, the basic stance I have adopted throughout the study. However, I should not be remiss in saying that I have used my experience with dance indirectly. ;My thesis is that the essence or eidos, or as Husserl would say, central core of pure objectivity or pure objective sense of dance is sexuality. Using the Kantian framework of the space-time continuum I have brought to light what I call erotic timing-spacing as the condition for the possibility of dance. The full noematic object may vary from dance prototype to dance prototype, e.g., from ballet to flamenco to jazz. But sexuality is, I contend, the central core of pure objectivity of dance. The corollary of this major proposition, as I argue in the text, is that erotic timing-spacing is ultimately the condition for the possibility of every aesthetic object. Therefore, every aesthetic object is ultimately essentially erotic, indeed. I would hope that the notion of the eidos of dance as sexuality and its validation in terms of the phenomenon of erotic timing-spacing along with the concomitant proposition that the essence of every aesthetic object is ultimately erotic constitutes a contribution to philosophical inquiry. ;Immanuel Kant, Mikel Dufrenne and Roman Ingarden are three thinkers whose views I consider in the study. (shrink)

VIA is a mobile art project (video-dance and computational music) semiotically translated to photographic media by means of formal constraints derived from selected properties of Rio de Janeiro’s predefined downtown routes. Under the constraints of street buildings and the morphology of the routes, questions regarding the influence of the bodily movements of the urban space led to the creation of a dance typology. This typology is related to pedestrians in the area and to the structure of the buildings spans where (...) the performance happened. The dance movements captured in the videos were restricted and regulated by the physical environment and its main features. Here, an intersemiotic translation of a mobile art project to a photographic essay is presented and described. It strongly relates, and tentatively explores, both an artistic research praxis and a theoretical discussion. The essay explores an analogous semiotic effect from the VIA project on the photographic essay as a result of this investigation. -/- . (shrink)

Sally Banes' analysis, Dancing Women: Female Bodies on Stage, is an exemplary model for future feminist criticism of all the arts. The reason is that Banes deliberately avoids judgments about dancing bodies that are overwhelmingly negative or positive, that is, inflexible indicators of either victimization or celebration. What she teaches us instead is the practice of looking.