David Hume

Hume's essay "Of Miracles" has the reputation of providing, in Hume's own words, an "everlasting check" to accepting reports of miracles. Author Robert Larmer demonstrates that this reputation is undeserved. Taking seriously the environment in which "Of Miracles" was composed reveals that its arguments are neither original to Hume nor compelling. Both before and after the publication of "Of Miracles" these arguments received devastating criticisms by Hume's predecessors and contemporaries. Contemporary revisionary attempts to defend the argument by insisting that Hume (...) cannot really have meant what he has traditionally been understood to claim are inevitably guilty of eisegesis and systematically ignoring crucial passages fatal to their idiosyncratic readings. The clarity of Larmer's writing makes Hume's Counterfeit Check accessible both to professional academics and interested lay persons. Anyone interested in assessing the rationality of accepting testimonial evidence for the occurrence of miracles should view Hume's Counterfeit Check as required reading. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between Hume’s causal philosophy and Newton’s philosophy of nature. I claim that Newton’s experimentalist methodology in gravity research is an important background for understanding Hume’s conception of causality: Hume sees the relation of cause and effect as not being founded on a priori reasoning, similar to the way that Newton criticized non-empirical hypotheses about the properties of gravity. However, according to Hume’s criteria of causal inference, the law of universal gravitation is not a complete causal (...) law, since it does not include a reference either to contiguity or to temporal priority. It is still argued that because of the empirical success of Newton’s theory—the law is a statement of an exceptionless repetition—Hume gives his support to it in interpreting gravity force instrumentally as if it bore a causal relation to motion. (shrink)

Kant’s aim in the Transcendental Deduction is to prove that the a priori categories of the understanding necessarily apply to objects of experience. He claims that he will do this simply by explaining how they could so apply. But the idea that a mere explanation of this possibility should provide a defence of the categories’ actual (let alone necessary) applicability is surprising. We argue that it can be understood by attending to the source of the scepticism that the Critique’s Analytic (...) is supposed to overcome: Hume’s inability to explain causal knowledge in the Enquiry. (shrink)

필자는 이 글에서 서양근대 경험주의 사유를 체계적으로 집성한 철학자로 평가받는 흄이 그의 철학 체계 내에 수용하는 이원주의 모델이 무엇인지 검토한다. 일단 논의는 첫째, 사실상 흄의 이원론적 사유가 전통적 구도를 취하지 않는다는 것을 보인다. 인간학의 기조에 들어맞게 곧 대안으로 오히려 구도가 취해지게 된다는 사실이 강조될 것이다. 다음으로, 둘째, 공간성을 바로 지각들의 내적-외적 이원화를 위한 척도로 흄이 제시하는 것이라고 주장한다. 지각들 중에서도 공간성을 규명하는 시도에 부합하는 것으로 시각과 촉각이 실제로 언급되는 상황에 필자는 무엇보다 주목할 것이다. 마지막 셋째 논의는, 지각들의 체계적 이원화에 이르는 (...) 가운데 표출되는 구조적 문제들을 살피는 작업에 거의 집중될 것이다. 이러한 논의의 단계를 거치면서 우리의 의식적 노력을 강조하는 흄의 통찰이 결국 시사하는 내용이 분명하게 드러날 것으로 기대된다. (shrink)

This is an engaging collection of essays on a central topic in Hume’s philosophy. Perhaps Hume’s best-known contribution to the philosophy of the self is his denial, in section 1.4.6 of the Treatise, “Of personal identity,” of the existence of a simple, enduring self that is accessible by reflection. But as his distinction between personal identity “as it regards our thought or imagination” and personal identity “as it regards our passions or the concern we take for ourselves” suggests, he has (...) more to say about the self and personal identity than the skeptical doctrines presented in T 1.4.6 (T 1.4.6.5). One virtue of the collection is that it strives to capture the breadth and complexity of Hume’s thinking about... Read More. (shrink)

This essay develops a naturalist framework based on Hume, Darwin, and Wittgenstein against postmodernist constructivism. That framework claims universal features of human biology, cognition, and behavior to explain our cultural histories, running contrary to two core constructivist doctrines of postmodernist scholarship: mutual opacity and epistemic violence. Mutual opacity posits the incommensurability of systems rooted in differing contexts, cultures, and group identities, while epistemic violence morally impugns the extension of the knowledge claims of any such system beyond its strictly localized boundaries. (...) This is the extension that universalist approaches, like naturalism, are recriminated against owing to their claims to discover encompassing standpoint‐independent and transcultural features of human constitution and modes of life. Comparative evaluation of these approaches exposes the failure of postmodernist constructivism to explain parallel practices, conventions, and institutions across human cultural histories, which universalist naturalism succeeds at, while moreover revealing how this failure undermines its agendas of social justice. (shrink)

Na corrente empirista, David Hume apresenta o caráter cognoscitivo do homem como essencial à compreensão de sua natureza. Distinguindo as percepções em Impressões e Ideias, inicia um complexo sistema epistêmico que culminará nos princípios associativos da mente humana. Um desses princípios, a causalidade, é a responsável pela formação de crenças no homem, devido à influência estabelecida pelo hábito ou costume. Nessa perspectiva, nossas crenças relacionadas à relação de causalidade entre dois objetos não passam de associações mentais, não possíveis de certeza (...) e verificação empírica. Duas correntes de interpretação avaliam a filosofia humeana confirmando-a ora como cética ora como portadora de uma espécie de psicologismo ou naturalismo, sem, contudo, negar sua postura crítica em relação à Metafísica como forma de conhecimento. Analisando a origem das ideias e sua implicação na crítica e reconstrução da teoria da causalidade propostas por Hume abordamos o eixo de sua epistemologia que nos servirá de base para a compreensão de sua filosofia da natureza humana. (shrink)

Nosso texto busca fazer uma análise das hipóteses levantadas, para as explicações acerca da origem das ideias e de suas conexões, pelo filósofo David Hume (um dos principais representantes da corrente de pensamento empirista na modernidade), e, Gottfried Leibniz, que, junto com Descartes, apresenta, em suas obras, as principais teorias da corrente de pensamento racionalista. Para isso, encontramos a base de nossa proposta na Investigação sobre o entendimento humano, de Hume, e nos Novos ensaios sobre o entendimento humano, de Leibniz. (...) Como sabemos, a obra de Leibniz aqui referida é uma tentativa de refutação do Ensaio acerca do entendimento humano, de Locke, o que pode nos levar a fazer algumas referências ao precursor de Hume, e, também, a René Descartes, uma vez que o Ensaio de Locke foi escrito com o objetivo de combater o cartesianismo, e, mais diretamente sua teoria de que nossas ideias seriam inatas. Embora nosso texto envolva quatro filósofos, a preocupação que nos move recai sobre Hume e Leibniz, servindo-nos Locke e Descartes, apenas, como pontos de apoio, devido o entrecruzamento entre suas teorias. (shrink)

This second edition of Historical Dictionary of Hume's Philosophy contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 100 cross-referenced entries covering key terms, as well as brief discussions of Hume's major works and of some of his most important predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.

In this paper I aim to defend one version at least of Hume’s dictum: roughly, the idea that possibility is determined by ontology through something like independent variation. My defence is broadly pragmatic, in the sense that adherence to something like Hume’s dictum delivers at least three benefits. The first benefit is that, through Hume’s dictum, a physical theory’s ontology delimits a range of possibilities, that I call kinematical possibilities, which serves as a sufficiently permissive notion of possibility to sustain (...) something like an intensional semantics for its claims, and a sufficiently demanding notion of supervenience to sustain plausible claims of inter-theoretic reduction and theoretical equivalence. The second benefit is that Hume’s dictum allows us to work backwards from a range of kinematical possibilities to an ontology. This is especially useful when aiming to glean an interpretation of a physical theory, since often we are more confident that we have arrived at the right space of possibilities than that we have arrived at the right ontology. The third benefit is that Hume’s dictum —- at least the version I aim to defend here —- may be applied to physical theories more or less as we find them, and therefore we can practice something resembling ontology without having to force our theories into some Procrustean bed, such as a first-order language. (shrink)

This article puts forward two hypotheses about David Hume’s position on the epistemic status of consciousness. Firstly, it is argued that Hume does not offer any explicit argument in favor of the thesis that the mind cannot be mistaken about a mental state of which it is conscious, and some possible interpretations that could offer this argument are questioned. Secondly, it is argued that Hume is committed to the thesis that the mind is conscious of all its mental phenomena as (...) they occur, and the passages in which the philosopher seems to refer to non-conscious mental operations — which would contradict that thesis — are explained on the basis of a theory of degrees of consciousness according to the vividness of perceptions. (shrink)

흄에게 있어서 주체와 주체화의 문제는 자신이 주장하려고 하는 것보다 더 큰 의미를 가진다. 우리는 흄이 주장하는 주체성에서 근대를 넘어서는 사유, 현대적 주체성에 대한 관점의 선취를 본다. 그것은 주체가 주어진 것 안에서 구성된다는 것, 이 수동성이야말로 주체를 이해하는 중요한 요소이다. 우리는 마르크스나 정신분석학이 소화된 푸코나 들뢰즈와 같은 철학, 즉 현대적 주체성을 그려 보여주는 철학의 시원적 지점으로서 흄의 철학을 참고할 필요가 있다. 따라서 이 글은 흄의 주체화의 문제를 수동성의 맥락 안에서 다룬다. 이러한 흄의 주체성은 근대적 특성을 닮고 있으면서도 근대성을 넘어서는 사유의 지평을 (...) 보여준다. 그리고 우리는 근대에 이미 실천적 주체에 대한 사유를 흄을 통해서 볼 수 있다. (shrink)

Can reason play a significant role in making moral distinctions and in generating moral precepts? In this book I attempt to provide Hume's answers to these questions in the light of his employment of the 'Experimen tal Method', his doctrine of perceptions, and his analysis of reason. In addition to this, attention is paid to some of Hume's rationalist predeces sors - most notably, Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston - in order to assess Hume's critique of the rationalists. Regarding the (...) preparation of this book I wish to thank Professor Ronald J. Butler who introduced me to Hume's writings. Professors W. J. Huggett, R. F. McRae, and F. E. Sparshott each read the original draft of this book and provided me with extremely valuable comments and criticisms. My wife Barbara Tweyman and my mother Fay Tweyman provided me with constant support throughout the time I was preparing this book, and for this, as well as for many other things, I will always be grateful. My father-in-law, the late Joseph Millstone, a man I dearly loved and respected, also provided me with support during the time I was working on this book. His death is for me an incalculable loss, and his memory is something I will always cherish. (shrink)

In section 1.4.4 of the Treatise, “Of the modern philosophy,” Hume offers a skeptical argument concerning the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The argument in that section is often understood to aim to undermine the modern philosophy’s account of body, according to which bodies lack paradigmatic secondary qualities, by showing that it has “extravagant” skeptical consequences. I argue that Hume does not reject the core commitments of the modern philosophy. His aim in T 1.4.4 is not to undermine any (...) particular account of body but rather to establish the deeply rooted inadequacy of our cognition of external bodies. (shrink)

This collection contains fourteen critical essays on Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*, plus an Introduction: 1 The Association of Ideas in Hume’s Treatise (John P. Wright), 2 Methodizing Hume’s Metaphysics (Donald L. M. Baxter), 3 Hume on Belief (Jennifer Smalligan Marǔsić), 4 “All the Logic I think Proper to Employ”: Hume’s Rules by which to Judge of Causes and Effects (Hsueh Qu), 5 Imagining the Unseen: The External World of Hume’s Treatise (Angela Coventry), 6 The Updating Problem for Hume’s (...) Account of Belief in Personal Identity (Annemarie Butler), 7 Experimental Philosophy, Blind Submission, and Hume’s Other Sceptical Principles (Miren Boehm), 8 How to Read Book 2 of the Treatise (Katharina Paxman), 9 Hume on Curiosity: The Conclusion to Treatise Book 2? (Emilio Mazza), 10 Hume’s Geography of Feeling in A Treatise of Human Nature (Don Garrett), 11 Some Vexations about Character in Hume’s Treatise (Elizabeth S. Radcliffe), 12 Hume on Promising and Self-Obligation (Rachel Cohon), 13 No Men Are Created Equal: Rank, Passions, and Virtues in Hume’s Treatise (Margaret Watkins), 14 The Eighteenth-Century British Reception of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (Mark G. Spencer and Mikko Tolonen). -/- . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Reviewed by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers by Brian C. Ribeiro Donald C. Ainslie Brian C. Ribeiro. Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers. Brill: Leiden, 2021. Pp. 165. Hardback, $154.00. Brian C. Ribeiro’s Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers is a charming and quirky investigation of his three titular skeptics. It is perhaps best understood as a skeptical investigation of skepticism. By that I mean that, like a good Pyrrhonist, Ribeiro explains how (...) things appear to him without claiming to lay down a doctrine or dogma. His topic is how and why skepticism still matters (7). And he suggests that those who are moved by skeptical arguments can learn intellectual modesty from them and thereby achieve a degree of philosophical “calmness of soul” (141).Ribeiro approaches his three figures by taking the cogency of their skeptical arguments for granted. There is little investigation of why these philosophers call various beliefs into question, and his concern is rather what remains once the skeptical doubts are taken on board. Because what he calls “Pyrrhonizing” philosophers reveal that large swaths of our beliefs lack epistemic merit, they also show us how we are not fully rational creatures in our everyday lives. In the case of Sextus, Ribeiro’s focus is on the famous question of whether skeptics can live their skepticism once they have actually suspended all belief. With Sextus, as with Montaigne and Hume, Ribeiro opts for the more radical of the interpretive options; he is not persuaded by Michael Frede’s suggestion that Pyrrhonists restrict their suspension only to abstruse matters, not the everyday (51). But even if we follow the “four-fold way” (20–23) that Sextus offers us as guides for life—the directives of nature, feelings, custom, and expertise—Ribeiro still thinks we will inevitably fall back into belief. He concludes that the original Pyrrhonists should be read aspirationally: insofar as we develop our capacities [End Page 517] to argue on both sides of every question and thus are able to suspend judgment, to that extent we will achieve tranquility. In the case of Montaigne, Ribeiro focuses on his Christian fideism. Once he recognizes the incapacity of reason to resolve intellectual problems, he falls back on faith. And Ribeiro argues that the Catholic flavor of this faith is simply a reflection of Montaigne’s surroundings. In a different community, he could just as easily have embraced a different faith. The heart of the book concerns Hume, whom Ribeiro discusses in three chapters, as opposed to the one each devoted to Sextus and Montaigne. In keeping with his interpretive preferences, Ribeiro’s Hume is a radical skeptic, though he acknowledges the significant yet “utterly perplexing” (95n22) naturalist strains that are also present. Ribeiro takes the resulting tension to be insoluble (98), though I was not convinced. Consider that, in both the Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume uses causal reasoning to investigate causal reasoning. He learns that our ideas are caused by prior impressions; that repeated experience of conjoint events causes us to associate our ideas of similar events; and so on. In the Treatise, he concludes the argument that association is at the root of such causal reasoning by presenting a set of rules, a “logic,” for it. The argument is not as such skeptical, though when Hume “recasts” it in the first Enquiry, he does so in terms of “sceptical doubts” and a “sceptical solution.” In the Treatise, “total” and “extravagant” skepticism come into play only as “systems of philosophy” that Hume uses to shed light on his own core commitments. The problem, I think, is that Ribeiro tends to read Hume a little too literally, as if he is himself falling prey to the skeptical upheaval of the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, or the final section of the first Enquiry. But I would suggest that Hume is rather deploying the rhetoric of skepticism in these discussions, using it for his ultimate philosophical ends (a point that is especially clear in Ribeiro’s favorite of Hume’s works, the Dialogues). He is showing his reader how his naturalistic philosophical project is itself rooted in human nature, and thus does not yield insight into the intrinsic structure of... (shrink)

Focusing on the topics of empiricism, naturalism, imagination, and social relations, the paper examines the ways in which Quine and Anderson’s projects in naturalized epistemology may be understood as successors to Hume’s epistemological framework. The paper concludes with some remarks on the normative side of naturalized epistemology to show that situating these thinkers together may illuminate one of the more controversial aspects of Hume’s philosophy to do with naturalism and skepticism.

Many philosophers have found in Hume’s skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding the materials for an argument that generalizes from induction to other domains, like our beliefs in the external world, other minds, and the past. This chapter offers a novel reconstruction of that argument and identifies the principles that are responsible for its capacity to generalize beyond induction. Next, it presents a classical reading of Hume’s skeptical solution and shows that Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory is close in (...) spirit to it. After that, it develops two objections to entitlement theory: it relies on the truth of deeply contingent propositions that are not a priori rational, and it does not manage to redefine the concept of epistemic rationality while offering an effective anti-skeptical response. The chapter concludes with a constructive suggestion: some passages that support a non-classical reading of Hume’s positive views on induction offer the materials to reject the steps of the skeptical argument that cause trouble for entitlement theory. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of philosophers have promoted a quasi-realist (or projectivist) interpretation of Hume's theory of causation. In this paper, we argue against the quasi-realist interpretation of Hume, on the grounds that there is a direct clash between a fundamental element of Hume's system (his empiricist theory of content) and one of the main constraints that governs any form of quasi-realism (and so a fortiori, quasi-realism about causation).

The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) is widely regarded as the greatest and most significant English-speaking philosopher and often seen as having had the most influence on the way philosophy is practiced today in the West. His reputation is based not only on the quality of his philosophical thought but also on the breadth and scope of his writings, which ranged over metaphysics, epistemology, morals, politics, religion, and aesthetics. The Handbook's 38 newly commissioned chapters are divided into six parts: Central (...) Themes; Metaphysics and Epistemology; Passion, Morality and Politics; Aesthetics, History, and Economics; Religion; Hume and the Enlightenment; and After Hume. The volume also features an introduction from editor Paul Russell and a chapter on Hume's biography. (shrink)

This paper provides a brief history of some critical responses and expansions of Hume on external objects, with a particular emphasis on the relevance of developmental psychology.

L'empirisme transcendantal élaboré par Gilles Deleuze n'est pas le fruit du hasard : il résulte de lectures critiques et d'un véritable remaniement de concepts, notamment dans ses monographies des années cinquante et soixante. Or on lit généralement les œuvres de maturité de Deleuze sans trop s'attarder sur ces premiers écrits. De même, la question de la subjectivité dans son œuvre est souvent laissée au second plan, et l'on constate dans la littérature secondaire des opinions diamétralement opposées quant au statut du (...) sujet chez Deleuze. Le présent ouvrage reconstruit la notion deleuzienne de subjectivité à partir des premières monographies que le philosophe a consacrées à Hume, Kant, Nietzsche et Bergson. Il confronte les œuvres de ces auteurs aux monographies de Deleuze, et réarticule les concepts de la période de 'Différence et répétition' (singularités, habitudes, champ transcendantal, etc.) autour des questions sur la genèse et le statut de la subjectivité."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Ce livre naît de la conviction qu'il est impossible de saisir le sens de la philosophie de Pierre Bayle sans la mettre en contexte dans les grands débats du siècle. Dans cette perspective, le scepticisme n'était pas pour lui incompatible avec le rationalisme, si l'on entend le premier comme raison critique exigeante et le second comme recherche qui fait éclater tout dogmatisme. C'est la notion et la méthode d'hypothèse qui gagnent du terrain, en fondant la tolérance et annonçant la polémique (...) contre l'esprit de système. David Hume est l'un des lecteurs majeurs de Bayle : de la phase pyrrhonienne du Treatise à celle, académique, de la First Enquiry, du refus des hypothèses aux conjectures de plus en plus audacieuses dans l'étude des rapports body-mind et dans la critique du théisme expérimental avancée dans les Dialogues. On découvre ainsi des côtés radicaux dans la pensée tant de Bayle que de Hume, sans les ramener simplement l'un au scepticisme, l'autre à l'empirisme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

이 논문에서 나는 흄의 관념이론을 검토한다. 그렇게 하는 과정에서 우리는 흄이 『인성론』의 여러 장에서 ‘관념’이라는 말을 사용하고 있음을 알게 되고 흄의 ‘관념’에 관해 여러 가지 방식의 해석이 존재함을 알게 된다. 우선 우리는 표준적 해석으로서 관념을 ‘이미지(image)’로 보는 입장을 검토한다. 두 번째 해석은 관념을 ‘작용(act)’으로 보는 것이고, 세 번째 해석은 관념을 ‘대상(object)’으로 보는 것이다. 그리고 네 번째 해석은 관념을 ‘뇌의 인상(brain impression)’으로 보는 것이다. 네 번째 해석과 관련하여 몇몇의 주석가들은 흄이 지각을 표상이라고 설명하는 방식을 다루는데 있어서 신경생리학적 개념을 사용한 것에 주목한다.나는 (...) 흄을 실재론자로 해석하기 위해 최근의 논의와 관련하여 흄의 '관념들'에 관한 또 다른 의미를 보여주고자 한다. 실재론은 최근의 흄 학자들 사이의 주요 쟁점 중 하나이다. 최근에 많은 흄 학자들은 흄을 실재론자로 읽으려고 한다. 그들은 소위 '새로운 흄주의자들'이다. 흄의 '생각 가능한 것 (conceiving)'과 '가정 (supposing)'에 대한 개념과 외부 대상의 존재 및 원인에 관한 우리의 믿음에 관한 흄의 입장은 뉴 흄 (New Hume)의 논의와 여러 면에서 특별히 관련이 있다.이 논문에서 나는 흄의 회의론적 실재론의 경력을 지적함으로써 실재론을 지지하고자 한다. 흄은 자신의 경험주의적 관념이론에 따라 의미 이론의 개척자로서 출발한다. 그런 다음 그는 "지각 이외의 것들이 존재한다고 가정하는 것은 이해할 만하며 큰 힘을 가지고 우리가 그와 같은 것들의 본질에 대해 (확실한) 지식을 가질 수 없다는 점을 표명하는 것이 쉽다는 것을 인정하면서 멈춘다."(Strawson, 2000, p. 16). 이러한 점이 존라이트가 말하는 '회의주의적 실재론’의 핵심이며, 이 논문에서 나는 흄의 실재론은 이러한 의미의 실재론이라는 것을 보이고자 한다. (shrink)

A tradução a seguir tem como pretensão demonstrar o modo como Gaston Berger (1896-1960) em seu texto Husserl et Hume, promove uma articulação entre a fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl e o empirismo de David Hume. No texto, o autor apresenta a maneira como a fenomenologia ao valorizar a experiência (tendo-a como imprescindível) se aproxima da filosofia de Hume, e ao tratá-la como insuficiente por si mesma, acaba por estabelecer uma estreita relação com o idealismo transcendental kantiano. O fato é que (...) por mais que Husserl acredite ter superado a imediaticidade dos fatos empíricos vindo a construir um novo sistema de idealismo transcendental, a sua fenomenologia jamais deixou de clara fazer referência a Hume. (shrink)

‘British Empiricism’ is a name traditionally used to pick out a group of eighteenth-century thinkers who prioritised knowledge via the senses over reason or the intellect and who denied the existence of innate ideas. The name includes most notably John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. The counterpart to British Empiricism is traditionally considered to be Continental Rationalism that was advocated by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, all of whom lived in Continental Europe beyond the British Isles and all embraced innate (...) ideas. This article characterizes empiricists more broadly as those thinkers who accept Locke’s Axiom that there is no idea in the mind that cannot be traced back to some particular experience. It includes British-Irish Philosophy from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century. As well as exploring the traditional connections among empiricism and metaphysics and epistemology, it examines how British empiricists dealt with issues in moral philosophy and the existence and nature of God. The article identifies some challenges to the standard understanding of British Empiricism by including early modern thinkers from typically marginalised groups, especially women. Finally, in showing that there is nothing uniquely British about being an empiricist, it examines a particular case study of the eighteenth-century philosopher Anton Wilhelm Amo, the first African to receive a doctorate in Europe. (shrink)

A key theme throughout Maimon’s works is a circularity he diagnoses at the heart of Kant’s response to Hume. The objective validity of Kant’s category of causality ultimately rests, Maimon argues, upon the logical status of the hypothetical judgement – on its inclusion among the forms of pure general logic. In turn, however, the inclusion of the hypothetical within pure general logic itself rests upon the objective validity of causal judgements. This article examines Maimon’s diagnosis and traces it back to (...) a debate that has its origins in Wolff’s German Logic, concerning the relationship between categorical and hypothetical judgements. (shrink)

The paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of Hume's theory of personal identity, by examining a conflict regarding the vivacity of the self in his writings about sympathy. Although the mechanism of sympathy supposes that self is the liveliest perception of thought, when we consider sympathy through the perspective of the ‘desire of company’, we find that self lacks vivacity and, without alterity, it would be in reality nothing. Our objective is to present the conflict and show that, far (...) from being a contradiction in Hume's thinking, it is consistent with how the philosopher conceives personal identity as a product of imagination, that is, a perception that, like any other, exists within the flow of perceptions. (shrink)

Si l'on s'en tient à la distinction qu'établit l'Introduction de L'histoire naturelle de la religion entre la question du fondement de la religion dans la raison et celle de son origine dans la nature humaine, on sera tenté d'attribuer à chacun des deux principaux textes de Hume sur la religion - L'histoire naturelle de la religion et les Dialogues sur la religion naturelle -un objet propre, déterminant un type de discours philosophique particulier. L'histoire naturelle développerait un discours causal, principalement généalogique, (...) sur les religions positives, toutes populaires en leur fond, tandis que les Dialogues auraient à charge de mener l'examen critique des prétentions philosophiques de la religion naturelle. Il y aurait d'un côté la religion du peuple, ou de l'humanité encore inculte, et de l'autre la religion des savants, ou de l'humanité civilisée. Mais les choses ne sont pas si simples. Car d'une part, en montrant que le polythéisme, religion primitive de l'humanité inculte, conduit naturellement au théisme, L'histoire naturelle montre par là même que le théisme, dans lequel il faut comprendre la religion naturelle elle-même, a ses origines dans la superstition populaire. D'autre part, les trois dernières parties des Dialogues, consacrées aux attributs moraux de la divinité (parties X et XI) et à l'utilité ou la nécessité de la religion pour la morale et la société (partie XII), mettent en évidence les prétentions pratiques, et non simplement spéculatives, de la religion naturelle. Autrement dit, la superstition populaire a un devenir philosophique ou spéculatif, dans le théisme, et inversement la religion naturelle rejoint les religions positives dans leur prétention à régir la conduite humaine. C'est pourquoi, loin d'être totalement distincts et indépendants, le discours de L'histoire naturelle et celui des Dialogues se croisent et sont dans un rapport d'étroite intertextualité. Si une lecture interne de L'histoire naturelle suffit pour comprendre que la religion naturelle est bien, au même titre que les autres sortes de religion, l'objet de cette dissertation, ainsi comprise, L'histoire naturelle porte néanmoins un éclairage sur les Dialogues, en ce qu'elle permet de montrer que le ressort des arguments de Cléanthe et de Déméa n'est autre que la superstition. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to bring the historical origins of sociology and Hume’s philosophy of society a bit closer together by examining some of the ways that Hume’s thought has influenced the directions of sociological thinking. I survey Humean traces in key figures in the field of sociology across the nineteenth to twenty-first centuries in Europe and the United States of America on the topics of positivism, economics, convention, custom and habit, religion, morality, and the self.

The review of the works and the writings of philosophers regarding the origin of philosophical concepts and the origin of the concepts and imaginations before it are indicative of the gradual and influenced formation and importance of this issue from a series of ideas in both the west and Islam. In the western world, the idea of innate ideas raised by rationalists and the rejection of the same idea by empiricists finally leads the Scottish philosopher Hume, who is evasive from (...) the mysterious philosophy,to tract the origin of concepts and adaptations and by presenting a plan to refer concepts and adaptations has beaten all philosophies and introduced them as illusory and invalid concepts,and appeals to justifying the existence of these concepts in the mind to psychological and imaginary bases. later and in the passing of time due to the entry of western ideas into Iran,especially in the contemporary era,the issue of the origin of concepts and ideas (in general) and the origin of philosophical(in particular) by Allamh Tabatabayi has doubled its value and importance. Allameh, like Hume while rejecting the idea of innate and preconceived notions of the mind and bringing science to the field of presence and emphasizing the inherent existence and discovery of science and by reference all concepts and ideas to present science the validity and epistemological value of the philosophical concepts which are in Hume's philosophical dictionary restores what was disappeared and gives new life to philosophy and its concepts. (shrink)

Vorwort.--Einleitung.--Francis Bacon.--John Locke.--George Berkeley.--David Hume.

Modality: A History provides readers a sweeping study of the history of philosophical work on modal concepts. Everyday discourse is saturated with appeals to what might be the case or to what must be true or to what cannot happen. Possibility, necessity, and impossibility are modal terms, and philosophers have long wondered how to best understand them. This volume traces the history of some of the most prominent and important contributions to our understanding of possibility and necessity over the past (...) two and half millennia of western philosophy, from ancient Greek philosophers through current debates in the 21st century. Over the course of nine chapters from prominent scholars, this volume traces a history of modal theorizing that begins with extended discussions of Aristotle and the Stoics. Several chapters discuss insights and disagreements among Latin, Arabic, and Jewish medieval scholastics, such as Al-Ghazâlî, Scotus, and Crescas. Three chapters center on early modern philosophers, whose modal views were deeply shaped by this conceptual inheritance but also departed from it in significant ways: Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume. Kant and Hegel's modal contributions are presented in their own chapter, and another chapter traces the legacy of Kant's account on early-to-mid 20th century modal views, including Husserl, Heidegger, Russell, and Quine. The revival of modal metaphysics in the more recent work of Kripke, Marcus, and Lewis has led to a new flourishing of modal theories, including in recent debates among neo-Aristotelians, as the final chapter illustrates. Although modal concepts are interesting and important on their own, theories of modality often intersect with other significant philosophical topics, such as time, freedom, and God. Modal concepts also extend beyond metaphysics. To illustrate the role of modality in other domains, several small-scale studies, or Reflections, are dispersed among these main chapters on modality in cosmology, religion, music, literature, and logic. Readers will learn how a seemingly timeless and changeless cluster of modal concepts have undergone significant revisions and enjoy a rich developmental history. (shrink)

¿Qué significa "fracasar" para un naturalista metodológico? ¿Está éste abocado al escepticismo, y es este un fracaso? Para responder a estas preguntas, realizaré (1) un análisis de lo que se considera "naturalismo" en Hume, desde el que analizaré (2) la crisis escéptica narrada en la conclusión del Libro I del Tratado. Allí defenderé que la metafórica utilizada, engarzada con el concepto de fracaso, permite dos lecturas: una que une necesariamente naturalismo metodológico y escepticismo mitigado, y otra que no. No obstante, (...) concluiré que en ambos casos se dibuja una misma experiencia de límite que permite construir ciencia y filosofía no-excepcionalistas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to My CriticsExperience Embodied: Early Modern Accounts of the Human Place in NatureAnik Waldow (bio)I would like to thank Dario Perinetti and Hynek Janoušek for their thoughtful comments and the time and effort they invested into my work. Their reflections drive attention to important questions and make helpful suggestions about how some of the arguments of the book can be further developed and clarified. In what follows, I (...) will first discuss the proposal to distinguish between a narrow and a broad sense of experience, then specify how I understand the connection between having a body and being able to engage in experiences. In this context, I will also discuss Janoušek’s suggestion to draw further distinctions between the different senses in which the concept of body relates to experience in Descartes and Hume. In the last section, I address the question of whether the focus on bodies risks undermining the claim that experience is intersubjectively constituted.1. Narrow versus Broad Concept of ExperienceDario Perinetti raises the worry that during the early modern period, and even before, the concept of experience was mainly used to discuss epistemological questions, and that therefore the Broad Experience Thesis fails. According to this thesis, it is reductive to think of experience in exclusively epistemological terms, since this ignores that many early modern writers approached questions about the benefits and dangers of experience from a wider moral perspective. This perspective, as I argue in [End Page 329] Experience Embodied, was concerned with the training of the mind’s intellectual and moral capacities, the role of pleasure and pain (and other affects) in epistemic and moral judgement, and, more generally, the question of how it is possible to be self-determined agents who do more than simply respond to the experiences they have.To support his claim, Perinetti cites the Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Cauvin’s Lexicon Rationale sive Thesaurus Philosophicus, but also Aristotle, Bacon, and Hobbes. The approach I pursue in my book is based on the usage of the concept of experience by the authors examined (Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Herder, Kant). I will turn to the analysis of this usage in a moment, but before this let me say a few words about dictionaries.It is in principle not surprising that a dictionary like the Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie—and its discussion of Aristotle, Bacon, and Hobbes—supports the traditional approach to experience as a centrally epistemological concept. Its entry on “experience” revolves around the idea that philosophers are either empiricists or rationalists.1 Yet it is precisely the establishment of this distinction that has substantially contributed to promoting a reductive concept of experience. After all, rationalism and empiricism are labels typically used to describe competing epistemological positions.2 It is also worth noting that the dictionary’s entry is from the 1970s. Because of this, it operates with a picture of the history of philosophy that has long been challenged by studies that show that there is far more to early modern philosophy than the standard works of some selected canonical figures.3 When dealing with Locke, the entry for instance exclusively focuses on An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and does not even mention that experience is a key concept in Some Thoughts Concerning Education.The rather short and general entry on experience in Chauvin’s Lexicon Philosophicum (1692) is not very telling either—at least not if treated in isolation from other dictionaries and encyclopedias of the period, such as D’Alembert and Diderot’s Encylopédie: a tremendously influential work, that, according to its editors, is in itself committed to the Baconian method.4 And here César Chesneau Du Marsais’s entry on experience straightforwardly highlights the moral dimension of the knowledge acquired through experience:Experience, abstract term, commonly means the knowledge acquired through a long life, combined with the reflections made on what one has seen, and on the good and bad that has happened to us. In this sense, reading history is a highly profitable way of gaining experience; it tells us of events, and shows us the good or bad repercussions and consequences of these events.5The... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Experience, Embodiment, and History: Remarks on Waldow’s Experience EmbodiedDario Perinetti (bio)Anik Waldow’s Experience Embodied delves into what she calls the “early modern debate on the concept of experience.”1 In her rich and wide-ranging account, she shows how a group of key early modern philosophers dealt with a puzzle regarding the connection between the subjective and objective aspects of experience. The puzzle stems from the fact that experience reveals as (...) much about the experiencing subject as it does about the experienced world. Waldow believes that a one-sided focus on the role of “the way of ideas” in shaping the subjective aspect of experience has distorted our understanding of early modern views on experience.According to the traditional reading, the puzzle presents an intractable challenge to early modern philosophers. For if we experience the world through ideas, and ideas are internal mental states, it becomes difficult to reconcile the explanations required for the psychology of our mental states with those needed for the natural sciences dealing with objective states of affairs. But, so Waldow claims, the challenge can be successfully faced once we understand experience as embodied: “We have to think of experience as embodied to do justice to both explanatory requirements, because it is the body that connects the experiencing mind and its subjectivity with the factual realm of the world.”2Waldow disputes the commonly held view that early modern philosophers saw experience as an interaction between mind and world. She contends, instead, that most early modern philosophers understood experience as embodied. The thesis is presented through a series of “case studies” or “snapshots.” These snapshots focus on the way Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Herder, and Kant accounted for the [End Page 319] embodied dimension of experience. The case studies are noteworthy because they succeed in revealing the significance of embodied experience for the authors in question. Waldow manages to expose the significance of embodied experience by focusing on the connection between the authors’ central philosophical views and their views on topics like education, the psychology of emotions, and history, which are often considered of lesser interest by contemporary philosophers.For example, in chapter 1, Waldow argues that connecting Descartes’s mind-body dualism with his understanding of reason as a tool for human self-determination and agency, makes it possible to see how, contrary to commonly held assumptions, Descartes’s dualism aligns well with an understanding of experience as embodied. This weakens the view that Descartes defended a conception of reason as disembodied, and instead, allows for a reading of Cartesian philosophy as aligned with a more naturalistic picture of human nature. In her chapters on Hume and Herder, Waldow sheds light on the way these philosophers perceived reason and experience as deeply rooted in bodily sensibility, as well as in historically shaped moral attitudes and social norms. This focus on embodied experience is central for highlighting how, in different ways, these philosophers endorsed the naturalistic project of understanding the human place in nature. Building on these results, Waldow approaches the problem of the relationship between naturalism and the methodology proper to philosophy from a different and original angle. Her final chapters on Herder and Kant present two ways of understanding the connection between philosophy and the empirical sciences. In her view, Herder advocates for a naturalistic methodology as a way to provide answers to deep metaphysical questions, as well as to empirical questions related to human nature and its connection to culture, society, and history. Unlike Herder, Kant appears as promoting a form of methodological dualism that distinguishes conceptual questions regarding the structure of experience from empirical questions regarding the experience of concrete, embodied human beings. Waldow succeeds in highlighting this contrast between two methodological approaches, thanks to a journey that takes us through the canonical texts of these two thinkers, as well as through less frequented texts such as Herder’s work on the origins of language and Kant’s writings on anthropology, geography, natural history, and history. As can be seen, Waldow’s book not only provides a valuable insight into the significance of embodied experience in early modern philosophy, but also offers refreshing and unexpected readings of the... (shrink)

The text first briefly summarizes the contents of Annik Waldow's book and then attempts to highlight the diverse meanings of the concept of bodily experience in eighteenth-century philosophy, especially in the philosophy of David Hume. After a brief distinction between subjective and objective bodily experience in Descartes, I point to six different meanings of this concept in David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. One of these notions, the body as a center of reference, turns out to be important for interpreting (...) the meaning of Hume's notion of the general point of view and of moral judgment of character. In connection with this, I conclude by providing two somewhat different readings of Hume's example of judging Marc Brutus's character from T 3. 3. 1. 16, which works with finding the optimal point of view that implies the bodily form of our experience. (shrink)