About this topic
Summary

Making a decision is a way of forming an intention, at least other things equal. In making a decision we seem to be active – decisions seem to be mental actions. One question philosophers have asked about decisions is whether and in what sense decisions really are actions. Other questions include: (i) what makes a decision rational? (ii) do decisions provide reasons to act as you have decided? (iii) are decisions reducible to other kinds of mental states or events (e.g. desire-formation). Since decisions lead to intentions, many discussions of intentions are also relevant to discussions of decisions, and vice-versa.

Key works For discussion of whether decisions are actions, see Mele 2000 and Pink 1996. For discussion of the rationality of decisions and of whether decisions give us reasons to act, see Pink 1996Smith 1991, and Cullity 2008.
Introductions Pettit 2010
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199 found
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1 — 50 / 199
  1. added 2020-05-25
    Defeated Ambivalence.Hili Razinsky - 2020 - International Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2):173-188.
    Ambivalence is often presented through cases of defeated ambivalence and multivalence, in which opposed attitudes suggest mutual isolation and defeat each other. Properly understood, however, ambivalence implies the existence of poles that are conflictually yet rationally interlinked and are open to non-defeated joint conduct. This paper considers cases that range from indecisiveness and easy adoption of conflicting attitudes, to tragically conflicted deliberation and to cases of shifting between self-deceptively serious attitudes. Analyzing such cases as variants of defeated ambivalence, I argue (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-24
    Falsificationism and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.
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  3. added 2020-04-27
    Scientific Choice, its effects of values and its effects on science.Majid Asadpour - 2014 - Dissertation, Sharif University of Technology
    This thesis seeks to demonstrate the importance (important status) of “subject” and “question” in science and also wants to show that choosing this issue is affected by values. There are various values, especially outside of science, which play role in subject choices made by scientists, scientific institutions and scientific policies, and therefore influence science by this way. So after giving an account of the term “scientific choice”, which has been proposed by Alvin Weinberg in 1963, we try to examine the (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-23
    Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Decisions are made under uncertainty when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and one is uncertain to which the act will lead. Decisions are made under indeterminacy when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and it is indeterminate to which the act will lead. This paper develops a theory of (synchronic and diachronic) decision-making under indeterminacy that portrays the rational response to such situations as inconstant. Rational agents have to capriciously and randomly choose how to resolve (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-23
    Argumentation, Decision and Rationality.Fabio Paglieri - unknown
    From a decision theoretic perspective, arguments stem from decisions made by arguers. Despite some promising results, this approach remains underdeveloped in argumentation theories, mostly because it is assumed to be merely descriptive. This assumption is mistaken: considering arguments as the product of decisions brings into play various normative models of rational choice. The challenge is rather to reconcile strategic rationality with other normative constraints relevant for argumentation, such as inferential validity and dialectical appropriateness.
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  6. added 2020-04-23
    Choice and Action: In Defense of Richard Jeffrey's "Logic of Decision".John Piers Rawling - 1989 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    Richard Jeffrey's Logic of Decision has come under fire on the grounds that it appears to prescribe irrational decisions under certain circumstances . A number of authors see the source of Jeffrey's difficulty as a lack of sensitivity to causal distinctions of a certain kind. They have proposed modifications of Jeffrey's theory to overcome this putative deficiency. David Lewis argues, convincingly, that these modified theories are all more or less the same. In essence, they all augment the Logic of Decision (...)
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  7. added 2020-04-23
    Decision, Probability and Utility: Selected Readings.Peter Gärdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin (eds.) - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    Decision theory and the theory of rational choice have recently been the subjects of considerable research by philosophers and economists. However, no adequate anthology exists which can be used to introduce students to the field. This volume is designed to meet that need. The essays included are organized into five parts covering the foundations of decision theory, the conceptualization of probability and utility, pholosophical difficulties with the rules of rationality and with the assessment of probability, and causal decision theory. The (...)
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  8. added 2020-04-23
    Rational Choice and Expected Utility.Reed Brannon Richter - 1985 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
    This dissertation primarily consists of three related, published articles on decision theory. All three articles are at least in part a response to various problems and issues raised by an approach known as "causal decision theory". But "Rationality, Group Choice and Expected Utility" goes beyond the issue of causal versus non-causal decision theory, and deals in general with the subject of analysing rational choice in terms of expected utility. I develop a new way of handling cases of rational cooperation within (...)
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  9. added 2020-04-23
    Newcomb Decision Problems and Causal Decision Theory.Peter Charles Menzies - 1984 - Dissertation, Stanford University
    Newcomb's problem, first presented by Robert Nozick in 1969, has aroused much interest among philosophers because it appears to involve a conflict between two intuitively attractive principles of decision: the Principle of Dominance and the decision-rule of Richard Jeffrey's decision theory, the Principle of Maximizing Conditional Expected Utility. I believe that the Principle of Dominance makes the rational prescription in Newcomb's problem and, consequently, that the problem constitutes a counterexample to Jeffrey's theory. ;Setting aside the question whether Jeffrey's decision theory (...)
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  10. added 2020-02-14
    Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward F. McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a major contribution to the theory of rational choice which will be of particular interest to philosophers and economists. The author sets out the foundations of rational choice, and then sketches a dynamic choice framework in which principles of ordering and independence follow from a number of apparently plausible conditions. However, there is potential conflict among these conditions, and when they are weakened to avoid it the usual foundations of rational choice no longer prevail. The thrust of the (...)
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  11. added 2020-02-12
    Rational Decision and Causality.James Cargile - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):163-168.
  12. added 2020-02-02
    What Aristotelian Decisions Cannot Be.Jozef Müller - 2016 - Ancient Philosophy 36 (1):173-195.
    I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian (...)
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  13. added 2020-01-31
    Neural Dynamics of Decision Making Under Risk: Affective Balance and Cognitive-Emotional Interactions.Stephen Grossberg & William E. Gutowski - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (3):300-318.
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  14. added 2020-01-27
    The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity.Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst - 2020 - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
    This volume provides a framework for approaching and understanding mental normativity. It presents cutting-edge research on the ethics of belief as well as innovative research beyond the normativity of belief—and towards an ethics of mind. By moving beyond traditional issues of epistemology the contributors discuss the most current ideas revolving around rationality, responsibility, and normativity. -/- The book’s chapters are divided into two main parts. Part I discusses contemporary issues surrounding the normativity of belief. The essays here cover topics such (...)
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  15. added 2020-01-22
    What the Tortoise Will Say to Achilles – or “Taking the Traditional Interpretation of the Sea Battle Argument Seriously”.Ramiro Peres - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
    This dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise – in the spirit of those of Carroll and Hofstadter – argues against the idea, identified with the “traditional” interpretation of Aristotle’s “sea battle argument”, that future contingents are an exception to the Principle of Bivalence. It presents examples of correct everyday predictions, without which one would not be able to decide and to act; however, doing this is incompatible with the belief that the content of these predictions lacks a truth-value. The cost (...)
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  16. added 2020-01-12
    Deciding as Bringing Deliberation to a Close.Philippe Urfalino - 2010 - Social Science Information 49 (1):111-140.
    The notion of decision is almost never defined with precision and often assimilated to the notion of choice. This article defines deciding as bringing deliberation to a close, on the basis of two characteristics: deciding puts an end to deliberation rather than constituting the end produced by deliberation ; and decision produces an obligation. In the light of this definition, it first examines the difference between individual and collective decisions, then the rules of collective decision as stopping rules.
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  17. added 2020-01-12
    Rational Decision and Causality. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1987 - International Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):72-74.
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  18. added 2020-01-10
    Coffee Cues Elevate Arousal and Reduce Level of Construal.Eugene Y. Chan & Sam J. Maglio - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 70:57-69.
    Coffee and tea are two beverages commonly-consumed around the world. Therefore, there is much research regarding their physiological effects. However, less is known about their psychological meanings. Derived from a predicted lay association between coffee and arousal, we posit that exposure to coffee-related cues should increase arousal, even in the absence of actual ingestion, relative to exposure to tea-related cues. We further suggest that higher arousal levels should facilitate a concrete level of mental construal as conceptualized by Construal Level Theory. (...)
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  19. added 2020-01-06
    Book Reviews Bermúdez, José Luis . Decision Theory and Rationality . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 189. $50.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Paul Weirich - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):757-761.
  20. added 2019-12-02
    Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revisid by Decision Rules.Robert Sugden - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):425-427.
    Like many theorists before him, Paul Weirich has set out to find the Holy Grail of classical game theory: the solution concept that identifies the uniquely rational solution to every non-cooperative game. In this book, he reports an intermediate stage in his quest. He cannot actually identify the unique solution for every game but, he believes, he has found a new concept of equilibrium that is a necessary property of that solution.
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  21. added 2019-12-02
    Practical Inference.A. J. Kenny - 1966 - Analysis 26 (3):65.
  22. added 2019-11-25
    Review of Decision Theory and Rationality. [REVIEW]Igor Douven - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):59-64.
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  23. added 2019-11-25
    Why Rational Deontological Action Optimizes Subjective Value.Julian Nida-Rümelin - 2005 - ProtoSociology 21:182-193.
    In present day philosophy there are two competing views regarding practical rationality: Decision and game theory and economic theory have developed a theory of rational decision which has proven to be fruitful in many areas of social science. Practical philosophy should work with that paradigm Economic theory and decision theory do not have an adequate account of practical rationality. The homo oeconomicus model is – at best – one perspective which competes inter alia with philosophical accounts of practical reason.In this (...)
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  24. added 2019-11-17
    Digital Era Framework. Ein Bezugsrahmen für das Digitale Informationszeitalter.Jörn Lengsfeld - 2019 - 88339 Bad Waldsee, Deutschland:
    Der »Digital Era Framework« ist ein Bezugsrahmen für das digitale Informationszeitalter. Gerichtet an Wissenschaft und Praxis gleichermaßen, bietet das Konzept einen umfassenden Ansatz zur Einordnung und Analyse von Phänomenen des Digitalen Wandels, der Digitalisierung und der Digitalen Transformation. Dem »Digital Era Framework« liegt dabei ein integrierter Ansatz zur Untersuchung des Wandels zugrunde, insofern als Ursprungszustand, Veränderung und Endzustand in einem einheitlichen Schema dargestellt werden können. Der Bezugsrahmen stellt die Information in den Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung und beruht auf zwei Ordnungsmomenten: der (...)
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  25. added 2019-11-17
    Method Change Caused by Digitalization.Jörn Lengsfeld - 2019
    Digitalization goes hand in hand with a fundamental change in methods that has the potential to change people’s thinking, decisions and actions. Departing from this thesis, a structure is proposed for the analysis of the method change induced by digitalization. The article provides a brief outline of the driving forces, the forms and the effects of this method change.
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  26. added 2019-11-17
    Digital Era Framework.Jörn Lengsfeld - 2019 - Bad Waldsee:
    The "Digital Era Framework" is a reference framework for the digital information age. Targeted at science and practice alike, the concept offers a comprehensive approach for the analysis and assessment of phenomena of digital change, digitalization and digital transformation. The "Digital Era Framework" is based on an integrated approach to examine digital change, in so far as the original state, the occuring change and the final state can be represented in a uniform scheme. The framework emphasises information as the central (...)
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  27. added 2019-11-17
    Authenticity, Insight and Impaired Decision-Making Capacity in Acquired Brain Injury.Gareth S. Owen, Fabian Freyenhagen & Wayne Martin - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1):29-32.
    Thanks to Barton Palmer and John McMillan for these thoughtful commentaries. We found much to agree with and it is striking how so many of the issues relating to decision-making capacity assessment find resonances outside of an English jurisdiction. California and New Zealand are clearly grappling with a very similar set of issues and the commentaries speak to the international nature of these discussions.We will pick up on some main points the commentaries raise.As Palmer notes, DMC law is vulnerable to (...)
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  28. added 2019-11-11
    Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
    In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that epistemologists should pay attention (...)
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  29. added 2019-11-11
    G.E.M. Anscombe and Rediscovery of Practical Syllogism.Elisa Grimi - 2012 - Acta Philosophica 21 (II):351-362.
    The present paper proposes to analyse the role of the practical syllogism in G.E.M. Anscombe’s theory of action. To this end, I have rst of all chosen to examine, even if in broad terms, the conception of practical syllogism as it is present in the Aristotelian doctrine, and to reveal/delineate some critical points found within it. The following section is the central part of the paper, where, starting from § 33 of Intention, a re ection is carried out on the (...)
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  30. added 2019-09-01
    Diachronic Agency and Practical Entitlement.Matthew Heeney - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):177-198.
    As diachronic agents, we deliberate and decide in the present to perform future courses of action. Such future‐directed decisions normally enjoy a distinctive species of rational authority over subsequent thought and action. But what is the nature of this authority, and what underwrites its normative force? In this paper, I argue that our answer to this question must begin by situating future‐directed deciding within an intrapersonal model of cross‐temporal influence. The role of future‐directed deciding (and intending), then, is not to (...)
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  31. added 2019-06-06
    Making Room for Options: Moral Reasons, Imperfect Duties, and Choice: Patricia Greenspan.Patricia Greenspan - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):181-205.
    An imperfect duty such as the duty to aid those in need is supposed to leave leeway for choice as to how to satisfy it, but if our reason for a certain way of satisfying it is our strongest, that leeway would seem to be eliminated. This paper defends a conception of practical reasons designed to preserve it, without slighting the binding force of moral requirements, though it allows us to discount certain moral reasons. Only reasons that offer criticism of (...)
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  32. added 2019-06-06
    Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality.Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role (...)
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  33. added 2019-06-06
    Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447-453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
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  34. added 2019-06-05
    Invisible Women in Reproductive Technologies: Critical Reflections.Piyali Mitra - 2018 - Indian Journal of Medical Ethics 3 (2):NS: 113-9.
    The recent spectacular progress in assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) has resulted in new ethical dilemmas. Though women occupy a central role in the reproductive process, within the ART paradigm, the importance accorded to the embryo commonly surpasses that given to the mother. This commentary questions the increasing tendency to position the embryonic subject in an antagonistic relation with the mother. I examine how the mother’s reproductive autonomy is compromised in relation to that of her embryo and argue in favour of (...)
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  35. added 2019-05-29
    A Dilemma for Moral Deliberation in AI in Advance.Ryan Jenkins & Duncan Purves - forthcoming - International Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Many social trends are conspiring to drive the adoption of greater automation in society, and we will certainly see a greater offloading of human decisionmaking to robots in the future. Many of these decisions are morally salient, including decisions about how benefits and burdens are distributed. Roboticists and ethicists have begun to think carefully about the moral decision making apparatus for machines. Their concerns often center around the plausible claim that robots will lack many of the mental capacities that are (...)
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  36. added 2019-05-22
    Risk Aversion and the Long Run.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):230-253.
    This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory’s claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in the face (...)
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  37. added 2019-05-22
    Advice for the Steady: Decision Theory and the Requirements of Instrumental Rationality.Johanna Thoma - 2017 - Dissertation,
    Standard decision theory, or rational choice theory, is often interpreted to be a theory of instrumental rationality. This dissertation argues, however, that the core requirements of orthodox decision theory cannot be defended as general requirements of instrumental rationality. Instead, I argue that these requirements can only be instrumentally justified to agents who have a desire to have choice dispositions that are stable over time and across different choice contexts. Past attempts at making instrumentalist arguments for the core requirements of decision (...)
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  38. added 2019-05-06
    Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Bias Towards the Future.Preston Greene, Andrew James Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue for the irrationality of hedonic future-bias. This (...)
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  39. added 2019-03-20
    Causal Decision Theory and Decision Instability.Brad Armendt - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):263-277.
    The problem of the man who met death in Damascus appeared in the infancy of the theory of rational choice known as causal decision theory. A straightforward, unadorned version of causal decision theory is presented here and applied, along with Brian Skyrms’ deliberation dynamics, to Death in Damascus and similar problems. Decision instability is a fascinating topic, but not a source of difficulty for causal decision theory. Andy Egan’s purported counterexample to causal decision theory, Murder Lesion, is considered; a simple (...)
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  40. added 2019-03-20
    Deliberation and Pragmatic Belief.Brad Armendt - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    To what extent do our beliefs, and how strongly we hold them, depend upon how they matter to us, on what we take to be at stake on them? The idea that beliefs are sometimes stake-sensitive (Armendt 2008, 2013) is further explored here, with a focus on whether beliefs may be stake-sensitive and rational. In contexts of extended deliberation about what to do, beliefs and assessments of options interact. In some deliberations, a belief about what you will do may rationally (...)
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  41. added 2019-03-08
    Success-First Decision Theories.Preston Greene - 2018 - In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem. Cambridge University Press. pp. 115–137.
    The standard formulation of Newcomb's problem compares evidential and causal conceptions of expected utility, with those maximizing evidential expected utility tending to end up far richer. Thus, in a world in which agents face Newcomb problems, the evidential decision theorist might ask the causal decision theorist: "if you're so smart, why ain’cha rich?” Ultimately, however, the expected riches of evidential decision theorists in Newcomb problems do not vindicate their theory, because their success does not generalize. Consider a theory that allows (...)
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  42. added 2019-02-22
    Pascal’s Wager and the Origins of Decision Theory: Decision-Making by Real Decision-Makers.James Franklin - 2018 - In Paul Bartha & Lawrence Pasternack (eds.), Pascal's Wager. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27-44.
    Pascal’s Wager does not exist in a Platonic world of possible gods, abstract probabilities and arbitrary payoffs. Real decision-makers, such as Pascal’s “man of the world” of 1660, face a range of religious options they take to be serious, with fixed probabilities grounded in their evidence, and with utilities that are fixed quantities in actual minds. The many ingenious objections to the Wager dreamed up by philosophers do not apply in such a real decision matrix. In the situation Pascal addresses, (...)
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  43. added 2019-02-12
    Armin Schulz, Efficient Cognition. [REVIEW]Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:online.
  44. added 2018-11-06
    What’s a Rational Self-Torturer to Do?Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    This paper concerns Warren Quinn’s famous “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.” I argue that even if we accept his assumption that practical rationality is purely instrumental such that what he ought to do is simply a function of how the relevant options compare to each other in terms of satisfying his actual preferences that doesn’t mean that every explanation as to why he shouldn’t advance to the next level must appeal to the idea that so advancing would be suboptimal in (...)
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  45. added 2018-09-28
    Bias.Daniel Moseley - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Following Kahneman and Tversky, I examine the term ‘bias’ as it is used to refer to systematic errors. Given the central role of error in this understanding of bias, it is helpful to consider what it is to err and to distinguish different kinds of error. I identify two main kinds of error, examine ethical issues that pertain to the relation of these types of error, and explain their moral significance. Next, I provide a four-level explanatory framework for understanding biases: (...)
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  46. added 2018-08-26
    How Do You Like Me Now?Gerald Hull - manuscript
    These reflections are an attempt to get to the heart of the "reason is the slave of the passions" debate. The whole point of deliberation is to arrive at a choice. What factors persons find to be choice-relevant is a purely empirical matter. This has significant consequences for the views of Hume, Williams, Nagel, Parfit and Korsgaard regarding practical reason.
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  47. added 2018-06-29
    Book ReviewsRobert Audi,. Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision.New York: Routledge, 2005. Pp. 264. $120.00 ; $37.95. [REVIEW]Matt King - 2008 - Ethics 118 (4):717-721.
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  48. added 2018-06-20
    Extended Agency and the Problem of Diachronic Autonomy.Julia Nefsky & Sergio Tenenbaum - manuscript
    It seems to be a humdrum fact of human agency that we act on intentions or decisions that we have made at an earlier time. At breakfast, you look at the Taco Hut menu online and decide that later today you’ll have one of their avocado burritos for lunch. You’re at your desk and you hear the church bells ring the noon hour. You get up, walk to Taco Hut, and order the burrito as planned. As mundane as this sort (...)
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  49. added 2018-06-02
    Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison.Amelia Hicks - 2018 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 13. Oxford, UK: pp. 161-183.
    Several philosophers have recently argued that decision-theoretic frameworks for rational choice under risk fail to provide prescriptions for choice in cases of moral uncertainty. They conclude that there are no rational norms that are “sensitive” to a decision-maker's moral uncertainty. But in this paper, I argue that one sometimes has a rational obligation to take one's moral uncertainty into account in the course of moral deliberation. I first provide positive motivation for the view that one's moral beliefs can affect what (...)
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  50. added 2018-02-17
    Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict.Isaac Levi - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often have to juggle competing values, and that no choice will maximise satisfaction of them all. However, the prevailing account of these cases assumes that there is always a single ranking of the agent's values, and therefore no unresolvable conflict between them. Isaac Levi denies this assumption, arguing that agents often must choose without having balanced their different values and that to be rational, an act does not have to be optimal, (...)
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