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1 — 50 / 165
  1. added 2020-04-24
    Accurate Updating for the Risk-Sensitive.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa006.
    Philosophers have recently attempted to justify particular belief revision procedures by arguing that they are the optimal means towards the epistemic end of accurate credences. These attempts, however, presuppose that means should be evaluated according to classical expected utility theory; and there is a long tradition maintaining that expected utility theory is too restrictive as a theory of means–end rationality, ruling out too many natural ways of taking risk into account. In this paper, we investigate what belief-revision procedures are supported (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-28
    Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude.Sven Neth - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:252–272.
    Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-23
    On the Individuation of Choice Options.Roberto Fumagalli - forthcoming - Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
    Decision theorists have attempted to accommodate several violations of decision theory’s axiomatic requirements by modifying how agents’ choice options are individuated and formally represented. In recent years, prominent authors have worried that these modifications threaten to trivialize decision theory, make the theory unfalsifiable, impose overdemanding requirements on decision theorists and hamper decision theory’s internal coherence. In this paper, I draw on leading descriptive and normative works in contemporary decision theory to address these prominent concerns. In doing so, I articulate and (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-10
    What Rationality Is.Arif Ahmed - manuscript
    A choice function C is rational iff: if it allows a path through a sequence of decisions with a particular outcome, then that outcome is amongst the ones that C would have chosen from amongst all the possible outcomes of the sequence. This implies, and it is the strongest definition that implies, that anyone who is irrational could be talked out of their own preferences. It also implies weak but non-vacuous constraints on choices over ends. These do not include alpha (...)
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  5. added 2020-02-11
    Making Choices: A Recasting of Decision Theory.William J. Talbott - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):827-833.
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  6. added 2020-01-30
    The Reality of Free Will.Claus Janew - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 11 (1):1-16.
    The uniqueness of each viewpoint, each point of effect, can be "overcome" only by changing the viewpoint to other viewpoints and returning. Such an alternation, which can also appear as constant change, makes up the unity of the world. The wholeness of an alternation, however, is a consciousness structure because of the special relationship between the circumscribing periphery and the infinitesimal center. This process structure unites determinacy and indeterminacy at every point also totally. We are dealing, therefore, with forms of (...)
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  7. added 2020-01-23
    The Causal Decision Theorist's Guide to Managing the News.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (3):117-149.
    According to orthodox causal decision theory, performing an action can give you information about factors outside of your control, but you should not take this information into account when deciding what to do. Causal decision theorists caution against an irrational policy of 'managing the news'. But, by providing information about factors outside of your control, performing an act can give you two, importantly different, kinds of good news. It can tell you that the world in which you find yourself is (...)
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  8. added 2020-01-22
    The Intrinsic Value of Risky Prospects.Zeev Goldschmidt & Ittay Nissan-Rozen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    We study the representation of attitudes to risk in Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework suggested by Stefánsson and Bradley :602–625, 2015; Br J Philos Sci 70:77–102, 2017) and Bradley :231–248, 2016; Decisions theory with a human face, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017). We show that on this representation, the value of any prospect may be expressed as a sum of two components, the prospect’s instrumental value and the prospect’s intrinsic value. Both components have an expectational form. We also make a distinction between (...)
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  9. added 2020-01-21
    The Sure-Thing Principle and P2.Yang Liu - 2017 - Economics Letters 159:221-223.
    This paper offers a fine analysis of different versions of the well known sure-thing principle. We show that Savage's formal formulation of the principle, i.e., his second postulate (P2), is strictly stronger than what is intended originally.
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  10. added 2019-11-02
    Review of Lara Buchak, *Risk and Rationality*. [REVIEW]Arif Ahmed - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Review of Books.
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  11. added 2019-10-28
    Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    It is natural to think that there is something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this natural thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk-avoidance that is both wide-spread and intuitively rational. More specifically, we argue that if the kind of risk-avoidance recently defended by Lara Buchak is rational, avoiding evidence can be epistemically commendable. In the course of our argument we also lay some foundations for studying epistemic value, or accuracy, when considering (...)
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  12. added 2019-08-02
    Mark Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy.A. Morton - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):505-507.
  13. added 2019-06-06
    Epistemological Naturalism and Mark Kaplan’s Decision Theory.John Shoemaker - 2003 - Philo 6 (2):249-262.
    In Decision Theory as Philosophy, Mark Kaplan reissues a number of perennial questions within decision theory and epistemology, particularly regarding the relevance of decision theory to epistemology and the scope of an epistemology informed by a “modest” Bayesian decision theory. Much of Kaplan’s book represents a challenge to what he calls the “Orthodox” Bayesian theory of decision and evidence. His arguments turn positive in the fourth chapter, in which he argues for the “Assertion View” of belief---an attempted reconciliation of the (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    John W. Carroll, Review of Decision Theory as Philosophy by Mark Kaplan. [REVIEW]John W. Carroll - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):727-728.
  15. added 2019-05-05
    Law as Trope: Framing and Evaluating Conceptual Metaphors.Lloyd Harold Anthony - 2016 - Pace Law Review 37.
    Like others who work with language, many lawyers no doubt appreciate good kennings. However, metaphors also play a much deeper role in thought and law than style, ornament, or verbal virtuosity. As we shall see, metaphors play a necessary role in our categories of thought. As a result, metaphors are a necessary part of thought itself, including legal thought.
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  16. added 2019-03-09
    How To Be Rational: How to Think and Act Rationally.David Robert - manuscript
    This book is divided into 4 chapters. In Chapters 1 and 2, I address (1) how to acquire rational belief attitudes and (2) how to make rational choices. Building on Chapters 1 and 2, I then answer two of the most pressing questions of our time: (3) Should you be skeptical of climate change? (4) Should you invest in life-extension medical research?
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  17. added 2019-03-08
    Success-First Decision Theories.Preston Greene - 2018 - In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem. Cambridge University Press. pp. 115–137.
    The standard formulation of Newcomb's problem compares evidential and causal conceptions of expected utility, with those maximizing evidential expected utility tending to end up far richer. Thus, in a world in which agents face Newcomb problems, the evidential decision theorist might ask the causal decision theorist: "if you're so smart, why ain’cha rich?” Ultimately, however, the expected riches of evidential decision theorists in Newcomb problems do not vindicate their theory, because their success does not generalize. Consider a theory that allows (...)
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  18. added 2019-02-26
    Newcomb University: A Play in One Act.Adam Elga - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):212-221.
    Counter-intuitive consequences of both causal decision theory and evidential decision theory are dramatized. Each of those theories is thereby put under some pressure to supply an error theory to explain away intuitions that seem to favour the other. Because trouble is stirred up for both sides, complacency about Newcomb’s problem is discouraged.
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  19. added 2019-02-23
    The Dead Hands of Group Selection and Phenomenology -- A Review of Individuality and Entanglement by Herbert Gintis 357p (2017)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 364-376.
    Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books with interest, I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly, he makes the dead hands of group selection and phenomenology into the centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this largely invalidates the work. Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into question all his previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a (...)
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  20. added 2019-02-04
    Prudence.Phillip Bricker - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (7):381-401.
    The article explicates a notion of prudence according to which an agent acts prudently if he acts so as to satisfy not only his present preferences, but his past and future preferences as well. A simplified decision-theoretic framework is developed within which three analyses of prudence are presented and compared. That analysis is defended which can best handle cases in which an agent's present act will affect his future preferences.
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  21. added 2018-12-13
    Influences on Primary Care Provider Imaging for a Hypothetical Patient with Low Back Pain.Hh le, Matt DeCamp, Amanda Bertram, Minal Kale & Zackary Berger - 2018 - Southern Journal of Medicine 12 (111):758-762.
    OBJECTIVE: How outside factors affect physician decision making remains an open question of vital importance. We sought to investigate the importance of various influences on physician decision making when clinical guidelines differ from patient preference. -/- METHODS: An online survey asking 469 primary care providers (PCPs) across four practice sites whether they would order magnetic resonance imaging for a patient with uncomplicated back pain. Participants were randomized to one of four scenarios: a patient's preference for imaging (control), a patient's preference (...)
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  22. added 2018-12-13
    Decision Theory Without Representation Theorems.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Naive versions of decision theory take probabilities and utilities as primitive and use expected value to give norms on rational decision. However, standard decision theory takes rational preference as primitive and uses it to construct probability and utility. This paper shows how to justify a version of the naive theory, by taking dominance as the most basic normatively required preference relation, and then extending it by various conditions under which agents should be indifferent between acts. The resulting theory can make (...)
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  23. added 2018-11-14
    Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.Ian Wells - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):429-457.
    The 'Why ain'cha rich?' argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's problem allegedly vindicates evidential decision theory and undermines causal decision theory. But there is a good response to the argument on behalf of causal decision theory. I develop this response. Then I pose a new problem and use it to give a new 'Why ain'cha rich?' argument. Unlike the old argument, the new argument targets evidential decision theory. And unlike the old argument, the new argument is sound.
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  24. added 2018-08-28
    Is Risk Aversion Irrational?H. Orri Stefánsson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-13.
    A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning $200 or losing $100. Such behaviour seems rational if, for instance, the pain of losing $100 is felt more strongly than the joy of winning $200. The aim of this paper is to examine an influential argument that some have interpreted as showing that such moderate risk aversion is irrational. After presenting an axiomatic argument that I take to be the strongest case for (...)
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  25. added 2018-05-18
    What Decision Theory Provides the Best Procedure for Identifying the Best Action Available to a Given Artificially Intelligent System?Samuel A. Barnett - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    Decision theory has had a long-standing history in the behavioural and social sciences as a tool for constructing good approximations of human behaviour. Yet as artificially intelligent systems (AIs) grow in intellectual capacity and eventually outpace humans, decision theory becomes evermore important as a model of AI behaviour. What sort of decision procedure might an AI employ? In this work, I propose that policy-based causal decision theory (PCDT), which places a primacy on the decision-relevance of predictors and simulations of agent (...)
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  26. added 2018-04-01
    Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility.Rachael Briggs - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  27. added 2018-04-01
    Generalized Regret Based Decision Making.Ronald R. Yager - 2017 - Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence 65:400-405.
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  28. added 2018-04-01
    Modeling Traveler Choice Behavior Using the Concepts of Relative Utility and Relative Interest.Junyi Zhang, Harry Timmermans, Aloys Borgers & Donggen Wang - 2004 - Transportation Research Part B 38:215–34..
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  29. added 2018-04-01
    Internal Consistency of Choice.Amartya Sen - 1993 - Econometrica 61:495–521.
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  30. added 2018-04-01
    Nontransitive Measurable Utility.Peter C. Fishburn - 1982 - Journal of Mathematical Psychology 26:31–67.
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  31. added 2018-04-01
    The Psychology of Preferences.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Scientific American 246:160–173.
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  32. added 2018-04-01
    Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty.David Bell - 1982 - Operations Research 30:961–81.
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  33. added 2018-04-01
    Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty.Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden - 1982 - Economic Journal 92:805–24.
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  34. added 2018-04-01
    Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa - 1967 - New York: Wiley.
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  35. added 2018-04-01
    Functions Resembling Quotients of Measures.Ethan Bolker - 1966 - Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 2:292–312.
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  36. added 2018-04-01
    Games Against Nature.John Willard Milnor - 1954 - In R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs & R. L. Davis (eds.), Decision Processes. New York: Wiley.
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  37. added 2018-04-01
    Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton University Press.
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  38. added 2018-03-22
    Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge.Moritz Schulz - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):463-483.
    A knowledge-based decision theory faces what has been called the prodigality problem : given that many propositions are assigned probability 1, agents will be inclined to risk everything when betting on propositions which are known. In order to undo probability 1 assignments in high risk situations, the paper develops a theory which systematically connects higher level goods with higher-order knowledge.
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  39. added 2018-03-07
    Syiden kisat Leibnizin mielenfilosofiassa.Markku Roinila - 2007 - In Heta Gylling, Ilkka Niiniluoto & Risto Vilkko (eds.), Syy. Gaudeamus.
    G. W. Leibnizin mielenfilosofiassa ymmärrykselle on jatkuvasti läsnä erilaisia taipumuksia erilaisiin päämääriin. Nämä taipumukset tai syyt toimia jollakin tavoin saattavat perustua selviin ja tarkkoihin havaintoihin ja olla tiedostettuja ennakkotahtomuksia. Näiden lisäksi mielessämme on epälukuinen määrä epäselviin havaintoihin perustuvia tiedostamattomia ja hetkittäisiä passioita, oikkuja tai hurahduksia. Kun henkilö ryhtyy harkitsemaan toimintaansa, nämä erilaiset taipumukset ja ennakkotahtomukset alkavat ottaa mittaa toisistaan. Prosessin tuloksena on lopullinen tahtomus tai riittävä syy. Kun ymmärrys on muodostanut suosituksen, tahto seuraa Leibnizin mukaan sitä ja toteuttaa ao. toiminnan. (...)
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  40. added 2018-03-06
    Newcomb's Problem.Arif Ahmed (ed.) - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    Newcomb's Problem is a controversial paradox of decision theory. It is easily explained and easily understood, and there is a strong chance that most of us have actually faced it in some form or other. And yet it has proven as thorny and intractable a puzzle as much older and better-known philosophical problems of consciousness, scepticism and fatalism. It brings into very sharp and focused disagreement several long-standing philosophical theories on practical rationality, on the nature of free will, and on (...)
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  41. added 2018-02-22
    Conflicting Intentions: Rectifying the Consistency Requirements.Hein Duijf, Jan Broersen & John-Jules Ch Meyer - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):1097-1118.
    Many philosophers are convinced that rationality dictates that one’s overall set of intentions be consistent. The starting point and inspiration for our study is Bratman’s planning theory of intentions. According to this theory, one needs to appeal to the fulfilment of characteristic planning roles to justify norms that apply to our intentions. Our main objective is to demonstrate that one can be rational despite having mutually inconsistent intentions. Conversely, it is also shown that one can be irrational despite having a (...)
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  42. added 2018-02-17
    Risk's Place in Decision Rules.Paul Weirich - 2001 - Synthese 126 (3):427-441.
    To handle epistemic and pragmatic risks, Gärdenfors and Sahlin design a decision procedure for cases in which probabilities are indeterminate. Their procedure steps outside the traditional expected utility framework. Must it do this? Can the traditional framework handle risk? This paper argues that it can. The key is a comprehensive interpretation of an option's possible outcomes. Taking possible outcomes more broadly than Gärdenfors and Sahlin do, expected utility can give risk its due. In particular, Good's decision procedure adequately handles indeterminate (...)
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  43. added 2017-11-28
    Transformative Experience and the Knowledge Norms for Action: Moss on Paul’s Challenge to Decision Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - In Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. New York, NY, USA:
    to appear in Lambert, E. and J. Schwenkler (eds.) Transformative Experience (OUP) -/- L. A. Paul (2014, 2015) argues that the possibility of epistemically transformative experiences poses serious and novel problems for the orthodox theory of rational choice, namely, expected utility theory — I call her argument the Utility Ignorance Objection. In a pair of earlier papers, I responded to Paul’s challenge (Pettigrew 2015, 2016), and a number of other philosophers have responded in similar ways (Dougherty, et al. 2015, Harman (...)
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  44. added 2017-10-24
    The Systemic Mind and a Conceptual Framework for the Psychosocial Environment of Business Enterprises: Practical Implications for Systemic Leadership Training.Radek Trnka & Petr Parma - 2015 - In Martin Kuška & M. J. Jandl (eds.), Current Research in Psychosocial Arena: Thinking about Health, Society and Culture. Wien: Sigmund Freud PrivatUniversitäts Verlag. pp. 68-79.
    This chapter introduces a research-based conceptual framework for the study of the inner psychosocial reality of business enterprises. It is called the Inner Organizational Ecosystem Approach (IOEA). This model is systemic in nature, and it defines the basic features of small and medium-size enterprises, such as elements, structures, borders, social actors, organizational climate, processes and resources. Further, it also covers the dynamics of psychosocial reality, processes, emergent qualities and the higher-order subsystems of the overall organizational ecosystem, including the global business (...)
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  45. added 2017-10-20
    Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence.Philippe Mongin - 2017 - TARK 2017.
    Stochastic independence has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory. Bayesian decision theorists such as Savage can be criticized for being silent about stochastic independence. From their current preference axioms, they can derive no more than the definitional properties of a probability measure. In a new framework of twofold uncertainty, we introduce preference axioms that entail not (...)
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  46. added 2017-10-05
    La Théorie de la Décision Et la Psychologie du Sens Commun.Philippe Mongin - 2011 - Social Science Information 50 (3-4):351-374.
    Taking the philosophical standpoint, this article compares the mathematical theory of individual decision-making with the folk psychology conception of action, desire and belief. It narrows down its topic by carrying the comparison vis-à-vis Savage's system and its technical concept of subjective probability, which is referred to the basic model of betting as in Ramsey. The argument is organized around three philosophical theses: (i) decision theory is nothing but folk psychology stated in formal language (Lewis), (ii) the former substantially improves on (...)
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  47. added 2017-09-21
    Risk Writ Large.Johanna Thoma & Jonathan Weisberg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2369-2384.
    Risk-weighted expected utility theory is motivated by small-world problems like the Allais paradox, but it is a grand-world theory by nature. And, at the grand-world level, its ability to handle the Allais paradox is dubious. The REU model described in Risk and Rationality turns out to be risk-seeking rather than risk-averse on one natural way of formulating the Allais gambles in the grand-world context. This result illustrates a general problem with the case for REU theory, we argue. There is a (...)
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  48. added 2017-08-21
    Continuity and Completeness of Strongly Independent Preorders.David McCarthy & Kalle Mikkola - 2018 - Mathematical Social Sciences 93:141-145.
    A strongly independent preorder on a possibly in finite dimensional convex set that satisfi es two of the following conditions must satisfy the third: (i) the Archimedean continuity condition; (ii) mixture continuity; and (iii) comparability under the preorder is an equivalence relation. In addition, if the preorder is nontrivial (has nonempty asymmetric part) and satisfi es two of the following conditions, it must satisfy the third: (i') a modest strengthening of the Archimedean condition; (ii') mixture continuity; and (iii') completeness. Applications (...)
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  49. added 2017-08-21
    Representation of Strongly Independent Preorders by Sets of Scalar-Valued Functions.David McCarthy, Kalle Mikkola & Teruji Thomas - 2017 - MPRA Paper No. 79284.
    We provide conditions under which an incomplete strongly independent preorder on a convex set X can be represented by a set of mixture preserving real-valued functions. We allow X to be infi nite dimensional. The main continuity condition we focus on is mixture continuity. This is sufficient for such a representation provided X has countable dimension or satisfi es a condition that we call Polarization.
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  50. added 2017-05-16
    Expected Comparative Utility Theory: A New Theory of Rational Choice.David Robert - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (1):19-37.
    This paper proposes a new theory of rational choice, Expected Comparative Utility (ECU) Theory. It is first argued that for any decision option, a, and any state of the world, G, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a in G is the comparative utility of a in G – that is, the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in G. On the basis of this principle, it is then argued, roughly (...)
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