This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
349 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 349
Material to categorize
  1. J. McKenzie Alexander (2012). Decision Theory Meets the Witch of Agnesi. Journal of Philosophy 109 (12):712-727.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2005). Value and Unacceptable Risk. Economics and Philosophy 21 (2):177-197.
    Consider a transitive value ordering of outcomes and lotteries on outcomes, which satisfies substitutivity of equivalents and obeys “continuity for easy cases,” i.e., allows compensating risks of small losses by chances of small improvements. Temkin (2001) has argued that such an ordering must also – rather counter-intuitively – allow chances of small improvements to compensate risks of huge losses. In this paper, we show that Temkin's argument is flawed but that a better proof is possible. However, it is more difficult (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  3. Marcus Arvan (2015). How to Rationally Approach Life's Transformative Experiences. Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1199-1218.
    In a widely discussed forthcoming article, “What you can't expect when you're expecting,” L. A. Paul challenges culturally and philosophically traditional views about how to rationally make major life-decisions, most specifically the decision of whether to have children. The present paper argues that because major life-decisions are transformative, the only rational way to approach them is to become resilient people: people who do not “over-plan” their lives or expect their lives to play out “according to plan”—people who understand that beyond (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Robert Audi (1986). Action Theory as a Resource for Decision Theory. Theory and Decision 20 (3):207-221.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley (eds.) (1991). Essays in the Foundations of Decision Theory. Blackwell.
  6. S. K. Berninghaus, S. J. Brams, P. H. Edelman, J. Esteban, I. Fischer, P. C. Fishburn, G. Gigliotti, W. Güth, R. D. Luce & P. Modesti (2003). Theory and Decision. Theory and Decision 55 (392).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7. Magnus Boman (1999). Norms in Artificial Decision Making. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (1):17-35.
    A method for forcing norms onto individual agents in a multi-agent system is presented. The agents under study are supersoft agents: autonomous artificial agents programmed to represent and evaluate vague and imprecise information. Agents are further assumed to act in accordance with advice obtained from a normative decision module, with which they can communicate. Norms act as global constraints on the evaluations performed in the decision module and hence no action that violates a norm will be suggested to any agent. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. C. Alan Boneau & James L. Cole (1967). Decision Theory, the Pigeon, and the Psychophysical Function. Psychological Review 74 (2):123-135.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Raphaël Giraud, Accounting for Framing-Effects - an Informational Approach to Intensionality in the Bolker-Jeffrey Decision Model.
    We suscribe to an account of framing-effects in decision theory in terms of an inference to a background informationa by the hearer when a speaker uses a certain frame while other equivalent frames were also available. This account was sketched by Craig McKenzie. We embed it in Bolker-Jeffrey decision model - one main reason of this is that this latter model makes preferences bear on propositions. We can deduce a given anomaly or cognitive bias in a formal decision theory. This (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Wojciech Buszkowski (1982). Some Decision Problems in the Theory of Syntactic Categories. Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 28 (33-38):539-548.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11. Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel (2003). Decision Theory, Symmetry and Causal Structure: Reply to Meacham and Weisberg. Mind 112 (448):691-701.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Franz Dietrich, How to Reach Legitimate Decisions When the Procedure is Controversial.
    Imagine a group that faces a decision problem but does not agree on which decision procedure is appropriate. In that case, can a decision be reached that respects the procedural concerns of the group? There is a sense in which legitimate decisions are possible even if people disagree on which procedure to use. I propose to decide in favour of an option which maximizes the number of persons whose judged-right procedure happens to entail this decision given the profile. This decision (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2016). Reason-Based Choice and Context-Dependence: An Explanatory Framework. Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):175-229.
    We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate boundedly rational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley (2016). Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules. Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Ellery Eells (1985). Weirich on Decision Instability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):473 – 478.
  16. Peter Gärdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin, Decision Making with Unreliable Probabilities.
    This paper presents a decision theory which allows subjects to account for the uncertainties of their probability estimates. This is accomplished by modelling beliefs about states of nature by means of a class of probability measures. In order to represent uncertainties of those beliefs a measure of epistemic reliability is introduced. The suggested decision theory is evaluated in the light of empirical evidence on ambiguity and uncertainty in decision making. The theory is also compared to Tversky & Kahneman's prospect theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  17. R. Allen Gardner & John B. Forsythe (1961). Supplementary Report: Two-Choice Decision Behavior with Many Alternative Events. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (6):631.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Hilary Greaves (2013). Epistemic Decision Theory. Mind 122 (488):915-952.
    I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads to a proliferation of puzzle cases and theories to deal with them, including epistemic analogues of evidential and causal decision theory, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  19. York Hagmayer & Björn Meder (2008). Causal Learning Through Repeated Decision Making. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 179--184.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Alan Hájek & Harris Nover (2006). Perplexing Expectations. Mind 115 (459):703 - 720.
    This paper revisits the Pasadena game (Nover and Háyek 2004), a St Petersburg-like game whose expectation is undefined. We discuss serveral respects in which the Pasadena game is even more troublesome for decision theory than the St Petersburg game. Colyvan (2006) argues that the decision problem of whether or not to play the Pasadena game is ‘ill-posed’. He goes on to advocate a ‘pluralism’ regarding decision rules, which embraces dominance reasoning as well as maximizing expected utility. We rebut Colyvan’s argument, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  21. C. A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. Mcclennen (1980). Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1):252-254.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Howard Sobel Jordan (1998). Ramsey's Foundations Extended to Desirabilities. Theory and Decision 44 (3):231-278.
    In his Truth and Probability (1926), Frank Ramsey provides foundations for measures of degrees of belief in propositions and preferences for worlds. Nonquantitative conditions on preferences for worlds, and gambles for worlds and certain near-worlds, are formulated which he says insure that a subject's preferences for worlds are represented by numbers, world values. Numbers, for his degrees of belief in propositions, probabilities, are then defined in terms of his world values. Ramsey does not also propose definitions of desirabilities for propositions, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. James Joyce (1995). Decision Theory. Philosophical Books 36 (4):225-237.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. James Michael Joyce (1992). The Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Bayesian decision theorists argue that rational agents should always perform acts that maximize subjective expected utility. To justify this claim, they prove representation theorems which are designed to show that any decision maker whose beliefs and desires satisfy reasonable axiomatic constraints will necessarily behave like an expected utility maximizer. The existence of such a representation result is a prerequisite for any adequate account of rational choice because one is only able to determine what a decision theory says about beliefs and (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Joseph B. Kadane, Teddy Seidenfeld & Mark J. Schervish, A Rubinesque Theory of Decision.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26. Mortimer Raymond Kadish (1950). Toward a Theory of Decision. Dissertation, Columbia University
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Mark Kaplan (1998). Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Luc Lauwers (2016). Why Decision Theory Remains Constructively Incomplete. Mind 125 (500):1033-1043.
    The existence of a transitive, complete, and weakly independent relation on the full set of gambles implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set. Therefore, each transitive and weakly independent relation on the set of gambles either is incomplete or does not have an explicit description. Whatever tools decision theory makes available, there will always be decision problems where these tools fail us. In this sense, decision theory remains incomplete.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Gary Malinas (1993). Reflective Coherence and Newcomb Problems: A Simple Solution. Theory and Decision 35 (2):151-166.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Laurence T. Maloney (2002). Statistical Decision Theory and Biological Vision. In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World. Wiley. pp. 145--189.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  31. Kenneth L. Manders (1979). The Theory of All Substructures of a Structure: Characterisation and Decision Problems. Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (4):583-598.
    An infinitary characterisation of the first-order sentences true in all substructures of a structure M is used to obtain partial reduction of the decision problem for such sentences to that for Th(M). For the relational structure $\langle\mathbf{R}, \leq, +\rangle$ this gives a decision procedure for the ∃ x∀ y-part of the theory of all substructures, yet we show that the ∃ x 1x 2 ∀ y-part, and the entire theory, is Π 1 1 -complete. The theory of all ordered subsemigroups (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Howard Margolis (2000). Simple Heuristics That Make Us Dumb. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):758-758.
    The simple heuristics that may indeed usually make us smart–or at least smart enough–in contexts of individual choice will sometimes make us dumb, especially in contexts of social choice. Here each individual choice (or vote) has little impact on the overall choice, although the overall choice is compounded out of the individual choices. I use an example (risk aversion) to illustrate the point.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Herman Mcdaniel (1970). Applications of Decision Tables a Reader.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Björn Meder & York Hagmayer (2009). Causal Induction Enables Adaptive Decision Making. In N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (eds.), Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. J. Sayer Minas (1965). Comments on Richard C. Jeffrey's "Ethics and the Logic of Decision". Journal of Philosophy 62 (19):542-544.
  36. A. Morton (1999). Mark Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50:505-507.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Sahlin Nils-Eric, Vareman Niklas, Galavotti Maria Carla & Scazzieri Roberto (2008). Three Types of Decision Theory. In Maria-Carla Galavotti (ed.), Reasoning, Rationality and Probability. CSLI Publications.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Alastair Norcross (1998). Great Harms From Small Benefits Grow: How Death Can Be Outweighed by Headaches. Analysis 58 (2):152–158.
    Suppose that a very large number of people, say one billion, will suffer a moderately severe headache for the next twenty-four hours. For these billion people, the next twenty-four hours will be fairly unpleasant, though by no means unbearable. However, there will be no side-effects from these headaches; no drop in productivity in the work-place, no lapses in concentration leading to accidents, no unkind words spoken to loved ones that will later fester. Nonetheless, it is clearly desirable that these billion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  39. J. M. P. (1966). The Logic of Decision. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 19 (4):813-814.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. S. Pandey (1980). The Logic of Decision. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1):77.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Thomas D. Paxson Jr (1980). Decision Theoretic Epistemology. Noûs 14 (4):605-617.
  42. Philip Pettit (1989). Decision Theory, Political Theory and the Hats Hypothesis. In Fred D'Agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality. Reidel. pp. 23--34.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Solomon L. Pollack, Harry T. Hicks & William J. Harrison (1971). Decision Tables Theory and Practice.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. John L. Pollock (2011). Locally Global Planning. Thinking About Acting.
    This chapter reiterates the proposition that practical cognition should not aim at finding optimal solutions to practical problems. A rational cognizer should instead look for good solutions, and replace them with better solutions if any are found. Solutions come in the form of plans. In general, a change to the master plan may consist of deleting several local plans and adding several others. This theory is still fairly schematic. It leaves most details to the imagination of the reader, and in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2000). Value and Choice Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy. Lund Universitetstrycheriet.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Gerard Radnitzky (1984). Sicence, Tecnology, and Political Decision. From the Creation of a Theory to the Consequences of its Application. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 40 (3):307-317.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Susanna Rinard (2015). A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (7).
    Those who model doxastic states with a set of probability functions, rather than a single function, face a pressing challenge: can they provide a plausible decision theory compatible with their view? Adam Elga and others claim that they cannot, and that the set of functions model should be rejected for this reason. This paper aims to answer this challenge. The key insight is that the set of functions model can be seen as an instance of the supervaluationist approach to vagueness (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  48. Ewan Rodgers, Decision Theory with a Human Face: An Interview with Richard Bradley.
    Richard Bradley’s written a new book about decision theory. We decided to ask him some questions about it.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Nils-Eric Sahlin & Niklas Vareman (2008). Three Types of Decision Theory. In Maria-Carla Galavotti (ed.), Reasoning, Rationality and Probability. CSLI Publications. pp. 37--59.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Leonard J. Savage (1951). The Theory of Statistical Decision. Journal of the American Statistical Association 46:55--67.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 349