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  1. Applying the Jeffrey Decision Model to Rational Betting and Information Acquisition.Ernest W. Adams & Roger D. Rosenkrantz - 1980 - Theory and Decision 12 (1):1-20.
  2. Decision Theory Meets the Witch of Agnesi.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (12):712-727.
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  3. Value and Unacceptable Risk.Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (2):177-197.
    Consider a transitive value ordering of outcomes and lotteries on outcomes, which satisfies substitutivity of equivalents and obeys “continuity for easy cases,” i.e., allows compensating risks of small losses by chances of small improvements. Temkin (2001) has argued that such an ordering must also – rather counter-intuitively – allow chances of small improvements to compensate risks of huge losses. In this paper, we show that Temkin's argument is flawed but that a better proof is possible. However, it is more difficult (...)
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  4. How to Rationally Approach Life's Transformative Experiences.Marcus Arvan - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1199-1218.
    In a widely discussed forthcoming article, “What you can't expect when you're expecting,” L. A. Paul challenges culturally and philosophically traditional views about how to rationally make major life-decisions, most specifically the decision of whether to have children. The present paper argues that because major life-decisions are transformative, the only rational way to approach them is to become resilient people: people who do not “over-plan” their lives or expect their lives to play out “according to plan”—people who understand that beyond (...)
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  5. Action Theory as a Resource for Decision Theory.Robert Audi - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (3):207-221.
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  6. Essays in the Foundations of Decision Theory.Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley (eds.) - 1991 - Blackwell.
  7. The Foundations of Decision Theory: An Intuitive, Operational Approach with Mathematical Extensions.J. M. Bernardo, J. R. Ferrandiz & A. F. M. Smith - 1985 - Theory and Decision 19 (2):127-150.
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  8. Theory and Decision.S. K. Berninghaus, S. J. Brams, P. H. Edelman, J. Esteban, I. Fischer, P. C. Fishburn, G. Gigliotti, W. Güth, R. D. Luce & P. Modesti - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (392).
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  9. Norms in Artificial Decision Making.Magnus Boman - 1999 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (1):17-35.
    A method for forcing norms onto individual agents in a multi-agent system is presented. The agents under study are supersoft agents: autonomous artificial agents programmed to represent and evaluate vague and imprecise information. Agents are further assumed to act in accordance with advice obtained from a normative decision module, with which they can communicate. Norms act as global constraints on the evaluations performed in the decision module and hence no action that violates a norm will be suggested to any agent. (...)
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  10. Decision Theory, the Pigeon, and the Psychophysical Function.C. Alan Boneau & James L. Cole - 1967 - Psychological Review 74 (2):123-135.
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  11. Accounting for Framing-Effects - an Informational Approach to Intensionality in the Bolker-Jeffrey Decision Model.Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Raphaël Giraud - unknown
    We suscribe to an account of framing-effects in decision theory in terms of an inference to a background informationa by the hearer when a speaker uses a certain frame while other equivalent frames were also available. This account was sketched by Craig McKenzie. We embed it in Bolker-Jeffrey decision model - one main reason of this is that this latter model makes preferences bear on propositions. We can deduce a given anomaly or cognitive bias in a formal decision theory. This (...)
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  12. The Representation of Beliefs and Desires Within Decision Theory.Richard W. Bradley - 1997 - Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    This dissertation interprets the lack of uniqueness in probability representations of agents' degrees of belief in the decision theory of Richard Jeffrey as a formal statement of an important epistemological problem: the underdetermination of our attributions of belief and desire to agents by the evidence of their observed behaviour. A solution is pursued through investigation of agents' attitudes to information of a conditional nature. ;As a first step, Jeffrey's theory is extended to agents' conditional attitudes of belief and desire by (...)
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  13. Some Decision Problems in the Theory of Syntactic Categories.Wojciech Buszkowski - 1982 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 28 (33‐38):539-548.
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  14. Some Decision Problems in the Theory of Syntactic Categories.Wojciech Buszkowski - 1982 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 28 (33-38):539-548.
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  15. Jordan Howard Sobel Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. [REVIEW]Paul Castell - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):628.
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  16. Decision Theory, Symmetry and Causal Structure: Reply to Meacham and Weisberg.Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):691-701.
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  17. Components of Risk in Decision Making: Probability and Variance Preferences.C. H. Coombs & D. G. Pruitt - 1960 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 60 (5):265.
  18. How to Reach Legitimate Decisions When the Procedure is Controversial.Franz Dietrich - unknown
    Imagine a group that faces a decision problem but does not agree on which decision procedure is appropriate. In that case, can a decision be reached that respects the procedural concerns of the group? There is a sense in which legitimate decisions are possible even if people disagree on which procedure to use. I propose to decide in favour of an option which maximizes the number of persons whose judged-right procedure happens to entail this decision given the profile. This decision (...)
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  19. Reason-Based Choice and Context-Dependence: An Explanatory Framework.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):175-229.
    We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate boundedly rational (...)
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  20. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
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  21. Decision Theory and Morality.James Dreier - 2004 - In Piers Rawling & Al Mele (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 156--181.
    Dreier shows how the formal apparatus of decision theory is connected to some abstract issues in moral theory. He begins by explaining how to think about utility and the advice that decision theory gives us, in particular, decision theory does not assume or insist that all rational agents act in their own self-interest. Next he examines decision theory’s contributions to social contract theory, with emphasis on David Gauthier’s rationalist contractualism. Dreier’s third section considers a reinterpretation of the formal theory that (...)
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  22. Weirich on Decision Instability.Ellery Eells - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):473 – 478.
  23. Decision Making with Unreliable Probabilities.Peter Gärdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin - unknown
    This paper presents a decision theory which allows subjects to account for the uncertainties of their probability estimates. This is accomplished by modelling beliefs about states of nature by means of a class of probability measures. In order to represent uncertainties of those beliefs a measure of epistemic reliability is introduced. The suggested decision theory is evaluated in the light of empirical evidence on ambiguity and uncertainty in decision making. The theory is also compared to Tversky & Kahneman's prospect theory.
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  24. Supplementary Report: Two-Choice Decision Behavior with Many Alternative Events.R. Allen Gardner & John B. Forsythe - 1961 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (6):631.
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  25. Comments on Richard Jeffrey.Terry M. Goode - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):135 - 138.
    In this commentary, after first summarizing the three major theses of Jeffrey's paper Probability and Falsification: Critique of the Popper Program, and sketching out what I take to be his central argument, I criticize Jeffrey on two grounds. The first is that he has failed to explain why his version of Bayesianism provides us with better theories upon which to make decisions; the second is that he has offered a theory about decision-making that by-passes the important question: How can we (...)
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  26. Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.
    I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads to a proliferation of puzzle cases and theories to deal with them, including epistemic analogues of evidential and causal decision theory, and (...)
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  27. Causal Learning Through Repeated Decision Making.York Hagmayer & Björn Meder - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 179--184.
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  28. Some Reminiscences on Richard Jeffrey, and Some Reflections on The Logic of Decision.Alan Hájek - 2006 - In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan. pp. 73--947.
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  29. Perplexing Expectations.Alan Hájek & Harris Nover - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):703 - 720.
    This paper revisits the Pasadena game (Nover and Háyek 2004), a St Petersburg-like game whose expectation is undefined. We discuss serveral respects in which the Pasadena game is even more troublesome for decision theory than the St Petersburg game. Colyvan (2006) argues that the decision problem of whether or not to play the Pasadena game is ‘ill-posed’. He goes on to advocate a ‘pluralism’ regarding decision rules, which embraces dominance reasoning as well as maximizing expected utility. We rebut Colyvan’s argument, (...)
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  30. Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory.C. A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. Mcclennen - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1):252-254.
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  31. Ramsey's Foundations Extended to Desirabilities.Howard Sobel Jordan - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (3):231-278.
    In his Truth and Probability (1926), Frank Ramsey provides foundations for measures of degrees of belief in propositions and preferences for worlds. Nonquantitative conditions on preferences for worlds, and gambles for worlds and certain near-worlds, are formulated which he says insure that a subject's preferences for worlds are represented by numbers, world values. Numbers, for his degrees of belief in propositions, probabilities, are then defined in terms of his world values. Ramsey does not also propose definitions of desirabilities for propositions, (...)
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  32. Decision Theory.James Joyce - 1995 - Philosophical Books 36 (4):225-237.
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  33. The Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory.James Michael Joyce - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Bayesian decision theorists argue that rational agents should always perform acts that maximize subjective expected utility. To justify this claim, they prove representation theorems which are designed to show that any decision maker whose beliefs and desires satisfy reasonable axiomatic constraints will necessarily behave like an expected utility maximizer. The existence of such a representation result is a prerequisite for any adequate account of rational choice because one is only able to determine what a decision theory says about beliefs and (...)
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  34. A Rubinesque Theory of Decision.Joseph B. Kadane, Teddy Seidenfeld & Mark J. Schervish - unknown
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  35. Toward a Theory of Decision.Mortimer Raymond Kadish - 1950 - Dissertation, Columbia University
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  36. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
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  37. Why Decision Theory Remains Constructively Incomplete.Luc Lauwers - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1033-1043.
    The existence of a transitive, complete, and weakly independent relation on the full set of gambles implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set. Therefore, each transitive and weakly independent relation on the set of gambles either is incomplete or does not have an explicit description. Whatever tools decision theory makes available, there will always be decision problems where these tools fail us. In this sense, decision theory remains incomplete.
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  38. Reflective Coherence and Newcomb Problems: A Simple Solution.Gary Malinas - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (2):151-166.
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  39. Statistical Decision Theory and Biological Vision.Laurence T. Maloney - 2002 - In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World. Wiley. pp. 145--189.
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  40. The Theory of All Substructures of a Structure: Characterisation and Decision Problems.Kenneth L. Manders - 1979 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (4):583-598.
    An infinitary characterisation of the first-order sentences true in all substructures of a structure M is used to obtain partial reduction of the decision problem for such sentences to that for Th(M). For the relational structure $\langle\mathbf{R}, \leq, +\rangle$ this gives a decision procedure for the ∃ x∀ y-part of the theory of all substructures, yet we show that the ∃ x 1x 2 ∀ y-part, and the entire theory, is Π 1 1 -complete. The theory of all ordered subsemigroups (...)
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  41. Simple Heuristics That Make Us Dumb.Howard Margolis - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):758-758.
    The simple heuristics that may indeed usually make us smart–or at least smart enough–in contexts of individual choice will sometimes make us dumb, especially in contexts of social choice. Here each individual choice (or vote) has little impact on the overall choice, although the overall choice is compounded out of the individual choices. I use an example (risk aversion) to illustrate the point.
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  42. Egon Boerger, Erich Graedel, and Yuri Gurevich, The Classical Decision Problem.M. Marx - 1999 - Journal of Logic Language and Information 8:478-481.
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  43. Applications of Decision Tables a Reader.Herman Mcdaniel - 1970
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  44. Causal Induction Enables Adaptive Decision Making.Björn Meder & York Hagmayer - 2009 - In N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (eds.), Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
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  45. What Does Subjective Decision Theory Tell Us?D. H. Mellor - 2005 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
  46. Comments on Richard C. Jeffrey's "Ethics and the Logic of Decision".J. Sayer Minas - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (19):542-544.
  47. Mark Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy.A. Morton - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50:505-507.
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  48. Three Types of Decision Theory.Sahlin Nils-Eric, Vareman Niklas, Galavotti Maria Carla & Scazzieri Roberto - 2008 - In Maria-Carla Galavotti (ed.), Reasoning, Rationality and Probability. CSLI Publications.
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  49. Great Harms From Small Benefits Grow: How Death Can Be Outweighed by Headaches.Alastair Norcross - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):152–158.
    Suppose that a very large number of people, say one billion, will suffer a moderately severe headache for the next twenty-four hours. For these billion people, the next twenty-four hours will be fairly unpleasant, though by no means unbearable. However, there will be no side-effects from these headaches; no drop in productivity in the work-place, no lapses in concentration leading to accidents, no unkind words spoken to loved ones that will later fester. Nonetheless, it is clearly desirable that these billion (...)
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  50. The Logic of Decision. [REVIEW]J. M. P. - 1966 - Review of Metaphysics 19 (4):813-814.
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