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  1. M. Shahid Alam, Pragmatic Arguments in the Qur'an for Belief.
  2. J. McKenzie Alexander (2011). Expectations and Choiceworthiness. Mind 120 (479):803-817.
    The Pasadena game is an example of a decision problem which lacks an expected value, as traditionally conceived. Easwaran (2008) has shown that, if we distinguish between two different kinds of expectations, which he calls ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, the Pasadena game lacks a strong expectation but has a weak expectation. Furthermore, he argues that we should use the weak expectation as providing a measure of the value of an individual play of the Pasadena game. By considering a modified version of (...)
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  3. Gerard Allwein, Yingrui Yang & William L. Harrison (2011). Qualitative Decision Theory Via Channel Theory. Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (1-2):81-110.
    We recast parts of decision theory in terms of channel theory concentrating on qualitative issues. Channel theory allows one to move between model theoretic and language theoretic notions as is necessary for an adequate covering. Doing so clarifies decision theory and presents the opportunity to investigate alternative formulations. As an example, we take some of Savage’s notions of decision theory and recast them within channel theory. In place of probabilities, we use a particular logic of preference. We introduce a logic (...)
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  4. Horacio Arló-Costa (2005). Models of Preference Reversals and Personal Rules: Do They Require Maximizing a Utility Function with a Specific Structure? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):650-651.
    One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
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  5. P. Bartha (2007). Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal’s Wager and Relative Utilities. Synthese 154 (1):5-52.
  6. Paul Bernays (1957). Review: W. Ackermann, Solvable Cases of the Decision Problem. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (1):68-72.
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  7. Max Black (1978). The « Prisoner's Dilemma » and the Limits of Rationality. International Studies in Philosophy 10:7-22.
  8. N. Bostrom (2001). The Meta-Newcomb Problem. Analysis 61 (4):309-310.
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  9. Nick Bostrom (2001). The Meta-Newcomb Problem. Analysis 61 (4):309–310.
    There are two boxes in front of you and you are asked to choose between taking only box B or taking both box A and box B. Box A contains $ 1,000. Box B will contain either nothing or $ 1,000,000. What B will contain is (or will be) determined by Predictor, who has an excellent track record of predicting your choices. There are two possibilities. Either Predictor has already made his move by predicting your choice and putting a million (...)
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  10. Ann Boyd (2013). Treatment Option or Pharmacological Wager? Journal of Clinical Research and Bioethics 4 (4).
  11. Darren Bradley (2007). Bayesianism And Self-Locating Beliefs. Dissertation, Stanford University
    How should we update our beliefs when we learn new evidence? Bayesian confirmation theory provides a widely accepted and well understood answer – we should conditionalize. But this theory has a problem with self-locating beliefs, beliefs that tell you where you are in the world, as opposed to what the world is like. To see the problem, consider your current belief that it is January. You might be absolutely, 100%, sure that it is January. But you will soon believe it (...)
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  12. Allen H. Brady (1998). Review: Pascal Michel, Busy Beaver Competition and Collatz-Like Problems. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (1):331-332.
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  13. John P. Burgess (1985). From Preference to Utility: A Problem of Descriptive Set Theory. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 26 (2):106-114.
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  14. E. Carlson (1998). Fischer on Backtracking and Newcomb's Problem. Analysis 58 (3):229-231.
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  15. John W. Carroll (1993). The Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Reply to Becker and Cudd. Theory and Decision 34 (1):63-72.
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  16. A. B. Carter (2002). Is the Wager Back On? A Response to Douglas Groothuis. Philosophia Christi 4 (2):493-500.
  17. Jackie Ray Caughran (1980). Newcomb's Problem. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    Newcomb's Problem is a hypothetical situation wherein you are called upon to choose between two possible but mutually exclusive acts for both of which there are seemingly compelling, if not conclusive, arguments. As such it is a challenge to those who would construct a coherent and complete theory of rational decision. After introducing and clarifying the problem I suggest, following Robert Nozick, that the conflict, if there be such, is between a policy of choosing a dominant act and an policy (...)
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  18. Raphaël Cerf (2002). The Hausdorff Lower Semicontinuous Envelope of the Length in the Plane. Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa 1 (1):33-71.
    We study the Hausdorff lower semicontinuous envelope of the length in the plane. This envelope is taken with respect to the Hausdorff metric on the space of the continua. The resulting quantity appeared naturally as the rate function of a large deviation principle in a statistical mechanics context and seems to deserve further analysis. We provide basic simple results which parallel those available for the perimeter of Caccioppoli and De Giorgi.
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  19. D. J. Chalmers (2002). The St. Petersburg Two-Envelope Paradox. Analysis 62 (2):155-157.
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  20. Brian F. Chellas (1974). Gauthier David P.. Hare's Debtors. Mind, N.S. Vol. 77 , Pp. 400–405. Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (2):366.
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  21. Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel (2006). The Dr. Psycho Paradox and Newcomb’s Problem. Erkenntnis 64 (1):85-100.
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  22. Ann T. Delehanty (2004). Morality and Method in Pascal's. Philosophy and Literature 28 (1).
    : This essay argues that Pascal's work both questions the accuracy of perspective in an infinite universe, and describes a model for moral truth that escapes the limitations of perspective. This model, rooted in Christianity, requires a total reorientation of approach towards moral truth. By asserting the limits of rational method, making use of recent scientific developments, and constructing a new model for moral truth, Pascal's work sought to update the role of Christianity to be not only consonant with the (...)
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  23. Verena H. Dyson (1973). Greenleaf Newcomb. Fields in Which Varieties Have Rational Points: A Note on a Problem of Ax. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 27 , Pp. 139–140. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (1):163.
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  24. Ellery Eells (1984). Newcomb's Many Solutions. Theory and Decision 16 (1):59-105.
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  25. Edward Elliott (forthcoming). A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-40.
    The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees (...)
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  26. Xiaocong Fan & John Yen (2012). Intentions and Potential Intentions Revisited. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (3):203-230.
    The importance of potential intentions has been demonstrated both in the construction of agent systems and in the formalisation of teamwork behaviour. However, there still lacks an adequate semantics for the notion of potential intentions as introduced by Grosz and Kraus in their SharedPlans framework. In this paper, we give a formal semantics to intentions and potential intentions, drawing upon both the representationalist approach and the accessibility-based approach. The model captures the dynamic relationship among intentions and potential intentions by providing (...)
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  27. José Luis Ferreira (2010). Monty Hall Drives a Wedge Between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping Beauty: A Reply to Bovens. Analysis 70 (3):473 - 481.
    Consider van Fraassen's ( 1981) Judy Benjamin (JB) problem. Judy is dropped in an area that is divided vertically in Blue (B) and Red (R) and horizontally in Headquarters (Q) and Second Company (S). These divisions define four quadrants, as in Figure 1 (roman script headings). Judy initially believes that there is an equal chance of being in each quadrant. She is then told by a fully reliable source that if she is in R, then there is a chance of (...)
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  28. J. M. Fischer (2001). Newcomb's Problem: A Reply to Carlson. Analysis 61 (3):229-236.
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  29. John Martin Fischer (2001). Newcomb’s Problem: A Reply to Carlson. Analysis 61 (271):229–236.
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  30. James Franklin (2001). The Science of Conjecture: Probability Before Pascal: Contents. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    The Dark Ages The Gregorian Revolution The Glossators Invent "Half-Proof" Presumptions in Canon Law Innocent III Grades of Evidence, and Torture The Post-Glossators Bartolus and Baldus: The Completed Theory The Inquisition Maimonides on Testimony Law in the East Ch. 3 Renaissance Law..
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  31. David Gauthier (1989). XII—In the Neighbourhood of the Newcomb-Predictor. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1):179-194.
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  32. On Genuine & Territorial Demarcation (2013). Loki's Wager and Laudan's Error. In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 79.
  33. L. Goldstein (2003). Examining Boxing and Toxin. Analysis 63 (3):242-244.
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  34. Laurence Goldstein (2003). Examining Boxing and Toxin. Analysis 63 (3):242–244.
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  35. Laurence Goldstein & Peter Cave (2008). A Unified Pyrrhonian Resolution of the Toxin Problem, the Surprise Examination, and Newcomb's Puzzle. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):365 - 376.
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  36. Samuel Gorovitz (1979). The St. Petersburg Puzzle. In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 259--270.
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  37. Yuri Gurevich (1976). The Decision Problem for Standard Classes. Journal of Symbolic Logic 41 (2):460-464.
  38. Alan Hájek & Harris Nover (2006). Perplexing Expectations. Mind 115 (459):703 - 720.
    This paper revisits the Pasadena game (Nover and Háyek 2004), a St Petersburg-like game whose expectation is undefined. We discuss serveral respects in which the Pasadena game is even more troublesome for decision theory than the St Petersburg game. Colyvan (2006) argues that the decision problem of whether or not to play the Pasadena game is ‘ill-posed’. He goes on to advocate a ‘pluralism’ regarding decision rules, which embraces dominance reasoning as well as maximizing expected utility. We rebut Colyvan’s argument, (...)
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  39. Jeffrey Helzner (2008). Expected Content. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):424-432.
    We propose an approach to assigning propositional content to deliberate acts of arbitrary type, as opposed to just speech acts. This approach, which is based on the idea that the content of an act is the decision maker's expectation concerning the change that would take place if the act were to be performed, is shown to be related to the concept of expected utility that has played a central role in various accounts of rationality.
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  40. Terry Horgan (2015). Newcomb's Problem Revisited. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22:4-15.
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  41. Riley Hughes (1946). The Journals of Charles King Newcomb. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):541-543.
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  42. R. T. A. Innes (1913). Note on the Newcomb Operators Used in the Development of the Perturbative Function. Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa 3 (1):337-339.
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  43. P. Iyer (2004). Liability in the Care of the Elderly. Dialogue and Universalism 33 (1):124-131.
    This article sets out to propose some characteristic features of the intellectual and ethical attitudes which, in the popular belief and scholarly communities alike, stand for ideals worthy of promoting as ones which could underpin a modern society where both believers and unbelievers can feel at home. The “ethos” is construed to be about the sort of behaviour logically stemming from a tolerant outlook on the one hand, and an intellectual commitment to a noble cause worthy of one’s efforts, on (...)
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  44. N. Jacobi (1993). Newcomb's Paradox: A Realist Resolution. Theory and Decision 35 (1):1-17.
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  45. Jeff Jordan (1996). Pragmatic Arguments and Belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (4):409 - 420.
  46. Jeff Jordan (1991). Duff and the Wager. Analysis 51 (3):174 - 176.
  47. R. Jurecka (2000). Pascal's Argument of Stake. Filosoficky Casopis 48 (4):541-556.
  48. Richard JureČka (2000). Pascalův Argument Sázky. Filosoficky Casopis 48:541-556.
  49. Laszlo Kalmar & Janos Suranyi (1947). On the Reduction of the Decision Problem. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (3):65 - 73.
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  50. Leigh B. Kelley (1988). Reflections on Deliberative Coherence. Synthese 76 (1):83 - 121.
    This paper treats two problem cases in decision theory, the Newcomb problem and Reed Richter''s Button III. Although I argue that, contrary to Richter, the latter case does not constitute a genuine counterexample to a standard general proposition of (causal) decision theory, I agree with and undertake to amplify his solution to the decision problem in Button III. I then apply the conclusions and distinctions in the foregoing treatment of Button III to the Newcomb problem and argue that a familiar (...)
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