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  1. added 2020-01-29
    How to Handle Risky Experiments Producing Uncertain Phenomenon Like Cold Fusion?Robert W. P. Luk - 2019 - Science and Philosophy 7 (2):3-14.
    Some experiments are risky in that they cannot repeatedly produce certain phenomenon at will for study because the scientific knowledge of the process generating the uncertain phenomenon is poorly understood or may directly contradict with existing scientific knowledge. These experiments may have great impact not just to the scientific community but to mankind in general. Banning them from study may incur societies a great opportunity cost but accepting them runs the risk that scientists are doing junk science. How to make (...)
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  2. added 2019-07-15
    Why is Bayesian Confirmation Theory Rarely Practiced?Robert W. P. Luk - 2019 - Science and Philosophy 7 (1):3-20.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is a leading theory to decide the confirmation/refutation of a hypothesis based on probability calculus. While it may be much discussed in philosophy of science, is it actually practiced in terms of hypothesis testing by scientists? Since the assignment of some of the probabilities in the theory is open to debate and the risk of making the wrong decision is unknown, many scientists do not use the theory in hypothesis testing. Instead, they use alternative statistical tests that (...)
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  3. added 2018-08-14
    Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism?Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A:30-38.
    A prominent type of scientific realism holds that some important parts of our best current scientific theories are at least approximately true. According to such realists, radically distinct alternatives to these theories or theory-parts are unlikely to be approximately true. Thus one might be tempted to argue, as the prominent anti-realist Kyle Stanford recently did, that realists of this kind have little or no reason to encourage scientists to attempt to identify and develop theoretical alternatives that are radically distinct from (...)
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  4. added 2016-12-12
    Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to decision theory, focusing on the question of when it is rational to accept scientific theories. The author examines both Bayesian decision theory and confirmation theory, refining and elaborating the views of Ramsey and Savage. He argues that the most solid foundation for confirmation theory is to be found in decision theory, and he provides a decision-theoretic derivation of principles for how many probabilities should be revised over time. Professor Maher defines a notion of (...)
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  5. added 2016-12-08
    Decision Analysis as a Basis for Medical Decision Making: The Tree of Hippocrates.D. A. Zarin & S. G. Pauker - 1984 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (2):181-214.
    Physicians have developed a number of implicit and explicit approaches to complex medical decisions. Decision analysis is an explicit, quantitative method of clinical decision making that involves the separation of the probabilities of events from their relative values, or utilities. Its use can help physicians make difficult choices in a manner that promotes true patient participation. Decision analysis also provides a framework for the incorporation of data from multiple sources and for the assessment of the impact of uncertain data on (...)
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  6. added 2016-08-22
    Enhancing the Use of Decision Support Systems for Re-Engineering of Operations and Business- Applied Study on the Palestinian Universities.Samy S. Abu Naser & Mazen J. Al Shobaki - 2016 - Journal of Multidisciplinary Engineering Science Studies 2 (5):505--512.
    This research aims to identify the use of decision support systems as an entry point for operations of re-engineering in the Palestinian universities in Gaza Strip. The researchers used the method of questionnaire to collect data, and the researchers used a sample stratified random way, were (350) questionnaire distributed on the research sample and (312) questionnaire were collected back (89.1%). The study results showed that the most important ones are: there exists statistically significant impact at the level of significance (α (...)
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  7. added 2016-08-08
    Hypothesis Testing, “Dutch Book” Arguments, and Risk.Daniel Malinsky - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):917-929.
    “Dutch Book” arguments and references to gambling theorems are typical in the debate between Bayesians and scientists committed to “classical” statistical methods. These arguments have rarely convinced non-Bayesian scientists to abandon certain conventional practices, partially because many scientists feel that gambling theorems have little relevance to their research activities. In other words, scientists “don’t bet.” This article examines one attempt, by Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane, to progress beyond such apparent stalemates by connecting “Dutch Book”–type mathematical results with principles actually endorsed (...)
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  8. added 2014-10-25
    The Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Two Puzzles Resolved.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):1013-1021.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Carter and Peterson raise two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for anyone aspiring to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle trades on an application of epistemic contextualism to the precautionary principle; the second puzzle concerns the compatibility of the precautionary principle with the de minimis rule. In this note, I argue that neither puzzle should worry defenders of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle can be shown to be an instance of the (...)
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  9. added 2014-03-19
    Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.
    According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent updates her beliefs by conditionalization: that is, her posterior subjective probability after taking account of evidence X, pnew, is to be set equal to her prior conditional probability pold(·|X). Bayesians can be challenged to provide a justification for their claim that conditionalization is recommended by rationality—whence the normative force of the injunction to conditionalize? There are several existing justifications for conditionalization, but none directly addresses the idea that conditionalization will be epistemically rational (...)
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  10. added 2014-02-25
    Carnap's Inductive Probabilities as a Contribution to Decision Theory.Joachim Hornung - 1980 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 1 (3):325-367.
    Common probability theories only allow the deduction of probabilities by using previously known or presupposed probabilities. They do not, however, allow the derivation of probabilities from observed data alone. The question thus arises as to how probabilities in the empirical sciences, especially in medicine, may be arrived at. Carnap hoped to be able to answer this question byhis theory of inductive probabilities. In the first four sections of the present paper the above mentioned problem is discussed in general. After a (...)
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  11. added 2013-04-20
    New Tools for Theory Choice and Theory Diagosis.John R. Welch - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):318-329.
    Theory choice can be approached in at least four ways. One of these calls for the application of decision theory, and this article endorses this approach. But applying standard forms of decision theory imposes an overly demanding standard of numeric information, supposedly satisfied by point-valued utility and probability functions. To ameliorate this difficulty, a version of decision theory that requires merely comparative utilities and plausibilities is proposed. After a brief summary of this alternative, the article illustrates how comparative decision theory (...)
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  12. added 2011-10-27
    The Utility of Knowledge.Campbell Brown - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):155-65.
    Recent epistemology has introduced a new criterion of adequacy for analyses of knowledge: such an analysis, to be adequate, must be compatible with the common view that knowledge is better than true belief. One account which is widely thought to fail this test is reliabilism, according to which, roughly, knowledge is true belief formed by reliable process. Reliabilism fails, so the argument goes, because of the "swamping problem". In brief, provided a belief is true, we do not care whether or (...)
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  13. added 2011-10-26
    Epistemic Utility and the Evaluation of Experiments.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (3):368-386.
    William K. Goosens claims to show that my account of epistemic utility runs into serious difficulties when confronted with certain attractive conditions of adequacy for the evaluation of experiments. I show that those conditions of adequacy which are, indeed, acceptable to both of us are satisfied by the procedures for evaluating experiments mandated by combining my theory of epistemic utilities with the approach to evaluating experiments on which Goosens' argument is based. In particular, I demonstrate that my theory does not (...)
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  14. added 2011-10-26
    Cost-Benefit Versus Expected Utility Acceptance Rules.Alex C. Michalos - 1970 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970 (1):375-402.
    A rule for the acceptance of scientific hypotheses called 'the principle of cost-benefit dominance' is shown to be more effective and efficient than the well-known principle of the maximization of expected utility. Harvey 's defense of his theory of the circulation of blood in animals is examined as a historical paradigm case of a successful defense of a scientific hypothesis and as an implicit application of the cost-benefit dominance rule advocated here. Finally, various concepts of 'dominance' are considered by means (...)
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  15. added 2011-10-17
    Some Results in Bayesian Confirmation Theory with Applications.David Jehle - 2009 - Dissertation, Cornell University
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  16. added 2011-10-17
    Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.
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  17. added 2011-10-17
    Bayes and Beyond.Geoffrey Hellman - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):191-221.
    Several leading topics outstanding after John Earman's Bayes or Bust? are investigated further, with emphasis on the relevance of Bayesian explication in epistemology of science, despite certain limitations. (1) Dutch Book arguments are reformulated so that their independence from utility and preference in epistemic contexts is evident. (2) The Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem problem is pursued; the phenomenon of a "protective belt" of auxiliary statements around reasonably successful theories is explicated. (3) The Bayesian approach to understanding the superiority of (...)
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  18. added 2011-10-17
    Bayesianism With A Human Face.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1983 - In John Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 133--156.
  19. added 2011-10-17
    The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference.Henry Kyburg - 1974 - Reidel.
    At least one of these conceptions of probability underlies any theory of statistical inference (or, to use Neyman's phrase, 'inductive behavior'). ...
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  20. added 2011-10-17
    The Theory of Choice Under Subjective Risk and Uncertainty.Gerhard Tintner - 1941 - Econometrica 9:298-304.
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  21. added 2011-03-24
    The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.
    This major work challenges some widely held positions in epistemology - those of Peirce and Popper on the one hand and those of Quine and Kuhn on the other.
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  22. added 2011-02-12
    An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Proceedings of EPSA: Amsterdam '09. Springer. pp. 287--301.
    Beliefs come in different strengths. What are the norms that govern these strengths of belief? Let an agent's belief function at a particular time be the function that assigns, to each of the propositions about which she has an opinion, the strength of her belief in that proposition at that time. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that an agent's belief function at any time ought to be a probability function (Probabilism), and that she ought to update her belief function upon obtaining (...)
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  23. added 2011-02-12
    Bayesian Probability.Patrick Maher - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127.
    Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the agent’s evidence.
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  24. added 2011-02-11
    Is Probability the Only Coherent Approach to Uncertainty?Mark Colyvan - unknown
    In this article, I discuss an argument that purports to prove that probability theory is the only sensible means of dealing with uncertainty. I show that this argument can succeed only if some rather controversial assumptions about the nature of uncertainty are accepted. I discuss these assumptions and provide reasons for rejecting them. I also present examples of what I take to..
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  25. added 2011-02-11
    Bayesian Decision Theory, Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses.John C. Harsanyi - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.
    It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and (...)
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  26. added 2011-02-11
    The Neyman-Pearson Theory as Decision Theory, and as Inference Theory; with a Criticism of the Lindley-Savage Argument for Bayesian Theory.Allan Birnbaum - 1977 - Synthese 36 (1):19 - 49.
  27. added 2011-02-11
    Decision Theory and Confirmation.Isaac Levi - 1961 - Journal of Philosophy 58 (21):614-625.