Related categories

43 found
Order:
  1. Mechanistic Explanation Versus Deductive-Nomological Explanation.F. Michael Akeroyd - 2008 - Foundations of Chemistry 10 (1):39-48.
    This paper discusses the important paper by Paul Thagard on the pathway version of mechanistic explanation that is currently used in chemical explanation. The author claims that this method of explanation has a respectable pedigree and can be traced back to the Chemical Revolution in the arguments used by the Lavoisier School in their theoretical duels with Richard Kirwan, the proponent of a revised phlogistonian theory. Kirwan believed that complex chemical reactions could be explained by recourse to affinity tables that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Time Enough for Explanation.Sam Baron & Mark Colyvan - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (2):61-88.
    The present paper advances an analogy between cases of extra-mathematical explanation and cases of what might be termed ‘extra-logical explanation’: the explanation of a physical fact by a logical fact. A particular case of extra-logical explanation is identified that arises in the philosophical literature on time travel. This instance of extra-logical explanation is subsequently shown to be of a piece with cases of extra-mathematical explanation. Using this analogy, we argue extra-mathematical explanation is part of a broader class of non-causal explanation. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. A Pragmatic Analysis of Idealizations in Physics.William F. Barr - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (1):48-64.
    A brief discussion is offered of what it means to say that a set of statements provides D-N explanation with special emphasis given to approximative D-N explanation. An idealized theory is seen to provide approximative D-N explanation. An ideal case provides explanation only if postulates are offered which connect the ideal antecedent condition with actual conditions. Such postulates will help in accounting for deviations between what the consequent of the ideal case entails and what actually occurs. Three ways are presented (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  4. Thomas Reid on Causation and Scientific Explanation.Manuel Barrantes & Juan Manuel Durán - 2016 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (1):51-67.
    We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's and Benbaji's interpretations of Reid's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Selection and Explanation.Alexander Bird - 2006 - In Rethinking Explanation. Springer. pp. 131--136.
    Selection explanations explain some non-accidental generalizations in virtue of a selection process. Such explanations are not particulaizable - they do not transfer as explanations of the instances of such generalizations. This is unlike many explanations in the physical sciences, where the explanation of the general fact also provides an explanation of its instances (i.e. standard D-N explanations). Are selection explanations (e.g. in biology) therefore a different kind of explanation? I argue that to understand this issue, we need to see that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Explanation and Metaphysics.Alexander Bird - 2005 - Synthese 143 (1-2):89-107.
    Is the nature of explanation a metaphysical issue? Or has it more to do with psychology and pragmatics? To put things in a different way: what are primary relata in an explanation? What sorts of thing explain what other sorts of thing? David Lewis identifies two senses of ‘explanation’ (Lewis 1986, 217–218). In the first sense, an explanation is an act of explaining. I shall call this the subjectivist sense, since its existence depends on some subject doing the explaining. Hence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Explanation in Biology: Reduction, Pluralism, and Explanatory Aims.Ingo Brigandt - 2011 - Science & Education 22 (1):69-91.
    This essay analyzes and develops recent views about explanation in biology. Philosophers of biology have parted with the received deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation primarily by attempting to capture actual biological theorizing and practice. This includes an endorsement of different kinds of explanation (e.g., mathematical and causal-mechanistic), a joint study of discovery and explanation, and an abandonment of models of theory reduction in favor of accounts of explanatory reduction. Of particular current interest are philosophical accounts of complex explanations that appeal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  8. Logical Empiricism and Logical Positivism.Krzysztof Brzechczyn - 2009 - In Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography. Wiley-Blackwell.
  9. Explanations Are Like Salted Peanuts. Why You Can't Cut the Route Toward Further Reduction.Daniel Cohnitz - 2002 - In A. Beckermann & C. Nimtz (eds.), Argument und Analyse: Proceedings of GAP4. Mentis.
    Take a look at these four situations: Figure 1 All of these situations have certain features in common: in all of them an explanation is asked for, in all of them an explanation is given, and all these explanations are literally false (although in different ways).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Some Observations on the Deductive-Nomological Theory.S. T. Goh - 1970 - Mind 79 (315):408-414.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Carl Hempel - 1965 - The Free Press.
  12. Studies in the Logic of Explanation.Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
  13. Why Friedman's Non-Monotonic Reasoning Defies Hempel's Covering Law Model.M. C. W. Janssen & Y. -H. Tan - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):255 - 284.
    In this paper we will show that Hempel's covering law model can't deal very well with explanations that are based on incomplete knowledge. In particular the symmetry thesis, which is an important aspect of the covering law model, turns out to be problematic for these explanations. We will discuss an example of an electric circuit, which clearly indicates that the symmetry of explanation and prediction does not always hold. It will be argued that an alternative logic for causal explanation is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts.Kareem Khalifa - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (4):263-284.
    Explanatory contrastivists hold that we often explain phenomena of the form p rather than q. In this paper, I present a new, social‐epistemological model of contrastive explanation—accountabilism. Specifically, my view is inspired by social‐scientific research that treats explanations fundamentally as accounts; that is, communicative actions that restore one's social status when charged with questionable behaviour. After developing this model, I show how accountabilism provides a more comprehensive model of contrastive explanation than the causal models of contrastive explanation that are currently (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Hempel, Explanation, Metaphysics.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 94 (1-2):1-20.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  16. On the Logical Conditions of Deductive Explanation.Jaegwon Kim - 1963 - Philosophy of Science 30 (3):286-291.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  17. Can There Be a Philosophy of Archaeology?: Processual Archaeology and the Philosophy of Science.William Harvey Krieger - 2006 - Lexington Books.
  18. Empiricism, Objectivity, and Explanation.Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Carl G. Anderson - 1993 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):121-131.
    We sley Salmon, in his influential and detailed book, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, argues that the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation, “construed as the claim that scientific explanation can be explicated entirely in pragmatic terms” (1989, 185) is inadequate. The specific inadequacy ascribed to a pragmatic account is that objective relevance relations cannot be incorporated into such an account. Salmon relies on the arguments given in Kitcher and Salmon (1987) to ground this objection. He also suggests that Peter Railton’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. The Nonmechanistic Option: Defending Dynamical Explanation.Russell Meyer - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:0-0.
    This paper demonstrates that nonmechanistic, dynamical explanations are a viable approach to explanation in the special sciences. The claim that dynamical models can be explanatory without reference to mechanisms has previously been met with three lines of criticism from mechanists: the causal relevance concern, the genuine laws concern, and the charge of predictivism. I argue, however, that these mechanist criticisms fail to defeat nonmechanistic, dynamical explanation. Using the examples of Haken et al.’s ([1985]) HKB model of bimanual coordination, and Thelen (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Philosophy, Certainty and Semantic Stretch.Michaelis Michael - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (3):281-290.
  21. La conception déductive de l'explication scientifique et l'économie.P. Mongin - 2002 - Social Science Information 41 (2):139-165.
    This essay presents and discusses the currently most famous among the deductive conceptions of explanation, i.e., the deductive-nomological one, and proceeds to apply it to microeconomic theory. After restating the basic ideas, the essay investigates some of the important objections raised against it, with a view to decide whether or not they invalidate the proposed application to economics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Harcourt, Brace & World.
    Introduction: Science and Common Sense Long before the beginnings of modern civilization, men ac- quired vast funds of information about their environment. ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   288 citations  
  23. Die Deduktiv-Nomologische Erklärung AlS Hauptmotiv Empirisch-Wissenschaftlicher Tätigkeit.Edmund Nierlich - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (1):1 - 33.
    In this paper an attempt is made at developing the notion of a real and complete empirical explanation as excluding all forms of potential or incomplete explanations. This explanation is, however, no longer conceived as the proper aim of empirical science, for it can certainly be gleaned from recent epistemological publications that no comprehensive notion of a real and complete scientific explanation is likely to be constructed from within empirical science. Contrary to common understanding the empirical explanation, deductive-nomological as well (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. The Covering Law Model of Historical Explanation.Stanley Paluch - 1968 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):368 – 387.
    It is often argued (as by Hempel and Nagel) that genuine historical explanations — if these are to be had — must exhibit a connection between events to be explained and universal or probabilistic laws (or 'hypotheses'). This connection may take either a 'strong' or 'weak' form. The historian may show that a statement of the event to be explained is a logical consequence of statements of reasonably well-confirmed universal laws and occurrences linked by the laws to the event to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Approximative Explanation is Deductive-Nomological.David Pearce & Veikko Rantala - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (1):126-140.
    We revive the idea that a deductive-nomological explanation of a scientific theory by its successor may be defensible, even in those common and troublesome cases where the theories concerned are mutually incompatible; and limiting, approximating and counterfactual assumptions may be required in order to define a logical relation between them. Our solution is based on a general characterization of limiting relations between physical theories using the method of nonstandard analysis.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. In Defense of a Causal Requirement on Explanation.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 470.
    Causalists about explanation claim that to explain an event is to provide information about the causal history of that event. Some causalists also endorse a proportionality claim, namely that one explanation is better than another insofar as it provides a greater amount of causal information. In this chapter I consider various challenges to these causalist claims. There is a common and influential formulation of the causalist requirement – the ‘Causal Process Requirement’ – that does appear vulnerable to these anti-causalist challenges, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Rethinking Explanation.Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.) - 2007 - Springer.
    This book highlights some of the conceptual problems that still need to be solved and points out a number of fresh philosophical ideas to explore.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28. Theories of Explanation.Joseph C. Pitt (ed.) - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
    Since the publication of Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim's ground-breaking work "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," the theory of explanation has remained a major topic in the philosophy of science. This valuable collection provides readers with the opportunity to study some of the classic essays on the theory of explanation along with the best examples of the most recent work being done on the topic. In addition to the original Hempel and Oppenheim paper, the volume includes Scriven's critical reaction (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  29. A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation.Peter Railton - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (2):206-226.
    It has been the dominant view that probabilistic explanations of particular facts must be inductive in character. I argue here that this view is mistaken, and that the aim of probabilistic explanation is not to demonstrate that the explanandum fact was nomically expectable, but to give an account of the chance mechanism(s) responsible for it. To this end, a deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation is developed and defended. Such a model has application only when the probabilities occurring in covering laws (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  30. Explaining Explanation.David-Hillel Ruben - 1990 - Routledge.
    This book introduces readers to the topic of explanation. The insights of Plato, Aristotle, J.S. Mill and Carl Hempel are examined, and are used to argue against the view that explanation is merely a problem for the philosophy of science. Having established its importance for understanding knowledge in general, the book concludes with a bold and original explanation of explanation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  31. The Ontology of Explanation.David-Hillel Ruben - 1989 - In Fred D'Agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality. Reidel. pp. 67--85.
    In an explanation, what does the explaining and what gets explained? What are the relata of the explanation relation? Candidates include: people, events, facts, sentences, statements, and propositions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. The Spirit of Logical Empiricism: Carl G. Hempel's Role in Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science.Wesley C. Salmon - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):333-350.
    In this paper, I discuss the key role played by Carl G. Hempel's work on theoretical realism and scientific explanation in effecting a crucial philosophical transition between the beginning and the end of the twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, the dominant view was that science is incapable of furnishing explanations of natural phenomena; at the end, explanation is widely viewed as an important, if not the primary, goal of science. In addition to its intellectual benefits, this transition (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Carl G. Hempel on the Rationality of Science.Wesley C. Salmon - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (10):555-562.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Hempel's Conception of Inductive Inference in Inductive-Statistical Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):179-185.
    Carl G. Hempel has often stated that inductive-statistical explanations, as he conceives them, are inductive arguments. This discussion note raises the question of whether such arguments are to be understood as (1) arguments of the traditional sort, containing premises and conclusions, governed by some sort of inductive "acceptance rules," or (2) something more closely akin to Carnap's degree of confirmation statements which occur in an inductive logic which entirely eschews inductive "acceptance rules." Hempel's writings do not seem unequivocal on this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Indeterminism and Epistemic Relativization.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):199-202.
    Carl G. Hempel's doctrine of essential epistemic relativization of inductive-statistical explanation seems to entail the unintelligibility of the notion of objective homogeneity of reference classes. This discussion note explores the question of whether, as a consequence, essential epistemic relativization also entails the unintelligibility of the doctrine of indeterminism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36. Comments on 'Hempel's Ambiguity' by J. Alberto Coffa.Wesley C. Salmon - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):165 - 169.
    Using Coffa's paper as a point of departure, this brief note is designed to show that Hempel's inductive-statistical model of explanation implicitly construes explanations of that type as defective deductive-nomological explanations, with the consequence that there is no such thing as genuine inductive-statistical explanation according to Hempel's account. This result suggests a possible implicit commitment to determinism behind Hempel's theory of scientific explanation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Ohne Telos und Substanz. Grenzen des naturwissenschaftlichen Kausalitätsverständnisses.Gregor Schiemann - 1998 - In Paideia. Philosophy of Science XX. World Congress for Philosophy 1998). pp. 1-8.
    Die Zeiten, in denen Kausalität das Charakteristikum von Wissenschaftlichkeit war, scheinen sich ihrem Ende zu nähern. Seit dem Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts ist eine seit langem schwelende Krise des herkömmlichen Kausalitätsverständnisses in den Naturwissenschaften unübersehbar zum Ausdruck gekommen. Dessen ungeachtet halten jedoch viele Wissenschaftstheoretiker an Kausalitätsvorstellungen als vermeintlich unverzichtbarem Analyseinstrument fest. In Kritik dieser Tendenz zur Verkennung eines grundlegenden Bedeutungsverlustes wird der historische Verdrängungsprozess von Kausalitätsvorstellungen unter den Stichworten der Entfinalisierung und Entsubstantialisierung nachgezeichnet. Aus der Perspektive geschichtlicher Rekonstruktion handelt es sich (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Ein Logisch-Pragmatisches Modell Von Deduktiv-Nomologischer Erklärung (Systematisierung).Gerhard Schurz - 1982 - Erkenntnis 17 (3):321 - 347.
    The present paper first shows that the validity of deductive-nomological (D-N) explanations (systematizations) depends in general on the interpretation context of the predicates involved in the explanation. Therefore, no logical-semantical model can be adequate. This problem is solved by relativisation of the validity criteria on both the confirmation context and the definition context of the premisses. Based upon this, a logical-pragmatical model of D-N explanation is developed. Thereby, especially explanations of laws and global explanations are taken into consideration, since these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39. The Content of Science, the Methodology of Science and Hempel's Models of Explanation and Confirmation.Lawrence Sklar - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 94 (1-2):21-34.
  40. Nagelian Reduction Beyond the Nagel Model.Raphael van Riel - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (3):353-375.
    Nagel’s official model of theory-reduction and the way it is represented in the literature are shown to be incompatible with the careful remarks on the notion of reduction Nagel gave while developing his model. Based on these remarks, an alternative model is outlined which does not face some of the problems the official model faces. Taking the context in which Nagel developed his model into account, it is shown that the way Nagel shaped his model and, thus, its well-known deficiencies, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. Explanatory Depth.Brad Weslake - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):273-294.
    I defend an account of explanatory depth according to which explanations in the non-fundamental sciences can be deeper than explanations in fundamental physics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  42. The Last Stand of the Covering-Law Theory: A Reply to Opp.P. Ylikoski - 2013 - Social Science Information 52 (3):383-393.
    In his paper Karl-Dieter Opp heroically sets out to defend both the adequacy and socio- logical fruitfulness of the covering-law account of explanation (the HO scheme). The attempt is bold, as he is not only defending the HO scheme as a theory of explanation but also as a scheme for finding and establishing causal relationships. In this reply I argue that the defense is not successful; quite the contrary, it clearly demonstrates why mecha- nism-based reasoning is important in the social (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. The Third Dogma Revisited.Petri Ylikoski - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):395–419.
    This paper is an attempt to further our understanding of mechanisms conceived of as ontologically separable from laws. What opportunities are there for a mechanistic perspective to be independent of, or even more fundamental than, a law perspective? Advocates of the mechanistic view often play with the possibility of internal and external reliability, or with the paralleling possibilities of enforcing, counteracting, redirecting, etc., the mechanisms’ power to produce To further this discussion I adopt a trope ontology. It is independent of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation