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Summary

Deductive reasoning is (very roughly) the kind of reasoning in which the premises logically entail the conclusion, at least assuming that no mistake has been made in the reasoning. The premises of a deductive argument may be propositions that the thinker believes or propositions that the thinker temporarily assumes to be true in order to explore their consequences. Deductive reasoning contrasts with inductive (or ampliative ) reasoning, the kind of reasoning in which the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

One important question concerning deductive reasoning is whether we do, in fact, engage in anything that could reasonably be called “deductive reasoning”. Some philosophers and psychologists have denied that there is any such thing, though the consensus in both psychology and philosophy seems to be that there is a distinctive kind of deductive reasoning. Within cognitive science, an important question concerns the nature of deductive reasoning – does it depend on applying rules to mental representations that resemble the sentences of natural language or does it involve reasoning with diagrammic models? Within philosophy, there are important questions concerning the epistemology of deductive reasoning. Which deductive rules are thinkers justified in employing? What makes it the case that certain rules of inference preserve justification (or knowledge) rather than others?

Key works See Harman 1986 for the claim that logic does not provide a theory of good reasoning (and that there is no such thing as deductive inference). See Field 2009 for a reply. A classic paper on deduction is Carroll 1895, which raises the question of how deductive inferences rationally compel belief in their conclusion.  Dummett 1974 discusses the issue of what it is to justify deduction raised in the context of deciding between classical and intuitionist logic). Also see Haack 1976 on the difficulty of justifying deduction in a non-circular way. There are many different account of the justification of deductive rules of inference. They are often presented as part of a more general theory of a priori knowledge and justification. For instance, Bealer 1999 presents a theory based on intuition. BonJour 1998 presents a theory based on rational insight. Boghossian 2003 and Peacocke 1993 present theories based on the nature of concepts. Horwich 2008 argues that it is a primitive fact which rules of inference are justified.
Introductions For a brief introductory article, see Schechter 2013
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203 found
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1 — 50 / 203
  1. added 2020-09-02
    Restricted and Unrestricted Modus Ponens.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    In a typical modus ponens the reasoner will (a) assert that a premise materially implies a conclusion in a given world; (b) assert this premise and (c) infer the conclusion. But this restricted modus ponens has little in common with the unrestricted textbook modus ponens, since the latter claims that there are no possible worlds where: (a’) a premise materially implies a conclusion, (b’) that premise is true and (c’) the conclusion is false. It is clear that this textbook modus (...)
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  2. added 2020-08-19
    Modus Ponens, Conditional-Circularity and Material Implication.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The modus ponens can be interpreted as an answer to a circularity charge, but this strategy is only feasible if the additional conditional premise is interpreted as a claim to a material implication. Here’s how it works.
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  3. added 2020-08-10
    Making Sense of Deduction.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    An argument is deductive when the arguer believes the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion. A deductive argument is valid when the arguer’s claim is true, i.e., when there are no possible worlds whether the premises are true and the conclusion is false. But in order to evaluate this claim in an accurate manner we need to consider three qualifications that have been repeatedly ignored in the literature, namely, consistency in the attribution of truth values, world (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-15
    On What a Good Argument Is, in Science and Elsewhere.Rainer Ebert - 2011 - Dhaka University Journal on Journalism, Media and Communication Studies 1:17-26.
    This article investigates what constitutes good reason, in particular in scientific communication. I will start out with a general description of what scientists do and will identify the good argument as an integral part of all science. Employing some simple examples, I will then move on to derive some necessary conditions for the goodness of an argument. Along the way, I will introduce various basic concepts in logic and briefly talk about the nature of human knowledge. I will conclude by (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-10
    Variables de Medida del Razonamiento Deductivo.Francisco Salto, Paula Alvarez-Merino & Carmen Requena - 2018 - Revista Iberoamericana de Diagnstico y Evaluación Psicológica 49 (4):59-75.
    Hay doble pulsión en el centro de la discusión del razonamiento deductivo. Una conduce aparentemente a la abstracción y dominios arbitrarios, mientras que la otra conduce a la concreción y la dependencia del contenido. El objetivo de esta investigación es diseñar, aplicar y validar un instrumento de evaluación que nos permita corroborar si el razonamiento deductivo maneja reglas lógicas o contenidos. La muestra de estudio se compuso de 80 participantes (edad 18-77 años). El test consta de 60 ítems categorizados en: (...)
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  6. added 2019-12-02
    Minimal Rationality and the Web of Questions.Daniel Hoek - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk & Andy Egan (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.
    This paper proposes a new account of bounded or minimal doxastic rationality (in the sense of Cherniak 1986), based on the notion that beliefs are answers to questions (à la Yalcin 2018). The core idea is that minimally rational beliefs are linked through thematic connections, rather than entailment relations. Consequently, such beliefs are not deductively closed, but they are closed under parthood (where a part is an entailment that answers a smaller question). And instead of avoiding all inconsistency, minimally rational (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    Deductive Reasoning Under Uncertainty: A Water Tank Analogy.Guy Politzer - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):479-506.
    This paper describes a cubic water tank equipped with a movable partition receiving various amounts of liquid used to represent joint probability distributions. This device is applied to the investigation of deductive inferences under uncertainty. The analogy is exploited to determine by qualitative reasoning the limits in probability of the conclusion of twenty basic deductive arguments (such as Modus Ponens, And-introduction, Contraposition, etc.) often used as benchmark problems by the various theoretical approaches to reasoning under uncertainty. The probability bounds imposed (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Blind Reasoning.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):249-293.
    [Paul Boghossian] The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ’blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible. (...)
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Understanding and Inference.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249-293.
    The paper challenges the inferentialist account of concept possession that Paul Boghossian takes as a premise in his account of the transmission of justification by deductive reasoning in his paper 'Blind Reasoning'. Unorthodox speakers who reject the inferences in an alleged possession condition can still have the concept by understanding a word for it. In that sense, the inferences are not analytic. Inferentialist accounts of logical constants, theoretical terms (using the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method) and pejorative expressions such as 'Boche' are examined (...)
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  10. added 2019-05-07
    Inferencia y Presuposición.Axel Barceló - 2018 - In Max A. Freund, Max Fernandez de Castro & Marco Ruffino (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Logic: Recent Trends in Latin America and Spain. London, UK: College Publications.
    Pronpongo una nueva manera de concebir la aceptación de proposiciones y su relación con la creencia y la inferencia. Argumento además que adoptar esta propuesta nos permite resolver de manera relativamente sencilla algunas paradojas aparentemente tan disímbolas cómo la del prefacio, la lotería y el sorites. Según esta propuesta, el error detrás de la paradoja sorítica es pensar que quién cree que hay una línea divisoria entre lo que cae dentro de la extensión de un término y lo que cae (...)
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  11. added 2019-04-26
    Introduction.Andrew Aberdein & Matthew Inglis - 2019 - In Andrew Aberdein & Matthew Inglis (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 1-13.
    There has been little overt discussion of the experimental philosophy of logic or mathematics. So it may be tempting to assume that application of the methods of experimental philosophy to these areas is impractical or unavailing. This assumption is undercut by three trends in recent research: a renewed interest in historical antecedents of experimental philosophy in philosophical logic; a “practice turn” in the philosophies of mathematics and logic; and philosophical interest in a substantial body of work in adjacent disciplines, such (...)
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  12. added 2019-04-17
    Using Computer-Assisted Argument Mapping to Teach Reasoning to Students.Martin Davies, Ashley Barnett & Tim van Gelder - 2019 - In J. Anthony Blair (ed.), Studies in Critical Thinking. Windsor, ON, Canada: Windsor Studies in Argumentation. pp. 131-176.
    Argument mapping is a way of diagramming the logical structure of an argument to explicitly and concisely represent reasoning. The use of argument mapping in critical thinking instruction has increased dramatically in recent decades. This paper overviews the innovation and provides a procedural approach for new teaches wanting to use argument mapping in the classroom. A brief history of argument mapping is provided at the end of this paper.
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  13. added 2019-04-17
    Critical Thinking and the Disciplines Reconsidered.Martin Davies - 2013 - Higher Education Research and Development 32 (4):529-544.
    This paper argues that Moore's specifist defence of critical thinking as ‘diverse modes of thought in the disciplines’, which appeared in Higher Education Research & Development, 30(3), 2011, is flawed as it entrenches relativist attitudes toward the important skill of critical thinking. The paper outlines the critical thinking debate, distinguishes between ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘relativist’ approaches and locates Moore's account therein. It uses examples from one discipline-specific area, namely, the discipline of Literature, to show that the generalist approach to critical (...)
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  14. added 2019-04-17
    Computer-Aided Argument Mapping and the Teaching of Critical Thinking (Part 1).Martin Davies - 2012 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 27 (2):15-30.
    This paper is in two parts. Part I outlines three traditional approaches to the teaching of critical thinking: the normative, cognitive psychology, and educational approaches. Each of these approaches is discussed in relation to the influences of various methods of critical thinking instruction. The paper contrasts these approaches with what I call the “visualisation” approach. This approach is explained with reference to computer-aided argument mapping (CAAM) which uses dedicated computer software to represent inferences between premise and conclusions. The paper presents (...)
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  15. added 2019-04-17
    Computer-Aided Argument Mapping and the Teaching of Critical Thinking (Part 2).Martin Davies - 2012 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 27 (3):16-28.
    Part I of this paper outlined the three standard approaches to the teaching of critical thinking: the normative (or philosophical), cognitive psychology, and educational taxonomy approaches. The paper contrasted these with the visualisation approach; in particular, computer-aided argument mapping (CAAM), and presented a detailed account of the CAAM methodology and a theoretical justification for its use. This part develops further support for CAAM. A case is made that CAAM improves critical thinking because it minimises the cognitive burden of prose and (...)
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  16. added 2019-04-17
    Concept Mapping, Mind Mapping Argument Mapping: What Are the Differences and Do They Matter?W. Martin Davies - 2011 - Higher Education 62 (3):279–301.
    In recent years, academics and educators have begun to use software mapping tools for a number of education-related purposes. Typically, the tools are used to help impart critical and analytical skills to students, to enable students to see relationships between concepts, and also as a method of assessment. The common feature of all these tools is the use of diagrammatic relationships of various kinds in preference to written or verbal descriptions. Pictures and structured diagrams are thought to be more comprehensible (...)
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  17. added 2019-04-17
    Computer-Assisted Argument Mapping: A Rationale Approach.Martin Davies - 2009 - Higher Education 58:799-820.
    Computer-Assisted Argument Mapping (CAAM) is a new way of understanding arguments. While still embryonic in its development and application, CAAM is being used increasingly as a training and development tool in the professions and government. Inroads are also being made in its application within education. CAAM claims to be helpful in an educational context, as a tool for students in responding to assessment tasks. However, to date there is little evidence from students that this is the case. This paper outlines (...)
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  18. added 2019-04-17
    An "Infusion" Approach to Critical Thinking: Moore on the Critical Thinking Debate.Martin Davies - 2006 - Higher Education Research and Development 25 (2):179-193.
    This paper argues that general skills and the varieties of subject-specific discourse are both important for teaching, learning and practising critical thinking. The former is important because it outlines the principles of good reasoning simpliciter (what constitutes sound reasoning patterns, invalid inferences, and so on). The latter is important because it outlines how the general principles are used and deployed in the service of ‘academic tribes’. Because critical thinking skills are—in part, at least—general skills, they can be applied to all (...)
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  19. added 2019-02-11
    The Prospects of Working Memory Training for Improving Deductive Reasoning.Erin L. Beatty & Oshin Vartanian - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  20. added 2019-02-11
    Fluency and Belief Bias in Deductive Reasoning: New Indices for Old Effects.Dries Trippas, Simon J. Handley & Michael F. Verde - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  21. added 2019-02-11
    A Dialogical Account of Deductive Reasoning as a Case Study for How Culture Shapes Cognition.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2013 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 13 (5):459-482.
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  22. added 2019-01-30
    Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Deductive Reasoning: The Relation of the Universal and the Particular in Early Works of Tanabe Hajime.Timothy Burns & Tanabe Hajime - 2013 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 5 (2):124-149.
    This article introduces the first English translation of one of Tanabe’s early essays on metaphysics. It questions the relation of the universal to the particular in context of logic, phenomenology, Neo-Kantian epistemology, and classical metaphysics. Tanabe provides his reflections on the nature of the concept of universality and its constitutive relation to phenomenal particulars through critical analyses of the issue as it is discussed across various schools of philosophy including: British Empiricism, the Marburg School, the Austrian School, the Kyoto School, (...)
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  23. added 2018-10-21
    Prolegomena to a Cognitive Investigation of Euclidean Diagrammatic Reasoning.Yacin Hamami & John Mumma - 2013 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (4):421-448.
    Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning refers to the diagrammatic inferential practice that originated in the geometrical proofs of Euclid’s Elements. A seminal philosophical analysis of this practice by Manders (‘The Euclidean diagram’, 2008) has revealed that a systematic method of reasoning underlies the use of diagrams in Euclid’s proofs, leading in turn to a logical analysis aiming to capture this method formally via proof systems. The central premise of this paper is that our understanding of Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning can be fruitfully advanced (...)
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  24. added 2018-10-09
    Review of David Christensen, Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief[REVIEW]William J. Talbott - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
  25. added 2018-09-04
    On the Justification of Deduction and Induction.Franz Huber - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (3):507-534.
    The thesis of this paper is that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end. I will begin by presenting a contemporary variant of Hume ’s argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principle of induction. Then I will criticize the responses the resulting problem of induction has received by Carnap and Goodman, as well as praise Reichenbach ’s approach. Some of these authors compare induction to deduction. Haack compares (...)
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  26. added 2018-08-11
    Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):325-347.
    There are many domains about which we think we are reliable. When there is prima facie reason to believe that there is no satisfying explanation of our reliability about a domain given our background views about the world, this generates a challenge to our reliability about the domain or to our background views. This is what is often called the reliability challenge for the domain. In previous work, I discussed the reliability challenges for logic and for deductive inference. I argued (...)
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  27. added 2018-07-14
    Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.
    In this paper I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise-beliefs to conclusion-beliefs, but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples of (...)
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  28. added 2018-07-12
    The Epistemology of Modality and the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction.Anand Jayprakash Vaidya & Michael Wallner - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years : conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction. One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the (...)
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  29. added 2018-01-23
    The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference – A Model-Theoretic Approach.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Bucharest: PRO Universitaria Publishing. pp. 11-36.
    The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference (Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to (...)
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  30. added 2018-01-16
    Believing Epistemic Contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
    What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical (...)
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  31. added 2018-01-08
    Reliable Deduction. Munaretti - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):725.
    Neste artigo trato da questão sobre o que torna uma dedução confiável. Uma resposta satisfatória a tal questão nos ajudaria a entender como dedução pode expandir ou gerar conhecimento. Eu exploro duas respostas a tal questão. A primeira faz uso da noção de acarretamento lógico-formal, enquanto que a segunda faz uso da noção de acarretamento metafísico. A última é superior à primeira, pois nos permite explicar a confiabilidade de uma classe mais ampla de deduções.
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  32. added 2017-11-07
    The Link Between Deductive Reasoning and Mathematics.Kinga Morsanyi, Teresa McCormack & Eileen O'Mahony - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (2):234-257.
    Recent studies have shown that deductive reasoning skills are related to mathematical abilities. Nevertheless, so far the links between mathematical abilities and these two forms of deductive inference have not been investigated in a single study. It is also unclear whether these inference forms are related to both basic maths skills and mathematical reasoning, and whether these relationships still hold if the effects of fluid intelligence are controlled. We conducted a study with 87 adult participants. The results showed that transitive (...)
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  33. added 2017-10-18
    In Defence of Single-Premise Closure.Weng Tang - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1887-1900.
    It’s often thought that the phenomenon of risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure but not for single-premise closure. But recently, Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter have challenged this thought. Lasonen-Aarnio argues that, insofar as risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure, it poses a similar problem for single-premise closure. For she thinks that, there being such a thing as deductive risk, risk may aggregate over a single premise and the deduction itself. Schechter argues that single-premise closure succumbs to risk (...)
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  34. added 2017-09-11
    The Problem of Basic Deductive Inference.Gordon Barnes - manuscript
    Knowledge can be transmitted by a valid deductive inference. If I know that p, and I know that if p then q, then I can infer that q, and I can thereby come to know that q. What feature of a valid deductive inference enables it to transmit knowledge? In some cases, it is a proof of validity that grounds the transmission of knowledge. If the subject can prove that her inference follows a valid rule, then her inference transmits knowledge. (...)
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  35. added 2017-09-11
    How We Naturally Reason.Fred Sommers - manuscript
    In the 17th century, Hobbes stated that we reason by addition and subtraction. Historians of logic note that Hobbes thought of reasoning as “a ‘species of computation’” but point out that “his writing contains in fact no attempt to work out such a project.” Though Leibniz mentions the plus/minus character of the positive and negative copulas, neither he nor Hobbes say anything about a plus/minus character of other common logical words that drive our deductive judgments, words like ‘some’, ‘all’, ‘if’, (...)
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  36. added 2017-09-11
    Deductive Reasoning and the Brain.Charles M. Wharton & Jordan Grafman - forthcoming - Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
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  37. added 2017-09-11
    The New Riddle of Induction and the New Riddle of Deduction.Gal Yehezkel - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):31-41.
    Many believe that Goodman’s new riddle of induction proves the impossibility of a purely syntactical theory of confirmation. After discussing and rejecting Jackson’s solution to Goodman’s paradox, I formulate the “new riddle of deduction,” in analogy to the new riddle of induction. Since it is generally agreed that deductive validity can be defined syntactically, the new riddle of induction equally does not show that inductive validity cannot be defined syntactically. I further rely on the analogy between induction and deduction in (...)
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  38. added 2017-09-11
    Reasoning Processes as Epistemic Dynamics.Fernando Velázquez-Quesada - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):41-60.
    This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...)
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  39. added 2017-09-11
    Imaging Deductive Reasoning and the New Paradigm.Mike Oaksford - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  40. added 2017-09-11
    On 'Deduction' and the Inductive/Deductive Distinction.Jeffrey Goodman & Daniel Flage - 2012 - Studies in Logic 5 (3).
    The definitions of ‘deduction’ found in virtually every introductory logic textbook would encourage us to believe that the inductive/deductive distinction is a distinction among kinds of arguments and that the extension of ‘deduction’ is a determinate class of arguments. In this paper, we argue that that this approach is mistaken. Specifically, we defend the claim that typical definitions of ‘deduction’ operative in attempts to get at the induction/deduction distinction are either too narrow or insufficiently precise. We conclude by presenting a (...)
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  41. added 2017-09-11
    Deductive Inference and Aspect Perception.Arif Ahmed - 2010 - In Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
    Deductive inference seems to reveal semantic connections between their premise(s) and conclusion that were there all along. This looks inconsistent with Wittgenstein's later views on meaning. The paper argues that W's treatment of aspects suggests a Wittgensteinian treatment of deduction that accommodates the troublesome phenomenon without conceding its force.
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  42. added 2017-09-11
    The Scandal of Deduction: Hintikka on the Information Yield of Deductive Inferences.Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (1):67-94.
    This article provides the first comprehensive reconstruction and analysis of Hintikka’s attempt to obtain a measure of the information yield of deductive inferences. The reconstruction is detailed by necessity due to the originality of Hintikka’s contribution. The analysis will turn out to be destructive. It dismisses Hintikka’s distinction between surface information and depth information as being of any utility towards obtaining a measure of the information yield of deductive inferences. Hintikka is right to identify the failure of canonical information theory (...)
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  43. added 2017-09-11
    Semantics and the Justification of Deductive Inference.Ebba Gullberg & Sten Lindström - 2007 - Hommage À Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    Is it possible to give a justification of our own practice of deductive inference? The purpose of this paper is to explain what such a justification might consist in and what its purpose could be. On the conception that we are going to pursue, to give a justification for a deductive practice means to explain in terms of an intuitively satisfactory notion of validity why the inferences that conform to the practice coincide with the valid ones. That is, a justification (...)
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  44. added 2017-09-11
    Confidence and Accuracy in Deductive Reasoning.Jody M. Shynkaruk & Valerie A. Thompson - 2006 - Memory and Cognition 34 (3):619-632.
    In two experiments, we investigated the relationship between confidence and accuracy in syllogistic reasoning. Participants judged the validity of conclusions and provided confidence ratings twice for each problem: once quickly and again after further deliberation. Correlations between confidence and accuracy were small or nonexistent. In addition, confidence and accuracy were mediated by different variables. Confidence judgments appeared to reflect external cues, so that confidence was greater when the participants were allowed additional time to think about the problem, as well as (...)
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  45. added 2017-09-11
    Cultural Differences in Belief Bias Associated with Deductive Reasoning?Sara J. Unsworth & Douglas L. Medin - 2005 - Cognitive Science 29 (4):525-529.
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  46. added 2017-09-11
    Logic and Human Reasoning: An Assessment of the Deduction Paradigm.Jonathan Evans - 2002 - Psychological Bulletin 128 (6):978-996.
    The study of deductive reasoning has been a major paradigm in psychology for approximately the past 40 years. Research has shown that people make many logical errors on such tasks and are strongly influenced by problem content and context. It is argued that this paradigm was developed in a context of logicist thinking that is now outmoded. Few reasoning researchers still believe that logic is an appropriate normative system for most human reasoning, let alone a model for describing the process (...)
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  47. added 2017-09-11
    Deductive Inference.Rachel J. Falmagne & Joanna Gonsalves - 1995 - Annual Review of Psychology 46 (1):525-559.
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  48. added 2017-09-11
    In Defense of Deductive Inference.Hilary Kornblith - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):247 - 257.
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  49. added 2017-09-11
    Can an Anti-Realist Be Revisionary About Deductive Inference?Bernhard Weiss - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):216 - 224.
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  50. added 2017-09-11
    Logic: Form and Function. The Mechanization of Deductive Reasoning.J. D. Halpern - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (1):227-229.
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