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  1. added 2019-09-13
    The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
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  2. added 2019-08-26
    Do Psychological Defeaters Undermine Foundationalism in Moral Epistemology? - a Critique of Sinnott-Armstrong’s Argument Against Ethical Intuitionism.Philipp Schwind - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):941-952.
    Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already constitute (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-06
    A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):75-81.
    John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation.David M. Godden & Douglas N. Walton - 2007 - Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
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  5. added 2019-03-06
    Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don’t know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it’s impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it’s impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it’s impossible (...)
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  6. added 2019-02-23
    Another Cartoon Portrait of the Mind From the Reductionist Metaphysicians--A Review of Peter Carruthers ‘The Opacity of Mind’ (2011) (Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 236-264.
    Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life, but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order (...)
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  7. added 2017-12-24
    Knowledge and Assumptions.Brett Sherman & Gilbert Harman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):131-140.
    When epistemologists talk about knowledge, the discussions traditionally include only a small class of other epistemic notions: belief, justification, probability, truth. In this paper, we propose that epistemologists should include an additional epistemic notion into the mix, namely the notion of assuming or taking for granted.
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  8. added 2017-12-24
    Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries.Gilbert Harman & Brett Sherman - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):492–500.
    John Hawthorne’s marvelous book contains a wealth of arguments and insights based on an impressive knowledge and understanding of contemporary discussion. We can address only a small aspect of the topic. In particular, we will offer our own answers to two questions about knowledge that he discusses.
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  9. added 2017-01-09
    Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges.John Nicholas Williams - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):83-94.
    I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false.I will show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsuccessfully) to address, (...)
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  10. added 2016-09-11
    Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes From Klein.Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.) - 2019 - Springer Verlag.
    This is a collection of new essays written in honor of the work of Peter D. Klein, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein’s work by engaging directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors.
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  11. added 2016-03-02
    Is Perception Inferential?William Cornwell - 2004 - In Johan Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. Niederosterreichkultur. pp. 80-82.
    Applying a theory of psychological modularity, I argue for a theory of defeasibility conditions for the epistemic justification of perceptual beliefs. My theory avoids the extremes of holism (e.g., coherentism and confirmation holism) and of foundationalist theories of non-inferential justification.
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  12. added 2016-02-27
    Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief Into Knowledge.Hans Rott - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469-493.
    In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to (...)
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  13. added 2015-12-01
    Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge.Steven R. Levy - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):115 - 123.
    There have been many attempts of late to formulate a satisfactory theory of knowledge with which to replace the traditional justified true belief analysis. Almost all agree that it must be the case that in order for S to know that p; i.) p be true, and ii.) S believe that p. Although many argue that there must be a condition stating that S has adequate evidence for p, requirements other than i.) and ii.) are controversial. The most popular approach (...)
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  14. added 2015-12-01
    Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.
    The recently offered, Purported counter-Examples to justified, True belief analyses of knowledge are looked at with some care and all found to be either incoherent or inconclusive. It is argued that justified, True belief analyses are based on sound insight into the concept of knowledge. The distinction between having been justified in claiming to know something and actually having known it is used in an effort to get the discussion of knowledge back on the right track.
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  15. added 2015-09-08
    Introduction.Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen & Marcus Willaschek - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 87 (1):1-8.
  16. added 2015-09-08
    Defeasibility in Philosophy: Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law.Claudia Blöser, Mikae Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen & Marcus Willaschek (eds.) - 2013 - Editions Rodopi.
    Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology , legal philosophy and ethics and the philosophy of action . The volume ends with an extensive (...)
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  17. added 2015-09-02
    Epistemic Entitlement. The Right to Believe.Hannes Ole Matthiessen - 2014 - Palgrave MacMillan.
    In Epistemic Entitlement. The Right to Believe Hannes Ole Matthiessen develops a social externalist account of epistemic entitlement and perceptual knowledge. The basic idea is that positive epistemic status should be understood as a specific kind of epistemic right, that is a right to believe. Since rights have consequences for how others are required to treat the bearer of the right, they have to be publicly accessible. The author therefore suggests that epistemic entitlement can plausibly be conceptualized as a status (...)
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  18. added 2015-08-24
    Defeasibility.W. Haas - 1957 - Mind 66 (264):543.
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  19. added 2015-04-10
    Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
    Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many (...)
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  20. added 2014-09-23
    Defeat Reconsidered and Repaired.Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - The Reasoner 8 (2):15-15.
  21. added 2014-03-16
    Useful False Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
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  22. added 2013-11-25
    Misleading Defeaters.Steven R. Levy - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (12):739-742.
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  23. added 2013-04-24
    Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief.Avram Hiller - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s (...)
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  24. added 2012-03-14
    Immune Belief Systems.Peter Klein - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
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  25. added 2012-03-14
    Real Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  26. added 2012-03-14
    Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  27. added 2012-03-14
    Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification.Peter D. Klein - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
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  28. added 2012-03-14
    Misleading "Misleading Defeaters".Peter D. Klein - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
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  29. added 2012-03-14
    Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
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  30. added 2012-03-14
    A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
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