This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

622 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 622
Material to categorize
  1. Studying Marginalised Physical Sciences.Sean F. Johnston - 2007 - ‘Writing the History’ of the Physical Sciences After 1945: State of the Art, Questions, and Perspectives, Strasbourg, 8-9 June 2007.
    The second half of the twentieth century offers distinct perspectives for the historian of science. The role of the State, the expansion of certain industries and the cultural engagement with science were all transformed. The foregrounding of certain strands of physical science in the public and administrative consciousness – nuclear physics and planetary science, for example – had a complement: the ‘backgrounding’ or institutional neglect of a number of other fields. My work in the history of the physical sciences has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Chunglin Kwa, Styles of Knowing: A New History of Science From Ancient Times to the Present. [REVIEW]Sean F. Johnston - 2012 - Ambix 59:294-295.
  3. Definition and the Foundations of Knowledge in Illuminationist Philosophy: Section on Expository Propositions (Al-Aqwāl Al-Shāriḥa),.Hossein Ziai - 1993 - In Borhan Ibneh Yousef (ed.), Papers in Honor of ‘Ostād’ Javad Mosleh. Los Angeles: Research & Education Center. pp. 108-130.
  4. Skepticism and the Acquisition of “Knowledge”.Shaun Nichols & N. Ángel Pinillos - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):397-414.
    Do you know you are not being massively deceived by an evil demon? That is a familiar skeptical challenge. Less familiar is this question: How do you have a conception of knowledge on which the evil demon constitutes a prima facie challenge? Recently several philosophers have suggested that our responses to skeptical scenarios can be explained in terms of heuristics and biases. We offer an alternative explanation, based in learning theory. We argue that, given the evidence available to the learner, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5. Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Data.Petar Bojanić, Samuele Iaquinto & Giuliano Torrengo - 2018 - Rivista di Estetica 69 (3):3-6.
    Introduction to the special issue "Empirical Evidence and Philosophy".
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge.Andrew Peet & Eli Pitcovski - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):141-157.
    In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not be indexed to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief. This shift is problematic for several prominent approaches to the theory of knowledge, including virtue reliabilism and proper functionalism (as normally conceived). The view that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief is better able to accommodate the shift in question.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. The Ambiguity Theory of “Knows”.Mark Satta - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):69-83.
    The ambiguity theory of “knows” is the view that knows and its cognates have more than one propositional sense—i.e., more than one sense that can properly be used in “knows that” etc. constructions. The ambiguity theory of “know” has received relatively little attention as an account of the truth-conditions for knowledge ascriptions and denials—especially compared to views like classical, moderate invariantism and epistemic contextualism. In this paper, it is argued that the ambiguity theory of knows has an advantage over both (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. E=K and The Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin.Rodrigo Borges - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1031-1041.
    A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs, for no false belief can be part of one’s total evidence and one’s total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief. The problem with this alleged implication of E=K, as Comesaña and Kantin :447–454, 2010) have noted, is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on. The original Gettier cases relied on two principles: that justification is closed under known entailment, and that sometimes one is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Gettier Across Cultures.Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Amita Chatterjee, Kaori Karasawa, Noel Struchiner, Smita Sirker, Naoki Usui & Takaaki Hashimoto - 2015 - Noûs:645-664.
    In this article, we present evidence that in four different cultural groups that speak quite different languages there are cases of justified true beliefs that are not judged to be cases of knowledge. We hypothesize that this intuitive judgment, which we call “the Gettier intuition,” may be a reflection of an underlying innate and universal core folk epistemology, and we highlight the philosophical significance of its universality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  10. Gettier Across Cultures.Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Amita Chatterjee, Kaori Karasawa, Noel Struchiner, Smita Sirker, Naoki Usui & Takaaki Hashimoto - 2015 - Noûs:645-664.
    In this article, we present evidence that in four different cultural groups that speak quite different languages there are cases of justified true beliefs that are not judged to be cases of knowledge. We hypothesize that this intuitive judgment, which we call “the Gettier intuition,” may be a reflection of an underlying innate and universal core folk epistemology, and we highlight the philosophical significance of its universality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  11. Knowledge as de Re True Belief?Paul Egré - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1517-1529.
    In “Facts: Particulars of Information Units?”, Kratzer proposed a causal analysis of knowledge in which knowledge is defined as a form of de re belief of facts. In support of Kratzer’s view, I show that a certain articulation of the de re/de dicto distinction can be used to integrally account for the original pair of Gettier cases. In contrast to Kratzer, however, I think such an account does not fundamentally require a distinction between facts and true propositions. I then discuss (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Justification and Indefinite Propositions: Disarming Gettier's Counterexamples.Paul K. Moser - 1984 - Critica 16 (46):3-14.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. The Origin of the ‘Gettier’ Problem: Socrates and The Theaetetus.Michael Jenkins - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):51-66.
    This article discusses the origin of what has become known as the Gettier Problem. It examines the claim put forward, though not expounded or defended, by J.Angelo Corlett in Analyzing Social Knowledge that the basis for Edmund Gettier’s article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” was originally argued for in Plato’sTheaetetus. In his article, Gettier argues that the Justified True Belief condition is not sufficient for knowledge. However, Corlett questions the originality of this argument. This article examines Gettier’s article followed by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. The Gettier Non-Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (1):85-107.
    This paper highlights an aspect of Gettier situations, one standardly not accorded interpretive significance. A remark of Gettier’s suggests its potential importance. And once that aspect’s contribution is made explicit, an argument unfolds for the conclusion that it is fairly simple to have knowledge within Gettier situations. Indeed, that argument dissolves the traditional Gettier problem.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15. Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism.Mylan Engel - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):99-117.
    When it comes to second-order knowledge, internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke.John N. Williams - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):363-378.
    Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. Fred Adams, John Barker and Murray Clarke argue that Backward Clock is no such counterexample. Their argument fails to nullify Backward Clock which also shows that other tracking analyses, such as Dretske’s and one that Adams et al. may well have in mind, are inadequate.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Beat the (Backward) Clock.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):353-361.
    In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. Rejoinder to Haze.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):227-230.
    Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counter-examples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges Claudio de Almeida & Peter Klein (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Reply to Adams and Clarke.Tristan Haze - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):221-225.
    Here I defend two counterexamples to Nozick’s truth-tracking theory of knowledge from an attack on them by Adams and Clarke. With respect to the first counterexample, Adams and Clarke make the error of judging that my belief counts as knowledge. More demonstrably, with respect to the second counterexample they make the error of thinking that, on Nozick’s method-relativized theory, the method M in question in any given case must be generally reliable.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. Knowing as the most general factive mental state.Francois-Igor Pris - 2017 - Философская Мысль 6:29-35.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Knowledge and the Gettier Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2016 - Cambridge University Press.
    Edmund Gettier's 1963 verdict about what knowledge is not has become an item of philosophical orthodoxy, accepted by philosophers as a genuine epistemological result. It assures us that - contrary to what Plato and later philosophers have thought - knowledge is not merely a true belief well supported by epistemic justification. But that orthodoxy has generated the Gettier problem - epistemology's continuing struggle to understand how to accommodate Gettier's apparent result within an improved conception of knowledge. In this book, Stephen (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. Testimony and Gettier: A Reply to Vance.Adrian Heathcote - 2016 - Ratio 29 (2):228-233.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):1-14.
    The possibility of justified true belief without knowledge is normally motivated by informally classified examples. This paper shows that it can also be motivated more formally, by a natural class of epistemic models in which both knowledge and justified belief are represented. The models involve a distinction between appearance and reality. Gettier cases arise because the agent's ignorance increases as the gap between appearance and reality widens. The models also exhibit an epistemic asymmetry between good and bad cases that sceptics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  25. Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper.M. Clark - 1963 - Analysis 24 (2):46-48.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  26. Two Notions of Warrant and Plantinga's Solution to the Gettier Problem.R. Greene & N. A. Balmert - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):132-139.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27. A Gettier Drama.O. Hanfling - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):262-263.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. The Two Faces of Compatibility with Justified Beliefs.Tero Tulenheimo - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):15-30.
    When discussing knowledge, two relations are of interest: justified doxastic accessibility \ , she is in \ ) and justification equivalence \ exactly the same justified beliefs that she has in \ ). Speaking of compatibility with the agent’s justified beliefs is potentially ambiguous: either of the two relations \ or \ can be meant. I discuss the possibility of identifying the relation of epistemic accessibility \ , she is in \ ) with the union of \ and \ . (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. In Defense of Sensitivity.Tim Black & Peter Murphy - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):53-71.
    The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  30. Knowledge’s Boundary Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):41-56.
    Where is the justificatory boundary between a true belief's not being knowledge and its being knowledge? Even if we put to one side the Gettier problem, this remains a fundamental epistemological question, concerning as it does the matter of whether we can provide some significant defence of the usual epistemological assumption that a belief is knowledge only if it is well justified. But can that question be answered non-arbitrarily? BonJour believes that it cannot be -- and that epistemology should therefore (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis.Lars Gundersen - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (3):353-364.
    According to Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge, an agent a knows that p just in case her belief that p is true and also satisfies the two tracking conditionals that had p been false, she would not have believed that p , and had p been true under slightly different circumstances, she would still have believed that p . In this paper I wish to highlight an interesting but generally ignored feature of this theory: namely that it is reminiscent of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32. Safety, Closure, and the Flow of Information.Jens Kipper - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1109-1126.
    In his earlier writings, Fred Dretske proposed an anti-skeptical strategy that is based on a rejection of the view that knowledge is closed under known entailment. This strategy is seemingly congenial with a sensitivity condition for knowledge, which is often associated with Dretske’s epistemology. However, it is not obvious how Dretske’s early account meshes with the information-theoretic view developed in Knowledge and the Flow of Information. One aim of this paper is to elucidate the connections between these accounts. First I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. The Epistemology of Neo-Gettier Epistemology.Bob Lockie - unknown
    The paper begins by drawing a number of ‘levels’ distinctions in epistemology. It notes that a theory of knowledge must be an attempt to obtain knowledge. It is suggested that we can make sense of much of the work found in analytic theory of knowledge by seeing three framework assumptions as underpinning this work. First, that to have philosophical knowledge of knowledge requires us to have an analysis. Second, that much of what we require from a theory of knowledge may (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Standard Gettier Cases: A Problem for Greco?Shane Ryan - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):201-212.
    I argue that Greco’s handling of barn-façade cases is unsatisfactory as it is at odds with his treatment of standard Gettier cases. I contend that this is so as there is no salient feature of either type of case such that that feature provides a ground to grant, as Greco argues, that there is an exercising of ability in one type of case, standard Gettier cases, but not in the other, barn-façade cases. The result, I argue, is that either Greco (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge.Katalin Farkas - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  36. Chapter 2. Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 6-8.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. The Maturation of the Gettier Problem.Allan Hazlett - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):1-6.
    Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” first appeared in an issue of Analysis , dated June of 1963, and although it’s tempting to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper’s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging. Epistemology has benefited from 50 years of sincere and rigorous discussion of issues arising from the paper, and Gettier’s conclusion that knowledge is not justified true belief is sometimes offered as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  38. Justified, True Belief: Is It Relevant to Knowledge?Jamie Leeser - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Gettier For Justification.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):305-318.
    I will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of virtue epistemology . The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justification do not provide sufficient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  40. The Importance of Knowledge Per Se.Jeffrey Glick - unknown
    A traditional line of inquiry in epistemology tried to analyze the concept of knowledge into its constituent components. In virtue of understanding these alleged more basic concepts, such as truth, justification, and belief, it was hoped that a complete and informative theory of knowledge would emerge. According to the revolutionary approach advocated here, one which originates in Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits, better success can be achieved by reversing this conceptual analysis structure by taking knowledge as the fundamental explanatory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Gettier-Problem.Bernd Buldt - unknown
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. A Theory of Knowledge.Frode Bjørdal - 1993 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    In this dissertation I present a new solution to the renowned Gettier problem. My solution, which in a sense represents a defense of a rather traditional epistemological approach, is based upon a distinction between primary and secondary beliefs. I argue that primary beliefs are known if justified and true, whereas secondary beliefs are known if they are believed on the basis of a known primary belief. Much emphasis is put upon defending this approach against potential objections, but I also draw (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Living in the Gettier Fallout.Todd Michael Furman - 1992 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    In a nutshell, I construct and defend an analysis of empirical knowledge. Call this analysis A . A is very eclectic, but it is best described as a reliabilistic-defeasibility analysis of knowledge. Its virtues are these: A seems to be able to handle Gettier examples. A overcomes the 'social aspects problem' of knowing. A makes sense of this phenomenon: Sometimes we are willing to attribute knowledge to S who has evidence E for believing that P. But, at other times, we (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. On Formalism in the Theory of Knowledge: A Metaepistemological Diatribe.Mckee Greer Lee - 1982 - Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    There are at least two distinct ways within contemporary analytic philosophy of trying to analyze knowledge. Some try to state necessary and sufficient conditions for its being the case that someone knows something. Others try to explicate knowledge without stating necessary and sufficient conditions, by presenting and discussing paradigmatic cases of knowledge, so as to delineate the criteria of knowledge. I label these two methodological schools formalism and non-formalism respectively. In this essay I criticize the former on behalf of the (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Gettier-Like Problem in Indian Philosophy.Roma Ray - 1985 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 12 (4):381.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. On Gettier's Notion of Knowledge and Justification.Debabrata Mukhopadhyay - 1989 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):447.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. "J. Schlanger": Une théorie du savoir. [REVIEW]D. Schulthess - 1980 - Revue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 112:316.
    A review of Jacques Schlanger’s Une théorie du savoir (1978): a positivist account of the nature of knowledge, focusing on the relation to objectivity, with elements from systems theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Comments on the E. Gettier's Paper.Dmitriy Ankin & Lev Lamberov - 2007 - Analytica 1:127-135.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Philosophical Analysis: A Defense By Example.David F. Austin - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):249-258.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. On Defining Knowledge as Justified True Belief.John Blackford Mcclatchey - 1973 - Dissertation, University of Georgia
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 622