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  1. Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Murray Clarke (2016). Beat the (Backward) Clock. Logos and Episteme 7 (3):353-361.
    In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
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  2. Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2016). Rejoinder to Haze. Logos and Episteme 7 (2):227-230.
    Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counter-examples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims.
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  3. Hartley B. Alexander (1905). Quantity, Quality, and the Function of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (17):459-464.
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  4. Dmitriy Ankin & Lev Lamberov (2007). Comments on the E. Gettier's Paper. Analytica 1:127-135.
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  5. A. J. Anwar (1997). Chisho'm's Solution of the Gettier Problem: An Inconsistency. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 24 (3):307-314.
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  6. Bruce Aune (1985). The Analysis of Knowing. Review of Metaphysics 38 (4):905-907.
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  7. David F. Austin (1993). Philosophical Analysis: A Defense By Example. Noûs 27 (2):249-258.
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  8. Murat Baç (2005). The Myth Of Nonepistemic Truth As A Necessary Condition Of Knowledge. Philosophical Writings 30 (3).
    This paper aims to show that the putatively non-epistemic nature of propositional truth presents an interesting problem for those who reasonably believe that truth is normatively distinct from warrant or evidence and that such truth is an irreducible condition on propositional knowledge. After arguing that McDowell’s direct realist approach is rather inadequate to deal with the issue I am raising here, I introduce the notion of ‘epistemic gradient’ to show that even if one may plausibly maintain that a significant portion (...)
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  9. John A. Barker & Fred Adams (2012). Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
  10. Lawrence C. Becker (1982). Knowledge as Doubly Anchored True Belief. Philosophy Research Archives 8:223-241.
    Some ambiguities in the verb ‘to know’ are analyzed, and it is argued that “undefeatably justified true belief” is the meaning of most philosophical interest with respect to specifying truth conditions for ‘S knows that p’. Two general conditions for an adequate definition of ‘S knows that p’ are discussed. Then a proposal for a quasi-causal theory of knowledge is introduced and defended.
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  11. Alexander Bird (2007). Justified Judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.
    When is a belief or judgment justified? One might be forgiven for thinking the search for single answer to this question to be hopeless. The concept of justification is required to fulfil several tasks: to evaluate beliefs epistemically, to fill in the gap between truth and knowledge, to describe the virtuous organization of one’s beliefs, to describe the relationship between evidence and theory (and thus relate to confirmation and probabilification). While some of these may be held to overlap, the prospects (...)
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  12. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Oup Usa.
    Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how (...)
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  13. Michael Bishop & J. D. Trout (2005). The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology. Noûs 39 (4):696-714.
    Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) names a contingently clustered class of methods and theses that have dominated English-speaking epistemology for about the past half-century. The major contemporary theories of SAE include versions of foundationalism (Chisholm 1981, Pollock 1974), coherentism (Bonjour 1985, Lehrer 1974), reliabilism (Dretske 1981, Goldman 1986) and contextualism (DeRose 1995, Lewis 1996). While proponents of SAE don’t agree about how to define naturalized epistemology, most agree that a thoroughgoing naturalism in epistemology can’t work. For the purposes of this paper, (...)
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  14. Frode Bjordal (1993). A Theory of Knowledge. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    In this dissertation I present a new solution to the renowned Gettier problem. My solution, which in a sense represents a defense of a rather traditional epistemological approach, is based upon a distinction between primary and secondary beliefs. I argue that primary beliefs are known if justified and true, whereas secondary beliefs are known if they are believed on the basis of a known primary belief. Much emphasis is put upon defending this approach against potential objections, but I also draw (...)
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  15. Tim Black & Peter Murphy (2007). In Defense of Sensitivity. Synthese 154 (1):53-71.
    The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a (...)
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  16. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Knowledge and Presuppositions. Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.
    The paper explicates a new way to model the context-sensitivity of 'knows', namely a way that suggests a close connection between the content of 'knows' in a context C and what is pragmatically presupposed in C. After explicating my new approach in the first half of the paper and arguing that it is explanatorily superior to standard accounts of epistemic contextualism, the paper points, in its second half, to some interesting new features of the emerging account, such as its compatibility (...)
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  17. Christian L. Bonnet (1942). The Analysis of Knowledge. Modern Schoolman 19 (2):37-38.
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  18. Rodrigo Borges (forthcoming). E=K and The Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin. Erkenntnis:1-11.
    A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs, for no false belief can be part of one’s total evidence and one’s total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief. The problem with this alleged implication of E=K, as Comesaña and Kantin :447–454, 2010) have noted, is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on. The original Gettier cases relied on two principles: that justification is closed under known entailment, and that sometimes one is (...)
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  19. David Braine (1971). The Nature of Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72:41 - 63.
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  20. Ben Bronner (2012). Problems with the Dispositional Tracking Theory of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme 3 (3):505-507.
    Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan attempt to improve on Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge by providing a modified, dispositional tracking theory. The dispositional theory, however, faces more problems than those previously noted by John Turri. First, it is not simply that satisfaction of the theory’s conditions is unnecessary for knowledge – it is insufficient as well. Second, in one important respect, the dispositional theory is a step backwards relative to the original tracking theory: the original but not the dispositional theory (...)
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  21. Bernd Buldt, Gettier-Problem.
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  22. Eugenio Bulygin, Jean Louis Gardies & Ilkka Nilniluoto (eds.) (1985). MAN, LAW AND MODERN FORMS OF LIFE, Vol. 1 Law and Philosophy Library, Pp. 251-261. D. Reidel.
    In this paper I argue that the rationality of law and legal decision making would be enhanced by a systematic attempt to recognize and respond to the implications of empirical uncertainty for policy making and decision making. Admission of uncertainty about the accuracy of facts and the validity of assumptions relied on to make inferences of fact is commonly avoided in law because it raises the spectre of paralysis of the capacity to decide issues authoritatively. The roots of this short-sighted (...)
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  23. Panayot Butchvarov (1970). The Concept of Knowledge. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
    not analytic. This seems to be the point of Kant's claim that the concept of the sum of seven and five does not include its equality to the number twelve ...
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  24. Stephen A. Butterfill (2013). 11. What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel,'Knowledge as a Mental State'. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:309.
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  25. John Campbell (2009). Does Knowledge of Material Objects Depend on Spatial Perception? Comments on Quassim Cassam's the Possibility of Knowledge. Analysis 69 (2):309-317.
    1. The spatial perception requirementCassam surveys arguments for what he calls the ‘Spatial Perception Requirement’ . This is the following principle: " SPR: In order to perceive that something is the case and thereby to know that it is the case one must be capable of spatial perception. " A couple of preliminary glosses. By ‘spatial perception’ Cassam means either perception of location, or perception of specifically spatial properties of an object, such as its size and shape. Second, Cassam takes (...)
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  26. Lawrence R. Carleton (1982). Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Edited by George Pappas. Modern Schoolman 60 (1):60-61.
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  27. Quassim Cassam (2009). Can the Concept of Knowledge Be Analysed? In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  28. Albert Casullo (2012). Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification: Essays. Oup Usa.
    The past twenty-five years have seen a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge. In the sixteen essays collected here, which span this entire period, philosopher Albert Casullo documents the complex set of issues motivating the renewed interest, identifies the central epistemological questions, and provides the leading ideas of a unified response to them.
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  29. Albert Casullo, Annotated Bibliography on A Priori Knowledge.
    Contents 1. Introduction 2. General Overviews 3. Textbooks 4. Anthologies 5. Historical Background to the Contemporary Debate 6. General Accounts 7. Mathematical Knowledge 8. Logical Knowledge 9. Intuitions and Conceptual Analysis 10. Modal Knowledge a. Overviews b. Primary Sources 11. Testimonial Knowledge 12. Naturalism 13. Scepticism 14. New Developments..
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  30. M. Clark (1963). Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper. Analysis 24 (2):46-48.
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  31. Rodrigo Borges Claudio de Almeida & Peter Klein (eds.) (forthcoming). Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press.
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  32. Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña (2013). Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):15-29.
    Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in (...)
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  33. Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña (2013). Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply. Inquiry 56 (4):400-415.
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  34. Earl Conee (1988). Why Solve the Gettier Problem? In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 55--58.
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  35. Claudio Ferreira Costa (2010). A Definição Tradicional de Conhecimento. Princípios 4 (5):63-102.
    In this paper the relevance of so-called "propositional knowledge" is at first compared witho ther forms of knowledge. Secondly,the traditional and standard definition of propositional knowledge as justified true belief is discussed and defended against its most relevant objections. The third and main focus of this paper is a discussion of Gettier's objection to the tradicional definition and some answers to it,with the purpose of developing a more elaborate version of the traditional definition, one which makes it immune to counter-examples, (...)
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  36. Zvonimir Čuljak (2003). Gettier's Counterexamples and the Analysis of Knowledge. Prolegomena 2 (2):197-217.
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  37. Zvonimir Čuljak (2003). Gettierovi protuprimjeri i analiza znanja. Prolegomena 2 (2):197-217.
    Suprotno općeprihvaćenom mišljenju, argumentiram da Gettierovi protuprimjeri za trodijelnu analizu znanja kao opravdanoga istinitog vjerovanja nisu uspjeli zato što uvjet opravdanja, a pogotovo uvjet istinitosti za znanje u tim slučajevima nisu jednoznačno ispunjeni. Jer sudovi u koje se vjeruje jesu semantički ambivalentni te se za njih ne može jasno reći jesu ili istiniti ili neistiniti, pa stoga ni jesu li predmeti opravdanih istinitih vjerovanja. To je zbog zbunjujuće semantičke uloge koju igra odreðeni opis i ekskluzivna disjunkcija . Stoga nijedan od (...)
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  38. Friedrich Dudda (2007). Gettier-Beispiele Und Eine Gebrauchsdefinition des Begriffs des Propositionalen Wissens. Facta Philosophica 9 (1):161-176.
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  39. Paul Egré (forthcoming). Knowledge as de Re True Belief? Synthese:1-13.
    In “Facts: Particulars of Information Units?”, Kratzer proposed a causal analysis of knowledge in which knowledge is defined as a form of de re belief of facts. In support of Kratzer’s view, I show that a certain articulation of the de re/de dicto distinction can be used to integrally account for the original pair of Gettier cases. In contrast to Kratzer, however, I think such an account does not fundamentally require a distinction between facts and true propositions. I then discuss (...)
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  40. Engel (2000). Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:99-117.
    When it comes to second-order knowledge, internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, (...)
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  41. Katalin Farkas (2015). Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
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  42. Michael P. Fenton, The Possibility of Empirical Knowledge.
    This thesis offers a reassessment of the philosophical problem of scepticism about knowledge of the external world. It distinguishes between different forms of this sceptical problem and considers two kinds of response: a strategy developed by Tim Williamson, and a disjunctivist approach. Chapters one and two offer an introduction to the problem of scepticism: the sceptical arguments of Descartes and Hume are compared, and Williamson’s approach to scepticism is introduced. Chapter three considers three different ways of responding to Humean scepticism. (...)
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  43. Juan José Acero Fernández (2009). The Gettier Problem and the Demands of Inquiry. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):49-64.
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  44. Richard Foley, A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.
    In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was (...)
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  45. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 2. Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge. In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 6-8.
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  46. Todd Michael Furman (1992). Living in the Gettier Fallout. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    In a nutshell, I construct and defend an analysis of empirical knowledge. Call this analysis A . A is very eclectic, but it is best described as a reliabilistic-defeasibility analysis of knowledge. Its virtues are these: A seems to be able to handle Gettier examples. A overcomes the 'social aspects problem' of knowing. A makes sense of this phenomenon: Sometimes we are willing to attribute knowledge to S who has evidence E for believing that P. But, at other times, we (...)
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  47. Carlos Emilio García (2007). Casos Gettier y razonadores normales. Ideas Y Valores 56 (135):77-88.
    Como bien se sabe, la caracterización del conocimiento en términos de "creencia verdadera justificada" (CVJ) se ha considerado fallida desde la popularización de contraejemplos tipo Gettier. En este artículo se revisa el trabajo seminal de Gettier y sus argumentos. Se sostiene que los contraejemplos..
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  48. Carlos Emilio García (2007). Gettier Cases and Normal Reasoners. Ideas Y Valores 56 (135):73-84.
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  49. Edmund L. Gettier (2003). 11. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge. In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 104.
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  50. R. Greene & N. A. Balmert (1997). Two Notions of Warrant and Plantinga's Solution to the Gettier Problem. Analysis 57 (2):132-139.
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