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  1. added 2020-04-20
    On Folk Epistemology by Mikkel Gerken. [REVIEW]James R. Beebe - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  2. added 2020-04-20
    Is Justification Necessary for Knowledge?David Sackris & James R. Beebe - 2014 - In James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Bloomsbury. pp. 175-192.
    Justification has long been considered a necessary condition for knowledge, and theories that deny the necessity of justification have been dismissed as nonstarters. In this chapter, we challenge this long-standing view by showing that many of the arguments offered in support of it fall short and by providing empirical evidence that individuals are often willing to attribute knowledge when epistemic justification is lacking.
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  3. added 2020-03-10
    Non-Factivity About Knowledge: A Defensive Move.Daniel Nolan - 2008 - The Reasoner 2 (11):6-7.
    Those defending non-factivity of knowledge should explain why it is so intuitive that knowledge entails truth. One option they have is to concede a great deal to this intuition: they can maintain that we know that knowledge is factive, even though it is not.
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  4. added 2020-02-21
    Prime Cuts And The Method Of Recombination.David-Hillel Ruben - forthcoming - Episteme 2021.
    Whether some condition is equivalent to a conjunction of some (sub-) conditions has been a major issue in analytic philosophy. Examples include: knowledge, acting freely, causation, and justice. Philosophers have striven to offer analyses of these, and other concepts, by showing them equivalent to such a conjunction. Timothy Williamson offers a number of arguments for the idea that knowledge is ‘prime’, hence not equivalent to or composed by some such conjunction. I focus on one of his arguments: the requirement that (...)
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  5. added 2020-01-21
    The Analysis of Knowledge.Jonathan Ichikawa & Matthias Steup - 2017 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
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  6. added 2019-12-22
    Could “Knows That” Be Inconsistent?Gillian Russell - manuscript
    In his recent Philosophers’ Imprint paper “The (mostly harmless) inconsistency of knowledge attributions” [Weiner, 2009], Matt Weiner argues that the semantics of the expression “knows that”, as it is used in attributions of knowledge like “Hannah knows that the bank will be open,” are inconsistent, but that this inconsistency is “mostly harmless.” He presents his view as an alternative to the invariantist, contextualist and relativist approaches currently prevalent in the literature, (e.g. [Stanley, 2005], [DeRose, 1995], [Hawthorne, 2006], [MacFarlane, 2005]) and (...)
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  7. added 2019-11-30
    Factivity and Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to Sankey.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):443-444.
    This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the factivity of knowledge does entail that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
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  8. added 2019-10-20
    Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of Quine's understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, especially as it is conveyed in his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism.".
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  9. added 2019-10-20
    The Construction of Relations in Hume and Quine, Directed by Jaakko Hintikka (Introduction).Stefanie A. Rocknak - 1999 - Dissertation, Boston University
    Hume and Quine argue that human beings do not have access to general knowledge, that is, to general truths . The arguments of these two philosophers are premised on what Jaakko Hintikka has called the atomistic postulate. In the present work, it is shown that Hume and Quine in fact sanction an extreme version of this postulate, according to which even items of particular knowledge are not directly accessible in so far as they are relational. For according to their fully (...)
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  10. added 2019-09-10
    Goldman’s Early Causal Theory of Knowledge.Stephen J. Sullivan & L. Gregory Wheeless - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 47 (1):143-154.
    In his 1967 paper 'A Causal Theory of Knowing', Alvin Goldman sketched an account of empirical knowledge in terms of appropriate causal connections between the fact known and the knower's belief in that fact. This early causal account has been much criticized, even by Goldman himself in later years. We argue that the theory is much more defensible than either he or its other critics have recognized, that there are plausible internal and external resources available to it which save it (...)
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  11. added 2019-07-25
    Conocimiento y verdad.Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas - 2017 - Diccionario Interdisciplinar Austral.
    El término “conocimiento” y la disciplina filosófica que lo estudia —la teoría del conocimiento— han experimentado notables cambios hasta el presente. La teoría clásica concibe el conocimiento en íntima unión con la verdad, como una captación intelectual de realidades necesarias e inmutables. Con la llegada de la modernidad, la difusión de un clima escéptico puso en duda esta pretensión, cuestionando la aptitud misma del conocimiento para la verdad. Esta duda ha presidido toda la modernidad hasta el presente. Para responder al (...)
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  12. added 2019-07-05
    Екокритичний аспект дикості у поетичному циклі Олега Лишеги «Снігові і вогню».Tetiana Hanzha - 2018 - NaUKMA Researh Papers. Literary Studies 1:62-65.
    У статті проаналізовано категорію дикості в поезії Олега Лишеги. Екокритична категорія дикості – як протилежність до цивілізованого, обжитого, людського – дає змогу окреслити основні ознаки лісу у поезії Лишеги як дикого, непередбачуваного, тваринного, магічного простору. Близька взаємодія суб’єкта лірики із лісовим ландшафтом створює глибшу ідентичність дикого лісу, який, отримавши голос, промовляє у тексті. Надзвичайно важливим для поета є збереження неприрученості, гармонійне співіснування світу природи і світу людей.
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  13. added 2019-07-01
    Are Modal Conditions Necessary for Knowledge?Mark Anthony Dacela - 2019 - Kritike 13 (1):101.
    Modal epistemic conditions have played an important role in post-Gettier theories of knowledge. These conditions purportedly eliminate the pernicious kind of luck present in all Gettier-type cases and offer a rather convincing way of refuting skepticism. This motivates the view that conditions of this sort are necessary for knowledge. I argue against this. I claim that modal conditions, particularly sensitivity and safety, are not necessary for knowledge. I do this by noting that the problem cases for both conditions point to (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-11
    The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
    Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side-effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. Here we report the results of an experiment that extends these findings by testing for an analogous effect regarding knowledge attributions. Our results suggest that subjects are less likely to find that an agent knows an action will bring about a side-effect when the effect is good than when it is bad. It (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):75-81.
    John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second‐Order Skepticism.Alexander S. Harper - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
    Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains‐in‐vats, it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge‐claims is much reduced (...)
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  17. added 2019-06-05
    Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.
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  18. added 2019-04-30
    Semantic Blindness and Error Theorizing for the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):275-284.
    The ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is the view that ‘knows’ and its cognates have more than one propositional sense – i.e. more than one sense that can properly be used in ‘knows that’ etc. constructions. Given that most of us are ‘intuitive invariantists’ – i.e. most of us initially have the intuition that ‘knows’ is univocal – defenders of the ambiguity theory need to offer an explanation for the semantic blindness present if ‘knows’ is in fact ambiguous. This paper is (...)
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  19. added 2019-04-24
    Epistemology for the Rest of the World. [REVIEW]Mark Satta - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):438-440.
    Epistemology for the Rest of the World. Edited by Mizumoto Masaharu, Stich Stephen, McCready Eric.
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  20. added 2019-03-08
    Knowledge, Evidence, and Multiple Process Types.Jeffrey Tolly - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    The generality problem is one of the most pressing challenges for reliabilism. The problem begins with this question: of all the process types exemplified by a given process token, which types are the relevant ones for determining whether the resultant belief counts as knowledge? As philosophers like Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have argued, extant responses to the generality problem have failed, and it looks as if no solution is forthcoming. In this paper, I present a new response to the (...)
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  21. added 2019-01-23
    Knowledge and Belief in the Letter of Paul the Persian.Said Hayati - 2016 - In Dietmar W. Winkler (ed.), Syrische Studien. LIT Verlag. pp. 63-73.
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  22. added 2019-01-06
    Evidentialism, Knowledge, and Evidence Possession.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):433-449.
    Evidentialism has shown itself to be an important research program in contemporary epistemology, with evidentialists giving theories of virtually every important topic in epistemology. Nevertheless, at the heart of evidentialism is a handful of concepts, namely evidence, evidence possession, and evidential fit. If evidentialists cannot give us a plausible account of these concepts, then their research program, with all its various theories, will be in serious trouble. In this paper, I argue that evidentialists has yet to give a plausible account (...)
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  23. added 2018-12-14
    Die identifikationistische Lösung des Gettier Problems.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Dirk Koppelberg & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie -- Wie und Wozu? Munster, Germany: Mentis. pp. 189-214.
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  24. added 2018-10-05
    The Internalist Virtue Theory of Knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.
    Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition is compatible with (...)
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  25. added 2018-09-06
    Knowledge Requires Commitment (Instead of Belief).Nicholas Tebben - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):321-338.
    I argue that S knows that p implies that S is properly committed to the truth of p, not that S believes that p. Belief is not required for knowledge because it is possible that one could know that there are no beliefs. Being ‘properly committed’ to the truth of a proposition is a matter of having a certain normative status, not occupying a particular psychological state. After arguing that knowledge requires commitment instead of belief, I go on to demonstrate (...)
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  26. added 2018-08-05
    Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the Practical Foundation of Knowledge.Jörg Volbers - 2012 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2).
    Even though both Dewey and Wittgenstein have been rightly classified as both being ‘pragmatist’ thinkers in a broad sense, they stand in stark contrast with respect to their writing style and their general attitude towards the future of western civilization. This article reflects these differences and traces them back to their diverging conceptions of knowledge. Dewey criticizes the philosophical tradition for erecting an artificial barrier between theory and practice, but he retains the traditional high esteem for knowledge by re-describing it (...)
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  27. added 2018-07-09
    Steps Towards a Theory of the Knowledge-Society.Andrea Cerroni - 2018 - Social Science Information 57 (2):322-343.
    During the last decades, knowledge has attracted the greatest attention in a growing number of disciplines, generating a deluge of literature. However, it has yet to become the object of a fully established sociology of knowledge able to fulfil the challenges of present society, often called the knowledge-society. We posit knowledge as a basis on which to model social life, proposing a three-dimensional approach to social reality (i.e., individuals, social aggregates, knowledge). Looking at knowledge as at ‘a cooperative good’ and (...)
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  28. added 2018-07-06
    Платон, эвиденциализм и JTB (Plato, Evidentialism, and JTB).Pavel Butakov - 2018 - Schole 12 (2):669-685.
    It is often claimed that Plato’s definition of knowledge as “true opinion with an account” is in agreement with the contemporary analysis of knowledge as “justified true belief”. Some scholars disagree with the attribution of JTB to Plato. I analyze three influential arguments against the assumption of Plato’s agreement with JTB, and refute them. Then I provide my own argument against the assumption. I argue that the contemporary interpretation of the JTB formula understands “belief” not in the sense of an (...)
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  29. added 2018-03-25
    The Activity of Speaking.Jesús Gerardo Martínez del Castillo - 2015 - International Journal of Language and Linguistics 3 (6-1):59-66.
    The most comprehensive manifestation of language can be seen in the activity of speaking. In it the activity of speaking cannot be understood unless it is referred to the concepts of language and a language. Anything in language can be found in the activity of speaking. Because of this you can find what language is if you abstract from the innumerable manifestations of the activity of speaking.
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  30. added 2018-03-17
    Reason Dethroned; Knowledge Regained.James Arthur Moore - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Hume held that we have no rational justification for our inductive beliefs. A more radical view is that we have no rational justification for any of our beliefs. This dissertation has two goals pertaining to this more radical view. // The first goal is to find a basis for constructive epistemology that is consistent with this view. This goal is first sought by considering externalist theories of knowledge since these do not require rational justification for knowledge. Externalist theories are defended (...)
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  31. added 2018-02-20
    Hintikka’s Socratic Epistemology Meets Gettier’s Counterexamples.John Ian K. Boongaling - 2017 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):25-56.
    The overall goal of this paper is to apply Hintikka’s Socratic Epistemology to Gettier’s counterexamples to the tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the process, I will make full use of Socratic Epistemology’s methodology and commitments. This includes, among other things, looking at Gettier’s counterexamples as games between an Inquirer and Nature (the source of information), as well as treating the items in them as pieces of information. The strategy that I employ in this paper also makes (...)
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  32. added 2018-02-16
    Epistemic Luck.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272-281.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provide an account of how veritic epistemic luck (...)
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  33. added 2018-01-30
    Saving Safety From Counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper I will offer a comprehensive defense of the safety account of knowledge against counterexamples that have been recently put forward. In section 1, I will discuss different versions of safety, arguing that a specific variant of method-relativized safety is the most plausible. I will then use this specific version of safety to respond to counterexamples in the recent literature. In section 2, I will address alleged examples of safe beliefs that still constitute Gettier cases. In section 3, (...)
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  34. added 2017-10-06
    La Connaissance Commune: Une Sémantique Pour la Logique Modale.L. Lismont & P. Mongin - 1993 - Logique Et Analyse 133 (134):133-149.
    This French paper is a prelimary report on the authors' work on the logics of common knowledge and common belief. See L. Lismont and P. Mongin, "On the logic of common belief and common knowledge", Theory and Decision 37 (1): 75-106. 1994 for a more complete report.
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  35. added 2017-10-05
    On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge.Luc Lismont & Philippe Mongin - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):75-106.
    The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge- whether individual or common- is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections (...)
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  36. added 2017-09-11
    Defending Virtue Epistemology: Epistemic Dependence in Testimony and Extended Cognition.Walker Page - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    This paper provides an account of how virtue epistemology can accommodate knowledge acquired through testimony and extended cognition. Section 1 articulates the characteristic claim of virtue epistemology, and introduces the issues discussed in the paper. Section 2 details a related pair of objections to VE: that it is unable to accommodate cases of knowledge through testimony and extended cognition. Section 3 reviews two different virtue epistemologies and their responses to these objections presented in Greco :1–26, 2012). Considerations are presented for (...)
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  37. added 2017-08-13
    Unconscious Perception and Perceptual Knowledge.Paweł J. Zięba - 2017 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 301-303.
    It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological (...)
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  38. added 2017-07-28
    Knowledge as justified true belief and the Gettier problem.Francois-Igor Pris - 2018 - NB Философская Мысль (6):41-52.
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  39. added 2017-05-24
    Certainty.Ali Hasan - 2017 - Oxford Bibliographies.
  40. added 2017-05-23
    Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense.Peter Baumann - 2016 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form "S knows that p" can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book examines arguments for contextualism and develops Baumann's version. It begins by dealing with the argument from cases and ordinary usage, and then addresses "theoretical" arguments, from reliability and from luck. The second part of the book discusses (...)
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  41. added 2017-03-28
    Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock.Murray Clarke, Fred Adams & John A. Barker - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):99-112.
    In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
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  42. added 2017-03-24
    Doświadczenie źródłowe z perspektywy klasycznej filozofii indyjskiej.Marzenna Jakubczak - 2016 - Archiwum Historii Filozofii I Myśli Społecznej 61:41-58.
    The author of this paper discusses the source experience defined in terms of the ancient Indian philosophy. She focuses on two out of six mainstream Hindu philosophical schools, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. While doing so the author refers to the oldest preserved texts of this classical tradition, namely Yogasūtra c. 3rd CE and Sāṃkhyakārikā 5th CE, together with their most authoritative commentaries. First, three major connotations of darśana, the Sanskrit equivalent of φιλοσοφια, are introduced and contextualised appropriately for the comparative study (...)
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  43. added 2017-03-17
    Stanley and the Stakes Hypothesis.Michael J. Shaffer - 2017 - The Reasoner 11:73-74.
    The main examples of pragmatic encroachment presented by Jason Stanley involve the idea that knowledge ascription occurs more readily in cases where stakes are low rather than high. This is the stakes hypothesis. In this paper an example is presented showing that in some cases knowledge ascription is more readily appropriate where stakes are high rather than low.
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  44. added 2017-01-09
    Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):67-73.
    In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.
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  45. added 2017-01-09
    Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right.Davide Fassio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):265-289.
    Some philosophers have recently argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge in a specific circumstance depends on features of the subject’s practical situation that are unrelated to the truth of the subject’s belief, such as the costs for the subject of being wrong about whether the believed proposition is true. One of the best-known arguments used to support this view is that it best explains a number of paradigmatic cases, such as the well-known Bank Case, in which a (...)
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  46. added 2017-01-09
    In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 371-382.
    In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting’s conclusion that my earlier paper offered an inadequate treatment of fake barn cases, but defend a new account of basic perceptual reasons that is consistent (...)
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  47. added 2017-01-06
    A Defense of Parrying Responses to the Generality Problem.Jeffrey Tolly - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1935-1957.
    The generality problem is commonly seen as one of the most pressing issues for process reliabilism. The generality problem starts with the following question: of all the process types exemplified by a given process token, which type is the relevant one for measuring reliability? Defenders of the generality problem claim that process reliabilists have a burden to produce an informative account of process type relevance. As they argue, without such a successful account, the reasonability of process reliabilism is significantly undermined. (...)
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  48. added 2016-12-12
    Ernest Sosa's epistemology and other theories of knowledge.Pris Francois-Igor - 2017 - Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology 1:36-44.
  49. added 2016-12-08
    Logical Properties of Warrant.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):171-182.
    Trenton Merricks argues that on any reasonable account, warrant must entailtruth. I demonstrate three theses about the properties ofwarrant: (1) Warrant is not unique;there are many properties that satisfy the definition of warrant. (2) Warrant need not entail truth; there are some warrant properties that entailtruthand others that do not. (3) Warrant need not be closed under entailment, even if knowledge is. If knowledge satisfies closure, then some warrant properties satisfy closure while others do not;if knowledge violates closure, then allwarrant (...)
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  50. added 2016-12-08
    The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies.Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):331-352.
    Perhaps the concept of knowledge, prior to its being fashioned and molded by certain philosophical traditions, never offered any stable negative verdict in the original fake barn case.
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