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  1. Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):67-73.
    In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.
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  2. Epistemic Situationism: An Extended Prolepsis.Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Mark Alfano & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Epistemic Situationism. Oxford University Press.
    This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic virtues are not sufficiently widely distributed for a virtue-theoretic constraint on knowledge to apply without leading to skepticism. It deals with four objections to epistemic situation: 1) that virtuous dispositions are not required for knowledge, 2) that the Big Five or Big Six personality model proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, 3) that the cognitive-affective personality system framework proves that intellectual virtues are a (...)
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  3. Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses?Murat Bac & Nurbay Irmak - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):305-321.
    The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing wrongly” in Turkish. (...)
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  4. Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense.Baumann Peter - 2016 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form "S knows that p" can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book examines arguments for contextualism and develops Baumann's version. It begins by dealing with the argument from cases and ordinary usage, and then addresses "theoretical" arguments, from reliability and from luck. The second part of the book discusses (...)
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  5. Information, Closure, And Knowledge: On Jäger’s Objection To Dretske.P. Baumann - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):403-408.
    Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske's information theory of knowledge raises a serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information is closed under known entailment (even under entailment simpliciter); given that Dretske explains the concept of knowledge in terms of "information", it is hard to stick with his denial of closure for knowledge. Thus, one of the two basic claims of Dretske would have to go. Since giving up the denial of closure would commit Dretske (...)
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  6. Va Savoir! De la Connaissance En Général -- Pascal Engel. [REVIEW]Guillaume Beaulac & Pierre Poirier - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):217-221.
  7. Do Bad People Know More? Interactions Between Attributions of Knowledge and Blame.James R. Beebe - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2633–2657.
    A central topic in experimental epistemology has been the ways that non-epistemic evaluations of an agent’s actions can affect whether the agent is taken to have certain kinds of knowledge. Several scholars have found that the positive or negative valence of an action can influence attributions of knowledge to the agent. These evaluative effects on knowledge attributions are commonly seen as performance errors, failing to reflect individuals’ genuine conceptual competence with knows. In the present article, I report the results of (...)
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  8. Surprising Connections Between Knowledge and Action: The Robustness of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.James R. Beebe & Mark Jensen - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):689 - 715.
    A number of researchers have begun to demonstrate that the widely discussed ?Knobe effect? (wherein participants are more likely to think that actions with bad side-effects are brought about intentionally than actions with good or neutral side-effects) can be found in theory of mind judgments that do not involve the concept of intentional action. In this article we report experimental results that show that attributions of knowledge can be influenced by the kinds of (non-epistemic) concerns that drive the Knobe effect. (...)
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  9. Knowledge How Vs. Knowledge That.John Bengson - 2013 - In B. Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia for Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage Publications.
    An overview of philosophical work on the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that, focusing on what it means to say that they are 'distinct', and on what is at stake in the debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowledge how.
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  10. Nonpropositional Intellectualism.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-195.
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  11. On the Metaphysics of Knowledge.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Markus Gabriel, Wolfram Hogrebe & Andreas Speer (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics. De Gruyter. pp. 161-180.
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  12. Knowledge Without Belief.Carolyn Black - 1971 - Analysis 31 (5):152-158.
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  13. Getting Off the Wheel.Patrick Bondy & Dustin Olson - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):620-637.
    Roderick Chisholm argues that in giving an account of knowledge, we must either begin with an account of what knowledge is, and proceed on that basis to identify the particular things that we know, or else start with instances of knowledge, and proceed on that basis to formulate a definition of knowledge. Either approach begs the question against the other. This is the epistemic wheel. This article responds to Chisholm's challenge. It begins with cases of knowledge attribution and builds its (...)
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  14. The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):625-638.
    Stephen Hetherington has defended the tripartite analysis of knowledge (Hetherington in Philos Q 48:453–469, 1998; J Philos 96:565–587, 1999; J Philos Res 26:307–324, 2001a; Good knowledge, bad knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001b). His defence has recently come under attack (Madison in Australas J Philos 89(1):47–58, 2011; Turri in Synthese 183(3):247–259, 2012). I critically evaluate those attacks as well as Hetherington’s newest formulation of his defence (Hetherington in Philosophia 40(3):539–547, 2012b; How to know: A practicalist conception of knowledge, Wiley, Oxford, (...)
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  15. Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.R. Borges, C. de Almeida & P. Klein (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    This is an edited collection of twenty-three (23) new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the Problem, and the list contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art scholarship on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier (...)
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  16. A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):75 - 81.
    This is a reply to John N. Williams’ paper “Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge'” (2015). That paper argues that Peter Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. Klein himself answered a version of this objection in his (1971). Williams’ paper adds a new twist to the 1971 objection. I argue that Williams’ objection misses its target because of this new twist.
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  17. Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):463-479.
    Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck (...)
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  18. Knowledge and True Belief in Hintikka's Epistemic Logic.Michael E. Byrd - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (2):181 - 192.
  19. The Roots of Knowledge.L. S. Carrier - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):81-95.
    I defend the view that propositional knowledge can be defined as follows: A knows that p if and only if A believes that p because p. Spelling out the meaning of 'because' in this formula results in a causal-explanatory view of knowledge.
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  20. A Problem for Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):253-275.
    Duncan Pritchard has, in the years following his (2005) defence of a safety-based account of knowledge in Epistemic Luck, abjured his (2005) view that knowledge can be analysed exclusively in terms of a modal safety condition. He has since (Pritchard in Synthese 158:277–297, 2007; J Philosophic Res 34:33–45, 2009a, 2010) opted for an account according to which two distinct conditions function with equal importance and weight within an analysis of knowledge: an anti-luck condition (safety) and an ability condition-the latter being (...)
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  21. (Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy (...)
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  22. Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock.Murray Clarke, Fred Adams & John A. Barker - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):99-112.
    In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
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  23. Good to Know.Earl Conee - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):311-331.
    Our curiosity has us interested in finding out the truth. Knowing the fact of the matter fulfills the interest. This fulfillment is something satisfying about knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is a good way for a person to relate to a proposition. Knowing is good because of what knowledge is. In other words, knowledge is intrinsically good. The credibility of these assessments calls for some explanation. A traditional view is that knowledge is justified true belief with no Gettier accidents. This conception is (...)
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  24. An Essay on Knowledge and Belief.John Corcoran - 2006 - International Journal of Decision Ethics (2):125-144.
    This accessible essay treats knowledge and belief in a usable and applicable way. Many of its basic ideas have been developed recently in Corcoran-Hamid 2014: Investigating knowledge and opinion. The Road to Universal Logic. Vol. I. Arthur Buchsbaum and Arnold Koslow, Editors. Springer. Pp. 95-126. http://www.springer.com/birkhauser/mathematics/book/978-3-319-10192-7 .
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  25. Qu’est-ce que la connaissance?Julien Dutant - 2010 - Vrin.
    Dans cet ouvrage, l’auteur discute d’abord un un ensemble d’idées de sens commun qui permettent de mieux cerner la notion de connaissance : nous savons beaucoup de choses, ce que nous savons ne vient pas toujours des sciences, tout ce que nous savons est vrai, la connaissance est le but de l’enquête, on ne doit croire et affirmer que ce que l’on sait, on ne doit agir que sur la base de ce que l’on sait, la connaissance a de la (...)
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  26. Die Elimination des Wissensbegriffs1.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2004 - Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 6:45-56.
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  27. Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right.Davide Fassio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):265-289.
    Some philosophers have recently argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge in a specific circumstance depends on features of the subject’s practical situation that are unrelated to the truth of the subject’s belief, such as the costs for the subject of being wrong about whether the believed proposition is true. One of the best-known arguments used to support this view is that it best explains a number of paradigmatic cases, such as the well-known Bank Case, in which a (...)
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  28. Ernest Sosa's epistemology and other theories of knowledge.Pris Francois-Igor - 2017 - Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology 1:36-44.
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  29. Knowledge and Ways of Knowing.Craig French - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):353-364.
    Quassim Cassam offers a conception of ways of knowing which he argues is preferable to rival accounts such as the account we find in Williamson. The correct way to think about ways of knowing matters for philosophers, such as Cassam and Williamson, who want to understand knowledge itself in terms of ways of knowing. So is Cassam right that his conception of ways of knowing is preferable to Williamson's? The discussion to follow is irenic in spirit: I will argue that (...)
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  30. On the Virtues and Plausibility of Feminist Epistemologies.Pieranna Garavaso & Nicla Vassallo - 2003 - Epistemologia, Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Della Scienza (1):99-131.
    In this paper, we examine some issues debated in mainstream epistemology for which the social features of knowledge are relevant, such as the epistemic relevance of social contexts, the nature of practical knowledge, and the epistemic role of testimony. In the first part of the paper, we show how feminist epistemologies have usefully stressed the social character of knowledge in many central areas of debate within mainstream epistemology. We call these the virtues of feminist epistemology: the denial of the neutrality (...)
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  31. The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies.Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):331-352.
    Perhaps the concept of knowledge, prior to its being fashioned and molded by certain philosophical traditions, never offered any stable negative verdict in the original fake barn case.
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  32. Against Knowledge-First Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - In Gordon and Jarvis Carter (ed.), Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
    I begin by criticizing reductionist knowledge-first epistemology according to which knowledge can be used to reductively analyze other epistemic phenomena. My central concern is that proponents of such an approach commit a similar mistake to the one that they charge their opponents with. This is the mistake of seeking to reductively analyze basic epistemic phenomena in terms of other allegedly more fundamental phenomena. I then turn to non-reductionist brands of knowledge-first epistemology. Specifically, I consider the knowledge norms of assertion and (...)
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  33. A Logic of Justification and Truthmaking.Alessandro Giordani - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):323-342.
    In the present paper we propose a system of propositional logic for reasoning about justification, truthmaking, and the connection between justifiers and truthmakers. The logic of justification and truthmaking is developed according to the fundamental ideas introduced by Artemov. Justifiers and truthmakers are treated in a similar way, exploiting the intuition that justifiers provide epistemic grounds for propositions to be considered true, while truthmakers provide ontological grounds for propositions to be true. This system of logic is then applied both for (...)
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  34. Some Reflections on Gettier's Problem.Azam Golam - 2006 - The Dhaka University Studies,June 2006 (1):83-97.
  35. Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information?Michael Hannon - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1069-1076.
    In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view is that (...)
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  36. 'Knows' Entails Truth.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
    It is almost universally presumed that knowledge is factive: in order to know that p it must be the case that p is true. This idea is often justified by appealing to knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena; i.e., an utterance of the form ‘S knows that p, but not-p’ sounds contradictory. In a recent article, Allan Hazlett argues that our ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. From this it seems to follow that epistemologists cannot appeal to ordinary language (...)
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  37. Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism.Alexander S. Harper - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
    Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains-in-vats (BIVs), it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge-claims is much (...)
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  38. Certainty.Ali Hasan - 2017 - Oxford Bibliographies.
  39. Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge.Tristan Haze - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):309-311.
    I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
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  40. Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478.
    In “The Myth of Factive Verbs” (Hazlett 2010), I had four closely related goals. The first (pp. 497-99, p. 522) was to criticize appeals to ordinary language in epistemology. The second (p. 499) was to criticize the argument that truth is a necessary condition on knowledge because “knows” is factive. The third (pp. 507-19) – which was the intended means of achieving the first two – was to defend a semantics for “knows” on which <S knows p> can be true (...)
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  41. Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief.Avram Hiller - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s (...)
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  42. Was Wir Aus Dem Gettier-Problem Über den Begriff des Wissens Lernen Können. Und Was Daraus Für Die Möglichkeit von PatientInnenwissen Folgt.Helmut Hofbauer - 2015 - In Helmut Hofbauer, Lukas Kaelin, Hendrik Jan Ankersmit & Walter Feigl (eds.), Ist der Patient ein Mensch? LIT Verlag. pp. 131-165.
    The article talks about the social consequences of the so called Standard Analysis of Knowledge. Gettier cases demonstrate that human beings would need superhuman powers in order to fullfill the truth condition of the Standard Analysis of Knowledge. When Gettier cases are told, the storyteller usually omits to report who noticed what was the truth in this case and how he or she informed the protagonist of the Gettier case about it. This is done that way in order to hide (...)
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  43. Taking the Metaphysics of Knowledge Seriously: A Response to the Paper of Sven Bernecker.Joachim Horvath - 2015 - In Andreas Speer, Wolfram Hogrebe & Markus Gabriel (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics. De Gruyter. pp. 181-188.
    Response to Sven Bernecker's "On the Metaphysics of Knowledge" in the same volume.
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  44. Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  45. Logical Properties of Warrant.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):171-182.
    Trenton Merricks argues that on any reasonable account, warrant must entailtruth. I demonstrate three theses about the properties ofwarrant: (1) Warrant is not unique;there are many properties that satisfy the definition of warrant. (2) Warrant need not entail truth; there are some warrant properties that entailtruthand others that do not. (3) Warrant need not be closed under entailment, even if knowledge is. If knowledge satisfies closure, then some warrant properties satisfy closure while others do not;if knowledge violates closure, then allwarrant (...)
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  46. Almeder's Unknowable Defeater Defeated.Richard Hull - manuscript
    Robert Almeder has argued1 that three “fourth conditions” for nondefectiveness of knowledge justification claims, proposed in the recent literature,2 are essentially similar, require modification in order to eliminate the possibility of an unknowable defeater, and, so modified, render attainment of non-basic factual knowledge impossible. Although I believe there are objections to be raised against his exposition and reduction of the three proposed fourth conditions, I wish only to raise some doubts about the supposed necessity of the modifications and then to (...)
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  47. Doświadczenie źródłowe z perspektywy klasycznej filozofii indyjskiej.Marzenna Jakubczak - 2016 - Archiwum Historii Filozofii I Myśli Społecznej 61:41-58.
    The author of this paper discusses the source experience defined in terms of the ancient Indian philosophy. She focuses on two out of six mainstream Hindu philosophical schools, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. While doing so the author refers to the oldest preserved texts of this classical tradition, namely Yogasūtra c. 3rd CE and Sāṃkhyakārikā 5th CE, together with their most authoritative commentaries. First, three major connotations of darśana, the Sanskrit equivalent of φιλοσοφια, are introduced and contextualised appropriately for the comparative study (...)
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  48. In Praise of Folly: A Reply to Blome-Tillmann.Stephen Kearns - 2007 - Analysis 67 (295):219–222.
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  49. Not Without Justification.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):581-595.
    In this paper I take issue with Jonathan Sutton's attempt at defending the thesis that knowledge is justified belief. I argue, first, that the arguments he adduces in support of it fail. Second, I provide independent reason to believe that knowledge and justified belief come apart.
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  50. Wright on Truth and Superassertibility.Jonathan Kvanvig - unknown
    Crispin Wright argues persuasively that truth cannot be understood in terms of warranted assertibility, on the basis of some very simple facts about negation. The argument, he claims, undermines not only simply assertibility theories of truth, but more idealized ones according to which truth is to be understood in terms of what is assertible in the long run, or assertible within some ideal scientific theory.
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