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  1. added 2020-05-26
    A Complementary Approach to Aristotle’s Account of Definition and Carnap’s Account of Explication.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):19-40.
    In this paper it is argued that there are relevant similarities of Aristotle's account of definition and Carnap's account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle's conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle's account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap's conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle's conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap's condition of similarity once (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-18
    What is Power Sharing? Consociationalism, Centripetalism, and Hybrid Power Sharing.Krzysztof Trzcinski - 2018 - Studia Polityczne 46 (3):9-30.
    In this article, the author analyzes the term "power-sharing" in the context of power exercised within a state. He first examines the term in the very general sense, in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions of sharing of power between various groups and institutional entities. Second, the author examines the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, that is, the phenomenon of systemic sharing of power by groups (segments) whose membership is based on ascribed criteria (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-15
    Czym jest stabilność polityczna państwa?Krzysztof Trzcinski - 2015 - Przegląd Politologiczny 2:37-47.
    [WHAT IS POLITICAL STABILITY?] Artykuł traktuje o problemie definiowania pojęcia „stabilność polityczna” państwa. Głównym jego celem jest odpowiedź na pytanie, co znaczy stwierdzenie, że dane państwo jest stabilne politycznie. Artykuł składa się z czterech części. W pierwszej wyjaśniany jest leksykalny sens słów: „stabilny”, „stabilność” i „stabilizacja”. W drugiej części analizowane jest rozumienie znaczenia terminu „stabilność polityczna” w piśmiennictwie politologicznym. Trzecia część artykułu poświęcona jest omówieniu kwantytatywnych prób ujmowania sensu pojęcia stabilności politycznej. W zakończeniu podjęta została próba zdefiniowania przedmiotowego terminu polegająca (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-15
    Obywatelstwo w Europie. Idea i jej wyraz formalny w perspektywie historycznej.Krzysztof Trzcinski - 2002 - Studia Europejskie 2:45-67.
    [CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IDEA]. Obywatelstwo należy do najistotniejszych kategorii określających pozycję człowieka w państwie. W niektórych okresach dziejów pojęcie obywatelstwa istniało jedynie w sferze idei, w innych idea uległa urzeczywistnieniu, a członkostwo w państwie (lub mieście) oraz status obywatelski znalazły formalny wyraz na niwie prawnoustrojowej. Kształtowanie się obywatelstwa stanowi proces długi i wielofazowy. Obywatelstwo w Europie pozostaje bowiem już od starożytności w stanie permanentnego rozwoju i wciąż wzbogacane jest o nowe treści (lub też czasem zubożane (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-15
    Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.Michael Shaffer - forthcoming - In Introduction to Logic. Rebus.
  6. added 2020-01-10
    Truth in Virtue of Meaning.Gillian Kay Russell - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences - like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides - are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. -/- (...)
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  7. added 2019-11-14
    Paradoxical Hypodoxes.Alexandre Billon - 2019 - Synthese 83 (12):5205-5229.
    Most paradoxes of self-reference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the Truth-Teller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’). Russell’s paradox, which involves the set of sets that are not self-membered, has a dual involving the set of sets which are self-membered, etc. It is widely believed that these duals are not paradoxical or at least not as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals. In this paper, I argue that some paradox’s (...)
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  8. added 2019-08-21
    Edgar Morscher: Die wissenschaftliche Definition. [REVIEW]Moritz Cordes - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72:443-446.
  9. added 2019-07-08
    Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de “indução válida”.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (3):439-460.
    In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-25
    The Simple Nature of Institutional Facts.Matthias Holweger - manuscript
    Facts such as the fact that Donald Trump is the US president or the fact that Germany won the 2014 world cup final are commonly referred to as “institutional facts” (“IFF”). I advocate the view that the nature of these facts is comparatively simple: they are facts that exist by virtue of collective recognition (CR), where CR can be direct or indirect. The leading account of IFF, that of John Searle, basically conforms with this definition. However, in his writings Searle (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-14
    Catholics and Hugo Grotius’s Definition of Lying.John Skalko - 2015 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 89:159-179.
    Among Catholic philosophers, Saint Augustine was the first boldly to propose and defend the absolute view that all lies are wrong. Under no circumstances can a lie be licit. This absolute view held sway among Catholics until the sixteenth century with the introduction of the doctrine of mental reservation. In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius introduced another way to uphold the absolute view by changing the definition of lying: If the right of another is not violated, then there is no (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Definitions: Implications for Syntax, Semantics, and the Language of Thought, by Annabel Cormack.Richard Horsey - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (3):345-349.
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    Discussion: The Truth and Falsity of Definitions.Rem B. Edwards - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):76.
    This article examines several answers to the question, can lexical definitions be true or false.
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  14. added 2019-06-05
    On Essentialism and Real Definitions of Religion.Caroline Schaffalitzky - 2014 - Journal of the American Academy of Religion 82 (2):495-520.
    This article counters the widespread view within the study of religion that a real definition of religion should be avoided. It argues that an essentialist approach is not necessarily as contentious as is often assumed and that alternatives to essentialist definitions are less well-founded than they may appear. The article opens with an outline of different types of definitions and a discussion of common concerns. It goes on to present a starting point for providing a real definition and ends with (...)
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  15. added 2018-12-31
    J. M. Bocheński’s Definition of the Concept of Nation. A Critique and Analysis From the Pragmatic-Logical Point of View.Piotr Michał Sękowski - 2016 - Diametros 48:89-104.
    The article offers an analysis of Józef Bocheński's studies of the concept of nation. Bocheński acknowledges that there are difficulties in defining a nation. After that he claims that he will attempt to propose a definition of the Polish nation. Nation is a social group centered around some cultural ideal. The analysis shows that Bocheński did not avoid serious logical problems. First of all, he constantly falls into a circular reasoning. Furthermore, it is called into question if it makes sense (...)
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  16. added 2018-09-21
    The Adverbial Theory of Numbers: Some Clarifications.Joongol Kim - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    In a forthcoming paper in this journal, entitled “Bad company objection to Joongol Kim’s adverbial theory of numbers”, Namjoong Kim presents an ingenious Russell-style paradox based on an analogue of Kim’s definition of the number 1, and argues that Kim’s theory needs to provide a criterion of demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable definitions of adverbial entities. This paper addresses this ‘bad company’ objection and some other related issues concerning Kim’s adverbial theory by clarifying the purposes and uses of the formal (...)
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  17. added 2018-09-12
    Nothingness-Definition Antinomy Analysis.Berke Nihat Akay - manuscript
    Trying to define nothingness has always been a challenge for philosophers. What exactly is it? Does it share properties similar to spaces? Can we treat it as a ''thing'' ? We can say an object is inside nothingness, but how do we imagine that ''containment'' ?
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  18. added 2018-05-09
    One Dogma of Analyticism.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 240:429-444.
    According to one view on analyticity in formal languages, a definition of 'analytic' can be given by semantic notions alone. In this contribution we are going to show that a purely semantic conception of analyticity is inadequate. To do so, we provide a method for transforming theories with a synthetic empirical basis into logical equivalent theories with an analytic ``empirical'' basis. We draw the conclusion that a definition of analyticity is adequate only if it is a pragmatic one.
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  19. added 2018-01-02
    Guidelines for Writing Definitions in Ontologies.Selja Seppälä, Alan Ruttenberg & Barry Smith - 2017 - Ciência da Informação 46 (1): 73-88.
    Ontologies are being used increasingly to promote the reusability of scientific information by allowing heterogeneous data to be integrated under a common, normalized representation. Definitions play a central role in the use of ontologies both by humans and by computers. Textual definitions allow ontologists and data curators to understand the intended meaning of ontology terms and to use these terms in a consistent fashion across contexts. Logical definitions allow machines to check the integrity of ontologies and reason over data annotated (...)
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  20. added 2017-12-09
    Introduction to the Logic of Definitions.Barry Smith - 2013 - In International Workshop on Definitions in Ontologies, organized in conjunction with the Fourth International Conference on Biomedical Ontology (ICBO), Montreal, July 7, 2013, (CEUR, 1061). pp. 1-2.
    What follows is a summary of basic principles pertaining to the definitions used in constructing an ontology. A definition is a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions. What this means in the simplest case can be understood as follows. To say that ɸ‐ing is a necessary condition for being an A is just another way of saying that every A ɸ’s; to say that ɸ‐ing is a sufficient condition for being an A is just another way of saying that everything (...)
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  21. added 2017-11-08
    A Context Principle for the Twenty-First Century.Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History.
    This is an article for an upcoming volume of essays in honor and memory of Eva Picardi. I engage with the literature that has tried to distill the significance of Frege's context principle for the philosophy of language (setting aside its role in Frege's argument for mathematical platonism). I argue that there are some interpretive problems with recent meta-semantic interpretations of the principle. Instead, I offer a somewhat weaker alternative: the context principle is a tool to license certain definitions. Moreover, (...)
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  22. added 2017-11-04
    An Improved Ontological Representation of Dendritic Cells as a Paradigm for All Cell Types.Anna Maria Masci, Cecilia N. Arighi, Alexander D. Diehl, Anne E. Liebermann, Chris Mungall, Richard H. Scheuermann, Barry Smith & Lindsay Cowell - 2009 - BMC Bioinformatics 10 (1):70.
    Recent increases in the volume and diversity of life science data and information and an increasing emphasis on data sharing and interoperability have resulted in the creation of a large number of biological ontologies, including the Cell Ontology (CL), designed to provide a standardized representation of cell types for data annotation. Ontologies have been shown to have significant benefits for computational analyses of large data sets and for automated reasoning applications, leading to organized attempts to improve the structure and formal (...)
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  23. added 2017-02-28
    Definitions in Ontologies.Selja Seppälä, Alan Ruttenberg, Yonatan Schreiber & Barry Smith - 2016 - Cahiers de Lexicologie 109 (2):175‐207.
    Definitions vary according to context of use and target audience. They must be made relevant for each context to fulfill their cognitive and linguistic goals. This involves adapting their logical structure, type of content, and form to each context of use. We examine from these perspectives the case of definitions in ontologies.
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  24. added 2017-02-13
    Frege on the Purpose and Fruitfulness of Definitions.M. Schirn - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 32 (125-126):61-80.
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  25. added 2017-02-13
    Sur la Définition du Concept de Définition.M. Bombik - 1985 - Studia Philosophiae Christianae 21 (1):129-142.
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  26. added 2017-02-07
    A Definition of Meaning.John Goldthwait - 1962 - World Futures 1 (1):84-94.
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  27. added 2017-01-23
    The Definition of Good.Richard Robinson - 1948 - Review of Metaphysics 1 (4):104-112.
    He does not consider the suggestions that the occurrence of complex things entails only the occurrence of less complex things, and that analysis might theoretically go on for ever. His argument here seems to me no better than arguing that, if we keep on taking points nearer and nearer to each other, we shall eventually come to two points that are next each other. There must be unanalysed concepts, but there need not be unanalysable concepts. Just so, there must be (...)
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  28. added 2017-01-22
    Towards the Definition of Philosophy.Roger Caldwell - 2001 - Philosophy Now 32:46-47.
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  29. added 2017-01-21
    A Definition of Philosophy.Lawrence C. Becker - 1977 - Metaphilosophy 8 (2-3):249-252.
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  30. added 2016-12-17
    Ebert on Boghossian’s Template and Transmission Failure.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Boghossian (1996) has put forward an interesting explanation of how we can acquire logical knowledge via implicit definitions that makes use of a special template. Ebert (2005) has argued that the template is unserviceable, as it doesn't transmit warrant. In this paper, we defend the template. We first suggest that Jenkins (2008)’s response to Ebert fails because it focuses on doxastic rather than propositional warrant. We then reject Ebert’s objection by showing that it depends on an implausible and incoherent assumption.
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  31. added 2016-12-08
    Double Vision: Two Questions About the Neo-Fregean Program.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):443-456.
    Much of The Reason’s Proper Study is devoted to defending the claim that simply by stipulating an abstraction principle for the “number-of” functor, we can simultaneously fix a meaning for this functor and acquire epistemic entitlement to the stipulated principle. In this paper, I argue that the semantic and epistemological principles Hale and Wright offer in defense of this claim may be too strong for their purposes. For if these principles are correct, it is hard to see why they do (...)
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  32. added 2016-12-08
    Popper on Definitions.Wilhelm Büttemeyer - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):15-28.
    In the present paper I shall first summarize Popper's criticism of the traditional method of definition, and then go on to comment critically on his own views on the form and function of so-called nominalist definitions.
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  33. added 2016-12-08
    The Impermissibility of `Sufficiency Definitions'.J. J. Shafer - 1975 - Mind 84 (333):96 - 99.
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  34. added 2016-12-04
    Boghossian's Template and Transmission Failure.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - 2018 - Al Mukhatabat 26:71-90.
    Within his overarching program aiming to defend an epistemic conception of analyticity, Boghossian (1996 and 1997) has offered a clear-cut explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical truths and logical rules through implicit definition. The explanation is based on a special template or general form of argument. Ebert (2005) has argued that an enhanced version of this template is flawed because a segment of it is unable to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion. This (...)
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  35. added 2016-10-10
    The Functions of Definitions in Ontologies.Selja Seppälä, Alan Ruttenberg, & Barry Smith - 2016 - In R. Ferrario & W. Kuhn (eds.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference (FOIS 2016). IOS Pres. pp. 37-50.
    To understand what ontologies do through their definitions, we propose a theoretical explanation of the functions of definitions in ontologies backed by empirical neuropsychological studies. Our goal is to show how these functions should motivate (i) the systematic inclusion of definitions in ontologies and (ii) the adaptation of definition content and form to the specific context of use of ontologies.
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  36. added 2015-12-08
    Remarks on Classical Analysis.George Bealer - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (11):711-712.
    Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on Classical Analysis, December 30, 1983, commenting on a paper by Ernest Sosa.
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  37. added 2015-11-14
    Definitions, Explanations and Theories.Michael Scriven - 1958 - In Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2. University of Minnesota. pp. 99 – 195.
  38. added 2015-09-26
    Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):854-864.
    Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.
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  39. added 2015-09-26
    Neither 'Good' in Terms of 'Better' nor 'Better' in Terms of 'Good'.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):466-473.
    In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of (...)
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  40. added 2014-11-14
    La concezione epistemica dell'analiticità.Alessia Marabini - 2014 - Aracne editrice.
    La rinascita negli ultimi decenni di un nutrito dibattito intorno alla nozione di analiticità dopo le critiche a suo tempo mosse da Quine alla batteria di nozioni utilizzate da Rudolf Carnap (ad esempio, postulati di significato, regole semantiche, definizioni implicite, convenzioni e stipulazioni esplicite) prende le mosse da una riflessione critica sulle argomentazioni di Quine e tenta, da un lato, di approfondire meglio il legame fra analiticità e conoscenza a priori, e, dall’altro, di capire meglio il ruolo che la definizione (...)
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  41. added 2014-11-11
    A Note on Analysis and Circular Definitions.Francesco Orilia & Achille C. Varzi - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 54:107-113.
    Analyses, in the simplest form assertions that aim to capture an intimate link between two concepts, are viewed since Russell's theory of definite descriptions as analyzing descriptions. Analysis therefore has to obey the laws governing definitions including some form of a Substitutivity Principle (SP). Once (SP) is accepted the road to the paradox of analysis is open. Popular reactions to the paradox involve the fundamental assumption (SV) that sentences differing only in containing an analysandum resp. an analysans express the same (...)
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  42. added 2014-11-11
    Truth and Circular Definitions. [REVIEW]Francesco Orilia & Achille C. Varzi - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (1):124–129.
    This original and enticing book provides a fresh, unifying perspective on many old and new logico-philosophical conundrums. Its basic thesis is that many concepts central in ordinary and philosophical discourse are inherently circular and thus cannot be fully understood as long as one remains within the confines of a standard theory of definitions. As an alternative, the authors develop a revision theory of definitions, which allows definitions to be circular without this giving rise to contradiction (but, at worst, to “vacuous” (...)
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  43. added 2014-11-08
    The Sortal Resemblance Problem.Joongol Kim - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):407-424.
    Is it possible to characterize the sortal essence of Fs for a sortal concept F solely in terms of a criterion of identity C for F? That is, can the question ‘What sort of thing are Fs?’ be answered by saying that Fs are essentially those things whose identity can be assessed in terms of C? This paper presents a case study supporting a negative answer to these questions by critically examining the neo-Fregean suggestion that cardinal numbers can be fully (...)
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  44. added 2014-09-04
    Devious Stipulations.John Horden - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10.
    Recent attempts to answer ontological questions through conceptual analysis have been controversial. Still, it seems reasonable to assume that if the existence of certain things analytically follows from sentences we already accept, then there is no further ontological commitment involved in affirming the existence of those things. More generally, it is plausible that whenever a sentence analytically entails another, the conjunction of those sentences requires nothing more of the world for its truth than the former sentence alone. In his ‘Analyticity (...)
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  45. added 2014-08-20
    Plato, Wittgenstein and the Definition of Games.Catherine Rowett - 2013 - In Luigi Perissinotto & Begoña Ramón Cámara (eds.), Wittgenstein and Plato: connections, comparisons and contrasts. Palgrave. pp. 196-219.
    In this paper I argue, controversially, that Plato's Meno anticipates Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism. Plato is usually read as an essentialist of the very kind that Wittgenstein was challenging, and the Meno in particular is usually taken as evidence that Plato thought that to know something you must be able to define it, and that if you can't define it you can't investigate any other questions on the topic. I suggest instead that Plato shows Socrates proposing such a position (much (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-30
    What is a Definition?James Robert Brown - 1998 - Foundations of Science 3 (1):111-132.
    According to the standard view of definition, all defined terms are mere stipulations, based on a small set of primitive terms. After a brief review of the Hilbert-Frege debate, this paper goes on to challenge the standard view in a number of ways. Examples from graph theory, for example, suggest that some key definitions stem from the way graphs are presented diagramatically and do not fit the standard view. Lakatos's account is also discussed, since he provides further examples that suggest (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-30
    Should Natural-Language Definitions Be Insulated From, or Interactive with, One Another in Sentence Composition?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):177 - 197.
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  48. added 2014-03-30
    Frege on the Psychological Significance of Definitions.John F. Horty - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):223 - 263.
  49. added 2014-03-30
    Analyzing Analysis.C. Anthony Anderson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):199 - 222.
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  50. added 2014-03-30
    Real Definitions: Quine and Aristotle.José A. Benardete - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):265 - 282.
    Re-activating the philosophical quest for real definitions, I dare propose that its fulfillment is most convincingly represented, close to home, where one probably least expects it, notably in the first half of Section 36 of Word and Object, in the pages of Quine. Aristotle must inevitably remain our guide even as we insist on respecting Quine's anti-essentialism, and I must then explain how Aristotle, truncated, can be put here to use. Well, we may begin, appropriately, with a definition or with (...)
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