About this topic
Summary Deflationism about truth is not one view of truth but a family of accounts that rejects truth as a substantial property (whether of sentences, propositions, or entities of other sorts). In a typical minimalist formulation, to say that 'S' is true is equivalent to asserting S. Minimalism is attractive for its simplicity and lack of deep metaphysical commitments. Critics argue that it is too simple to answer fundamental questions about truth, for example: why is truth valued over falsehood? Minimalism may also be threatened by semantic paradoxes because it seems to require unqualified commitment to the equivalence principle "'S' is true iff S". 
Key works Deflationism about truth has its origin in Frege 1956, Ramsey 1927, and Ayer 1935. Contemporary expressions of deflationary truth include disquotationalism: Field 1994, Mcgee 1993, Quine 1970; minimalism: Horwich 1990 Horwich 1999 Horwich 1998 Horwich 2009 Horwich 2001 Horwich 2004; prosententialism: Grover et al 1975, Grover 1992, Brandom 1994, Brandom 2002
Introductions Armour-Garb 2012 and Armour-Garb 2012 present not only a general account of deflationism about truth but also the primary challenges such a theory faces from its critics. Armour-Garb & Beall 2005 is an anthology dedicated to presenting a variety of accounts ofdeflationism about truth, and Lynch et al 2021 also includes a number of important classic and contemporary contributions to the field. For a helpful overview of deflationary accounts of truth, see Armour-Garb et al 2021
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Minimalism about Truth
  1. Horwich on the Value of Truth.Byeong D. Lee - 2020 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (2):263–279.
    On the normativity objection to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, his theory fails to capture the value of truth. In response to this objection, he argues that his minimalist theory of truth is compatible with the value of truth. On his view, the concept of truth is not constitutively normative, but the value of true beliefs can be explained instead by the belief-truth norm that we ought to want our beliefs to be true, and the value of true beliefs expressed (...)
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  2. The Argument From Accidental Truth Against Deflationism.Masaharu Mizumoto - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, we present what we call the argument from accidental truth, according to which some instances of deflationist schemata, even those carefully reformulated and adjusted by Field and Horwich to accommodate the truth of utterances, are falsified due to accidental truths. Since the folk concept of truth allows for accidental truths, the deflationary theory of truth will face a serious problem. In particular, it follows that the deflationist schema fails to capture the proper extension of truth by precluding (...)
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  3. Global expressivism and alethic pluralism.Huw Price - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-55.
    This paper discusses the relation between Crispin Wright’s alethic pluralism and my global expressivism. I argue that on many topics Wright’s own view counts as expressivism in my sense, but that truth itself is a striking exception. Unlike me, Wright never seems to countenance an expressivist account of truth, though the materials needed are available to him in his approaches to other topics.
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  4. Deflationism, Truth, and Desire.Jamin Asay - 2022 - Ratio 35 (3):204-213.
    Deflationists about truth generally regard the contribution that ‘true’ makes to utterances to be purely logical or expressive: it exists to facilitate communication, and remedy our expressive deficiencies that are due to ignorance or finitude. This paper presents a challenge to that view by considering alethic desires. Alethic desires are desires for one’s beliefs to be true. Such desires, I argue, do not admit of any deflationarily acceptable analysis, and so challenge the deflationist’s austere view about the semantic role of (...)
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  5. Nothing is True.W. Gamester - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper motivates and defends alethic nihilism, the theory that nothing is true. I first argue that alethic paradoxes like the Liar and Curry motivate nihilism; I then defend the view from objections. The critical discussion has two primary outcomes. First, a proof of concept. Alethic nihilism strikes many as silly or obviously false, even incoherent. I argue that it is in fact well-motivated and internally coherent. Second, I argue that deflationists about truth ought to be nihilists. Deflationists maintain that (...)
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  6. Horwich’s Epistemological Fundamentality and Folk Commitment.Joseph Ulatowski - forthcoming - Axiomathes:1-18.
    There are many variants of deflationism about truth, but one of them, Paul Horwich’s minimalism, stands out because it accepts as axiomatic practical variants of the equivalence schema: 〈p〉 is true if and only if p. The equivalence schema is epistemologically fundamental. In this paper, I call upon empirical studies to show that practical variants of the equivalence schema are widely accepted by non-philosophers. While in the empirical data there is variation in how non-philosophers and philosophers talk about truth and (...)
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  7. Deflationism About Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb, Daniel Stoljar & James Woodbridge - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Deflationism about truth, what is often simply called “deflationism”, is really not so much a theory of truth in the traditional sense, as it is a different, newer sort of approach to the topic. Traditional theories of truth are part of a philosophical debate about the nature of a supposed property of truth. Philosophers offering such theories often make suggestions like the following: truth consists in correspondence to the facts; truth consists in coherence with a set of beliefs or propositions; (...)
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  8. The Proper Formulation of the Minimalist Theory of Truth.Thomas Schindler & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    Minimalism about truth is one of the main contenders for our best theory of truth, but minimalists face the charge of being unable to properly state their theory. Donald Davidson incisively pointed out that minimalists must generalize over occurrences of the same expression placed in two different contexts, which is futile. In order to meet the challenge, Paul Horwich argues that one can nevertheless characterize the axioms of the minimalist theory. Sten Lindström and Tim Button have independently argued that Horwich’s (...)
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  9. The Nature of Truth (Second Edition).Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2021 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  10. A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding.Thomas Schindler - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2029-2038.
    Horwich proposes a solution to the liar paradox that relies on a particular notion of grounding—one that, unlike Kripke’s notion of grounding, does not invoke any “Tarski-style compositional principles”. In this short note, we will formalize Horwich’s construction and argue that his solution to the liar paradox does not justify certain generalizations about truth that he endorses. We argue that this situation is not resolved even if one appeals to the \-rule. In the final section, we briefly discuss how Horwich (...)
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  11. Minimalismo e suas Mentiras Generalizadas (Minimalism's General Lies).Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2017 - Analytica (Rio) 21 (2):183-194.
    A teoria minimalista da verdade consiste em todas as instâncias do esquema 'φ é verdadeira sse φ' e na afirmação de que nossa aceitação (primitiva) dessas instâncias é suficiente para explicar nossas atitudes em relação a todas sentenças envolvendo ‘verdade’. Filósofos têm apontado que o minimalismo tem dificuldades em explicar nossas atitudes em relação a generalizações envolvendo ‘verdade’ bem como em lidar com instanciações contraditórias do esquema para sentenças paradoxais (ex. paradoxo do mentiroso). Proponentes do minimalismo apresentam soluções para esses (...)
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  12. Expressivism, Minimalism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Cambridge
    Quasi-realist expressivists have developed a growing liking for minimalism about truth. It has gone almost unnoticed, though, that minimalism also drives an anti-Archimedean movement which launches a direct attack on expressivists’ non-moral self-image by proclaiming that all metaethical positions are built on moral grounds. This interplay between expressivism, minimalism and anti-Archimedeanism makes for an intriguing metaethical encounter. As such, the first part of this dissertation examines expressivism’s marriage to minimalism and defends it against its critics. The second part then turns (...)
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  13. Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction.Richard L. Kirkham - 1992 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    Theories of Truth provides a clear, critical introduction to one of the most difficult areas of philosophy. It surveys all of the major philosophical theories of truth, presenting the crux of the issues involved at a level accessible to nonexperts yet in a manner sufficiently detailed and original to be of value to professional scholars. Kirkham's systematic treatment and meticulous explanations of terminology ensure that readers will come away from this book with a comprehensive general understanding of one of philosophy's (...)
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  14. Minimalism, Supervaluations and Fixed Points.Sergi Oms - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):139-153.
    In this paper I introduce Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth, called ‘Minimalism’, and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some (...)
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  15. Is Truth a Normative Concept?Paul Horwich - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1127-1138.
    My answer will be ‘no’. And I’ll defend it by: distinguishing a concept’s having normative import from its being functionally normative; sketching a method for telling whether or not a concept is of the latter sort; responding to the antideflationist, Dummettian argument in favor of the conclusion that truth is functionally normative; proceeding to address a less familiar route to that conclusion—one that’s consistent with deflationism about truth, but that depends on the further assumption that meaning is intrinsically normative; and (...)
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  16. A Minimalist Explanation of Truth’s Asymmetry.Julian Dodd - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):389-404.
    Suppose that Eleanor is drowsy. Truth's asymmetry is illustrated by the following fact: while we accept that <Eleanor is drowsy> is true because Eleanor is drowsy, we do not accept that Eleanor is drowsy because <Eleanor is drowsy> is true. This asymmetry requires an explanation, but it has been alleged, notably by David Liggins, that the minimalist about truth cannot provide one. This paper counteracts this pessimism by arguing that the minimalist can successfully explain the asymmetry conceptually, rather than metaphysically. (...)
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  17. Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth Beneath Cognitive Command.Filippo Ferrari - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Aberdeen
    This thesis engages with three topics and the relationships between them: (i) the phenomenon of disagreement (paradigmatically, where one person makes a claim and another denies it); (ii) the normative character of disagreements (the issue of whether, and in what sense, one of the parties is “at fault” for believing something that’s untrue); (iii) the issue of which theory of what truth is can best accommodate the norms relating belief and truth. People disagree about all sorts of things: about whether (...)
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  18. Knowledge, Lies and Vagueness : A Minimalist Treatment.Patrick Greenough - unknown
    Minimalism concerning truth is the view that that all there is to be said concerning truth is exhausted by a set of basic platitudes. In the first part of this thesis, I apply this methodology to the concept of knowledge. In so doing, I develop a model of inexact knowledge grounded in what I call minimal margin for error principles. From these basic principles, I derive the controversial result that epistemological internalism and internalism with respect to self-knowledge are untenable doctrines. (...)
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  19. The Value of Minimalist Truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1103-1125.
    Since the publication of Truth, Paul Horwich’s ‘Minimalism’ has become the paradigm of what goes under the label ‘the deflationary conception of truth’. Despite the many theoretical virtues of Horwich’s minimalism, it is usually contended that it cannot fully account for the normative role that truth plays in enquiry. As I see it, this concern amounts to several challenges. One such challenge—call it the axiological challenge—is about whether deflationists have the theoretical resources to explain the value of truth. Some philosophers (...)
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  20. Constituting Assertion: A Pragmatist Critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew Howat - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):935-954.
    In his influential book Truth, Paul Horwich deploys a philosophical method focused on linguistic usage, that is, on the function(s) the concept of truth serves in actual discourse. In doing so Horwich eschews abstract metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical or ontological conceptions of truth rest on basic misconceptions. From this description, one might reasonably expect Horwich's book to have drawn inspiration from, or even embodied philosophical pragmatism of some kind. Unfortunately Horwich relies upon Russell's tired caricature of pragmatism about truth (''p' (...)
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  21. Can Minimalism About Truth Embrace Polysemy?Katarzyna Kijania-Placek - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):955-985.
    Paul Horwich is aware of the fact that his theory as stated in his works is directly applicable only to a language in which a word, understood as a syntactic type, is connected with exactly one literal meaning. Yet he claims that the theory is expandable to include homonymy and indexicality and thus may be considered as applicable to natural language. My concern in this paper is with yet another kind of ambiguity—systematic polysemy—that assigns multiple meanings to one linguistic type. (...)
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  22. Three Questions for Minimalism.Keith Simmons - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1011-1034.
    In this paper, I raise some interconnected concerns for Paul Horwich’s minimal theory of truth, framed by these three questions: How should the minimal theory be formulated? How does the minimal theory address the liar paradox? What is the explanatory role of the concept of truth? I conclude that we cannot be linguistic or conceptual deflationists about truth.
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  23. Minimalism and the Generalisation Problem: On Horwich’s Second Solution.Cezary Cieśliński - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1077-1101.
    Disquotational theories of truth are often criticised for being too weak to prove interesting generalisations about truth. In this paper we will propose a certain formal theory to serve as a framework for a solution of the generalisation problem. In contrast with Horwich’s original proposal, our framework will eschew psychological notions altogether, replacing them with the epistemic notion of believability. The aim will be to explain why someone who accepts a given disquotational truth theory Th, should also accept various generalisations (...)
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  24. Minimalism About Truth: Special Issue Introduction.Joseph Ulatowski & Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):927-933.
    The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, a conception which has attracted extensive support since the landmark publication of Paul Horwich's Truth (1990). Many well-esteemed philosophers have challenged Horwich's alethic minimalism, an especially austere version of deflationary truth theory. In part, this is at least because his brand of minimalism about truth also intersects with several different literatures: paradox, implicit definition, bivalence, normativity, propositional attitudes, properties, explanatory power, meaning and use, and so forth. Deflationist sympathizers have introduced (...)
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  25. Intersubstitutivity Principles and the Generalization Function of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1065-1075.
    We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the (...)
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  26. The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.
    It's often said that according to deflationary theories of truth, truth is not a ‘substantial’ property. While this is a fine slogan, it is far from transparent what deflationists mean (or ought to mean) in saying that truth is ‘insubstantial’. Focusing so intently upon the concept of truth and the word ‘true’, I argue, deflationists and their critics have been insufficiently attentive to a host of metaphysical complexities that arise for deflationists in connection with the property of truth. My aim (...)
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  27. From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
    In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated (...)
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  28. Propositions, Representation, and Truth.Geoff Georgi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1019-1043.
    Theories of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances are committed to the thesis that sentences or other representations true in all and only the same circumstances express the same proposition. Theories of propositions as complex, structured entities are not committed to this thesis. As a result, structured propositions can play a role in our theories of language and thought that sets of truth-supporting circumstances cannot play. To illustrate this difference, I sketch a theory of transparent, non-deflationary truth consistent with some (...)
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  29. The Truth About "It is True That…".Varol Akman & M. Burak Senol - 2016 - Pragmatics and Cognition 23 (2):284-299.
    Deflationism, one of the influential philosophical doctrines of truth, holds that there is no property of truth, and that overt uses of the predicate "true" are redundant. However, the hypothetical examples used by theorists to exemplify deflationism are isolated sentences, offering little to examine what the predicate adds to meaning within context. We oppose the theory not on philosophical but on empirical grounds. We collect 7,610 occurrences of "it is true that" from 10 influential periodicals published in the United States. (...)
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  30. Deflationary Truth.Bradley P. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (eds.) - 2005 - Open Court Press.
    This book is a collection of important writings on deflationism, with a detailed introduction and an exhaustive annotated bibliography. Among philosophers concerned with the theory of truth, deflationist positions have quickly gained ground and have become the most popular. Yet heretofore there has been no single book to which the readers can go for a detailed, overall view of the entire phenomenon of deflationism. This is the only available map of the whole terrain of deflationism. -/- Deflationism is a comparatively (...)
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  31. Horwich and the Generalization Problem.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2004 - Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium:187-189.
    In order to be complete, Horwich’s minimalist theory must be able to deal with generalizations about truth. A logical and an epistemic-explanatory level of the generalization problem are distinguished, and Horwich’s responses to both sides of the problem are examined. Finally some persistent problems for minimalism are pointed out.
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  32. Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. [REVIEW]Dorothy Grover - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):706-711.
    Theories of Truth introduces readers to issues that have been connected with truth—the only book of its kind. Richard Kirkham has an easy writing style and a good sense of what needs to be explained to students new to the literature. These facts make Theories of Truth a serious contender for use in the classroom. As with most introductions, use of the book should be supplemented with readings from the major authors covered. Beyond that supplementation, however, the text still needs (...)
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  33. Minimal Realism or Realistic Minimalism.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):512-518.
  34. Critical Notices: Horwich's Semantic Deflationism.Darragh Byrne - 2000 - Humana Mente 8 (3):371-391.
  35. Why Expressivists About Value Should Not Love Minimalism About Truth.Divers John & Church Alonso - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):12-19.
  36. What is Minimalism About Truth?J. A. Burgess - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):259-267.
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  37. Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps.Richard Holton - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (2):137-168.
    The question is asked whether one can consistently both be a minimalist about truth, and hold that some meaningful assertoric sentences fail to be either true or false. It is shown that one can, but the issues are delicate, and the price is high: one must either refrain from saying that the sentences lack truth values, or else one must invoke a novel non-contraposing three-valued conditional. Finally it is shown that this does not help in reconciling minimalism with emotivism, where (...)
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  38. Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude and Belief.Michael Smith - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):21-26.
  39. Review: From a Deflationary Point of View. [REVIEW]Marian David - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):427-434.
    The review of this collection is primarily concerned with essays pertaining to Horwich's deflationary approaches to truth and meaning.
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  40. Un pseudoproblema para el minimismo.José E. Chaves Ruiz - 2007 - Critica 39 (115):69-82.
    El objetivo principal de este artículo es contribuir al debate entre contextualistas y minimistas, mostrando cómo uno de los principales argumentos en contra del minimismo, que denominaré el "Argumento de la pérdida de generalidad de la noción de implicatura", descansa en una mala comprensión o en una simplificación del mecanismo de generación de implicaturas conversacionales. /// The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate between contextualism and minimalism. I show that one of the main arguments against minimalism, (...)
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  41. Deflationary Truth and the Problem of Aboutness.Paul Horwich - 2008 - Analytica 2:62-75.
    Russian translation of Horwich P. Deflationary Truth and the Problem of Aboutness // Philosophical Issues, 8, 1997. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.
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  42. Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Matti Eklund - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (2):288-292.
    The basic elements of this framework were elaborated upon and defended at some length in Wright’s Truth and Objectivity —henceforth, T&O—which was a marvelous book. The present volume of essays, almost all previously published and including some that predate T&O, continues to discuss the same themes, and is, in virtue of the significance of the ideas discussed and the high level of the discussion, likewise a very important work. The collection is divided into five parts: Realism Reconfigured, Replies to Critics, (...)
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  43. On the Value and Nature of Truth.Gurpreet Rattan - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:235-251.
    The thought that truth is valuable for its own sake is obvious, yet difficult to explicate in a precise and vindicating way. The paper tries to explicate and vindicate this thought with an argument for the conclusion that truth is an epistemic value. Truth is an epistemic value in the sense that a commitment to the value of truth plays a role in the justification and explanation of a fundamental aspect of our epistemic practice, namely, critical reflection. The paper also (...)
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  44. Kripke’s Paradox of Meaning.Paul Horwich - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):23-32.
    This paper argues that deflationism about truth enables us to resolve the notorious problem of intentionality—the problem of explaining how intrinsically dead signs, whether material or mental, are able to reach into the world and pick out specific collections of things.
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  45. Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning.Anil Gupta - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):654-666.
    This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich’s use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an (...)
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  46. What Horwich’s Minimal Theory of Truth Does Not Explain.Gary L. Hardcastle - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):135-146.
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  47. This is Not an Instance of (E).Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1035–1063.
    Semantic paradoxes like the liar are notorious challenges to truth theories. A paradox can be phrased with minimal resources and minimal assumptions. It is not surprising, then, that the liar is also a challenge to minimalism about truth. Horwich (1990) deals swiftly with the paradox, after discriminating between other strategies for avoiding it without compromising minimalism. He dismisses the denial of classical logic, the denial that the concept of truth can coherently be applied to propositions, and the denial that the (...)
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  48. Is Simplicity Alethic for Semantic Theories?Francisco Calvo Garzón - 2003 - NTU Philosophical Review 26:31-50.
    Crispin Wright has reshaped debates about Realism by offering a new landscape of what's at stake in the discussions between realists and their opponents. Instead of arguing whether a given discourse can be truth apt, discussion should focus, Wright contends, on what kind of truth predicate a discourse can enjoy. Namely, whether truth for a discourse can be 'robust' or merely ‘minimal' Wright's approach has important implications for Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. The bulk of this paper (...)
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  49. On the Analogy Between Cognitive Representation and Truth.Suárez Mauricio & Solé Albert - 2006 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (1):39-48.
    In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.
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  50. Verdad y explicación.Fernando Broncano - 1992 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 7 (1-3):1161-1181.
    Truth is an epistemological concept that sometimes is claimed to have explanatory strength. It is argued, within a realistic view about causality and explanation, that concepts must represent naturalistic properties in order to have explanatory power. The eliminativistic theories about truth fail to account the use of predicate “truth” in explanatory contexts. Many antirealistic explanations of truth are reconstructed in order to sustain that thesis. Specially, we focus on the minimalist theory of truth. As we argue, we cannot eliminate the (...)
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