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Summary

In (practical) deliberation we aim to decide what to do by considering reasons to act. Deliberation of this sort raises many questions, including: (i) What is the relationship between deliberation and acting for reasons? For instance, is deliberation necessary for acting for a reason? (ii) To what extent is it possible for us to take into account things other than reasons for and against doing A in deliberating about whether to A? What explains any such restriction? (iii) What kind of freedom, if any, is presupposed in deliberation? (iv) What is the relationship between rational deliberation and rational action? For instance, does rational deliberation which concludes in a decision to A ensure that it is rational to A? (v) What kinds of factors make for rational deliberation? Is deliberation about whether to A rational only insofar as it responds to reasons for and against A-ing? Or do other factors – for instance, about the benefits of being disposed to deliberate in certain ways – also bear on the rationality of deliberation? Some philosophers have also discussed the possibility of doxastic deliberation – deliberation about what to believe. Some philosophers have argued that features of doxastic deliberation support the view that belief is essentially normative.

Key works For a very helpful recent discussion of (i), see Arpaly & Schroeder 2012. For discussion of (ii) see e.g. Hieronymi 2006Kavka 1983, and Shah 2008. Much of the literature on (iv) and (v) takes off from David Gauthier's work, especially Gauthier 1986Morris & Ripstein 2001 is a very useful collection of essays on Gauthier's work. Much of the recent debate about doxastic deliberation begins with Shah 2003.
Introductions Pettit 2010
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  1. added 2020-05-21
    Deliberative Culture and Politics.Baogang He - 2014 - Political Theory 42 (1):58-81.
    The very thought of deliberative politics in contemporary China may seem surprising. Indeed, there are questions over its veracity. Analyses of scholarship on deliberative democracy in China to date might be said to fall into two camps: one sees the emergence of deliberative democracy in China as a real prospect for democracy; the other dismisses it outright. This essay offers an alternative evaluation to these two camps. It proposes a theoretical reconstruction of deliberative culture that accounts for a proliferation of (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-29
    Normative Metaphysics for Accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    We use normative reasons in a bewildering variety of different ways. And yet, as many recent theorists have shown, one can discern systematic distinctions underlying this complexity. This paper is a contribution to this project of constructive normative metaphysics. We aim to bring a black sheep back into the flock: the balancing model of weighing reasons. This model is threatened by a variety of cases in which distinct reasons overlap, in the sense that they do not contribute separate weight for (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-23
    Review: Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, In Praise of Desire. [REVIEW]Errol Lord - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):562-567,.
  4. added 2020-04-23
    Moral Rectitude and Human Advantage: A Proposed Reconciliation in Terms of Intrinsic Value Realization.Joseph William Huster - 1997 - Dissertation, The University of Utah
    My dissertation develops and defends a modernized eudaemonistic approach to moral deliberation. I argue that conceding human advantage to be an objective matter, and defining advantage as that which either contributes to or constitutes our realization of intrinsic value, justifies our accepting this notion as a fundamental moral category. ;Specifically, I examine the role that "advantage" has played in the history of moral philosophy, particularly in the thought of the Stoics, Spinoza, and Kant. Using this analysis as a platform, I (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-23
    Robert Audi: Practical Reasoning.Miranda Pérez & Angel Luis - 1995 - Pragmatics and Cognition 3 (1):189-194.
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  6. added 2020-04-19
    Introduction to the Special Issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision.Franz Dietrich & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):1-4.
    This symposium in the overlap of philosophy and decision theory is described well by its title “Beliefs in Groups”. Each word in the title matters, with one intended ambiguity. The symposium is about beliefs rather than other attitudes such as preferences; these beliefs take the form of probabilities in the first three contributions, binary yes/no beliefs (‘judgments’) in the fourth contribution, and qualitative probabilities (‘probability grades’) in the fifth contribution. The beliefs occur in groups, which is ambiguous between beliefs of (...)
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  7. added 2020-04-12
    Selected Topics in the African Reflection on International Relations: A Study of the Views of George M. Carew.Krzysztof Trzcinski - 2014 - In Re-Visions and Re-Orientations: Non-European Thought in International Relations Studies. London, UK: Bloomsbury. pp. 112-129.
    In this paper, I present and make a critical analysis of the thoughts of the Sierra Leonean philosopher George M. Carew, who is the author of one of the broadest contemporary visions of the political future of Africa. Carew is disappointed with the decades of authoritarian rule in African countries, which have brought about neither development nor prosperity. He believes that the only political system able to change this situation is democracy. In the opinion of this thinker, the prerequisite for (...)
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  8. added 2020-04-11
    The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.
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  9. added 2020-03-13
    Future Desires, the Agony Argument, and Subjectivism About Reasons.Eden Lin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (1):95-130.
    Extant discussions of subjectivism about reasons for action have concentrated on presentist versions of the theory, on which reasons for present actions are grounded in present desires. In this article, I motivate and investigate the prospects of futurist subjectivism, on which reasons for present actions are grounded in present or future desires. Futurist subjectivism promises to answer Parfit's Agony Argument, and it is motivated by natural extensions of some of the considerations that support subjectivism in general. However, it faces a (...)
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  10. added 2020-02-14
    Practical Reasoning About Final Ends.Henry S. Richardson - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work of (...)
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  11. added 2020-02-14
    Practical Reasoning About Final Ends.Henry S. Richardson - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work of (...)
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  12. added 2020-02-12
    The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Richard Jeffrey - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):734-737.
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  13. added 2020-02-07
    Explanation and Justification: Understanding the Functions of Fact-Insensitive Principles.Kyle Johannsen - 2016 - Socialist Studies 11 (1):174-86.
    In recent work, Andrew T. Forcehimes and Robert B. Talisse correctly note that G.A. Cohen’s fact-insensitivity thesis, properly understood, is explanatory. This observation raises an important concern. If fact-insensitive principles are explanatory, then what role can they play in normative deliberations? The purpose of my paper is, in part, to address this question. Following David Miller, I indicate that on a charitable understanding of Cohen’s thesis, an explanatory principle explains a justificatory fact by completing an otherwise logically incomplete inference. As (...)
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  14. added 2020-01-31
    Argument and Deliberation: A Plea for Understanding.Larry Wright - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):565-585.
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  15. added 2020-01-31
    XI—Deliberation is of Ends.Aurel Kolnai - 1962 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62 (1):195-218.
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  16. added 2020-01-12
    A Dialectical Profile for the Evaluation of Practical Arguments.Isabela Fairclough - unknown
    This paper proposes a dialectical profile of critical questions attached to the deliberation scheme. It suggests how deliberation about means and about goals can be integrated into a single recursive procedure, and how the practical argument from goals can be integrated with the pragmatic argument from negative consequences. In a critical rationalist spirit, it argues that criticism of a proposal is criticism of its consequences, aimed at enhancing the rationality of decision-making in conditions of uncertainty and risk.
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  17. added 2020-01-12
    Deciding as Bringing Deliberation to a Close.Philippe Urfalino - 2010 - Social Science Information 49 (1):111-140.
    The notion of decision is almost never defined with precision and often assimilated to the notion of choice. This article defines deciding as bringing deliberation to a close, on the basis of two characteristics: deciding puts an end to deliberation rather than constituting the end produced by deliberation ; and decision produces an obligation. In the light of this definition, it first examines the difference between individual and collective decisions, then the rules of collective decision as stopping rules.
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  18. added 2020-01-06
    Deliberation, Practical Reasoning and Problem-Solving.Walton Douglas & Toniolo Alice - unknown
    We present a series of realistic examples of deliberation and discuss how they can form the basis for building a typology of deliberation dialogues. The observations from our examples are used to suggest that argumentation researchers and philosophers have been thinking about deliberation in overly simplistic ways. We argue that to include all the kinds of argumentation that make up realistic deliberations, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of deliberations. We propose a model including a problem-solving type of (...)
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  19. added 2020-01-06
    Fichte on the Highest Good: Agent Unity and Practical Deliberation in the Jena Sittenlehre.Benjamin D. Crowe - 2008 - Philosophy Today 52 (3-4):379-390.
  20. added 2020-01-01
    Emotions and Digital Well-Being. The Rationalistic Bias of Social Media Design in Online Deliberations.Lavinia Marin & Sabine Roeser - forthcoming - In Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi (eds.), Ethics of Digital Well-being: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Springer.
    In this chapter we argue that emotions are mediated in an incomplete way in online social media because of the heavy reliance on textual messages which fosters a rationalistic bias and a bias towards less nuanced emotional expressions. This incompleteness can happen either by obscuring emotions, showing less than the original intensity, misinterpreting emotions, or eliciting emotions without feedback and context. Online interactions and deliberations tend to contribute rather than overcome stalemates and informational bubbles, partially due to prevalence of anti-social (...)
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  21. added 2019-12-29
    Two Jobs for Aristotle's Practical Syllogism?Klaus Corcilius - 2009 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 12.
    Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I (...)
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  22. added 2019-12-02
    Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.
  23. added 2019-11-25
    Deliberation Across Deep Divisions. Transformative Moments.Jurg Steiner, Maria Clara Jaramillo, Rousiley C. M. Maia & Simona Mameli - 2017 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    From the local level to international politics, deliberation helps to increase mutual understanding and trust, in order to arrive at political decisions of high epistemic value and legitimacy. This book gives deliberation a dynamic dimension, analysing how levels of deliberation rise and fall in group discussions, and introducing the concept of 'deliberative transformative moments' and how they can be applied to deeply divided societies, where deliberation is most needed but also most difficult to work. Discussions between ex-guerrillas and ex-paramilitaries in (...)
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  24. added 2019-11-25
    Reasoning Under Scarcity.Jennifer M. Morton - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):543-559.
    Practical deliberation consists in thinking about what to do. Such deliberation is deemed rational when it conforms to certain normative requirements. What is often ignored is the role that an agent's context can play in so-called ‘failures’ of rationality. In this paper, I use recent cognitive science research investigating the effects of resource-scarcity on decision-making and cognitive function to argue that context plays an important role in determining which norms should structure an agent's deliberation. This evidence undermines the view that (...)
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  25. added 2019-11-25
    The Contrast Between Permissions to Act and Permissions to Believe.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):21-34.
    There is an interesting contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe. Plausibly, if it is permissible to believe something from a perspective with incomplete evidence, it cannot become impermissible to believe it from a second perspective with complete evidence. In contrast, it seems that something permissible to do for an agent in a perspective with limited evidence can become impermissible in a second perspective in which all the relevant evidence is available. What is more, an agent with incomplete (...)
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  26. added 2019-11-14
    An Eye on Particulars with the End in Sight: An Account of Aristotelian Phronesis.Maria Silvia Vaccarezza - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):246-261.
    This paper focuses on Aristotelian phronesis and aims at highlighting its nature as an eye on particulars with general ends in sight. More specifically, it challenges the particularistic interpretation of phronesis and Aristotelian ethics in order to argue for a “qualified generalism.” After sketching a radical Particularistic Reading (PR), the paper defends an interpretation it calls the Priority of Particulars Reading (PPR). First, it shows how PPR effectively accounts for the Aristotelian priority assigned to practical perception while at the same (...)
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  27. added 2019-11-14
    Practical Knowledge.Michael Schmitz - 2013 - Was Sollen Wir Glauben? Was Dürfen Wir Tun?, Sektionsbeiträge der GAP. 8.
    The contribution deals with knowledge of what to do, and how, where, when and why to do it, as it is found in a multitude of plans, rules, procedures, maxims, and other instructions. It is argued that while this knowledge is conceptual and propositional, it is still irreducible to theoretical knowledge of what is the case and why it is the case. It is knowledge of goals, of ends and means, rather than of facts. It is knowledge-to that is irreducibly (...)
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  28. added 2019-11-11
    Improving Practical Reasoning and Argumentation.Michael D. Baumtrog - 2015 - Dissertation, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
    This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily able (...)
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  29. added 2019-11-11
    G.E.M. Anscombe and Rediscovery of Practical Syllogism.Elisa Grimi - 2012 - Acta Philosophica 21 (II):351-362.
    The present paper proposes to analyse the role of the practical syllogism in G.E.M. Anscombe’s theory of action. To this end, I have rst of all chosen to examine, even if in broad terms, the conception of practical syllogism as it is present in the Aristotelian doctrine, and to reveal/delineate some critical points found within it. The following section is the central part of the paper, where, starting from § 33 of Intention, a re ection is carried out on the (...)
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  30. added 2019-09-23
    Realism, Objectivity, and Evaluation.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In David Kaspar (ed.), Explorations in Ethics.
    I discuss Benacerraf's epistemological challenge for realism about areas like mathematics, metalogic, and modality, and describe the pluralist response to it. I explain why normative pluralism is peculiarly unsatisfactory, and use this explanation to formulate a radicalization of Moore's Open Question Argument. According to the argument, the facts -- even the normative facts -- fail to settle the practical questions at the center of our normative lives. One lesson is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, (...)
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  31. added 2019-08-06
    Review of Anthony Simon Laden, Reasoning: A Social Picture. [REVIEW]Brendan de Kenessey - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):435-439.
  32. added 2019-06-06
    The Function of Normative Process‐Requirements.Julian Fink - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):115-136.
    This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process‐requirements upon us. It has been argued that process‐requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process‐requirements. First, process‐requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree (...)
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  33. added 2019-06-06
    Deliberation and the First Person.David Owens - unknown
    Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief.
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  34. added 2019-06-06
    Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality.Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role (...)
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  35. added 2019-06-06
    Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons.R. Jay Wallace - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):429-435.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality defends a strikingly nonpsychologistic account of motivating reasons for action. When we explain what people do by citing their reasons, we are trying to isolate the considerations that were actually effective in moving them to act. But it is crucial, Dancy contends, that these considerations be understood in a way that preserves their connection to the normative contexts in which the concept of a reason also has a place. The considerations that move agents to act are (...)
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  36. added 2019-06-06
    Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447-453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
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  37. added 2019-06-06
    Aristotle on Deliberation and the Practical Syllogism: Interpretations and Disputed Texts.Eric W. Snider Jr - 1988 - New Scholasticism 62 (2):179-209.
    The purpose of this dissertation is to show how it is that three interpreters of Aristotle's texts on deliberation and the practical syllogism come to views which differ considerably from each other. I argue that the differences are largely due to which set of texts the interpreter takes as most important in relation to Aristotle's theory of the practical syllogism. Neither G. E. M. Anscombe, John M. Cooper, nor Martha Craven Nussbaum has expressed adequately Aristotle's use of the practical syllogism (...)
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  38. added 2019-06-06
    The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle’s Causal Theory of Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1981 - New Scholasticism 55 (3):281-316.
    In the present paper, I want to contribute to a correct understanding of Aristotle's action theory by explaining just how two of the key concepts which it involves are connected and by showing that, contrary to what a number of commentators have said, there are causal concepts. The concepts in question are those of deliberation and the so-called "practical syllogism.".
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  39. added 2019-06-05
    Prudence and Person-Stages.Kristie Miller - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):460-476.
    Persons care about their future selves. They reason about their future selves’ interests; they plan for their future selves’ happiness and they worry about their future selves’ suffering. This paper is interested in the interplay between diachronic prudential reason and certain accounts of the metaphysics of personal identity that fall under the broad umbrella ‘conventionalist’. Some conventionalists conclude that under certain conditions there are intractable decisions for there is no fact of the matter regarding whether a person-stage ought (prudentially) to (...)
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  40. added 2019-04-10
    Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities.Étienne Brown - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):571-590.
    Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately (...)
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  41. added 2019-03-20
    Causal Decision Theory and Decision Instability.Brad Armendt - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):263-277.
    The problem of the man who met death in Damascus appeared in the infancy of the theory of rational choice known as causal decision theory. A straightforward, unadorned version of causal decision theory is presented here and applied, along with Brian Skyrms’ deliberation dynamics, to Death in Damascus and similar problems. Decision instability is a fascinating topic, but not a source of difficulty for causal decision theory. Andy Egan’s purported counterexample to causal decision theory, Murder Lesion, is considered; a simple (...)
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  42. added 2019-03-20
    Deliberation and Pragmatic Belief.Brad Armendt - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    To what extent do our beliefs, and how strongly we hold them, depend upon how they matter to us, on what we take to be at stake on them? The idea that beliefs are sometimes stake-sensitive (Armendt 2008, 2013) is further explored here, with a focus on whether beliefs may be stake-sensitive and rational. In contexts of extended deliberation about what to do, beliefs and assessments of options interact. In some deliberations, a belief about what you will do may rationally (...)
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  43. added 2019-01-29
    Review of Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, by Jonathan Dancy. [REVIEW]Jonathan Way - forthcoming - Ethics.
  44. added 2018-12-06
    Even Worse Than It Seems.John Capps - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:113-124.
    Laurie Paul has recently proposed that transformative experiences are a distinct challenge to our ability to make rational decisions about our futures. In response, many have claimed that the situation is not as bad as it seems and that it is possible to rationally choose to undergo a transformative experience. Here I argue that the situation is actually worse because the current debate has so far only been framed in terms of comparing a transformative experience to the familiar status quo. (...)
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  45. added 2018-12-06
    Even Worse Than It Seems: Transformative Experience and the Selection Problem.John Capps - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:113-124.
    Laurie Paul has recently proposed that transformative experiences are a distinct challenge to our ability to make rational decisions about our futures. In response, many have claimed that the situation is not as bad as it seems and that it is possible to rationally choose to undergo a transformative experience. Here I argue that the situation is actually worse because the current debate has so far only been framed in terms of comparing a transformative experience to the familiar status quo. (...)
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  46. added 2018-12-03
    Just Solidarity: The Key to Fair Health Care Rationing.Leonard M. Fleck - 2015 - Diametros 43:44-54.
    I agree with Professor ter Meulen that there is no need to make a forced choice between “justice” and “solidarity” when it comes to determining what should count as fair access to needed health care. But he also asserts that solidarity is more fundamental than justice. That claim needs critical assessment. Ter Meulen recognizes that the concept of solidarity has been criticized for being excessively vague. He addresses this criticism by introducing the more precise notion of “humanitarian solidarity.” However, I (...)
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  47. added 2018-11-01
    Reasoning with Unconditional Intention.Jens Gillessen - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:177-201.
    Suppose that you intend to go to the theater. Are you therein intending the unconditional proposition that you go to the theater? That would seem to be deeply irrational; after all, you surely do not intend to go if, for instance, in the next instant an earthquake is going to devastate the city. What we intend we do not intend ‘no matter what,’ it is often said. But if so—how can anyone ever rationally intend simply to perform an action of (...)
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  48. added 2018-08-26
    How Do You Like Me Now?Gerald Hull - manuscript
    These reflections are an attempt to get to the heart of the "reason is the slave of the passions" debate. The whole point of deliberation is to arrive at a choice. What factors persons find to be choice-relevant is a purely empirical matter. This has significant consequences for the views of Hume, Williams, Nagel, Parfit and Korsgaard regarding practical reason.
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  49. added 2018-07-24
    On the Elusive Notion of Meta-Agreement.Valeria Ottonelli & Daniele Porello - 2013 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (1):68-92.
    Public deliberation has been defended as a rational and noncoercive way to overcome paradoxical results from democratic voting, by promoting consensus on the available alternatives on the political agenda. Some critics have argued that full consensus is too demanding and inimical to pluralism and have pointed out that single-peakedness, a much less stringent condition, is sufficient to overcome voting paradoxes. According to these accounts, deliberation can induce single-peakedness through the creation of a ‘meta-agreement’, that is, agreement on the dimension according (...)
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  50. added 2018-07-11
    Normative Und Motivierende Gründe. Ein Kommentar Zu Susanne Mantels Determined by Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (3):421-428.
    One of the central aims of Susanne Mantel’s book "Determined by Reasons" (2018) is to reject the idea that normative and motivating reasons can be identical. In her own words, Mantel denies the “Identity Thesis”, according to which “when an agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a motivating reason M of that agent such that M is identical with N” (Mantel 2018, 93). In this comment, I offer a simple argument for the Identity Thesis: (1) When an (...)
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