Deliberative Democracy

On many science-related policy questions, the public is unable to make informed decisions, because of its inability to make use of knowledge obtained by scientists. Philip Kitcher and James Fishkin have both suggested therefore that on certain science-related issues, public policy should not be decided on by actual democratic vote, but should instead conform to the public’s counterfactual informed democratic decision. Indeed, this suggestion underlies Kitcher’s specification of an ideal of a well-ordered science. This article argues that this suggestion misconstrues (...) the normative significance of CIDDs. At most, CIDDs might have epistemic significance, but no authority or legitimizing force. (shrink)

(Pre-publication draft November 2015: Partial content of "Introduction: The 2030 Agenda," Journal of Global Ethics 11:3 [December 2015], 262-270) This introduction briefly explains the process through which the Sustainable Development Goals have developed from their receipt in 2014 to their passage in September 2015 by the UN General Assembly, and it considers their development in prospect. The Millennium Development Goals, which spanned 1990-2015, present a case study that reveals the changeability of such long-term multilateral commitments. They were enmeshed in overlapping (...) and inconsistent national and intergovernmental commitments reaching from 1995 to 2005, and the text of those goals also evolved, stabilizing for the last time in 2007. The Sustainable Development Goals and attendant commitments should be expected to evolve similarly over their fifteen year run. This presents a concern, for among the three committees established by the UN to create the goals, the two committees charged with public consultation were retired as planned in 2014. The process evident thereafter has displayed a shift towards a strategy of enrolling broad public endorsement that leaves such consultation and specific responsibility to those consulted in doubt. This bodes ill for public deliberation on the goals and for public accountability as the agenda proceeds towards 2030. (shrink)

The chapter develops a taxonomy of views about the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. Prominent approaches to epistemic democracy, epistocracy, epistemic libertarianism, and pure proceduralism are examined through the lens of this taxonomy. The primary aim is to explore options for developing an account of the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. The chapter also argues that a number of recent attacks on democracy may not adequately register the availability of a minimal approach to the epistemic responsibilities (...) of citizens in a democracy. (shrink)

Governments are often so focused on short-term gains that they ignore the long term, thus creating extra unnecessary burdens on their citizens, and violating their responsibilities to future generations. What can be done about this? In this paper I propose a package of reforms to the ways in which policies are made by legislatures, and in which those policies are scrutinised, implemented and evaluated. The overarching aim is to enhance the accountability of the decision-making process in ways that take into (...) account the interests of persons in the future. (shrink)

In this essay I situate John Dewey’s pragmatist approach to democratic epistemology in relation to contemporary “epistemic democracy.” Like epistemic democrats, Dewey characterizes democracy as a form of social inquiry. But whereas epistemic democrats suggest that democracy aims to “track the truth,” Dewey rejects the notion of “tracking” or “corresponding” to truth in political and other domains. For Dewey, the measure of successful decision-making is not some fixed independent standard of truth or correctness but, instead, our own reflective satisfaction with (...) the practical results. I argue that this approach better reconciles epistemic democracy with traditional models of popular authority (“the will of the people”) and bolsters the defenses of the epistemic democrat against elitist alternatives. (shrink)

La tesis central de este trabajo es que la tradicional tensión entre substancia y procedimiento socava las estabilidad de la justificación de la concepción liberal más extendida de la legitimidad (la Democracia Deliberativa). Dicha concepciones enfrentan problemas serios a la hora de articular de manera consistente dos dimensiones que parecen ir naturalmente asociadas a la idea de legitimidad: la dimensión procedimental, vinculada a la equidad del procedimiento, y la dimensión epistémica, asociada a la corrección de los resultados. En este trabajo (...) sostengo que a) esa tensión surge de la adopción de una concepción epistemológica social de tipo "veritativo-consecuencialista; b) es posible manejar dicha tensión mediante el remplazo de la epistemología subyacente por una concepción epistemológica social de tipo procedimentalista de orientación pragmatista y c) dicha operación orienta el diseño institucional en una dirección experimentalista. (shrink)

We argue that deliberative decision-making that is inclusive, transparent and accountable can contribute to more trustworthy and legitimate decisions on difficult ethical questions and political trade-offs during the pandemic and beyond.

Online deliberation is one important instance of civic tech that is both for and by the citizens, through engaging citizens in Internet-supported deliberative discussions on public issues. This article explains the origins of a set of symposium articles in this journal issue based on the 2017 'International Conference on Deliberation and Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Civic Tech' held in Singapore. Symposium articles are presented in a sequence that flows from designing decision making systems to platforms to specific technological nudges.

In this chapter I argue that intellectual humility is related to argumentation in several distinct but mutually supporting ways. I begin by drawing connections between humility and two topics of long-standing importance to the evaluation of informal arguments: the ad verecundiam fallacy and the principle of charity. I then explore the more explicit role that humility plays in recent work on critical thinking dispositions, deliberative virtues, and virtue theories of argumentation.

Recently, Margaret Gilbert has argued that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom. In this article, I show that Gilbert’s “negative argument” fails to be convincing. On the other hand, there are important lessons, particularly for democratic theory, that can be by looking carefully, and critically, at her argument. This article will proceed as follows. First, I present Gilbert’s argument. Next, I criticize her understanding of freedom, and then, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize (...) her understanding of a wise society. Finally, I discuss how what has been said can inform how one should think about democratic theory. (shrink)

In this article, I identify some good-making features of a deliberative democratic theory. The article will proceed as follows: First, I present both some important insights and some shortcomings of Rawls’ theory. I then present Robert Talisse’s account, focusing on how Talisse both accommodates what is right about Rawls while avoiding some of Rawls’ weaknesses. Finally, some positive claims are made about what an adequate deliberative theory might look like.

The public sphere should be regulated so the distribution of political speech does not correlate with the distribution of income or wealth. A public sphere where people can fund any political speech from their private holdings is epistemically defective. The argument has four steps. First, if political speech is unregulated, the rich predictably contribute a disproportionate share. Second, wealth tends to correlate with substantive political perspectives. Third, greater quantities of speech by the rich can “drown out” the speech of the (...) poor, because of citizens’ limited attention span for politics. Finally, the normative problem with all this is that it reduces the diversity of arguments and evidence citizens become familiar with, reducing the quality of their political knowledge. The clearest implication of the argument is in favour of strict contribution limits and/or public funding for formal political campaigns, but it also has implications for more informal aspects of the public sphere. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the claim for pluralism commonly advanced in political philosophy as a claim concerning the standards, methods, and norms for forming belief and judgment about certain kinds of facts rather than the nature of facts themselves. After distinguishing between descriptive and normative epistemic pluralism, I contend that in this context, pluralism needs to rest on grounds that are stronger than fallibilism yet weaker than relativism in order to enjoy a distinct standing. The idea of reasonable pluralism (...) seems to devise a variety of normative pluralism designed to meet this demand. I argue, however, that this is an unstable position and suggest that an epistemic view of deliberation may be better suited to making sense of political justification. The latter view, though, is bound to dispense with normative pluralism. (shrink)

Inspired by impossibility theorems of social choice theory, many democratic theorists have argued that aggregative forms of democracy cannot lend full democratic justification for the collective decisions reached. Hence, democratic theorists have turned their attention to deliberative democracy, according to which “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen 1997a, 73). However, relatively little work has been done to offer a formal theory of democratic deliberation. This (...) article helps fill that gap by offering a formal theory of three different modes of democratic deliberation: myopic discussion, constructive discussion, and debate. We show that myopic discussion suffers from indeterminacy of long run outcomes, while constructive discussion and debate are conclusive. Finally, unlike the other two modes of deliberation, debate is path independent and converges to a unique compromise position, irrespective of the initial status quo. (shrink)

This chapter explores some features of pragmatic pluralism as an ethical perspective on climate change. It is inspired in part by Andrew Light’s work on climate diplomacy, and by Bryan Norton’s environmental pragmatism, while drawing more explicitly than Light or Norton from classical pragmatist sources such as John Dewey. The primary aim of the chapter is to characterize, differentiate, and advance a general pragmatist approach to climate ethics. The main line of argument is that we are suffering culturally from a (...) sort of “moral jetlag” due in part to “moral fundamentalist” habits, and that a critical focus on pragmatic pluralism—in moral theory generally and climate ethics particularly—would be salutary for our recovery if philosophers are to speak more effectively to “wicked problems” in a way that aids public deliberation and social learning. Moral fundamentalist habits, and the monistic one-way assumption that unintentionally—but not blamelessly—exercises and unduly reinforces them, are obstacles to fostering habits of moral and political inquiry better suited to dealing with predicaments rapidly transforming our warming planet. (shrink)

Although successive generations of digital technology have become increasingly powerful in the past 20 years, digital democracy has yet to realize its potential for deliberative transformation. The undemocratic exploitation of massive social media systems continued this trend, but it only worsened an existing problem of modern democracies, which were already struggling to develop deliberative infrastructure independent of digital technologies. There have been many creative conceptions of civic tech, but implementation has lagged behind innovation. This article argues for implementing one such (...) vision of digital democracy through the establishment of a public corporation. Modeled on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting in the United States, this entity would foster the creation of new digital technology by providing a stable source of funding to nonprofit technologists, interest groups, civic organizations, government, researchers, private companies, and the public. Funded entities would produce and maintain software infrastructure for public benefit. The concluding sections identify what circumstances might create and sustain such an entity. (shrink)

Epistemic justifications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different aspects of decision-making: voting and deliberation, or ‘votes’ and ‘talk.’ The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justification in terms votes, and the Hong-Page “Diversity Trumps Ability” result is appealed to as a justification in terms of deliberation. Both of these, however, are most plausibly construed as models of direct democracy, with full and direct participation across the population. In this paper, we explore how these results (...) hold up if we vary the model so as to reflect the more familiar democratic structure of a representative hierarchy. We first recount extant analytic work that shows that representation inevitably weakens the voting results of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, but we question the ability of that result to shine light on real representative systems. We then show that, when we move from votes to talk, as modeled in Hong-Page, representation holds its own and even has a slight edge. (shrink)

Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of “aiming at truth”. This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non-veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding. I claim that empathetic understanding is an (...) epistemic good that doesn’t have truth as its primary goal. (shrink)

In this essay, I address several questions and challenges brought about by the contributors to the special issue on my book Democracy without Shortcuts. In particular, I address some implications of my critique of deep pluralism; distinguish between three senses of ‘blind deference’: political, reflective, and informational; draw a critical parallelism between the populist conception of representation as embodiment and the conception of ‘citizen-representatives’ often ascribed to participants in deliberative minipublics; defend the democratic attractiveness of participatory uses over empowered uses (...) of deliberative minipublics; clarify why accepting public reason constraints does not imply limiting deliberation to questions about constitutional rights, and argue that overcoming a state-centric conception of democracy does not require replacing the ‘all subjected’ principle with the ‘all affected’ principle. (shrink)

In this essay, I address some questions and challenges brought about by the contributors to this special issue on my book ‘Democracy without Shortcuts’. First, I clarify different aspects of my cri...

Post-truth has become a commonplace strategy. No longer are objective facts viewed as having evidentiary value; scientific knowledge is on a par with emotions or personal beliefs. We intend to show that in the context of post-truth, those proffering and receiving an assertion do not care about the truth-value of the assertion or about the best way to gather evidence concerning it. Such attitudes raise several questions about how relativism can be a corrupting influence in contemporary democracies. We will analyse (...) Steve Fuller’s use of the term «post-truth» – especially, the political connotations about epistemic democracy that he highlights. Instead, we offer a pragmatist defence of the truth and an alternative meaning of epistemic democracy. (shrink)

Democratic institutions are appealing means of making publicly justified social choices. By allowing participation by all citizens, democracy can accommodate diversity among citizens, and by considering the perspectives of all, via ballots or debate, democratic results can approximate what the balance of reasons favors. I consider whether, and under what conditions, democratic institutions might reliably make publicly justified social decisions. I argue that conventional accounts of democracy, constituted by voting or deliberation, are unlikely to be effective public justification mechanisms. I (...) conclude that the limitations of conventional mechanisms can be ameliorated through the use of lotteries instead of elections. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone señalar algunas tareas posibles para la ética del discurso de Karl-Otto Apel en la actualidad. Tales tareas pueden concentrarse en la necesidad de una teoría de la institucionalización del discurso práctico, como forma de racionalidad práctica realizada socialmente. La pregunta que se ha de responder es qué condiciones marco debe cumplir el discurso para que pueda ser puesto en práctica y qué efectos político-institucionales puede producir en el contexto de instituciones realmente existentes. A partir de (...) Gehlen y de Luhmann -aunque en menor medida-, Apel interpreta a las instituciones como sistemas de autoafirmación que, por un lado, liberan a los sujetos de la carga de la acción, pero, por otro lado, limitan o condicionan la racionalidad práctica consensual-argumentativa propia del discurso. Las coerciones (Sachzwänge) funcionales de las instituciones configuran un campo de acción y un tipo de racionalidad que, de acuerdo con Apel, deberían estar bajo el control del discurso institucionalizado como esfera pública racional (Öffentlichkeit). La relación entre los criterios normativos ideales del discurso práctico institucionalizado y las instituciones realmente existentes debe interpretarse como una tensión o entrelazamiento dialéctico no superable. Si esta interpretación es correcta, la ética del discurso, en tanto teoría crítica de la sociedad, no puede ser entendida como una aplicación sin más de criterios normativos ideales a la realidad histórica o de adecuación de esa realidad a los criterios ideales en su sentido vertical, sino como de mutua correlación horizontal. (shrink)

美国和世界正处于人口过度增长的崩溃过程中,其中大多数在上个世纪,现在全部归功于第三世界人民。消耗资源,增加40亿人口,将崩溃工业文明,带来惊人的饥饿、疾病、暴力和战争。地球每年至少损失1%的表土,因此 ,当它接近2100年时,大部分粮食的生长能力将消失。数十亿将死去,核战争几乎可以肯定。在美国,由于大规模移民和移民再生产,加上民主带来的滥用,这大大加速了这一点。堕落的人性无情地把民主和多样性的梦想变 成了犯罪和贫穷的恶梦。只要中国坚持限制自私的独裁统治,中国将继续压倒美国和世界。崩溃的根本原因是我们与生俱来的心理无法适应现代世界,这导致人们把不相干的人当作他们共同的利益对待。人权观念是左派分子宣扬 的邪恶幻想,旨在转移人们对无节制的第三世界母性无情毁灭地球的注意力。再加上对基础生物学和心理学的无知,导致部分受过教育的控制民主社会的人产生社会工程错觉。很少有人明白,如果你帮助一个人,你伤害了别人— —没有免费的午餐,任何人消耗的每一件东西都会破坏无法修复的地球。因此,各地的社会政策是不可持续的,一个个、没有严格控制自私的社会将崩溃为无政府状态或独裁。最基本的事实几乎从未提及过,即美国或世界上没有 足够的资源来使相当一部分穷人摆脱贫困并使他们继续生活。这样做的企图正在使美国破产,毁灭世界。地球生产食物的能力每天都在下降,我们的遗传质量也是如此。现在,和往常一样,穷人最大的敌人是其他穷人,而不是富 人。如果不进行戏剧性和立即的变化,就不可能阻止美国或任何遵循民主制度的国家的崩溃。.

Che ne dite di una diversa ripercorrere i ricchi e i famosi? Prima l'ovvio: i romanzi di Harry Potter sono una superstizione primitiva che incoraggia i bambini a credere nella fantasia piuttosto che assumersi la responsabilità per il mondo, ovviamente. JKR è altrettanto all'oscuro di se stessa e del mondo come la maggior partedelle persone , macirca 200 volte più distruttivo come l'americano medio e circa 800 volte più di cinese medio. È stata responsabile della distruzione di forse 30.000 ettari (...) di foresta per produrre questi romanzi spazzatura e tutta l'erosione che ne deriva (non banale come'è almeno 6 e forse 12 tonnellate / anno suolo nell'oceano per tutti sulla terra o forse 100 tonnellate per americano, e così circa 5000 tonnellate / anno per i libri e mov ies Rowlinge isuoi 3 bambini). La terra perde almeno l'1% del suo suolo superiore ogni anno, così come si avvicina a 2100, la maggior parte della sua capacità di coltivazione alimentare sarà andato. Poi c'è l'enorme quantità di carburante bruciato e rifiuti fatti per fare e distribuire i libri e film, bambole di plastica, ecc. Dimostra la sua mancanza di responsabilità sociale producendo figli piuttosto che usare i suoi milioni per incoraggiare la pianificazione familiare o acquistare la foresta pluviale, e promuovendo la tradizionale stupidità liberale della terza supremazia mondiale che sta distruggendo la Gran Bretagna, l'America, il mondo e il futuro del suo discendente. Certo, non è poi così diversa dalle altre 7. 8 miliardi all'oscuro - solo più rumoroso e più distruttivo. È il problema nessun pranzo gratuito scritto grande. La folla proprio non può vedere che non esiste una cosa come aiutare una persona senza danneggiare gli altri. I diritti o i privilegi concessi ai nuovi operatori in un mondo sovraffollato non possono chedim inish quelli degli altri. Nonostante i massicci disastri ecologici che accadono di fronte a loro ovunque ogni giorno, non possono fissarli alla maternità sfrenata del "diverso", che rappresenta la maggior parte dell'aumento della popolazione del secolo scorso e tutto questo in questo. Non hanno una combinazione di intelligenza, istruzione, esperienza e sanità mentale necessarie per estrapolare gli assalti quotidiani alle risorse e al funzionamento della società fino all'eventuale collasso della civiltà industriale. Ogni pasto, ogni viaggio in auto o in autobus, ogni paio di scarpe è un altro chiodo nella bara della terra. Probabilmente non ha mai attraversato la sua mente che un sedile su un aereo da Londra a San Francisco produce circa una tonnellata di carbonio che si scioglie circa 3 metri quadrati di ghiaccio marino e come una delle overprivileged che ha probabilmente volato centinaia di tali voli. Non solo i ricchi e famosi, ma quasi tutti i personaggi pubblici, compresi praticamente tutti gli insegnanti, sono spinti ad essere politicamente corretti, che nelle democrazie occidentali, ora significa socialdemocratico(neomarxista, cioè comunisti diluiti) terzo suprematisti del mondo che lavorano per la distruzione delle loro società e dei loro discendenti. Così, coloro la cui mancanzadiistruzione, esperienza, intelligenza (e buon senso di base), che dovrebbe proibire loro di fare qualsiasi dichiarazione pubblica a tutti, dominano totalmente tutti i media, creando l'impressione che l'intelligente e civile deve favorire la democrazia, la diversità e l'uguaglianza, mentre la verità è che questi sono i problemi e non le soluzioni, e che essi stessi sono i primi nemici della civiltà. Vedere il mio suicidio per democrazia 2nd ed (2019). (shrink)

Democratic theorists have proposed a number of competing justifications for democratic order, but no theory has achieved a consensus. While expecting consensus may be unrealistic, I nonetheless contend that we can make progress in justifying democratic order by applying competing democratic theories to different stages of the democratic process. In particular, I argue that the selection of political officials should be governed in accord with aggregative democracy. This process should prize widespread participation, political equality, and proper preference aggregation. I then (...) argue that the selection of public policies by political officials should be governed in accord with deliberative democracy. This process should prize high quality deliberation and political equality. A process democracy is a democracy that joins an aggregative process for selecting officials with a deliberative process for selecting policies. Democracy is justified and legitimate when it is structured in this way. (shrink)

Im vorliegenden Essay werde ich den von Jürgen Habermas entwickelten Ansatz einer diskursiven Rechtfertigung des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats diskutieren. Meine zentrale These lautet, dass Habermas’ Diskurstheorie trotz ihrer Vorzüge einem fundamentalen Einwand ausgesetzt ist: So kann es nicht gelingen, seine anspruchsvolle Rechtfertigungstheorie rationaler Diskurse rein prozeduralistisch zu operationalisieren. Damit meine ich, dass es ein System von Rechten, das allgemeine und gleiche Teilhabe am Begründungsverfahren nicht bloß formal erlaubt, sondern wirksam garantiert, grundsätzlich nicht geben kann. Daraus folgt, dass reine (...) Verfahrensgerechtigkeit kein normativ befriedigendes Kriterium abgibt, um positives Recht zu legitimieren. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass Habermas’ Prozeduralismus vielmehr in das Dilemma mündet, sich entweder (i) substanziellen Prinzipien öffnen zu müssen, die seinen radikal-demokratischen Ansatz unterlaufen oder (ii) (gegebenenfalls) Rechtsnormen als legitim anzuerkennen, die keine allgemeine Zustimmung verdienen. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea of robust discursive equality on which respect-based conceptions of justificatory reciprocity often draw. I distinguish between formal and substantive discursive equality and argue that if justificatory reciprocity requires that people be accorded formally equal discursive standing, robust discursive equality should not be construed as requiring standing that is equal substantively, or in terms of its discursive purchase. Still, robust discursive equality is purchase sensitive: it does not obtain when discursive standing is impermissibly unequal in purchase. (...) I then showcase different candidate conceptions of purchase justice, and draw conclusions about the substantive commitments of justificatory reciprocity. (shrink)

The traditional blackface character Black Pete has been at the center of an intense controversy in the Netherlands, with most black citizens denouncing the tradition as racist and most white citizens endorsing it as harmless fun. I analyze the controversy as an utter failure, on the part of white citizens, of what Alison Jaggar has called multicultural literacy. This article aims to identify both the causes of this failure of multicultural literacy and the conditions required for multicultural literacy to be (...) possible. I argue that this failure of multicultural literacy is due to hermeneutical injustice and to white ignorance. I close by considering possible avenues for fostering multicultural literacy. (shrink)

L’objection la plus ancienne et la plus redoutable à la démocratie fait valoir que le gouvernement par le peuple dessert le gouvernement pour le peuple. Les citoyens manquant pour la plupart de sagesse ou de compétence, le bien commun serait mieux assuré en confiant le pouvoir à un individu éclairé ou à une élite experte. Une réponse commune à cette objection concède la prémisse mais affirme la priorité au gouvernement par le peuple sur le gouvernement pour le peuple : le (...) droit égal à la participation devrait l’emporter sur la promotion de la compétence, même si celle-ci est requise par le bon gouvernement. La démocratie se trouve alors réduite à un ensemble de procédures équitables, traitant les citoyens en égaux ; elle ne se définit plus par la poursuite du bien commun. Il est toutefois une autre réponse à l’objection, qui évite cette dérive vers un procéduralisme étroit. Elle consiste à nier la prémisse et à affirmer la sagesse politique du peuple. Il n’est pas vrai que le gouvernement pour le peuple serait mieux assuré en confiant le pouvoir à un petit nombre de sages ou d’experts, fussent-ils les meilleurs parmi les citoyens. Cette thèse remarquable peut paraître improbable. Sa défense peut pourtant s’appuyer sur l’un des arguments les plus intrigants élaborés par la philosophie politique aristotélicienne, qui inspire et éclaire les controverses philosophiques contemporaines sur la valeur du régime démocratique : l’argument de la sagesse de la multitude. (shrink)

L’idéal démocratique est accusé d’être irréaliste. Le gouvernement du peuple par le peuple et pour le peuple serait une chimère dans les sociétés contemporaines. Il faudrait lui préférer les visées plus modestes associées à l’élection : un droit de vote égal et la satisfaction du plus grand nombre. La démocratie ne se laisse pourtant pas réduire à la compétition électorale. Les acteurs et les institutions politiques qui s’en réclament invoquent non seulement un marché, où rivalisent des intérêts privés, mais un (...) forum, où s’affrontent des visions adverses de la justice. Ils attendent de la délibération collective qu’elle serve l’autonomie politique et le bien commun, mais savent aussi qu’elle peut les menacer, lorsque la liberté, l’égalité ou la publicité lui font défaut. Cette enquête philosophique interroge la pertinence de l’idéal démocratique pour des sociétés complexes, dotées d’institutions représentatives et soumises à la communication de masse. Elle montre à quelles conditions cet idéal peut aujourd’hui orienter la critique et l’action. Les citoyens peuvent encore aspirer à se gouverner eux-mêmes, donc à délibérer en égaux. -/- The democratic ideal is accused of being unrealistic. Government of the people by the people and for the people would be a chimera in contemporary societies. The more modest aims associated with election should be preferred: equal suffrage and the satisfaction of the greatest number. But democracy cannot be reduced to electoral competition. The political actors and institutions that claim it invoke not only a market, where private interests compete, but also a forum, where opposing visions of justice confront each other. They expect collective deliberation to serve political autonomy and the common good, but they also know that it can threaten them when it lacks freedom, equality or publicity. This philosophical inquiry questions the relevance of the democratic ideal for complex societies with representative institutions and subject to mass communication. It shows under what conditions a deliberative understanding of this ideal can today orient criticism and action. Citizens can still aspire to govern themselves, hence to deliberate as equals. (shrink)

Les nouveaux médias représentent-ils une menace ou un progrès pour la presse en régime démocratique ? À partir d’une analyse du rôle politique de la presse, qui contribue au droit de chacun à gouverner, Charles Girard s’interroge sur le renouvellement du métier de journaliste et sur les modes de délibération démocratique.

In this chapter, I consider the kinds of validity claims used in moral discourse—that is, what kinds of reasons we can offer when we are discussing what we ought to do in situations of disagreement and conflict. I suggest that the ones that are typically used in Western society, or that match our common sense in terms of the kinds of activities we undertake in discourse—claims about facts in the world, claims about what is normatively appropriate, and claims about the (...) honesty of self-expressions—do not encompass the full range of possible validity claims available to us in principle or, in fact, those claims used in practice in societies other than Western ones. In particular, I suggest that some indigenous societies utilize at least one kind of validity claim that is not captured in this set, a claim that I call “ecological truth.”. (shrink)

How should civil society deal with radical actors such as populists? Should democrats engage in an open dialogue or avoid confrontation? Should they listen to them, let them speak and try to expose them argumentatively, or should they deny them any kind of public platform? Rather than providing a normative answer to these questions, this article analyzes and systematizes responses that are already circulating in public discourse. In particular, we focus on reactions to the invitations of the AfD politicians Alice (...) Weidel and Marc Jongen to the Oxford Union (2018), the Zurich Theater Gessnerallee as well as the Hannah Arendt Center in New York (both 2017). We will show that the debates gave excessive weight to fundamental questions of democratic theory while marginalizing the specific context factors of the events. Because of this, the populists eventually gained the moral victory. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to show some of the assumptions that lie behind transhumanism. The concept of enhancement is analyzed. While, from transhumanism, human welfare depends on the enhancement of human capabilities, here it shall be argued that to begin with, a social debate over what is considered welfare is needed before we can establish what we wish to improve (enhance). This reflection must emphasize the necessity to reflect, ex ante, on what kind of technological development we want, (...) viewing technology as a means to attain the agreed-upon type of welfare, rather than a goal in itself. On the basis of a socially open debate with an anticipatory perspective, society as a whole can establish which risks it is willing to take. (shrink)

This essay presents a novel approach to specifying the meaning of the concept of populism, on the political position it occupies and on the nature of populism. Employing analytic techniques of concept clarification and recent analytic ideology critique, it develops populism as a political kind in three steps. First, it descriptively specifies the stereotype of populist platforms as identified in extant research and thereby delimits the peculiar political position populism occupies in representative democracies as neither inclusionary nor fascist. Second, it (...) specifies on this basis analytically–normatively the particular stance towards liberal representative democracy that unifies populism’s political position and explains how populist politics can be compelling for democratic citizens. The normative core turns out to require no more than two general principles of legitimizing political authority by elections. Surprisingly, it does not need a separate anti-pluralist or exclusionary commitment: it entails it. Third, this normative model allows a response to a contested question in the theoretical discussion, namely, whether populism can be democracy-enhancing. The article defends the negative answer in virtue of the normative core alone and does so as much vis-à-vis a minimal as vis-à-vis a normatively ambitious conception of democracy. The reconstruction of the normative core of populist ideology enables a novel argument to show that populism is incompatible with the continued democratic legitimation of political authority even in the normatively most austere conception of ‘electoral democracy’, not just with ‘liberal democracy’. Assuming a normatively more ambitious concept of democratic legitimation in terms of political autonomy, the model also produces an extremely direct argument showing that populists cannot fulfil their promise of ‘taking back control’ over political decision-making to the population. (shrink)

This introduction presents the articles contained in this special issue of Philosophy and Social Criticism on the topic of populism. It does so by placing them in the field of discussions that the standard conception of populism as ‘illliberal democracy’ has stimulated in many areas of the populism-research that was produced in response to the recent increase in populist governments in established constitutional democracies world-wide. Following the methodological canon of studies in the field, it presents the individual contributions roughly in (...) three segments according to leading questions they focus on. In each segment, the introduction attempts to indicate the degree to which the articles depart and provide reasons for departing from the initial standard conception and thereby point to new relevant directions for further work. The first segment consists of essays that take on the definitional and empirical question of what and where populism is, and which varieties of it there are. The second segment presents new work focusing on the diagnostic question of what conditions and institutional conditions enable contemporary populism in established liberal constitutional representative democracies. They thus also aim at explaining or at least providing insight into the structures on the supply side that make populism popular as an `outsider option'. The third and largest segment comprises essays that present various approaches to answering the therapeutic question what democratic political systems and societies can do to confront, absorb or internalize the lessons from populist challenges. (shrink)

In this article I discuss the advantages of a theory of political representation for a prag- matist theory of (global) democracy. I first outline Dewey’s disregard for political rep- resentation by analyzing the political, epistemological and aesthetic underpinnings of his criticism of the Enlightenment ideal of democracy and its trust in the power of the detached gaze. I then show that a theory of political representation is not only com- patible with a pragmatist Deweyan-pragmatist perspective on democratic politics but also (...) that Dewey’s concept of “publics”, if applied to contemporary circumstances of globalized politics, requires such a theory. I suggest a pragmatic theory of political rep- resentation that combines elements of Dewey’s aesthetics, particularly his own theory of vision, with Michael Saward’s conception of representative claim-making into the notion of aesthetic democratic representation. (shrink)

State Medicaid programs have proposed closed formularies to limit spending on drugs. Closed formularies can be justified when they enable spending on other socially valuable aims. However, it is still necessary to justify guidelines informing formulary design, which can be done through a process of decision making that includes the public. This article examines criticisms that Medicaid closed formularies limit deliberation about decisions that affect drug access and unfairly disadvantage poor patients. Although unfairness to poor patients is a risk, it (...) is not a problem unique to Medicaid, since private insurance programs have also implemented closed formularies. (shrink)

This paper explores the political campaigning strategies of Lynton Crosby, and argues that they pose a threat to democracy. In doing so, I looks to shed light on Crosby’s tactics, but also to elucidate exactly what is anti-democratic about them. I argue that there are two worrying aspects to this. The first involves Crosby’s lack of respect for voters’ beliefs, interests and values, whereas the second concerns his propensity for avoiding debate.

In Democracy and Tradition, Jeffrey Stout asks Christian political theologians if they can discern God's activity in modern democratic cultures. In so doing they might "acknowledge the sovereignty of God while transcending both resentment of, and absorption into, the secular." As Stout recognizes, the question of sovereignty is relevant not only to Christian, but also Jewish and Islamic thought. However, interreligious comparisons remain undeveloped in his work. In response, the following essay coordinates Stout’s pragmatism with developments in comparative theology. It (...) then evaluates both the Jewish messianism of Gershom Scholem alongside Islamic sovereignty (hakimayyah) in the thought of Sayyid Qutb. While their viewpoints differ in considerable respects, they nonetheless provide key test cases for Stout’s questions concerning divine sovereignty. In sum, the paper opens new avenues for religious deliberations in democratic traditions. (shrink)

I argue that reliance on political testimony conflicts with two democratic values: the value of mutual justifiability and the value of equality of opportunity for political influence. Reliance on political testimony is characterized by a reliance on the assertions of others directly on a political question the citizen is asked to answer as part of a formal democratic decision procedure. Reliance on expert testimony generally, even in the context of political decision-making, does not similarly conflict with democratic values. As a (...) consequence of the argument, citizens have a pro tanto reason to rely on their own political judgment when determining their vote, and democratic societies have a reason to only ask citizens questions they are able to answer without reliance on political testimony. (shrink)