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Summary As paradigmatic symptoms of madness, delusions come in various forms and with diverse contents. The poster child of the current literature is the Capgras delusion: the patient may say with certainty that someone they are familiar with, such as their partner, is replaced by an imposter. Philosophical discussion of delusions tends to revolve around three groups of questions: (1) what are delusions? Are delusions beliefs or some other kinds of mental states? Suppose they are beliefs, what distinguish them from other forms of beliefs?; (2) How can we understand or explain the formation and maintenance of delusions? Where are the contents of delusions from? Why do patients adopt them in the first place? Why do patients not reject their delusions in light of counterevidence?; (3) How should we understand the relationship between patients’ delusions and their other mental states and actions? And what are the implications for our understanding of patients' rationality, agency, moral standing, legal status, and so on? 
Key works At the centre of the literature is the question of how we can understand or explain the formation and maintenance of delusions. The most influential account is the two-factor theory, according to which two distinct factors, i.e. departures from normality, are needed to explain a delusion. Factor 1 may be the patient’s anomalous experience that explains the content of the delusion, and Factor 2 may be some impairment of the patient’s hypothesis evaluation system that explains the adoption and maintenance of the delusion (Coltheart & Davies 2021Davies & Egan 2013Aimola Davies & Davies 2009Davies et al 2001). Other accounts include the one-factor theory (Maher 1988; Noordhof & Sullivan-Bissett 2021; for critique, see Nie 2023), the predictive processing theory (Corlett et al 2016; for critique, see Parrott 2021), the phenomenological theory (Sass & Pienkos 2013; Feyaerts et al 2021), the cognitive-bias theory (Ward & Garety 2019), the imagining theory (Currie 2000), and the social theory (Bell et al 2021).

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  1. Bayesian Psychiatry and the Social Focus of Delusions.Daniel Williams & Marcella Montagnese - manuscript
    A large and growing body of research in computational psychiatry draws on Bayesian modelling to illuminate the dysfunctions and aberrations that underlie psychiatric disorders. After identifying the chief attractions of this research programme, we argue that its typical focus on abstract, domain-general inferential processes is likely to obscure many of the distinctive ways in which the human mind can break down and malfunction. We illustrate this by appeal to psychosis and the social phenomenology of delusions.
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  2. Delusions and Imagination.Philip R. Corlett - forthcoming - PsyArXiv.
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  3. Illusion, delusion, and neural sense data: comments on Adam Pautz’s Perception.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This commentary on Adam Pautz's excellent book, Perception, explores the consequences of “spatial illusionism,” the view that the spatial properties presented in experience aren't instantiated in the extra-mental world. First, I consider whether spatial illusionism entails that our ordinary beliefs about the physical world are mostly false. I then argue that spatial illusionism threatens to undermine two arguments Pautz's defends in Perception: his argument that sense data theory is incompatible with physicalism, and his central argument against the internal physical state (...)
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  4. Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - forthcoming - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.
    Introduction: Cotard delusion—the delusional belief “I am dead”—is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard (1880, 1882). Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998) proposed that the idea “I am dead” comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if “I am dead” were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world. Methods: We scrutinised the literature on people who (...)
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  5. Anosognosia for Motor Impairments as a Delusion: Anomalies of Experience and Belief Evaluation.Martin Davies, Caitlin L. McGill & Anne M. Aimola Davies - forthcoming - In A. L. Mishara, P. R. Corlett, P. C. Fletcher, A. Kranjec & M. A. Schwartz (eds.), Phenomenological Neuropsychiatry: How Patient Experience Bridges Clinic with Clinical Neuroscience. Springer.
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  6. Delusions and the Predictive Mind.Bongiorno Federico & Corlett Philip R. - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a Bayesian predictive processing framework to account for the formation of delusions. The key here is that delusions form because of disrupted prediction error signalling. Parrott’s recent critique argues that the framework is incomplete in two respects: it leaves unclear why delusional hypotheses are selected over none at all or over more plausible alternatives; it leaves unclear how exactly it is that delusional hypotheses are (...)
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  7. Delusion and evidence.Carolina Flores - forthcoming - In Ema Sullivan Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
    Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...)
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  8. Belief updating in subclinical and clinical delusions.Sophie Fromm, Teresa Katthagen, Lorenz Deserno, Andreas Heinz, Jakob Kaminski & Florian Schlagenhauf - forthcoming - Schizophrenia Bulletin Open.
    Current frameworks propose that delusions result from aberrant belief updating due to altered prediction error (PE) signaling and misestimation of environmental volatility. We aimed to investigate whether behavioral and neural signatures of belief updating are specifically related to the presence of delusions or generally associated with manifest schizophrenia.Our cross-sectional design includes human participants (nfemale/male=6625/41), stratified into four groups: healthy participants with minimal (n=22) or strong delusional-like ideation (n=18), and participants with diagnosed schizophrenia with minimal (n=13) or strong delusions (n=13), resulting (...)
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  9. Delusions in Anorexia Nervosa.Stephen Gadsby - forthcoming - In Ema Sullivan Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
    Anorexia nervosa involves seemingly irrational beliefs about body size and the value of thinness. Historically, researchers and clinicians have avoided referring to such beliefs as delusions, instead opting for the label ‘overvalued ideas’. I discuss the relationship between the beliefs associated with anorexia nervosa and the distinction between delusions and overvalued ideas, as it is conceived in both European and American psychiatric traditions. In doing so, I question the benefit of applying the concepts of delusion and overvalued idea to anorexia (...)
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  10. Religious delusion or religious belief?Richard Gipps & Simon Clarke - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    How shall we distinguish religious delusion from sane religious belief? Making this determination is not usually found to be difficult in clinical practice – but what shall be our theoretical rationale? Attempts to answer this question often try to provide differentiating principles by which the religious “sheep” may be separated from the delusional “goats.” As we shall see, none of these attempts work. We may, however, ask whether the assumption underlying the search for a differentiating principle – that religious beliefs (...)
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  11. The meaning in grandiose delusions: measure development and cohort studies in clinical psychosis and non-clinical general population groups in the UK and Ireland.Louise Isham, Bao Sheng Loe, Alice Hicks, Natalie Wilson, Jessica Bird, Bentall C., P. Richard & Daniel Freeman - forthcoming - The Lancet Psychiatry.
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  12. Delusion and Reason.G. Jensen - forthcoming - Schizophrenia Bulletin.
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  13. Aberrant memory and delusional ideation: A pernicious partnership?William N. Koller & Tyrone D. Cannon - forthcoming - Clinical Psychology Review.
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  14. Lying by Asserting What You Believe is True: A Case of Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    In this paper, I argue (1) that the contents of some delusions are believed with sufficient confidence; (2) that a delusional subject could have a conscious belief in the content of his delusion (p), and concurrently judge a contradictory content (not-p) – his delusion could be transparent (Krstić 2020), and (3) that the existence of even one such case reveals a problem with pretty much all existing accounts of lying, since it suggests that one can lie by asserting what one (...)
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  15. Are delusions adaptive? An empirical and philosophical study on delusions in OCD.Eugenia Lancellotta - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Delusions are usually depicted in one of two contrasting ways. They are either characterized as harmful and dysfunctional beliefs or as fostering engagement with the environment and sometimes even psychological wellbeing in the face of psychological or biological difficulties – something which, according to some accounts, would make them biologically adaptive. It is this “adaptive hypothesis” that I focus on in this paper, by empirically investigating the adaptiveness of delusions in a sample of people suffering from OCD. The paper shows (...)
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  16. How the Cognitive Science of Belief Can Transform the Study of Mental Health.Eric Mandelbaum & Nicolas Porot - forthcoming - JAMA Psychiatry.
    The cognitive science of belief is a burgeoning field, with insights ranging from detailing the fundamental structure of the mind, to explaining the spread of fake news. Here we highlight how new insights into belief acquisition, storage, and change can transform our understanding of psychiatric disorders. Although we focus on monothematic delusions, the conclusions apply more broadly. -/- .
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  17. Delusions as Epistemic Hypervigilance.Ryan McKay & Hugo Mercier - forthcoming - Current Directions in Psychological Science.
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  18. Cotard’s Delusion From Subacute Encephalopathy With Seizures in Alcoholism.Mario F. Mendez - forthcoming - Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences.
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  19. Statistical shape analysis of corpus callosum in delusional disorder.Mustafa Nuray Namli, Sema Baykara, Murat Baykara & Yasin Hasan Balcioglu - forthcoming - Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging:111695.
    ABSTRACT Neurobiological foundations of delusional disorder (DD) have been studied less with neuroimaging techniques when compared to other psychotic disorders. The present study aimed to delineate the neural substrates of DD by investigating neuroanatomical characteristics of the corpus callosum (CC) with statistical shape analysis (SSA) conducted on magnetic resonance images (MRI). Twenty (female:male=1:1) DSM-5 DD patients and 20 age- and gender-matched healthy individuals were included. High-resolution 3D T1 Turbo Field Echo MRI images were scanned with a 1.5 T MR device. (...)
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  20. Akratic Beliefs and Seemings.Chenwei Nie - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    How does it come about that a person akratically believes that P, while at the same time believing that the available evidence speaks against that P? Among the current accounts, Scanlon offers an intuitive suggestion that one’s seeming experience that P may play an important role in the aetiology of their akratic belief that P. However, it turns out to be quite challenging to articulate what the role of seeming experience is. This paper will offer a novel development of Scanlon’s (...)
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  21. Delusional Perception Revisited.Kasper Møller Nielsen, Julie Nordgaard & Mads Gram Henriksen - forthcoming - Psychopathology.
    Delusional perception designates a sudden, idiosyncratic, and often self-referential delusion triggered by a neutral perceptual content. In classical psychopathology, delusional perception was considered almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. Since delusional perception has been erased from ICD-11 and always been absent in DSM, it risks slipping out of clinical awareness. In this article, we explore the clinical roots of delusional perception, elucidate the psychopathological phenomenon, and discuss its two predominant conceptualizations, i.e., Schneider’s well-known two-link model and Matussek’s lesser known one-link model. The (...)
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  22. Delusions and Everyday Life.Lucy O'Brien & Douglas Lavin - forthcoming - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter aims to get away from the ‘psychological attitude’ approach framing current philosophical discussion of delusion. We ask not what kind of attitude a delusion is – a belief or an imagination? Something else? – as if it were already clear what the ‘content’ of a delusion could be. We aim instead to shift attention to the question of the ‘object’ of delusions. What is delusion of? What is the object of this form of thinking? This focus on a (...)
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  23. Rationalism.Jakob Ohlhorst - forthcoming - In Ema Sullivan Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
    This chapter introduces the rationalist model of delusions. It begins by presenting John Campbell’s seminal proposal that delusions are caused top-down by pathological Wittgensteinian framework or hinge beliefs. After presenting Campbell’s rationalist account of delusions, the chapter raises and examines prominent objections by Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie as well as by Tim Thornton. The former make an important distinction between the aetiological top-down cognitive part and the epistemological rationalist framework part of Campbell’s account. The thesis that delusions are caused (...)
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  24. Delusion and Double Bookkeeping.José Eduardo Porcher - forthcoming - In Ema Sullivan Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
    This chapter connects the phenomenon of double bookkeeping to two critical debates in the philosophy of delusion: one from the analytic tradition and one from the phenomenological tradition. First, I will show how the failure of action guidance on the part of some delusions suggests an argument to the standard view that delusions are beliefs (doxasticism about delusion) and how its proponents have countered it by ascribing behavioral inertia to avolition, emotional disturbances, or a failure of the surrounding environment in (...)
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  25. Reasoning biases, behavior, and computation in delusions: shared and unique variance.Julia Sheffield, Ryan Smith, Praveen Suthaharan, Pantelis Leptourgos & Philip R. Corlett - forthcoming - PsyArXiv.
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  26. Hippocampal dysfunction underlies delusions of control in schizophrenia.Herman V. Szymanski - forthcoming - Medical Hypotheses.
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  27. Delusions and Hallucinations are Associated with Greater Severity of Delirium.Paula Trzepacz, Franco T., Meagher José G., Kishi David, Sepúlveda Yasuhiro, Gaviria Esteban, M. Ana, Chun-Hsin Chen, Ming-Chyi Huang, Leticia Furlanetto, Negreiros M., Lee Daniel, Kim Yanghyun, Kean Jeong-Lan & Jacob - forthcoming - Journal of the Academy of Consultation-Liaison Psychiatry.
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  28. Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.
    Philosophy is witnessing an “Agential Turn,” characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts, and of subjects as their agents. We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency––agentialism about doxastic responsibility, agentialism about doxastic self‐knowledge, and an agentialist explanation of the delusion of thought insertion: agentialists either commit themselves to implausibly strong claims about the kind of agency involved in the relevant phenomena, or make (...)
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  29. Revisiting Maher’s One-Factor Theory of Delusion, Again.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2024 - Neuroethics 17 (1):1-8.
    Chenwei Nie ([22]) argues against a Maherian one-factor approach to explaining delusion. We argue that his objections fail. They are largely based on a mistaken understanding of the approach (as committed to the claim that anomalous experience is sufficient for delusion). Where they are not so based, they instead rest on misinterpretation of recent defences of the position, and an underestimation of the resources available to the one-factor theory.
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  30. Drug-induced delusion: A comprehensive overview of the WHO pharmacovigilance database.A. Balcerac, A. Baldacci, A. Romier, S. Annette, B. Lemarchand, K. Bihan & H. Bottemanne - 2023 - Psychiatry Research 327:115365.
    INTRODUCTION: A number of prescribed medicines have been reported in cases of drug-induced delusion, such as dopaminergic agents or psychostimulants. But to this day, most studies are based on a limited number of cases and focus on a few drug classes, so a clear overview of this topic remains difficult. To address this issue, we provide in this article a comprehensive analysis of drug-induced delusion, based on the World Health Organization (WHO) pharmacovigilance database. METHODS: We performed a disproportionality analysis of (...)
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  31. The Epistemic Innocence of Elaborated Delusions Re-Examined.Maja Biał ek - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-26.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to re-examine the epistemic status of elaborated delusions. Bortolotti (2016, 2020) claims that they can be epistemically innocent. However, I will show that this type of delusions is more unique than suggested by the existing analyses of their epistemic status. They typically cause more profound harms than other kinds of delusions, and in most cases, it would be counterproductive to classify them as epistemically beneficial or innocent. I will employ predictive (...)
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  32. When my heart says so..." hope as delusion in Schopenhauer's philosophy.Marie-Michèle Blondin - 2023 - In Katerina Mihaylova & Anna Ezekiel (eds.), Hope and the Kantian Legacy: New Contributions to the History of Optimism. London, Vereinigtes Königreich: Bloomsbury Academic.
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  33. Why Delusions Matter.Lisa Bortolotti - 2023 - Bloomsbury Publishing.
    When we talk about delusions we may refer to symptoms of mental health problems, such as clinical delusions in schizophrenia, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are implausible and resistant to counterevidence; these can include anything from beliefs about the benefits of homeopathy to concerns about the threat of alien abduction. Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really are (...)
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  34. Monothematic Delusions and the Limits of Rationality.Adam Bradley & Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (3):811-835.
    Monothematic delusions are delusions whose contents pertain to a single subject matter. Examples include Capgras delusion, the delusion that a loved one has been replaced by an impostor, and Cotard delusion, the delusion that one is dead or does not exist. Two-factor accounts of such delusions hold that they are the result of both an experiential deficit, for instance flattened affect, coupled with an aberrant cognitive response to that deficit. In this paper we develop a new expressivist two-factor account of (...)
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  35. Decoding Delusions: A Clinician’s Guide to Working with Delusions and Other Extreme Beliefs.V. Hardy Clinical Director Kate, Hardy C. & Turkington D. K. V. - 2023 - American Psychiatric Association Publishing.
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  36. Delusions and the dilemmas of life: A systematic review and meta-analyses of the global literature on the prevalence of delusional themes in clinical groups.Sophie Collin, Georgina Rowse, Anton Martinez, Bentall P. & P. Richard - 2023 - Clinical Psychology Review 104.
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  37. The two-factor theory of delusion.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2023 - In E. Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge.
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  38. Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. E. Sullivan-Bissett (ed.) - 2023 - Routledge.
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  39. The Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives.A. Falcato & J. Gon\C. Calves - 2023 - Routledge.
    This book presents new philosophical work on delusions and their impact on everyday human behavior. It explores a cluster of related topics at the intersection of philosophy of mind and psychiatry, while also charting the historical development of work on delusions. Within psychiatry, there are several disputes about the nature and origin of delusions. Whereas some authors see only an abnormal phenomenon that needs to be treated by psychological or pharmacological means, others hold that delusions can be psychologically adaptive and (...)
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  40. What’s the Linguistic Meaning of Delusional Utterances? Speech Act Theory as a Tool for Understanding Delusions.Julian Hofmann, Pablo Hubacher Haerle & Anke Https://Orcidorg Maatz - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (7):1–21.
    Delusions have traditionally been considered the hallmark of mental illness, and their conception, diagnosis and treatment raise many of the fundamental conceptual and practical questions of psychopathology. One of these fundamental questions is whether delusions are understandable. In this paper, we propose to consider the question of understandability of delusions from a philosophy of language perspective. For this purpose, we frame the question of how delusions can be understood as a question about the meaning of delusional utterances. Accordingly, we ask: (...)
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  41. Reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population: A longitudinal study.S. A. K. Kuhn, C. Andreou, G. Elbel, R. Lieb & T. Zander-Schellenberg - 2023 - Schizophrenia Research 255:132–139.
    BACKGROUND: Reasoning biases have been suggested as risk factors for delusional ideation in both patients and non-clinical individuals. Still, it is unclear how these biases are longitudinally related to delusions in the general population. We hence aimed to investigate longitudinal associations between reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population. METHODS: We conducted an online cohort study with 1184 adults from the German and Swiss general population. Participants completed measures on reasoning biases (jumping-to-conclusion bias JTC, liberal acceptance bias LA, (...)
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  42. On the concept of delusions: Global trends and psychopathology in Japan.Tsutomu Kumazaki - 2023 - Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences Reports 2 (3).
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  43. Inferentialism and social delusion.Kamil Lemanek - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):535-547.
    This work sets out to present how the notion of delusion may be understood (and extended) within the semantic framework of Robert Brandom's inferentialism. The mechanisms of reliability and community‐oriented proprieties, among others, provide inferentialists with effective tools for understanding commitments (and so beliefs) in communities. These tools may be used to describe and assess both commitments that we might consider sound and commitments that we might consider delusional, both in terms of how they arise and in terms of how (...)
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  44. Delusional Misidentification Syndromes in Postpartum Psychosis: A Systematic Review.G. Lewis, L. Blake & G. Seneviratne - 2023 - Psychopathology 56 (4):285–294.
    INTRODUCTION: Delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS) are a group of psychopathological experiences occurring in psychosis, involving the misidentification of a person or place. DMS are often accompanied by hostility towards the object of delusional misidentification. This is of a particular concern in perinatal mental illness due to the potential disruption of the mother-infant bond, and risk of neglect, violence, or infanticide towards a misidentified child. This review aimed to collate all published cases of DMS in postpartum psychosis to further understand how (...)
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  45. Why Delusions Matter.Bortolotti Lisa - 2023 - Bloomsbury Publishing.
    Delusions can be many things. They can be symptoms of mental health problems, such as schizophrenia, clinical delusions, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are unsupported by evidence. We call the latter everyday delusions and they can include anything from the benefits of homeopathy to the dangers of alien abduction. Yet, why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why can they be so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really (...)
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  46. Revisiting Maher’s one-factor theory of delusion.Chenwei Nie - 2023 - Neuroethics 16 (2):1-16.
    How many factors, i.e. departures from normality, are necessary to explain a delusion? Maher’s classic one-factor theory argues that the only factor is the patient’s anomalous experience, and a delusion arises as a normal explanation of this experience. The more recent two-factor theory, on the other hand, contends that a second factor is also needed, with reasoning abnormality being a potential candidate, and a delusion arises as an abnormal explanation of the anomalous experience. In the past few years, although there (...)
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  47. The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion.Paul Noordhof & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2023 - In Samuel Murray & Paul Henne (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury.
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  48. Associations between acceptance of the implausible bias, theory of mind and delusions in first-episode psychosis patients; A longitudinal study.J. M. Panula, M. Lindgren, T. Kieseppa, J. Suvisaari & T. T. Raij - 2023 - Schizophrenia Research 254:27–34.
    Multiple different cognitive biases, among them the liberal acceptance (LA) bias, have been suggested to contribute to reality distortion in psychotic disorders. Earlier studies have been cross-sectional and considered a limited set of cognitive correlates of psychosis, thus the relationship between LA bias and psychosis remains poorly known. We studied a similar bias (acceptance of the implausible (AOI)) in 62 first-episode psychosis (FEP) patients and 62 control subjects, who watched movie scenes with varying degrees of realism and were asked to (...)
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  49. Relationships between cognitive biases, decision-making, and delusions.J. M. Sheffield, R. Smith, P. Suthaharan, P. Leptourgos & P. R. Corlett - 2023 - Scientific Reports 13 (1):9485.
    Multiple measures of decision-making under uncertainty (e.g. jumping to conclusions (JTC), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), win-switch behavior, random exploration) have been associated with delusional thinking in independent studies. Yet, it is unknown whether these variables explain shared or unique variance in delusional thinking, and whether these relationships are specific to paranoia or delusional ideation more broadly. Additionally, the underlying computational mechanisms require further investigation. To investigate these questions, task and self-report data were collected in 88 individuals (46 healthy controls, (...)
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  50. Misidentification delusions as mentalization disorders.Adrianna Smurzyńska - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (4):975-990.
    The aim of this article is to analyze those theories that interpret misidentification delusions in terms of mentalization. The hypothesis under examination holds that a mentalization framework is useful for describing misidentification delusions when identification is thought to be partially based on mentalization. The article provides both a characterization and possible interpretations of such delusions, and possible relations between misidentification and mentalization are scrutinized. Whether the mentalization approach may explain or describe such kinds of mental disorders is considered, with the (...)
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