About this topic
Summary Often the term "desire" in philosophy has a fairly technical use to simply mean motivational mental state. After all, desires are often defined as mental states with a "world-to-mind" direction of fit: states that function to be efficacious (for the world to fit the mind). Beliefs, in contrast, are states whose function is "mind-to-world"---functioning to accurately represent how things are in the world outside the mind. This naturally leads to what some call "the Humean theory of motivation," which states roughly that motivation always requires desire. One incarnation of this states: whenever one intentionally performs some action, A, one must have a preceding desire to A. Two main camps have disputed such claims. First, besire theorists maintain that sometimes beliefs or other characteristically cognitive states (especially moral beliefs) can themselves be motivational states; they can have both directions of fit. Second, anti-reductionists hold that some characteristically conative or motivational states, like intentions, are not reducible to desires (or combinations of beliefs and desires). Accepting the above brand of "Humeanism" does not commit one to other versions as well. For example, various rationalists maintain that beliefs can directly produce motivation while admitting that one must always have a desire to perform the action prior to executing it intentionally. On such a view, certain beliefs (e.g. the belief that donating $200 to Oxfam is a moral obligation) can directly produce a desire to act in accordance with them (i.e. a desire to donate $200 to Oxfam) without this serving or furthering some antecedent desire (e.g. a desire to do whatever is morally required of me). In this way, we may not be "slaves of our passions" even though desires are required somewhere in the motivational chain.
Key works The seeds of the idea of two key directions of fit are in Hume & Macnabb 1738 (2.3.3), but it is more explicitly drawn out in Anscombe 1957 (with her shopping list example, section 32) and is more recently developed in detail by Davidson 1963 and Smith 1987. For defenses of the besire theory, see Platts 1980. Some also interpret Nagel 1970 and Mcdowell & Mcfetridge 1978 as besire theorists. Bratman 1987 and Mele 1987 (see also Mele 1992) defend the idea that intentions are motivational states distinct from desires. Smith 1994 and  Wallace 2006 explicitly defend versions of the rationalist position described above.
Introductions The entry by Schroeder 2009 provides an excellent overview of desire; Pettit 1998 is more brief but also useful. See Schueler 2013 for an introduction to direction of fit. Mele 1995 argues that desires play a key role in motivation, but it also serves as an overview of many relevant issues; see also Mele 2003 (esp. ch. 1). Wallace 1990 provides a fairly lengthy but excellent introduction to key arguments for the role of desire in moral motivation.
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  1. added 2020-06-23
    Emotions as Original Existences: A Theory of Emotion, Motivation, and the Self.Demian Whiting - forthcoming - Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what Hume referred to as ‘original existences’: feeling states that have no intentional or representational properties of their own. In doing so, the book serves as a valuable counterbalance to the now mainstream view that emotions are representational mental states. Beginning with a defence of a feeling theory of emotion, Whiting opens up a whole new way of thinking about the role and centrality of emotion in our lives, showing how emotion (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-02
    Wahrheit ohne Tugend? oder: Setzt eine adäquate Wahrnehmung der Wirklichkeit Tugend voraus?Andreas Trampota - 2003 - Zur Debatte 33 (7):38f..
  3. added 2020-06-01
    Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivatlon.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2003 - In Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 147.
    Accidie, depression, and dejection seem to be psychological phenomena that are best characterized as cases in which an agent has no motivation to pursue what he or she judges to be good or valuable. The phenomena thus seem to present a challenge to any view that draws a close connection between motivation and evaluation. ‘Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivation’ aims to show that the phenomena are actually best explained by a theory that postulates a conceptual connection between motivation and evaluation.
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  4. added 2020-05-11
    Self and Desire as Seeds of Virtue.Paul Condon, John Dunne, Christine Wilson-Mendenhall, Wendy Hasenkamp, Karen Quigley & Lisa Barrett - unknown
    According to Buddhist philosophies, recognizing the self as impermanent, changing, and interdependent is at the root of virtue. With this realization, desires shift away from inward self-cherishing and toward outward self-transcending. This altruistic outlook underlies virtuous action and flourishing. Our primary research question asks: 1) to what extent do people experience self-transcending and self-cherishing desires in everyday life, and 2) to what extent do these different desires predict behaviors and body physiology that underlie virtue and well-being. As highlighted by the (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-23
    Review: Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, In Praise of Desire. [REVIEW]Errol Lord - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):562-567,.
  6. added 2020-04-05
    Loopy Regulations: The Motivational Profile of Affective Phenomenology.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    Affective experiences such as pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenology: they feel (un)pleasant. This type of phenomenology has a loopy regulatory profile: it often motivates us to act a certain way, and these actions typically end up regulating our affective experiences back. For example, the pleasure you get by tasting your morning coffee motivates you to drink more of it, and this in turn results in you obtaining another pleasant gustatory experience. In this article, we argue that reflexive imperativism (...)
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  7. added 2020-03-11
    Gründe, Rationalität und Parenthetikalismus. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.
    This is a review of Tim Henning's 'From a Rational Point of View' (Oxford 2019).
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  8. added 2020-03-02
    The Evolutionary Explanation: The Limits of the Desire Theories of Unpleasantness,.Abraham Sapien - 2018 - Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofia 23 (3):121-140.
    Several theorists have defended that unpleasantness can be explained by appealing to (intrinsic, simultaneous, de re) desires for certain experiences not to be occurring. In a nutshell, experiences are unpleasant because we do not want them, and not vice versa. A common criticism for this approach takes the form of a Euthyphro dilemma. Even if there is a solution for this criticism, I argue that this type of approach is limited in two important ways. It cannot provide an explanation for: (...)
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  9. added 2020-03-02
    The Unpleasantness of Pain.Abraham Sapien - 2018 - Dissertation,
    In this thesis I provide an account of the unpleasantness of pain. In doing this, I shed light on the nature of pain and unpleasantness. I propose to understand the unpleasantness of pain based on the determinable-determinate distinction. Unpleasantness is a determinable phenomenal property of mental states that entails badness. I propose that an unpleasant pain experience has two phenomenal properties: i) the phenomenal property of being a pain, and ii) a phenomenal determinate property (u1, u2, u3, etc.) of the (...)
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  10. added 2020-02-14
    Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    'We desire all and only those things we conceive to be good; we avoid what we conceive to be bad.' This slogan was once the standard view of the relationship between desire or motivation and rational evaluation. Many critics have rejected this scholastic formula as either trivial or wrong. It appears to be trivial if we just define the good as 'what we want', and wrong if we consider apparent conflicts between what we seem to want and what we seem (...)
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  11. added 2020-02-07
    Motives and Behaviour.K. F. Walker - 1942 - Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 20 (1):16-29.
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  12. added 2020-01-31
    Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of Inclination.Eric Entrican Wilson - 2016 - Kantian Review 21 (2):211-235.
    Tamar Schapiro has offered an important new ‘Kantian’ account of inclination and motivation, one that expands and refines Christine Korsgaard’s view. In this article I argue that Kant’s own view differs significantly from Schapiro’s. Above all, Kant thinks of inclinations as dispositions, not occurrent desires; and he does not believe that they stem directly from a non-rational source, as she argues. Schapiro’s ‘Kantian’ view rests on a much sharper distinction between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul. In the (...)
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  13. added 2020-01-31
    Future Orientation and Motivation of Immediate Activity: An Elaboration of the Theory of Achievement Motivation.Joel O. Raynor - 1969 - Psychological Review 76 (6):606-610.
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  14. added 2019-12-02
    Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation. [REVIEW]David Sussman - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):116-119.
    Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation examines the uniquely moral motive of respect in light of Kant’s general metaphysics of agency. Kant refers to respect as a “sui generis” feeling that is both intrinsically cognitive and conative, but also denies that respect is any kind of feeling at all. Guevara convincingly argues that the feelings characteristic of respect are not psychological effects caused by our recognition of the authority of the moral law: rather, such feelings are just the affective aspect of (...)
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  15. added 2019-11-14
    Ruly and Unruly Passions: Early Modern Perspectives.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85:21-38.
    A survey of theories on the passions and action in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain and western Europe reveals that few, if any, of the major writers held the view that reason in any of its functions executes action without a passion. Even rationalists, like Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth and English clergyman Samuel Clarke, recognized the necessity of passion to action. On the other hand, many of these intellectuals also agreed with French philosophers Jean-François Senault, René Descartes, and Nicolas Malebranche that, (...)
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  16. added 2019-11-14
    Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume’s Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]Andrew Cunningham - 1997 - Review of Metaphysics 51 (1):140-140.
    The main line of argument in Bricke’s stimulating and well-written interpretation of Hume’s moral theory runs roughly as follows: Hume holds that, in practical reasoning, beliefs are subordinate to desires, and is therefore a “conativist” ; we must attribute to Hume the view that both desires and beliefs have representational content, so that they are essentially distinguished by their opposite “directions of fit”—otherwise we cannot forestall the cognitivist from simply insisting that intrinsically motivating beliefs are possible; moral sentiments are motivating (...)
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  17. added 2019-10-12
    A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of (...)
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  18. added 2019-10-07
    Desire and Satisfaction.Ashley Shaw - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):371-384.
    Desire satisfaction has not received detailed philosophical examination. Yet intuitive judgments about the satisfaction of desires have been used as data points guiding theories of desire, desire content, and the semantics of ‘desire’. This paper examines desire satisfaction and the standard propositional view of desire. Firstly, I argue that there are several distinct concepts of satisfaction. Secondly, I argue that separating them defuses a difficulty for the standard view in accommodating desires that Derek Parfit described as ‘implicitly conditional on their (...)
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  19. added 2019-09-13
    On Not Getting Out of Bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.
    This morning I intended to get out of bed when my alarm went off. Hearing my alarm, I formed the intention to get up now. Yet, for a time, I remained in bed, irrationally lazy. It seems I irrationally failed to execute my intention. Such cases of execution failure pose a challenge for Mentalists about rationality, who believe that facts about rationality supervene on facts about the mind. For, this morning, my mind was in order; it was my action that (...)
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  20. added 2019-09-09
    Active Desire.Uku Tooming - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):945-968.
    Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive. Since it seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation, it also seems to constitute a paradigmatic type of mental state which is not up to us. In this paper, I will contest this idea. I will defend a view according to which we can actively shape our desires by controlling the way in which we imagine their contents. This view is supported both by (...)
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  21. added 2019-08-29
    Perdurantism, Fecklessness and the Veil of Ignorance.Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    There has been a growing charge that perdurantism—with its bloated ontology of very person-like objects that coincide persons—implies the repugnant conclusion that we are morally obliged to be feckless. I argue that this charge critically overlooks the epistemic situation—what I call the ‘veil of ignorance’—that perdurantists find themselves in. Though the veil of ignorance still requires an alteration of our commonsense understanding of the demands on action, I argue for two conclusions. The first is that the alteration that is required (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-06
    Dust, Ashes, and Vice: On Tim Schroeder’s Theory of Desire.Ronald De Sousa - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):139-150.
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics.Adam Morton - 2002 - L8ndon: Routledge.
    I discussed the ways in which folk psychology is influenced by the need for small-scale cooperation between people. I argue that considerations about cooperation and mutual benefit can be found in the everyday concepts of belief, desire, and motivation. I describe what I call "solution thinking", where a person anticipates another person's actions by first determining the solution to the cooperative problem that the person faces and then reasoning backwards to a prediction of individual action.
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  24. added 2019-06-06
    VIII—Belief, Desire, and the Praxis of Reasoning.S. G. Williams - 1990 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90 (1):119-142.
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    VI—Desire, Intentional Content and Teleological Explanation.Andrew Woodfield - 1982 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82 (1):69-88.
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    The World's Desires. [REVIEW]E. A. Ashcroft - 1906 - Ancient Philosophy (Misc) 16:473.
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  27. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewsSergio Tenenbaum,. Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason.New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. 315. $80.00. [REVIEW]Peter Brian Barry - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):181-184.
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  28. added 2019-05-31
    Foregrounding Desire: A Defense of Kant’s Incorporation Thesis.Tamar Schapiro - 2011 - Journal of Ethics 15 (3):147-167.
    In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to (...)
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  29. added 2019-04-23
    Why Do Desires Rationalize Actions?Alex Gregory - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    I begin the paper by outlining one classic argument for the guise of the good: that we must think that desires represent their objects favourably in order to explain why they can make actions rational (Quinn 1995; Stampe 1987). But what exactly is the conclusion of this argument? Many have recently formulated the guise of the good as the view that desires are akin to perceptual appearances of the good (Oddie 2005; Stampe 1987; Tenenbaum 2007). But I argue that this (...)
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  30. added 2019-04-21
    Exercícios Filosóficos em Epicteto.Diogo Luz - 2018 - Intuitio 11 (2):17-33.
    O presente artigo trata do pensamento de Epicteto pelo viés do exercício (áskēsis), ou seja, por meio de práticas que conduzem ao aperfeiçoamento de quem elege para si o ofício de filósofo. Para tal, inicialmente esclarecemos o que significam os exercícios na filosofia antiga, tendo como subsídio as teses de Pierre Hadot. Logo depois, exploramos seis exercícios que consideramos centrais para o filósofo de Nicópolis, contextualizando com os ensinamentos que estão envolvidos e descrevendo as principais características de seu método. Por (...)
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  31. added 2019-04-15
    Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope. London: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 135-151.
    Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. So I consider cases of second-order (...)
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  32. added 2019-03-29
    Wanting is Believing: A Theory of Human Behaviour and its Rationality.Alex Gregory - manuscript
    Under contract with Oxford University Press. -/- The book defends desire-as-belief, according to which the word “desire” just picks out a special subset of our beliefs: beliefs about reasons. On this view, wanting to do something is just the same thing as believing that there is reason to do it. This view allows us to see how human behaviour should be explained: by appeal to our desires, which is to say, our beliefs about reasons. This view also allows us to (...)
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  33. added 2019-03-28
    An Existential Perspective on Addiction Treatment: A Logic-Based Therapy Case Study.Guy Du Plessis - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Practice 5 (1).
    In this essay I argue that a comprehensive understanding of addiction and its treatment should include an existential perspective. I provide a brief overview of an existential perspective of addiction and recovery, which will contextualize the remainder of the essay. I then present a case study of how the six-step philosophical practice method of Logic-Based Therapy can assist with issues that often arise in addiction treatment framed through an existential perspective.
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  34. added 2019-03-16
    Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    This paper develops a new challenge for moral noncognitivism. In brief, the challenge is this: Beliefs — both moral and non-moral — are epistemically evaluable, whereas desires are not. It is tempting to explain this difference in terms of differences in the functional roles of beliefs and desires. However, this explanation stands in tension with noncognitivism, which maintains that moral beliefs have a desire-like functional role. After critically reviewing some initial responses to the challenge, I suggest a solution, which involves (...)
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  35. added 2019-03-15
    The Virtue of Practical Rationality.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):1-33.
    Practical rationality is best regarded as a virtue: an excellence in the exercise of one’s cognitive capacities in one’s practical endeavors. The author develops this idea so as to yield a Humean conception of practical rationality. Nevertheless, one of the crucial features of the approach is not distinctively Humean and sets it apart from the most familiar neo-Humean approaches: an agent’s practical rationality has to do with the presence and form of his cognitive activity, as weIl as with how it (...)
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  36. added 2018-10-01
    Vivid Representations and Their Effects.Kengo Miyazono - 2018 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 9 (1):73-80.
    : Sinhababu’s Humean Nature contains many interesting and important ideas, but in this short commentary I focus on the idea of vivid representations. Sinhababu inherits his idea of vivid representations from Hume’s discussions, in particular his discussion of calm and violent passions. I am sympathetic to the idea of developing Hume’s insight that has been largely neglected by philosophers. I believe that Sinhababu and Hume are on the right track. What I do in this short commentary is to raise some (...)
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  37. added 2018-09-17
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):919-928.
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 224.
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  38. added 2018-07-11
    Normative Und Motivierende Gründe. Ein Kommentar Zu Susanne Mantels Determined by Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (3):421-428.
    One of the central aims of Susanne Mantel’s book "Determined by Reasons" (2018) is to reject the idea that normative and motivating reasons can be identical. In her own words, Mantel denies the “Identity Thesis”, according to which “when an agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a motivating reason M of that agent such that M is identical with N” (Mantel 2018, 93). In this comment, I offer a simple argument for the Identity Thesis: (1) When an (...)
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  39. added 2018-06-25
    Normative Judgment and Rational Requirements: A Reply to Ridge.Francesco Orsi - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):281-290.
    I examine and rebut Ridge’s two arguments for Capacity Judgment Internalism (simply qua their particular character and content, first person normative judgments are necessarily capable of motivating without the help of any independent desire). First, the rejection of the possibility of anormativism (sec. 2), second, an argument from the rational requirement to intend to do as one judges that one ought to do (sec. 3). I conclude with a few remarks about the nature of this requirement and about verdicts of (...)
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  40. added 2018-05-08
    Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.
    What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons (...)
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  41. added 2018-04-06
    Emotion as the Categorical Basis for Moral Thought.Demian Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):533-553.
    I offer and develop an original answer to the question of whether emotion plays an important role in the formation of moral thought. In a nutshell, my answer will be that if motivational internalism provides us with a correct description of the nature of moral thought, then emotion plays an important role because emotion is required to explain or ground the behavioral dispositions that are involved in moral thought.
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  42. added 2018-03-22
    Halfhearted Action and Control.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend (...)
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  43. added 2018-03-08
    How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead.Alex Gregory - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241-249.
    In this paper I highlight two noteworthy features of assertions about our desires, and then highlight two ways in which they can mislead us into drawing unwarranted conclusions about desire. Some of our assertions may indicate that we are sometimes motivated independently of desire, and other assertions may suggest that there are vast divergences between our normative judgements and our desires. But I suggest that some such assertions are, in this respect, potentially misleading, and have in fact misled authors such (...)
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  44. added 2018-02-18
    Désir (Avancé).Federico Lauria - 2017 - Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    Les désirs sont centraux pour agir et être heureux. Qu’est-ce qu’un désir ? En quoi les désirs sont-ils importants ? Dans cette entrée, nous tenterons de mettre les mots sur cette expérience si familière et pourtant négligée par la philosophie contemporaine. (1) En guise de préliminaires, nous délimiterons notre objet d’étude à la lumière des principales distinctions entre les désirs et d’autres états mentaux tels que les croyances et intentions, ainsi qu’à l’aide des distinctions classiques parmi les désirs. (2) Notre (...)
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  45. added 2018-02-17
    Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction.Sophie Botros - 2005 - Routledge.
    Covering an important theme in Humean studies, this book focuses on Hume's hugely influential attempt in book three of his _Treatise of Human Nature _to derive the conclusion that morality is a matter of feeling, not reason, from its link with action. Claiming that Hume's argument contains a fundamental contradiction that has gone unnoticed in modern debate, this fascinating volume contains a refreshing combination of historical-scholarly work and contemporary analysis that seeks to expose this contradiction and therefore provide a significant (...)
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  46. added 2017-11-21
    Neil Sinhababu, Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). [REVIEW]Lorenzo Greco - 2017 - Rivista di Filosofia 108 (3):503-505.
  47. added 2017-11-13
    What Are Theories of Desire Theories Of?Tamar Schapiro - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):131-150.
    In this paper I try to undermine complacency with a predominant conception of desire, for the sake of refocusing attention on a philosophical problem. The predominant conception holds that to have a desire is to occupy an evaluative outlook, a perspective from which the agent 'sees' the world in practically salient terms. I argue that it is not clear what this theory is a theory of, because the concept of desire at its center is deeply ambiguous. Understood as a theory (...)
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  48. added 2017-11-08
    Hope and Practical Deliberation.Christopher A. Bobier - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):495-497.
    Accounts of practical deliberation tend to overlook any possible role for hope. I offer an argument showing that hope sets the ends of our practical deliberations and is thereby necessary for practical deliberation. It is because I hope to summit the mountain by midday that I deliberate about how to do so. Absent this particular hope, I could not deliberate about how to summit the mountain by midday.
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  49. added 2017-11-08
    Intentions and Intentionality.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche:43-54.
    Michael Thompson recently advanced a “naïve action theory” as an alternative to the “sophisticated” accounts of action displayed by ordinary folk psychology. In what follows I defend the plausibility of intentional psychology and folk psychological explanations. I do this in two ways. First I question that naïve explanations are more naïve than the ones provided by folk psychology and suggest that the latter are phenomenologically prior to the former. Second, I focus on the role of intentionality in deliberation and action (...)
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  50. added 2017-11-07
    Psychology in Action.A. Reply To Baumrind - forthcoming - Research Ethics.
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