About this topic
Summary Often the term "desire" in philosophy has a fairly technical use to simply mean motivational mental state. After all, desires are often defined as mental states with a "world-to-mind" direction of fit: states that function to be efficacious (for the world to fit the mind). Beliefs, in contrast, are states whose function is "mind-to-world"---functioning to accurately represent how things are in the world outside the mind. This naturally leads to what some call "the Humean theory of motivation," which states roughly that motivation always requires desire. One incarnation of this states: whenever one intentionally performs some action, A, one must have a preceding desire to A. Two main camps have disputed such claims. First, besire theorists maintain that sometimes beliefs or other characteristically cognitive states (especially moral beliefs) can themselves be motivational states; they can have both directions of fit. Second, anti-reductionists hold that some characteristically conative or motivational states, like intentions, are not reducible to desires (or combinations of beliefs and desires). Accepting the above brand of "Humeanism" does not commit one to other versions as well. For example, various rationalists maintain that beliefs can directly produce motivation while admitting that one must always have a desire to perform the action prior to executing it intentionally. On such a view, certain beliefs (e.g. the belief that donating $200 to Oxfam is a moral obligation) can directly produce a desire to act in accordance with them (i.e. a desire to donate $200 to Oxfam) without this serving or furthering some antecedent desire (e.g. a desire to do whatever is morally required of me). In this way, we may not be "slaves of our passions" even though desires are required somewhere in the motivational chain.
Key works The seeds of the idea of two key directions of fit are in Hume & Macnabb 1738 (2.3.3), but it is more explicitly drawn out in Anscombe 1957 (with her shopping list example, section 32) and is more recently developed in detail by Davidson 1963 and Smith 1987. For defenses of the besire theory, see Platts 1980. Some also interpret Nagel 1970 and Mcdowell & Mcfetridge 1978 as besire theorists. Bratman 1987 and Mele 1987 (see also Mele 1992) defend the idea that intentions are motivational states distinct from desires. Smith 1994 and  Wallace 2006 explicitly defend versions of the rationalist position described above.
Introductions The entry by Schroeder 2009 provides an excellent overview of desire; Pettit 1998 is more brief but also useful. See Schueler 2013 for an introduction to direction of fit. Mele 1995 argues that desires play a key role in motivation, but it also serves as an overview of many relevant issues; see also Mele 2003 (esp. ch. 1). Wallace 1990 provides a fairly lengthy but excellent introduction to key arguments for the role of desire in moral motivation.
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  1. Two Dogmas of Moral Psychology.Peter Brian Barry - manuscript
    I contend that there are two dogmas that are still popular among philosophers of action: that agents can only desire what they think is good and that they can only intentionally pursue what they think is good. I also argue that both dogmas are false. Broadly, I argue that our best theories of action can explain the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one thinks is not at all good, that we need to allow for the possibility of intentionally pursuing what (...)
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  2. Addictive Desires and Reasons-Responsiveness.Federico Burdman - manuscript
    In this paper, I look into one of the particular ways in which decreased reasons-responsiveness in addiction may come about, by focusing on certain anomalous features of addictive desires. The account I offer centers on two prominent features of these desires: the recalcitrance of standing or long-term dispositional addictive desires to use drugs in the face of contrary considerations, and the recurrent, intrusive nature of episodes of occurrently wanting to use drugs that addicted agents experience. Both the recalcitrance and the (...)
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  3. Psychology in Action.A. Reply To Baumrind - forthcoming - Research Ethics.
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  4. Desires Without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want.Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker - forthcoming - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press.
    Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This chapter argues that evaluativism, in both of its doxastic and perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterises the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever towards its evaluative status at all, (...)
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  5. The Unity of Normative Thought.Jeremy David Fix - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is our will, not an intellectual capacity whose exercises can influence those of our will. If practical reason is our will, thoughts about how I am to act have an essential tie to action. They are intentions. Thoughts about how others are to act, though, lack such a tie to action. They are beliefs, not intentions. How, then, can these thoughts form a unified class? I reject two answers which deny the differences (...)
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  6. Desire as Belief: A Study of Desire, Motivation, and Rationality.Alex Gregory - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    What is it to want something? Or, as philosophers might ask, what is a desire? This book defends “desire-as-belief”, the view that desires are just a special subset of our beliefs: normative beliefs. This view entitles us to accept orthodox models of human motivation and rationality that explain those things with reference to desire, but nonetheless to also make room for our normative beliefs to play a role in those domains. And this view tells us to diverge from the orthodox (...)
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  7. A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.
    According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of (...)
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  8. Gründe, Rationalität und Parenthetikalismus. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (3):481-491.
    This is a review of Tim Henning's 'From a Rational Point of View' (Oxford 2019).
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  9. Perdurantism, Fecklessness and the Veil of Ignorance.Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2565-2576.
    There has been a growing charge that perdurantism—with its bloated ontology of very person-like objects that coincide persons—implies the repugnant conclusion that we are morally obliged to be feckless. I argue that this charge critically overlooks the epistemic situation—what I call the ‘veil of ignorance’—that perdurantists find themselves in. Though the veil of ignorance still requires an alteration of our commonsense understanding of the demands on action, I argue for two conclusions. The first is that the alteration that is required (...)
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  10. Desire and Satisfaction.Ashley Shaw - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):371-384.
    Desire satisfaction has not received detailed philosophical examination. Yet intuitive judgments about the satisfaction of desires have been used as data points guiding theories of desire, desire content, and the semantics of ‘desire’. This paper examines desire satisfaction and the standard propositional view of desire. Firstly, I argue that there are several distinct concepts of satisfaction. Secondly, I argue that separating them defuses a difficulty for the standard view in accommodating desires that Derek Parfit described as ‘implicitly conditional on their (...)
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  11. The Stoics on the Education of Desire.Daniel Vazquez - 2020 - In Magdalena Bosch (ed.), Desire and Human Flourishing. pp. 213-228.
    The ancient Stoics proposed one of the most sophisticated and influential ethical frameworks in the history of philosophy. Its impact on theory and practice lasted for centuries during the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Today, their arguments and theories still inform many contemporary ethical debates. Moreover, some of the framework’s main tenets have been used as a theoretical foundation for cognitive–behavioural therapy (CBT), a widely used psychosocial intervention for improving mental health. Much of its lasting impact is the result of the (...)
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  12. Emotions as Original Existences: A Theory of Emotion, Motivation, and the Self.Demian Whiting - 2020 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what Hume referred to as ‘original existences’: feeling states that have no intentional or representational properties of their own. In doing so, the book serves as a valuable counterbalance to the now mainstream view that emotions are representational mental states. Beginning with a defence of a feeling theory of emotion, Whiting opens up a whole new way of thinking about the role and centrality of emotion in our lives, showing how emotion (...)
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  13. On Not Getting Out of Bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.
    This morning I intended to get out of bed when my alarm went off. Hearing my alarm, I formed the intention to get up now. Yet, for a time, I remained in bed, irrationally lazy. It seems I irrationally failed to execute my intention. Such cases of execution failure pose a challenge for Mentalists about rationality, who believe that facts about rationality supervene on facts about the mind. For, this morning, my mind was in order; it was my action that (...)
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  14. Loopy Regulations: The Motivational Profile of Affective Phenomenology.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Philosophical Topics 47 (2):233-261.
    Affective experiences such as pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenology: they feel pleasant. This type of phenomenology has a loopy regulatory profile: it often motivates us to act a certain way, and these actions typically end up regulating our affective experiences back. For example, the pleasure you get by tasting your morning coffee motivates you to drink more of it, and this in turn results in you obtaining another pleasant gustatory experience. In this article, we argue that reflexive imperativism (...)
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  15. Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    This paper develops a new challenge for moral noncognitivism. In brief, the challenge is this: Beliefs — both moral and non-moral — are epistemically evaluable, whereas desires are not. It is tempting to explain this difference in terms of differences in the functional roles of beliefs and desires. However, this explanation stands in tension with noncognitivism, which maintains that moral beliefs have a desire-like functional role. After critically reviewing some initial responses to the challenge, I suggest a solution, which involves (...)
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  16. Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope. London: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 135-151.
    Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. So I consider cases of second-order (...)
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  17. An Existential Perspective on Addiction Treatment: A Logic-Based Therapy Case Study.Guy du Plessis - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Practice 5 (1):1-32.
    In this essay I argue that a comprehensive understanding of addiction and its treatment should include an existential perspective. I provide a brief overview of an existential perspective of addiction and recovery, which will contextualize the remainder of the essay. I then present a case study of how the six-step philosophical practice method of Logic-Based Therapy can assist with issues that often arise in addiction treatment framed through an existential perspective.
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  18. Ruly and Unruly Passions: Early Modern Perspectives.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85:21-38.
    A survey of theories on the passions and action in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain and western Europe reveals that few, if any, of the major writers held the view that reason in any of its functions executes action without a passion. Even rationalists, like Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth and English clergyman Samuel Clarke, recognized the necessity of passion to action. On the other hand, many of these intellectuals also agreed with French philosophers Jean-François Senault, René Descartes, and Nicolas Malebranche that, (...)
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  19. Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.
    What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons (...)
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  20. Active Desire.Uku Tooming - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):945-968.
    Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive. Since it seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation, it also seems to constitute a paradigmatic type of mental state which is not up to us. In this paper, I will contest this idea. I will defend a view according to which we can actively shape our desires by controlling the way in which we imagine their contents. This view is supported both by (...)
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  21. Under the Guise of the Good: Kant and a Tenet of Moral Rationalism.Stefano Bacin - 2018 - In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. de Gruyter. pp. 1705-1714.
    Both in historical debates and in recent discussions, the Guise of the Good Thesis represents a genuine dogma of rationalism in moral philosophy. Many influential commentators have maintained that Kant belongs in that camp, even that he “explicitly endorses” the Thesis. Attributing the Thesis to Kant, however, faces scarce textual support and amounts to a dubious understanding of the relationship of Kant’s moral philosophy to previous rationalist views. I suggest that, in Kant’s view, the Thesis only applies to the determination (...)
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  22. Why Do Desires Rationalize Actions?Alex Gregory - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    I begin the paper by outlining one classic argument for the guise of the good: that we must think that desires represent their objects favourably in order to explain why they can make actions rational (Quinn 1995; Stampe 1987). But what exactly is the conclusion of this argument? Many have recently formulated the guise of the good as the view that desires are akin to perceptual appearances of the good (Oddie 2005; Stampe 1987; Tenenbaum 2007). But I argue that this (...)
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  23. Normative Und Motivierende Gründe. Ein Kommentar Zu Susanne Mantels Determined by Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (3):421-428.
    One of the central aims of Susanne Mantel’s book "Determined by Reasons" (2018) is to reject the idea that normative and motivating reasons can be identical. In her own words, Mantel denies the “Identity Thesis”, according to which “when an agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a motivating reason M of that agent such that M is identical with N” (Mantel 2018, 93). In this comment, I offer a simple argument for the Identity Thesis: (1) When an (...)
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  24. Exercícios Filosóficos em Epicteto.Diogo Luz - 2018 - Intuitio 11 (2):17-33.
    O presente artigo trata do pensamento de Epicteto pelo viés do exercício (áskēsis), ou seja, por meio de práticas que conduzem ao aperfeiçoamento de quem elege para si o ofício de filósofo. Para tal, inicialmente esclarecemos o que significam os exercícios na filosofia antiga, tendo como subsídio as teses de Pierre Hadot. Logo depois, exploramos seis exercícios que consideramos centrais para o filósofo de Nicópolis, contextualizando com os ensinamentos que estão envolvidos e descrevendo as principais características de seu método. Por (...)
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  25. Vivid Representations and Their Effects.Kengo Miyazono - 2018 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 9 (1):73-80.
    : Sinhababu’s Humean Nature contains many interesting and important ideas, but in this short commentary I focus on the idea of vivid representations. Sinhababu inherits his idea of vivid representations from Hume’s discussions, in particular his discussion of calm and violent passions. I am sympathetic to the idea of developing Hume’s insight that has been largely neglected by philosophers. I believe that Sinhababu and Hume are on the right track. What I do in this short commentary is to raise some (...)
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  26. Thinking, Acting, Considering.Daniel Muñoz - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):255-270.
    According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is (...)
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  27. Normative Judgment and Rational Requirements: A Reply to Ridge.Francesco Orsi - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):281-290.
    I examine and rebut Ridge’s two arguments for Capacity Judgment Internalism (simply qua their particular character and content, first person normative judgments are necessarily capable of motivating without the help of any independent desire). First, the rejection of the possibility of anormativism (sec. 2), second, an argument from the rational requirement to intend to do as one judges that one ought to do (sec. 3). I conclude with a few remarks about the nature of this requirement and about verdicts of (...)
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  28. The Evolutionary Explanation: The Limits of the Desire Theories of Unpleasantness,.Abraham Sapien - 2018 - Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 23 (3):121-140.
    Several theorists have defended that unpleasantness can be explained by appealing to (intrinsic, simultaneous, de re) desires for certain experiences not to be occurring. In a nutshell, experiences are unpleasant because we do not want them, and not vice versa. A common criticism for this approach takes the form of a Euthyphro dilemma. Even if there is a solution for this criticism, I argue that this type of approach is limited in two important ways. It cannot provide an explanation for: (...)
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  29. The Unpleasantness of Pain.Abraham Sapien - 2018 - Dissertation,
    In this thesis I provide an account of the unpleasantness of pain. In doing this, I shed light on the nature of pain and unpleasantness. I propose to understand the unpleasantness of pain based on the determinable-determinate distinction. Unpleasantness is a determinable phenomenal property of mental states that entails badness. I propose that an unpleasant pain experience has two phenomenal properties: i) the phenomenal property of being a pain, and ii) a phenomenal determinate property (u1, u2, u3, etc.) of the (...)
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  30. Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):919-928.
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 224.
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  31. A Challenge for Humean Externalism.Steven Swartzer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):23-44.
    Humean externalism is the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are “external” to an agent’s motivationally-inert moral judgments. A standard argument in favor of Humean externalism appeals to the possibility of amoral or morally cynical agents—agents for whom moral considerations gain no motivational traction. The possibility of such agents seems to provide evidence for both the claim that moral judgments are themselves motivationally inert, and the claim that moral motivation has its source in desires (...)
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  32. Emotion as the Categorical Basis for Moral Thought.Demian Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):533-553.
    I offer and develop an original answer to the question of whether emotion plays an important role in the formation of moral thought. In a nutshell, my answer will be that if motivational internalism provides us with a correct description of the nature of moral thought, then emotion plays an important role because emotion is required to explain or ground the behavioral dispositions that are involved in moral thought.
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  33. What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation?Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):322-342.
    I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation. Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a plausible interpretation of HTM's (...)
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  34. The Verdictive Organization of Desire.Derek Clayton Baker - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):589-612.
    Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than the question of what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. Both motivational force and phenomenological intensity seem relevant to a desire’s strength; however, (...)
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  35. Hope and Practical Deliberation.Christopher A. Bobier - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):495-497.
    Accounts of practical deliberation tend to overlook any possible role for hope. I offer an argument showing that hope sets the ends of our practical deliberations and is thereby necessary for practical deliberation. It is because I hope to summit the mountain by midday that I deliberate about how to do so. Absent this particular hope, I could not deliberate about how to summit the mountain by midday.
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  36. Why Hunger is Not a Desire.Patrick Butlin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (3):617-635.
    This paper presents an account of the nature of desire, informed by psychology and neuroscience, which entails that hunger is not a desire. The account is contrasted with Schroeder’s well-known empirically-informed theory of desire. It is argued that one significant virtue of the present account, in comparison with Schroeder’s theory, is that it draws a sharp distinction between desires and basic drives, such as the drive for food. One reason to draw this distinction is that experiments on incentive learning show (...)
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  37. Neil Sinhababu, Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). [REVIEW]Lorenzo Greco - 2017 - Rivista di Filosofia 108 (3):503-505.
  38. How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead.Alex Gregory - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241-249.
    In this paper I highlight two noteworthy features of assertions about our desires, and then highlight two ways in which they can mislead us into drawing unwarranted conclusions about desire. Some of our assertions may indicate that we are sometimes motivated independently of desire, and other assertions may suggest that there are vast divergences between our normative judgements and our desires. But I suggest that some such assertions are, in this respect, potentially misleading, and have in fact misled authors such (...)
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  39. Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
    This paper examines the view that desires are beliefs about normative reasons for action. It describes the view, and briefly sketches three arguments for it. But the focus of the paper is defending the view from objections. The paper argues that the view is consistent with the distinction between the direction of fit of beliefs and desires, that it is consistent with the existence of appetites such as hunger, that it can account for counterexamples that aim to show that beliefs (...)
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  40. "L'oeil du devoir-être". La conception déontique de l'intentionnalité du désir et les modes intentionnels.Federico Lauria - 2017 - Studia Philosophica 75:67-80.
    Desires matter. How are we to understand their intentionality? According to the main dogma, a desire is a disposition to act. In this article, I propose an alternative to this functionalist picture, which is inspired by the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, desire involves a specific manner of representing the world: deontic mode. Desiring a state of affairs, I propose, is representing it as what ought to be or, if one prefers, as what should be. Firstly, I present three principles (...)
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  41. The "Guise of the Ought to Be": A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
    How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be. Three lines of criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should (...)
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  42. Désir (Avancé).Federico Lauria - 2017 - Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    Les désirs sont centraux pour agir et être heureux. Qu’est-ce qu’un désir ? En quoi les désirs sont-ils importants ? Dans cette entrée, nous tenterons de mettre les mots sur cette expérience si familière et pourtant négligée par la philosophie contemporaine. (1) En guise de préliminaires, nous délimiterons notre objet d’étude à la lumière des principales distinctions entre les désirs et d’autres états mentaux tels que les croyances et intentions, ainsi qu’à l’aide des distinctions classiques parmi les désirs. (2) Notre (...)
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  43. Introduction. Reconsidering Some Dogmas About Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several dogmas. The first part of this introduction presents these dogmas and invites readers to scrutinize them. The main dogma is that desires are motivational states. This approach contrasts with the other dominant conception: desires are positive evaluations. But there are at least four other dogmas: the world should conform to our desires (world-to-mind direction of fit), desires involve a positive (...)
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  44. Desires, Values and Norms.Olivier Massin - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press.
    The thesis defended, the “guise of the ought”, is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts to be or oughts to do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key distinction between values and norms: positive and (...)
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  45. Halfhearted Action and Control.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend (...)
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  46. Do Desires Provide Reasons? An Argument Against the Cognitivist Strategy.Avery Archer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2011-2027.
    According to the cognitivist strategy, the desire to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P in a way analogous to how perceiving that P provides reasons for believing that P. However, while perceiving P provides reasons for believing P by representing P as true, desiring to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P by representing P as good. This paper offers an argument against this view. My argument proceeds via an appeal to (...)
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  47. Making Sense of Unpleasantness: Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger.Paul Boswell - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2969-2992.
    Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us. But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability? According to some recent evaluationist accounts, it is their representational content: unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as bad for one. Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves, for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shooting the messenger, and is every (...)
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  48. Desiderium: Eine Philosophie des Verlangens.Jörg Disse - 2016 - Kohlhammer.
    What do human beings desire? Desire is diverse, multi-layered, often contradictory, directed to the most various goals: from the satisfaction of the simplest, biologically-related needs, such as hunger, thirst, or sexuality, to elaborate forms of desire for self-realization, social recognition or religious experience. But what is the ultimate goal of desire? Is there such a goal? The book examines desire as a phenomenon in the intersection area of anthropological and psychological philosophy. It deals with the anthropological principle, indicated in Plato (...)
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  49. The Role of Imagination in Decision-Making.Bence Nanay - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):126-142.
    The psychological mechanism of decision-making has traditionally been modeled with the help of belief-desire psychology: the agent has some desires (or other pro-attitudes) and some background beliefs and deciding between two possible actions is a matter of comparing the probability of the satisfaction of these desires given the background beliefs in the case of the performance of each action. There is a wealth of recent empirical findings about how we actually make decisions that seems to be in conflict with this (...)
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  50. Commentary on Balcetis: On Some Limits to the Motivational Direction Approach.Jeanine K. Stefanucci & Dustin Stokes - 2016 - Emotion Review 8 (2):129-130.
    While we are sympathetic to Balcetis’s approach, we feel that using motivational direction as the sole organizing structure for influences of affect on perception may be unnecessarily limiting. Three reasons for this concern are discussed.
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