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  1. added 2020-05-13
    The Status and Prospects of Community Education Workers in China.Lixin Sun, Shuo Li & Yuxin Song - manuscript
    Professionalization, career development prospects, and social value are the three basic components of the status and prospects of community education workers, which influence their choice to continue their careers or not. In China, these problems are complex and lacking in systematic research, and the current situation does not meet the needs of community education. This study interviewed 24 community workers regarding their salaries, working conditions, and training and career advancement opportunities to evaluate this situation in Ningbo City. The findings highlight (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-19
    Knowing What's Good for You.Guy Fletcher - unknown
    An accessible introduction to some of the main issues in the philosophy of well-being, aimed at the general reader.
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  3. added 2020-04-03
    Progress and Happiness: A Utilitarian Reconsideration.David P. Gauthier - 1967 - Ethics 78 (1):77-82.
  4. added 2020-03-25
    Some Difficult Intuitions for the Principle of Universality.Stephen Kershnar - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (4):478-488.
    The Principle of Universality asserts that a part retains its intrinsic value regardless of the whole in which it is a part or even whether it is part of a whole. The idea underlying this principle is that the intrinsic value of a thing supervenes on its intrinsic properties. Since the intrinsic properties remain unchanged so does the thing’s intrinsic value. In this article, I argue that, properly understood, the Principle of Universality can handle seemingly troublesome intuitions about the relative (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-25
    The Time of Intrinsic Value.Stephen Kershnar - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):317-329.
    The issue of the time of intrinsic value focuses on the time during which a state has a level of intrinsic value. This is distinct from the time that desert makes a state of affairs good or bad (time of desert) and the time that statements about desert are true or false (time of the desert statement). To arrive at this conclusion, I assumed that intrinsic value is a function of desert-adjusted well-being. Both desert and well-being should be understood as (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-02
    The Evolutionary Explanation: The Limits of the Desire Theories of Unpleasantness,.Abraham Sapien - 2018 - Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofia 23 (3):121-140.
    Several theorists have defended that unpleasantness can be explained by appealing to (intrinsic, simultaneous, de re) desires for certain experiences not to be occurring. In a nutshell, experiences are unpleasant because we do not want them, and not vice versa. A common criticism for this approach takes the form of a Euthyphro dilemma. Even if there is a solution for this criticism, I argue that this type of approach is limited in two important ways. It cannot provide an explanation for: (...)
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  7. added 2020-01-31
    What is Good for Spock? A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism.Isaac Shur - 2019 - Ephemeris 19:46-57.
    Attitudinal Hedonism is a theory of well-being which claims that welfare consists in states of attitudinal pleasure. Fred Feldman characterizes attitudinal pleasure as a state of consciousness similar to attitudes of hope and fear or belief and doubt. He employs the term, enjoyment for the relevant conscious state of attitudinal pleasure and disenjoyment for attitudinal pain. Attitudinal pleasures and pains contrast with sensory pleasures like sex or drugs and sensory pains like cuts or bruises which are felt with the senses (...)
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  8. added 2019-09-09
    Desire-Satisfaction Theories of Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Theories of welfare answer the ancient question, What makes a person's life go well? Prominent among these are desire-satisfaction or preferentist theories, according to which welfare has to do ultimately with desire. This dissertation aims to criticize some recent popular arguments against standard desire-satisfaction theories of welfare, to develop and defend a novel version of the desire-satisfaction theory capable of answering the better objections, to defend the thesis that pleasure is reducible to desire, and to demonstrate an interesting link between (...)
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  9. added 2019-08-01
    On ‘Hybrid’ Theories of Personal Good.Thomas Hurka - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):450-462.
    ‘Hybrid’ theories of personal good, defended by e.g. Parfit, Wolf, and Kagan, equate it, not with a subjective state such as pleasure on its own, nor with an objective state such as knowledge on its own, but with a whole that supposedly combines the two. These theories apply Moore's principle of organic unities, which says the value of a whole needn't equal the sum of the values its parts would have by themselves. This allows them, defenders say, to combine the (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-17
    The Good of Today Depends Not on the Good of Tomorrow: A Constraint on Theories of Well-Being.Owen C. King - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    This article addresses three questions about well-being. First, is well-being future-sensitive? I.e., can present well-being depend on future events? Second, is well-being recursively dependent? I.e., can present well-being depend on itself? Third, can present and future well-being be interdependent? The third question combines the first two, in the sense that a yes to it is equivalent to yeses to both the first and second. To do justice to the diverse ways we contemplate well-being, I consider our thought and discourse about (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Desire Formation and Human Good.Richard Arneson - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:9-32.
    In Wuthering Heights a man and a woman fall in love and their passion for each other wreaks havoc on several lives, theirs included. Long after his beloved is dead, Heathcliff’s life revolves entirely around his love for her. Frustrated by events, his grand romantic passion expresses itself in destructive spasms of antisocial behavior. Catherine, the object of this passion, marries another man on a whim, but describes her feelings for him as like superficial foliage, whereas ‘her love for Heathcliff (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Sumner On Desires and Well-Being.Krister Bykvist - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):475-490.
    In a recent book, Wayne Sumner gives a lucid and very thorough treatment of the standard accounts of well-being. While his criticisms of hedonism and objectivism are convincing, his objections to preferentialism are less so. He argues that preferentialism is seriously mistaken, for preference satisfaction is neither sufficient nor necessary for well-being. In this paper, I show that Sumner’s arguments do not support this conclusion. In particular, I show that some of his main criticisms are based on a straw man (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction: RICHARD J. ARNESON.Richard J. Arneson - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1):113-142.
    What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking? This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A (...)
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  14. added 2019-05-04
    Is Motivation Internal to Value?J. David Velleman - 1998 - In C. Fehige & U. Wessels (eds.), Preferences. Walter de Gruyter.
    The view that something's being good for a person depends on his capacity to care about it – sometimes called internalism about a person’s good – is here derived from the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. In the course of this derivation, the limits of internalism are discussed, and a distinction is drawn between two senses of the phrase "a person's good".
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  15. added 2019-04-09
    Gott und die Frage nach dem Glück. Anthropologische und ethische Perspektiven.Disse Jörg & Goebel Bernd (eds.) - 2010 - Frankfurt a.M.: Knecht.
    Alle Menschen wollen glücklich sein, das eigentliche Glück aber besteht darin, Gott zu haben, lautet ein Grundsatz der Anthropologie von Augustinus, der das abendländische Menschenbild wesentlich geprägt hat. Doch streben wirklich alle Menschen nach dem Glück als ihrem letzten Ziel? Und kann man die Frage nach dem Glück wirklich mit Gott in Verbindung bringen, Gott womöglich selbst mit dem ersehnten Glück identifizieren? Welche Rolle kommt Gott in einer Ethik des Glücks, welche Rolle in einer nicht am Glück orientierten Ethik zu? (...)
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  16. added 2019-04-05
    Desiderium: Eine Philosophie des Verlangens.Jörg Disse - 2016 - Kohlhammer.
    What do human beings desire? Desire is diverse, multi-layered, often contradictory, directed to the most various goals: from the satisfaction of the simplest, biologically-related needs, such as hunger, thirst, or sexuality, to elaborate forms of desire for self-realization, social recognition or religious experience. But what is the ultimate goal of desire? Is there such a goal? The book examines desire as a phenomenon in the intersection area of anthropological and psychological philosophy. It deals with the anthropological principle, indicated in Plato (...)
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  17. added 2019-04-05
    Glück - Vollkommenheit - Gott. Reflexionen zu einer Metaphysik des Verlangens.Jörg Disse - 2010 - In Jörg Disse Bernd Goebel (ed.), Gott und die Frage nach dem Glück. Anthropologische und ethische Perspektiven. Verlag Josef Knecht. pp. 253-290.
    Analysis of a basic idea of Christian anthropology: that human desire is ultimately a desire of God.
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  18. added 2019-04-05
    Religion und das Verlangen des Menschen nach Vollkommenheit.Jörg Disse - 2010 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 52 (3):247-267.
    The article deals with the question of whether human beings are religious by nature. The answer is based on the idea of relating religion to the structure of human desire understood as essentially a desire for absolute perfection. Religion is defined as a relation to a non-sensual reality superior to the human realm which enables human beings to find orientation in life. The relationship of religion to human desire consists in its being an expression of a natural desire for a (...)
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  19. added 2019-04-05
    Religion oder das natürliche Verlangen des Menschen nach Gott. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Sigmund Freud.Jörg Disse - 2007 - In Hermann Deuser (ed.), Metaphysik und Religion. Die Wiederentdeckung eines Zusammenhanges. Gütersloher Verlagshaus. pp. 154-175.
    The article justifies the (augustinian or thomistic) idea of a natural desire for God through a critical analysis of Freud's understanding of culture and religion.
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  20. added 2019-04-05
    Menschliche Psyche und Gottesverhältnis: Kierkegaard versus Freud.Jörg Disse - 2003 - Theologie Und Philosophie 78 (4).
    Compares Freud's conception of religion being negative for the health of our psyche to Kierkegaard's theory of stages culminating in the necessity of a relationship to God for self-realization.
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  21. added 2019-03-27
    CHOICE: an Objective, Voluntaristic Theory of Prudential Value.Walter Horn - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):191-215.
    It is customary to think that Objective List (“OL), Desire-Satisfaction (“D-S”) and Hedonistic (“HED”) theories of prudential value pretty much cover the waterfront, and that those of the three that are “subjective” are naturalistic (in the sense attacked by Moore, Ross and Ewing), while those that are “objective” must be Platonic, Aristotelian or commit the naturalist fallacy. I here argue for a theory that is both naturalistic (because voluntaristic) and objective but neither Platonic, Aristotelian, nor (I hope) fallacious. In addition, (...)
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  22. added 2019-03-11
    Why Subjectivists About Welfare Needn't Idealize.Eden Lin - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):2-23.
    It is commonly thought that subjectivists about welfare must claim that the favorable attitudes whose satisfaction is relevant to your well-being are those that you would have in idealized conditions (e.g. ones in which you are fully informed and rational). I argue that this is false. I introduce a non-idealizing subjectivist view, Same World Subjectivism, that accommodates the two main rationales for idealizing: those given by Peter Railton and David Sobel. I also explain why a recent argument from Dale Dorsey (...)
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  23. added 2019-01-22
    Descartes's Nomic Concurrentism: Finite Causation and Divine Concurrence.Andrew Pessin - 2003 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.
  24. added 2018-11-29
    Evolution and Utilitarianism.François Jaquet - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1151-1161.
    Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer have recently provided an evolutionary argument for utilitarianism. They argue that most of our deontological beliefs were shaped by evolution, from which they conclude that these beliefs are unjustified. By contrast, they maintain that the utilitarian belief that everyone’s well-being matters equally is immune to such debunking arguments because it wasn’t similarly influenced. However, Guy Kahane remarks that this belief lacks substantial content unless it is paired with an account of well-being, and he adds (...)
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  25. added 2018-11-23
    David Sobel, From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism , Pp. Vii + 312. [REVIEW]Owen C. King - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):203-207.
    This is a review of David Sobel's monograph, From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism.
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  26. added 2018-10-05
    On Two Interpretations of the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Prudential Value.Joseph van Weelden - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):137-156.
    This article considers two different ways of formulating a desire-satisfaction theory of prudential value. The first version of the theory (the object view) assigns basic prudential value to the state of affairs that is the object of a person’s desire. The second version (the combo view) assigns basic prudential value to the compound state of affairs in which (a) a person desires some state of affairs and (b) this state of affairs obtains. My aims in this article are twofold. First, (...)
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  27. added 2018-09-06
    A Stringent but Critical Actualist Subjectivism About Well-Being.Stéphane Lemaire - 2016 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3):133-150.
    Stéphane Lemaire | : Subjectivists about well-being claim that an object is good for someone if and only if this individual holds a certain type of pro-attitude toward this object. In this paper, I focus on the dispute among subjectivists that opposes those who think that the relevant pro-attitudes are actual to those who think that they are counterfactual under some idealized conditions. My main claim is that subjectivism should be stringently actualist, though our actual pro-attitudes may be criticized from (...)
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  28. added 2018-08-28
    The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, McGill University
    In this dissertation, I argue that all extant theories of prudential value are either a) enumeratively deficient, in that they are unable to accommodate everything that, intuitively, is a basic constituent of prudential value, b) explanatorily deficient, in that they are at least sometimes unable to offer a plausible story about what makes a given thing prudentially valuable, or c) both. In response to the unsatisfactory state of the literature, I present my own account, the Disjunctive Hybrid Theory or DHT. (...)
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  29. added 2018-06-28
    Ethical Issues in Designing Interventions for Behavioural Change.Gyunchan Thomas Jun, Neil Sinclair & Fernando Carvalho - 2018 - Proceedings of Design Research Society 2018, Volume 1.
  30. added 2018-05-31
    Preferences’ Significance Does Not Depend on Their Content.Evan G. Williams - 2014 - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):211-234.
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 Moral theories which include a preference-fulfillment aspect should not restrict their concern to some subset of people’s preferences such as “now-for-now” preferences. Instead, preferences with all contents—e.g. ones which are external, diachronic, or even modal—should be taken into account. I offer a conceptualization of preferences and preference fulfillment which allows us to understand odd species of preferences, and I give a series of examples showing what it would mean to fulfill such preferences and why we (...)
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  31. added 2018-03-13
    Is Utilitarianism Bad for Women?H. E. Baber - 2017 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4).
    Open access: Philosophers and policy-makers concerned with the ethics, economics, and politics of development argue that the phenomenon of “adaptive preference” makes preference-utilitarian measures of well-being untenable. Poor women in the Global South, they suggest, adapt to deprivation and oppression and may come to prefer states of affairs that are not conducive to flourishing. This critique, however, assumes a questionable understanding of preference utilitarianism and, more fundamentally, of the concept of preference that figures in such accounts. If well-being is understood (...)
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  32. added 2018-03-05
    Quand nos émotions sont-elles raisonnables?Stéphane Lemaire - 2016 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141 (2):215-234.
    Nous jugeons les réponses émotionnelles comme plus ou moins raisonnables étant donné leur objet et le contexte. Je soutiens que la légitimité de ces jugements repose sur le caractère raisonnable des désirs ou des dispositions émotionnelles qui expliquent ces réponses émotionnelles. Il est déraisonnable d’être triste de ne pas satisfaire un désir déraisonnable. Mais comment un désir peut-il être déraisonnable ? Je rejette l’idée selon laquelle les désirs seraient raisonnables parce que cohérents. Je suggère que nos désirs et nos dispositions (...)
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  33. added 2018-01-26
    Well-Being and Animals.Christopher Rice - 2016 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 378-388.
    This essay examines several competing accounts of what makes life go well for non-human animals, including prominent subjective and objective theories of animal well-being.
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  34. added 2017-12-23
    The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.Olle Risberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):542-559.
    According to many popular views in normative ethics, meta-ethics and axiology, facts about what we ought to do or what is good for us depend on facts about the attitudes that some agent would have in some relevant idealized circumstances. This paper presents an unrecognized structural problem for such views which threatens to be devastating.
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  35. added 2017-12-04
    Asymmetrism About Desire Satisfactionism and Time.Eden Lin - 2017 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 7. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 161-183.
    Desire-satisfaction theories of welfare must answer the timing question: when do you benefit from the satisfaction of one of your desires? There are three existing views about this: the Time of Desire view, on which you benefit at just those times when you have the desire; the Time of Object view, on which you benefit just when the object of your desire obtains; and Concurrentism, on which you benefit just when you have the desire and its object obtains. This paper (...)
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  36. added 2017-11-20
    Achievement, Enjoyment, and the Things We Care About: A Theory of Personal Well-Being.Jason R. Raibley - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    This dissertation develops a theory of personal well-being---i.e., a theory of what is it for a person's life to go well for them. The proposed theory is called "the successful activity view of well-being." It is an end-neutral account of individual welfare that primarily values the pursuit, achievement, and enjoyment of ends that are important to a person. The parts of this process---e.g., the pursuit of ends, the achievement of ends, the enjoyment of activities and situations, and even the satisfaction (...)
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  37. added 2017-11-08
    The Experience Machine Objection to Desire Satisfactionism.Dan Lowe & Joseph Stenberg - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):247-263.
    It is widely held that the Experience Machine is the basis of a serious objection to Hedonistic theories of welfare. It is also widely held that Desire Satisfactionist theories of welfare can readily avoid problems stemming from the Experience Machine. But in this paper, we argue that if the Experience Machine poses a serious problem for Hedonism, it also poses a serious problem for Desire Satisfactionism. We raise two objections to Desire Satisfactionism, each of which relies on the Experience Machine. (...)
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  38. added 2017-11-08
    Dead and Gone.Joyce L. Jenkins - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (2):228-234.
    I argue that desire satisfaction theories of welfare are not committed to the view that changes in welfare levels can happen after death, or that events that occur after death impact the agent's welfare levels now. My argument is that events that occur after death have only epistemological import. They may reveal that the person was successful (unsuccessful) in life, but the desire was already frustrated or satisfied before the person died. The virtue of the account is that it gives (...)
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  39. added 2017-10-23
    Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being?Chris Heathwood - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):664-688.
    The desire-satisfaction theory of well-being says, in its simplest form, that a person’s level of welfare is determined by the extent to which their desires are satisfied. A question faced by anyone attracted to such a view is, *Which desires*? This paper proposes a new answer to this question by characterizing a distinction among desires that isn’t much discussed in the well-being literature. This is the distinction between what a person wants in a merely behavioral sense, in that the person (...)
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  40. added 2017-10-18
    Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences.Ben Colburn - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1):52-71.
    Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the options we have available. Jon Elster has argued that this is bad because it undermines our autonomy. I agree, but think that Elster's explanation of why is lacking. So, I draw on a richer account of autonomy to give the following answer. Preferences formed through adaptation are characterized by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily unaware), and covert influence undermines our (...)
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  41. added 2017-10-03
    Local Desire Satisfaction and Long Term Wellbeing: Revisiting the Gout Sufferer of Kant’s Groundwork.Alice Pinheiro Walla - 2015 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual.
    In this paper, I analyze the least discussed of Kant’s four examples of duty in the first section of his Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals: the gout sufferer who is no longer motivated by natural interest in his long-term wellbeing, and is thus in a unique position to secure his own happiness from duty. This example has long been wrongly interpreted as a failure of prudential rationality, as recently illustrated by Allen Wood’s reading of that example. -/- I argue (...)
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  42. added 2017-09-03
    Desire Satisfaction, Death, and Time.Duncan Purves - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):799-819.
    Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in (...)
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  43. added 2017-08-05
    Désir (Avancé).Federico Lauria - 2017 - Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    Les désirs sont centraux pour agir et être heureux. Qu’est-ce qu’un désir ? En quoi les désirs sont-ils importants ? Dans cette entrée, nous tenterons de mettre les mots sur cette expérience si familière et pourtant négligée par la philosophie contemporaine. (1) En guise de préliminaires, nous délimiterons notre objet d’étude à la lumière des principales distinctions entre les désirs et d’autres états mentaux tels que les croyances et intentions, ainsi qu’à l’aide des distinctions classiques parmi les désirs. (2) Notre (...)
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  44. added 2017-07-01
    Enumeration and Explanation in Theories of Welfare.Eden Lin - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):65-73.
    It has become commonplace to distinguish enumerative theories of welfare, which tell us which things are good for us, from explanatory theories, which tell us why the things that are good for us have that status. It has also been claimed that while hedonism and objective list theories are enumerative but not explanatory, desire satisfactionism is explanatory but not enumerative. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. When properly understood, every major theory of welfare is both enumerative and (...)
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  45. added 2017-06-10
    Review of David Sobel's From Valuing to Value. [REVIEW]Ben Bramble - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 201705:2017.05.13.
  46. added 2017-06-07
    Real Desires and Well-Being.Joseph Mendola - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):148-165.
    ‘Simple desire-based accounts’ of individual good or well-being identify an individual’s good with the satisfaction of their actual desires. I will defend one version.
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  47. added 2017-03-14
    Depression and the Problem of Absent Desires.Ian Tully - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-16.
    I argue that consideration of certain cases of severe depression reveals a problem for desire-based theories of welfare. I first show that depression can result in a person losing her desires and then identify a case wherein it seems right to think that, as a result of very severe depression, the individuals described no longer have any desires whatsoever. I argue that the state these people are in is a state of profound ill-being: their lives are going very poorly for (...)
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  48. added 2017-02-09
    Mark Overvold’s Contribution to Philosophy.Brad Hooker - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:333-344.
    The prevailing theory of self-interest (personal utility or individual welfare) holds that one’s Iife goes well to the extent that one’s desires are fulfilled. In a couple of seminal papers, Overvold raised a devastating objection to this theory---namely that the theory (added to commonsensical beliefs about the nature of action) makes self-sacrifice logically impossible. He then proposed an appealing revision of the prevailing theory, one which provided adequate logical space for self-sacrifice. And he analyzed his revised theory’s implications for the (...)
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  49. added 2017-02-09
    Plato's Theory of Desire.Charles H. Kahn - 1987 - Review of Metaphysics 41 (1):77 - 103.
    My aim here is to make sense of Plato's account of desire in the middle dialogues. To do that I need to unify or reconcile what are at first sight two quite different accounts: the doctrine of eros in the Symposium and the tripartite theory of motivation in the Republic. It may be that the two theories are after all irreconcilable, that Plato simply changed his mind on the nature of human desire after writing the Symposium and before composing the (...)
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  50. added 2017-01-29
    Self-Interest, Self-Sacrifice, and the Satisfaction of Desires.Mark Carl Overvold - 1976 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
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