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Summary Determinism is a claim about the laws of nature. Events are determined if the laws of nature, together with the total set of facts prevailing at a moment in time, are sufficient to settle precisely what happens at the next and each subsequent moment of time. Determinism thus rules out chanciness in a central sense of that word. The free will debate has been centrally concerned with whether determinism is incompatible with freedom: many philosophers worry that if how agents act is always settled prior to their action (settled even prior to their birth) than we lack free will.
Key works The key works on the compatibility question are more or less coextensive with the key works on free will, since the first issue has been so central to the second. I shall not list those works here. Important papers that explore the nature of determinism itself as it pertains to free will includeBerofsky 1971; the two volumes of Honderich 1988 and Earman 2004.
Introductions Honderich 1973;Kane 2002
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521 found
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  1. Eastern Determinism Reconsidered From a Scientific Point of View.Takehisa Abe & Fusako Kobayashi - 2002 - In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 485.
  2. Causal Decision Theory and the Fixity of the Past.Arif Ahmed - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):665-685.
    Causal decision theory (CDT) cares only about the effects of a contemplated act, not its causes. The article constructs a case in which CDT consequently recommends a bet that the agent is certain to lose, rather than a bet that she is certain to win. CDT is plainly giving wrong advice in this case. It therefore stands refuted. 1 The Argument2 The Argument in More Detail2.1 The betting mechanism2.2 Soft determinism2.3 The content of P 2.4 The argument again3 The Descriptive (...)
  3. Mill and Carlyle: An Examination of Mr. John Stuart Mill's Doctrine of Causation in Relation to Moral Freedom with an Occasional Discourse on Sauerteig by Smelfungus [I.E. P. P. Alexander]. [REVIEW]Patrick Proctor Alexander - 1866 - Norwood Editions.
  4. Evolution, Human Behavior, and Determinism.Richard D. Alexander - 1976 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:3 - 21.
  5. Review: The Roots of Biological Determinism. [REVIEW]Garland E. Allen - 1984 - Journal of the History of Biology 17 (1):141 - 145.
  6. Determinism and Ethics.John Anderson - 1928 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241 – 255.
  7. Indeterminism and the Direction of Time.Frank Arntzenius - 1995 - Topoi 14 (1):67-81.
    Many phenomena in the world display a striking time-asymmetry: the forwards transition frequencies are approximately invariant while the backwards ones are not. I argue in this paper that theories of such phenomena will entail that time has a direction, and that quantum mechanics in particular entails that the future is objectively different from the past.
  8. Looking to the Future.Mahnoush Arsanjani, Jacob Cogan, Robert Sloane & Siegfried Wiessner (eds.) - 2010 - M. Nijhoff.
  9. Determinism, Indeterminism and the Flow of Time.Miloš Arsenijević - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):123 - 150.
    A set of axioms implicitly defining the standard, though not instant-based but interval-based, time topology is used as a basis to build a temporal modal logic of events. The whole apparatus contains neither past, present, and future operators nor indexicals, but only B-series relations and modal operators interpreted in the standard way. Determinism and indeterminism are then introduced into the logic of events via corresponding axioms. It is shown that, if determinism and indeterminism are understood in accordance with their core (...)
  10. A New Theory of Free Will.Marcus Arvan - 2013 - Philosophical Forum 44 (1):1-48.
    This paper shows that several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that physical (...)
  11. Preface.Harald Atmanspacher - manuscript
    The machine sculpture “Klamauk” (English: hubbub) by the Swiss artist Jean Tinguely (1925–1991), featured on the cover, looks like a perfect example of a deterministic process, but it also looks as if thrown together “by chance”. This tension between determinism and chance has been of longstanding concern in the sciences and the humanities. And nowhere is this tension stronger than in debates about free will and our place in the world, where determinism seems bound to crowd freedom out of the (...)
  12. Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism.Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.) - 2002 - Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
    These and other questions emphasize the fact that chance and choice are two leading actors on stage whenever issues of determinism are under discussion. ...
  13. On Determinacy or its Absence in the Brain.Harald Atmanspacher & Stefan Rotter - 2011 - In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
    This chapter analyzes the different ways to describe brain behaviour with the goal to provide a basis for an informed discussion of the nature of decisions and actions that humans perform in their lives. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a number of concepts exhibiting how many subtle details and distinctions lie behind the broad notions of determinacy and stochasticity. These details are necessary for a discussion, in Section 3, of particular aspects relevant for the characterization of (...)
  14. Predictability in Life and in Science.Vilhelm Aubert - 1961 - Inquiry 4 (1-4):131 – 147.
    It is a significant coincidence that social science tends to assume a universal human need for predictability, and also uses predictive power as the basic criterion of scientific truth. It is claimed here that man's need for predictability often is crossed by a need for uncertainty and chance. Thus it seems doubtful that the methodological canon of predictability can be anchored in the universal usefulness of social predictions. Some important cases of decision?making seem to be more concerned with the past (...)
  15. The Refutation of Determinism.Michael R. Ayers - 1968 - Methuen.
  16. Foundations of Social Determinism.J. A. B. - 1960 - Review of Metaphysics 14 (1):173-173.
  17. Humean Libertarianism: Outline of a Revisionist Account of the Joint Problem of Free Will, Determinism, and Laws of Nature.M. Backmann - 2013 - Berlin/New York.
    3 LIBERTARIANISM Now that we have discussed determinism and laws of nature, let us finally turn to libertarianism. Traditionally, libertarianism has been viewed as an incompatibilist theory of free will, as it requires the existence of real ...
  18. Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
    There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.
  19. Free Will.Mark Balaguer - 2014 - MIT Press.
    A philosopher considers whether the scientific and philosophical arguments against free will are reason enough to give up our belief in it.
  20. Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the Social Sciences.Clint Ballinger - unknown
    This article shows how the social sciences rejected hard determinism by the mid-twentieth century largely on the deontological basis that it is irreconcilable with social justice, yet this rejection came just before a burst of creative development in consequentialist theories of social justice that problematize a facile rejection of determinism on moral grounds, a development that has seldom been recognized in the social sciences. Thus the current social science view of determinism and social justice is antiquated, ignoring numerous common and (...)
  21. Indeterminacy and Freedom: A Reappraisal.Ian Barbour - 1955 - Philosophy of Science 22 (1):8-20.
  22. The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology.Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291-309.
    In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
  23. Tolstoy on Free Will.Joe Barnhart - 1995 - The Personalist Forum 11 (1):33-54.
  24. Review: Social Implications of Biological Determinism. [REVIEW]Doris Bartlett & Francis Bartlett - 1971 - Science and Society 35 (2):209 - 219.
  25. Incommensurable Goods, Alternative Possibilities, and the Self-Refutation of the Self-Refutation of Determinism.M. Baur - 2005 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 50 (1):165-171.
  26. Free Choice.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):12-24.
    There are two inspirations for the theory presented. One is the Kantian idea that a free choice affects a deterministic sequence of events globally rather than just locally. The second is the Leibnizian idea that God chooses for actuality the possible world he deems best. But instead of God choosing, suppose free agents collectively do. Let actuality be an office which deterministic possible worlds are voted in and not of. In this way free choice can change things even if every (...)
  27. What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism?Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (8):2025-2049.
    Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features. We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were possible (...)
  28. James and the Rationality of Determinism.Robert W. Beard - 1967 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 (2):149-156.
  29. Leibniz on Determinism and Divine Foreknowledge.Endre Begby - 2005 - Studia Leibnitiana 37 (1):83-98.
    Nach Michael J. Murrays Aufsatz „Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom" ist Leibniz nicht als Kompatibilist zu verstehen. Die göttliche Vorhersehung beruhe nicht darauf, dass menschliche Handlungen mechanischen Gesetzen von Ursache und Wirkung (causa efficiens) gehorchen, sondern auf den für diese Handlungen spezifischen geistigen Gesetzen (causa finalis, moralische Gesetze, etc.). In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich, dass Murray die Tragweite des Grundsatzes vom hinreichenden Grund in Leibniz' Philosophie nicht richtig versteht. Des Weiteren zeige ich, dass die Unterscheidung (...)
  30. Doxastic Determinism.Steve Bein - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 33:5-12.
    Hard determinism is hardly a new position, but the most common arguments are not widely convincing. Theological arguments rest on the oversight or control of a supernatural entity, and so are not convincing to any who do not share the metaphysical assumptions latent in the argument. Psychological arguments reston putatively scientific claims that, if examined more closely, seem not to be scientific at all. A doxastic argument avoids these pitfalls. According to this doxastic argument, beliefs are not freely chosen, for (...)
  31. From Newtonian Determinism to Branching-Space-Time Indeterminism.Nuel Belnap - manuscript
  32. Two Moves Take Newtonian Determinism to Branching Space-Times.Nuel Belnap - unknown
    “Branching space-times” is intended as a representation of objective, event-based indeterminism. As such, BST exhibits both a spatio-temporal aspect and an indeterministic “modal” aspect of alternative possible historical courses of events. An essential feature of BST is that it can also represent spatial or space-like relationships as part of its relativistic theory of spatio-temporal relations; this ability is essential for the representation of local indeterminism. This essay indicates how BST might be seen to grow out of Newton ’s deterministic and (...)
  33. Branching Histories Approach to Indeterminism and Free Will.Nuel Belnap - unknown
    An informal sketch is offered of some chief ideas of the (formal) ``branching histories'' theory of objective possibility, free will and indeterminism. Reference is made to ``branching time'' and to ``branching space-times,'' with emphasis on a theme that they share: Objective possibilities are in Our World, organized by the relation of causal order.
  34. Newtonian Determinism to Branching Space-Times Indeterminism in Two Moves.Nuel Belnap - 2012 - Synthese 188 (1):5-21.
    “Branching space-times” (BST) is intended as a representation of objective, event-based indeterminism. As such, BST exhibits both a spatio-temporal aspect and an indeterministic “modal” aspect of alternative possible historical courses of events. An essential feature of BST is that it can also represent spatial or space-like relationships as part of its (more or less) relativistic theory of spatio-temporal relations; this ability is essential for the representation of local (in contrast with “global”) indeterminism. This essay indicates how BST might be seen (...)
  35. Branching and (in)Determinism.Jiri Benovsky - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):151-173.
    At a first glance, and even at a second one, it seems that if time is linear the threat of determinism is more severe than if time is branching, since in the latter case the future is open in a way it is not in the former one where, so to speak, there exists only one branch – one future. In this paper, I want to give a 'third glance' at this claim. I acknowledge that such a claim is intuitive (...)
  36. Time and Free Will, Tr. By F.L. Pogson.Henri Louis Bergson & Frank Lubecki Pogson - 1910
  37. On Causal Inference in Determinism and Indeterminism.Joseph Berkovitz - 2002 - In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 237--278.
  38. Justification and Determinism - An Exchange.Mark Bernstein - 1988 - The Monist 71 (3):358-364.
  39. XIII. Psychological Determinism.Bernard Berofsky - 2015 - In Determinism. Princeton University Press. pp. 298-324.
  40. Determinism.Bernard Berofsky - 1971 - Princeton University Press.
  41. Free Will and Determinism.Bernard Berofsky (ed.) - 1966 - Harper & Row.
  42. Phl 341f Free Will and Determinism.Bernard Berofsky, I. Wilks & Erindale College - 1995 - Custom Publishing Service, University of Toronto Bookstores.
  43. Determinism and Social Science.Rajeev Bhargava - 1992 - In Jayant Vishnu Narlikar, Indu Banga & Chhanda Gupta (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Perspectives From Natural and Social Sciences. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. pp. 40--151.
  44. Joachim Metallmann-Causality, Determinism and Science.Tomasz Bigaj - 2001 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 74:53-64.
  45. On the Separability of Prediction and Determinism.R. C. Bishop - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58:169-188.
  46. Contemporary Views on Compatibilism and Incompatibilism: Dennett and Kane.Robert Bishop - 2009 - Mind and Matter 7 (1):91-110.
    For a long time, Daniel Dennett, like many philosophers, has been trying to understand how to make room for free will in a world of ordered causes. A core feature of Dennett's view on these matters is that the world is deterministic and his approach to this project has been to show how determinism really is our friend rather than our enemy . His most recent foray into this arena is the ambitious book, Freedom Evolves, where he once again seeks (...)
  47. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy.Susanne Bobzien - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, moral character, fatalism, logical determinism and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.
  48. Determinism and Free Will in Stoic Philosophy.Susanne Bobzien - 1993
  49. The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line.Andrea Borghini & Giuliano Torrengo - 2013 - In F. Correia & A. Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree. Semantical and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 105-125.
    There seems to be a minimal core that every theory wishing to accommodate the intuition that the future is open must contain: a denial of physical determinism (i.e. the thesis that what future states the universe will be in is implied by what states it has been in), and a denial of strong fatalism (i.e. the thesis that, at every time, what will subsequently be the case is metaphysically necessary).1 Those two requirements are often associated with the idea of an (...)
  50. Determinizm I Nravstvennoe Povedenie Lichnosti.M. I. Borovskij - 1974 - Springer.
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