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Summary Articles in this category pertain to questions about how the ability to reason about psychological states (such as beliefs, desires, perspectives, and emotions) changes over the course of development. 
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236 found
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1 — 50 / 236
  1. added 2020-03-02
    Interacting with Fictions: The Role of Pretend Play in Theory of Mind Acquisition.Merel Semeijn - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):113-132.
    Pretend play is generally considered to be a developmental landmark in Theory of Mind acquisition. The aim of the present paper is to offer a new account of the role of pretend play in Theory of Mind development. To this end I combine Hutto and Gallagher’s account of social cognition development with Matravers’ recent argument that the cognitive processes involved in engagement with narratives are neutral regarding fictionality. The key contribution of my account is an analysis of pretend play as (...)
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  2. added 2019-12-09
    Theory, Simulation, and Neurological Similarity: Theory of Mind after 40 Years.Ali Yousefi Heris - 2018 - Eshare: An Iranian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):12-38.
    One of the central problems in cognitive science concerns our ability to understand others in terms of mental state attribution. We, humans, think of each other as having minds, an assumption which indeed forms the basis of our daily communication: by attributing mental state we understand and predict each other’s behavior. But what mechanisms underpin this ability? This is a question that has preoccupied philosophers and cognitive scientists for more than four decades. In this paper, I will examine two dominant (...)
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  3. added 2019-11-04
    The Nature of Empathy.Shannon Spaulding, Hannah Read & Rita Svetlova - forthcoming - In Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Philosophy of Neursocience. MIT Press.
    Empathy is many things to many people. Depending on who you ask, it is feeling what another person feels, feeling bad for another person’s suffering, understanding what another person feels, imagining yourself in another person’s situation and figuring out what you would feel, or your brain activating as if you were experiencing the emotion another person is experiencing. These are just some of the various notions of empathy that are at play in philosophy, cognitive science, neuroscience, developmental psychology, and primatology. (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-09
    Developmental Transformations in Attachment in Middle Childhood.Kathryn A. Kerns - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):33-34.
    The target article proposes a model to explain the emergence of sex differences in attachment in middle childhood and their implications for reproductive strategies. While biological factors are prominent in the model, little is said about the social context of middle childhood and its contributions. There is also a need to clarify the fundamental nature of attachment in middle childhood.
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    The Theory of Mind Module in Evolutionary Psychology.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (3):305-321.
  6. added 2019-06-05
    The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind.Julian Kiverstein (ed.) - 2016 - Routledge.
    The idea that humans are by nature social and political animals can be traced back to Aristotle. More recently, it has also generated great interest and controversy in related disciplines such as anthropology, biology, psychology, neuroscience and even economics. What is it about humans that enabled them to construct a social reality of unrivalled complexity? Is there something distinctive about the human mind that explains how social lives are organised around conventions, norms, and institutions? The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of (...)
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  7. added 2019-05-17
    Introspection, Mindreading, and the Transparency of Belief.Uwe Peters - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1086-1102.
    This paper explores the nature of self-knowledge of beliefs by investigating the relationship between self-knowledge of beliefs and one's knowledge of other people's beliefs. It introduces and defends a new account of self-knowledge of beliefs according to which this type of knowledge is developmentally interconnected with and dependent on resources already used for acquiring knowledge of other people's beliefs, which is inferential in nature. But when these resources are applied to oneself, one attains and subsequently frequently uses a method for (...)
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  8. added 2019-02-22
    Critical Note: How Revisionary Are 4E Accounts of Social Cognition?Mitchell Herschbach - 2018 - In Albert Newen, Leon De Bruin & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition. Oxford, UK: pp. 513-525.
    I argue that the chapters in this section only modestly challenge the “traditional min- dreading account,” which sees the capacity for mental state attribution as central to human social cognition. This internalist, cognitivist account has already been refined in recent years to give greater attention to unreflective, dynamic social interaction and non-mindreading processes. The chapters here support a kind of embodied social cognition that does not involve mindreading. They also support the idea that an embedded/situated cognition perspective can inform the (...)
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  9. added 2018-09-24
    Gricean Communication, Language Development, and Animal Minds.Richard Moore - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (12):e12550.
    Humans alone acquire language. According to one influen- tial school of thought, we do this because we possess a uniquely human ability to act with and attribute “Gricean” communicative intentions. A challenge for this view is that attributing communicative intent seems to require cognitive abilities that infant language learners lack. After considering a range of responses to this challenge, I argue that infant language development can be explained, because Gricean communication is cognitively less demanding than many suppose. However, a consequence (...)
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  10. added 2018-03-05
    A Unified Account of General Learning Mechanisms and Theory‐of‐Mind Development.Theodore Bach - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (3):351-381.
    Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment of relational structure that (...)
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  11. added 2018-02-17
    Cognitive Individualism and the Child as Scientist Program.Bill Wringe - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (4):518-529.
    n this paper, I examine the charge that Gopnik and Meltzoff’s ‘Child as Scientist’ program, outlined and defended in their 1997 book Words, Thoughts and Theories is vitiated by a form of ‘cognitive individualism’ about science. Although this charge has often been leveled at Gopnik and Meltzoff’s work, it has rarely been developed in any detail. -/- I suggest that we should distinguish between two forms of cognitive individualism which I refer to as ‘ontic’ and ‘epistemic’ cognitive individualism (OCI and (...)
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  12. added 2017-11-30
    On the Uniqueness of Human Normative Attitudes.Marco F. H. Schmidt & Hannes Rakoczy - forthcoming - In Kurt Bayertz & Neil Roughley (eds.), The normative animal? On the anthropological significance of social, moral and linguistic norms. Oxford University Press.
    Humans are normative beings through and through. This capacity for normativity lies at the core of uniquely human forms of understanding and regulating socio-cultural group life. Plausibly, therefore, the hominin lineage evolved specialized social-cognitive, motivational, and affective abilities that helped create, transmit, preserve, and amend shared social practices. In turn, these shared normative attitudes and practices shaped subsequent human phylogeny, constituted new forms of group life, and hence structured human ontogeny, too. An essential aspect of human ontogeny is therefore its (...)
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  13. added 2017-11-30
    Mental Files Theory of Mind: When Do Children Consider Agents Acquainted with Different Object Identities?Michael Huemer, Josef Perner & Brian Leahy - 2018 - Cognition 171:122-129.
  14. added 2017-11-30
    ‘I Don't Know’: Children's Early Talk About Knowledge.Paul L. Harris, Bei Yang & Yixin Cui - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):283-307.
    Children's utterances from late infancy to 3 years of age were examined to infer their conception of knowledge. In Study 1, the utterances of two English-speaking children were analysed and in Study 2, the utterances of a Mandarin-speaking child were analysed – in both studies, for their use of the verb know. Both studies confirmed that know and not know were used to affirm, query or deny knowledge, especially concerning an ongoing topic of conversation. References to a third party were (...)
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  15. added 2017-11-30
    Executive Function Depletion in Children and its Impact on Theory of Mind.Lindsey J. Powell & Susan Carey - 2017 - Cognition 164:150-162.
  16. added 2017-11-30
    The Construction of Self in Relationships: Narratives and References to Mental States During Picture-Book Reading Interactions Between Mothers and Children.Rollo Dolores, Longobardi Emiddia, Spataro Pietro & Sulla Francesco - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  17. added 2017-11-30
    Early Conversational Environment Enables Spontaneous Belief Attribution in Deaf Children.Marek Meristo, Karin Strid & Erland Hjelmquist - 2016 - Cognition 157:139-145.
  18. added 2017-11-29
    Episodic Memory and Theory of Mind: A Connection Reconsidered.Christoph Hoerl - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):148-160.
    In the literature on episodic memory, one claim that has been made by a number of psychologists, and that is also at least implicit in some of the accounts given by philosophers, is that being able to recollect particular past events in the distinctive way afforded by episodic memory requires the possession of aspects of a theory of mind, such as a grasp of the relationship between one’s present recollective experience and one’s own past perceptual experience of the remembered event. (...)
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  19. added 2017-11-24
    Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind", by Ian Apperly. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (13).
  20. added 2017-11-17
    Proceedings of the Workshop 'Reasoning About Other Minds: Logical and Cognitive Perspectives.J. van Eijck & R. Verbrugge (eds.) - 2011 - WEUR Proceedings.
    In recent years, the human ability to reasoning about mental states of others in order to explain and predict their behavior has come to be a highly active area of research. Researchers from a wide range of fields { from biology and psychology through linguistics to game theory and logic{ contribute new ideas and results. This interdisciplinary workshop, collocated with the Thirteenth International Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XIII), aims to shed light on models of social (...)
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  21. added 2017-10-23
    Social Cognition, Stag Hunts, and the Evolution of Language.Richard Moore - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (6):797-818.
    According to the socio-cognitive revolution hypothesis, humans but not other great apes acquire language because only we possess the socio-cognitive abilities required for Gricean communication, which is a pre-requisite of language development. On this view, language emerged only following a socio-cognitive revolution in the hominin lineage that took place after the split of the Pan-Homo clade. In this paper, I argue that the SCR hypothesis is wrong. The driving forces in language evolution were not sweeping biologically driven changes to hominin (...)
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  22. added 2017-09-09
    Ontogenesis of the Socially Extended Mind.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Cognitive Systems Research 25:40-46.
    I consider the developmental origins of the socially extended mind. First, I argue that, from birth, the physical interventions caregivers use to regulate infant attention and emotion (gestures, facial expressions, direction of gaze, body orientation, patterns of touch and vocalization, etc.) are part of the infant’s socially extended mind; they are external mechanisms that enable the infant to do things she could not otherwise do, cognitively speaking. Second, I argue that these physical interventions encode the norms, values, and patterned practices (...)
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  23. added 2017-08-07
    Ready to Teach or Ready to Learn: A Critique of the Natural Pedagogy Theory.Hisashi Nakao & Kristin Andrews - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):465-483.
    According to the theory of natural pedagogy, humans have a set of cognitive adaptations specialized for transmitting and receiving knowledge through teaching; young children can acquire generalizable knowledge from ostensive signals even in a single interaction, and adults also actively teach young children. In this article, we critically examine the theory and argue that ostensive signals do not always allow children to learn generalizable knowledge more efficiently, and that the empirical evidence provided in favor of the theory of natural pedagogy (...)
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  24. added 2017-08-07
    An Emotion-Cognition Interaction: Emotion Knowledge and Theory of Mind Impact the Development of Emotion Schemas.Adina Seidenfeld - unknown
    Children’s emotion knowledge (EK) influences their current and long-term social functioning. Emotion schemas are theorized to incorporate basic EK and cognitions. The present study of 64 3-to 5-year-old Head Start children explored the relation between two preschool emotion factors (sad bias and caregiver depression) and a cognitive factor (Theory of Mind; TOM) on children’s development of emotion schemas in kindergarten. The results partially supported our hypotheses. TOM moderated the relation between preschool maladaptive EK and emotion schema development. Higher levels of (...)
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  25. added 2017-08-07
    Minding the Developmental Gap: A Theoretical Analysis of the Theory of Mind Data.Dolci Dolcini - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (7-8):37-46.
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  26. added 2017-08-07
    Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind: Articles.Philip Gerrans & Valerie E. Stone - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):121-141.
    Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests (...)
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  27. added 2017-08-07
    Developmental Accounts of Theory-of-Mind Acquisition: Achieving Clarity Via Computational Cognitive Modeling.Bello Paul & Cassimatis Nicholas - unknown
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  28. added 2017-08-07
    Joint Attention and Understanding the Mind.Jane Heal - 2005 - In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Oxford University PressJoint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 34--44.
    It is plausible to think, as many developmental psychologists do, that joint attention is important in the development of getting a full grasp on psychological notions. This chapter argues that this role of joint attention is best understood in the context of the simulation theory about the nature of psychological understanding rather than in the context of the theory. Episodes of joint attention can then be seen not as good occasions for learning a theory of mind but rather as good (...)
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  29. added 2017-08-07
    Modularity in Language and Theory of Mind.Michael Siegal & Luca Surian - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. Oxford University Press. pp. 2--133.
  30. added 2017-08-07
    Why Language Matters for Theory of Mind.Janet W. Astington & Jodie A. Baird - 2005
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  31. added 2017-08-07
    No (Social) Construction Without (Meta-)Representation: Modular Mechanisms as a Basis for the Capacity to Acquire an Understanding of Mind.Tim P. German & Alan M. Leslie - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):106-107.
    Theories that propose a modular basis for developing a “theory of mind” have no problem accommodating social interaction or social environment factors into either the learning process, or into the genotypes underlying the growth of the neurocognitive modules. Instead, they can offer models which constrain and hence explain the mechanisms through which variations in social interaction affect development. Cognitive models of both competence and performance are critical to evaluating the basis of correlations between variations in social interaction and performance on (...)
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  32. added 2017-08-07
    Mindreading, Communication and the Learning of Names for Things.Paul Bloom - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (1-2):37–54.
    There are two facts about word learning that everyone accepts. The first is that words really do have to be learned. There is controversy over how much conceptual structure and linguistic knowledge is innate, but nobody thinks that this is the case for the specific mappings between sounds (or signs) and meanings. This is because these mappings vary arbitrarily from culture to culture. No matter how intelligent a British baby is, for instance, she still has to learn, by attending to (...)
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  33. added 2017-08-07
    Précis of How Children Learn the Meanings of Words.Paul Bloom - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1095-1103.
    Normal children learn tens of thousands of words, and do so quickly and efficiently, often in highly impoverished environments. In How Children Learn the Meanings of Words, I argue that word learning is the product of certain cognitive and linguistic abilities that include the ability to acquire concepts, an appreciation of syntactic cues to meaning, and a rich understanding of the mental states of other people. These capacities are powerful, early emerging, and to some extent uniquely human, but they are (...)
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  34. added 2017-08-07
    Social Cognition, Language Acquisition and the Development of the Theory of Mind.Jay L. Garfield, Candida C. Peterson & Tricia Perry - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (5):494–541.
  35. added 2017-08-07
    Children's Theory of Mind: Fodor's Heuristics Examined.Heinz Wimmer & Viktor Weichbold - 1994 - Cognition 53 (1):45-57.
  36. added 2017-08-07
    Theory of Mind and Autistic Children: Teaching the Appearance-Reality Distinction.Elizabeth Margaret Starr - unknown
    In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Special Education, Department of Educational Psychology.
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  37. added 2017-08-07
    A Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind.J. A. Fodor - 1992 - Cognition 44 (3):283-296.
  38. added 2017-08-07
    From Simulation to Folk Psychology: The Case for Development.P. F. Harris - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):120-144.
  39. added 2017-07-20
    Solving the Puzzle About Early Belief‐Ascription.Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):438-469.
    Developmental psychology currently faces a deep puzzle: most children before 4 years of age fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but preverbal infants demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Two main strategies are available: cultural constructivism and early-belief understanding. The latter view assumes that failure at elicited-response false-belief tasks need not reflect the inability to understand false beliefs. The burden of early-belief understanding is to explain why elicited-response false-belief tasks are so challenging for most children under 4 years of age. The goal of this (...)
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  40. added 2017-07-20
    Two Systems for Mindreading?Peter Carruthers - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):141-162.
    A number of two-systems accounts have been proposed to explain the apparent discrepancy between infants’ early success in nonverbal mindreading tasks, on the one hand, and the failures of children younger than four to pass verbally-mediated false-belief tasks, on the other. Many of these accounts have not been empirically fruitful. This paper focuses, in contrast, on the two-systems proposal put forward by Ian Apperly and colleagues. This has issued in a number of new findings. The present paper shows that the (...)
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  41. added 2017-07-20
    Perceptual Access Reasoning: Developmental Stage or System 1 Heuristic?Joseph Hedger - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):207-226.
    In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained (...)
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  42. added 2017-07-20
    How Children and Adults Represent God's Mind.Larisa Heiphetz, Jonathan D. Lane, Adam Waytz & Liane L. Young - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (1):121-144.
    For centuries, humans have contemplated the minds of gods. Research on religious cognition is spread across sub-disciplines, making it difficult to gain a complete understanding of how people reason about gods' minds. We integrate approaches from cognitive, developmental, and social psychology and neuroscience to illuminate the origins of religious cognition. First, we show that although adults explicitly discriminate supernatural minds from human minds, their implicit responses reveal far less discrimination. Next, we demonstrate that children's religious cognition often matches adults' implicit (...)
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  43. added 2017-07-20
    Narratives, Culture, and Folk Psychology.Anika Fiebich - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):135-149.
    In this paper, I aim to determine to what extent contemporary cross-cultural and developmental research can shed light on the role that narrative practices might play in the development of folk psychology. In particular, I focus on the role of narrative practices in the development of false belief understanding, which has been regarded as a milestone in the development of folk psychology. Second, I aim to discuss possible cognitive procedures that may underlie successful performance in false belief tasks. Methodologically, I (...)
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  44. added 2017-07-20
    I Know You See It Wrong! Children Use Others’ False Perceptions to Predict Their Behaviors.Carla Krachun & Robert Lurz - 2016 - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 150:380-395.
    Research on children’s ability to attribute false mental states to others has focused exclusively on false beliefs. We developed a novel paradigm that focuses instead on another type of false mental state: false perceptions. From approximately 4 years of age, children begin to recognize that their perception of an illusory object can be at odds with its true properties. Our question was whether they also recognize that another individual viewing the object will similarly experience a false perception. We tested 33 (...)
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  45. added 2017-07-20
    Pedagogy and Social Learning in Human Development.Richard Moore - 2016 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. Routledge. pp. 35-52.
  46. added 2017-07-20
    Pro-Social Cognition: Helping, Practical Reasons, and ‘Theory of Mind’.Johannes Roessler & Josef Perner - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):755-767.
    There is converging evidence that over the course of the second year children become good at various fairly sophisticated forms of pro-social activities, such as helping, informing and comforting. Not only are toddlers able to do these things, they appear to do them routinely and almost reliably. A striking feature of these interventions, emphasized in the recent literature, is that they show precocious abilities in two different domains: they reflect complex ‘ theory of mind’ abilities as well as ‘altruistic motivation’. (...)
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  47. added 2017-07-20
    Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):526-549.
    The predominant view in developmental psychology is that young children are able to reason with the concept of desire prior to being able to reason with the concept of belief. We propose an explanation of this phenomenon that focuses on the cognitive tasks that competence with the belief and desire concepts enable young children to perform. We show that cognitive tasks that are typically considered fundamental to our competence with the belief and desire concepts can be performed with the concept (...)
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  48. added 2017-07-20
    False Belief Understanding and “Cool” Inhibitory Control in 3-and 4-Years-Old Italian Children.Francesca Bellagamba, Elsa Addessi, Valentina Focaroli, Giulia Pecora, Valentina Maggiorelli, Beatrice Pace & Fabio Paglieri - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  49. added 2017-07-20
    Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are (...)
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  50. added 2017-07-20
    Belief is Prior to Knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.
    Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is a composite of belief and non-mental factors. However, Timothy Williamson suggests that orthodoxy implies that the concept of belief is acquired before the concept of knowledge, whereas developmental data suggest the reverse. More recently, Jennifer Nagel reviews the psychological evidence, building a psychological case that the concept of knowledge emerges prior to belief. I assess the psychological state of the art and find support for the opposite conclusion. Overall the empirical evidence supports the orthodox (...)
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