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  1. added 2020-04-30
    The Principle of Indifference and the Principal Principle Are Incompatible.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    The Principle of Indifference (POI) says that, in the absence of evidence, you should distribute your credences evenly. The Principal Principle (PP) says that, in the absence of evidence, you should align your credences with the chances. Richard Pettigrew (2016) appears to accept both the PP and the POI. Many other authors write as though Bayesians are free to accept both of these principles. Hawthorne et. al. (2017) even go so far as to argue that the PP implies the POI. (...)
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  2. added 2020-02-12
    Randomness and the Right Reference Class.Henry E. Kyburg - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (9):501-521.
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  3. added 2020-02-11
    The Reference Class. Kyburg - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):374-397.
    The system presented by the author in The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference suffered from certain technical difficulties, and from a major practical difficulty; it was hard to be sure, in discussing examples and applications, when you had got hold of the right reference class. The present paper, concerned mainly with the characterization of randomness, resolves the technical difficulties and provides a well structured framework for the choice of a reference class. The definition of randomness that leads to this framework (...)
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  4. added 2020-02-11
    Levi, Petersen, and Direct Inference. Kyburg - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):630-634.
  5. added 2020-02-11
    More on Maximal Specificity. Kyburg - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (2):295-300.
  6. added 2019-10-17
    Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.
    Why are conditional degrees of belief in an observation E, given a statistical hypothesis H, aligned with the objective probabilities expressed by H? After showing that standard replies are not satisfactory, I develop a suppositional analysis of conditional degree of belief, transferring Ramsey’s classical proposal to statistical inference. The analysis saves the alignment, explains the role of chance-credence coordination, and rebuts the charge of arbitrary assessment of evidence in Bayesian inference. Finally, I explore the implications of this analysis for Bayesian (...)
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  7. added 2019-10-17
    Direct Inference in the Material Theory of Induction.William Peden - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):672-695.
    John D. Norton’s “Material Theory of Induction” has been one of the most intriguing recent additions to the philosophy of induction. Norton’s account appears to be a notably natural account of actual inductive practices, although his theory has attracted considerable criticism. I detail several novel issues for his theory but argue that supplementing the Material Theory with a theory of direct inference could address these problems. I argue that if this combination is possible, a stronger theory of inductive reasoning emerges, (...)
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  8. added 2019-10-10
    The Objective Bayesian Conceptualisation of Proof and Reference Class Problems.James Franklin - 2011 - Sydney Law Review 33 (3):545-561.
    The objective Bayesian view of proof (or logical probability, or evidential support) is explained and defended: that the relation of evidence to hypothesis (in legal trials, science etc) is a strictly logical one, comparable to deductive logic. This view is distinguished from the thesis, which had some popularity in law in the 1980s, that legal evidence ought to be evaluated using numerical probabilities and formulas. While numbers are not always useful, a central role is played in uncertain reasoning by the (...)
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  9. added 2019-10-10
    Feature Selection Methods for Solving the Reference Class Problem.James Franklin - 2010 - Columbia Law Review Sidebar 110:12-23.
    Probabilistic inference from frequencies, such as "Most Quakers are pacifists; Nixon is a Quaker, so probably Nixon is a pacifist" suffer from the problem that an individual is typically a member of many "reference classes" (such as Quakers, Republicans, Californians, etc) in which the frequency of the target attribute varies. How to choose the best class or combine the information? The article argues that the problem can be solved by the feature selection methods used in contemporary Big Data science: the (...)
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  10. added 2019-10-08
    On the Direct Probability of Inductions.Donald C. Williams - 1953 - Mind 62 (248):465-483.
  11. added 2019-06-05
    Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.
    We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence or testimony providing causal information. Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why (...)
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  12. added 2018-12-18
    Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-37.
    Direct inferences identify certain probabilistic credences or confirmation-function-likelihoods with values of objective chances or relative frequencies. The best known version of a direct inference principle is David Lewis’s Principal Principle. Certain kinds of statements undermine direct inferences. Lewis calls such statements inadmissible. We show that on any Bayesian account of direct inference several kinds of intuitively innocent statements turn out to be inadmissible. This may pose a significant challenge to Bayesian accounts of direct inference. We suggest some ways in which (...)
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  13. added 2018-10-08
    Statistical Vs. Direct Evidence.Ferdinand Schoeman - 1987 - Noûs 21 (2):179-198.
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  14. added 2018-05-18
    Probability as a Guide in Life.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 2001 - The Monist 84 (2):135-152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn’t hard to see that empirical views won’t do, and many recent writers-for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is “the only game in town”-have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little guidance, (...)
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  15. added 2018-02-09
    Induction by Direct Inference Meets the Goodman Problem.Paul D. Thorn - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):1-24.
    I here aim to show that a particular approach to the problem of induction, which I will call “induction by direct inference”, comfortably handles Goodman’s problem of induction. I begin the article by describing induction by direct inference. After introducing induction by direct inference, I briefly introduce the Goodman problem, and explain why it is, prima facie, an obstacle to the proposed approach. I then show how one may address the Goodman problem, assuming one adopts induction by direct inference as (...)
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  16. added 2017-07-16
    'More Likely Than Not' - Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - In Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First - Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-292.
    The paper takes a closer look at the role of knowledge and evidence in legal theory. In particular, the paper examines a puzzle arising from the evidential standard Preponderance of the Evidence and its application in civil procedure. Legal scholars have argued since at least the 1940s that the rule of the Preponderance of the Evidence gives rise to a puzzle concerning the role of statistical evidence in judicial proceedings, sometimes referred to as the Problem of Bare Statistical Evidence. While (...)
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  17. added 2017-06-19
    Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.
    In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti-risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti-luck condition. Second, to legal (...)
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  18. added 2017-06-18
    Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.
    Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility of (...)
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  19. added 2017-05-30
    Direct Inference From Imprecise Frequencies.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - In Michela Massimi, Jan-Willem Romeijn & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), EPSA15 Selected Papers: The 5th conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association in Düsseldorf. Springer. pp. 347-358.
    It is well known that there are, at least, two sorts of cases where one should not prefer a direct inference based on a narrower reference class, in particular: cases where the narrower reference class is gerrymandered, and cases where one lacks an evidential basis for forming a precise-valued frequency judgment for the narrower reference class. I here propose (1) that the preceding exceptions exhaust the circumstances where one should not prefer direct inference based on a narrower reference class, and (...)
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  20. added 2017-01-29
    KYBURG, HENRY E., Jr: "Epistemology and Inference". [REVIEW]D. H. Mellor - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35:175.
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  21. added 2017-01-16
    The Problem of the Reference Class.Peter Kirschenmann - 1975 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 4 (5):289-299.
  22. added 2016-12-08
    Reasoning Defeasibly About Probabilities.John L. Pollock - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):317-352.
    In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q& R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability (...)
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  23. added 2016-12-08
    A Logic For Inductive Probabilistic Reasoning.Manfred Jaeger - 2005 - Synthese 144 (2):181-248.
    Inductive probabilistic reasoning is understood as the application of inference patterns that use statistical background information to assign (subjective) probabilities to single events. The simplest such inference pattern is direct inference: from “70% of As are Bs” and “a is an A” infer that a is a B with probability 0.7. Direct inference is generalized by Jeffrey’s rule and the principle of cross-entropy minimization. To adequately formalize inductive probabilistic reasoning is an interesting topic for artificial intelligence, as an autonomous system (...)
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  24. added 2016-12-08
    Studies in Subjective Probability. [REVIEW]J. M. P. - 1966 - Review of Metaphysics 19 (3):611-611.
    In this collection the authors have attempted to bring together a number of the essential papers in the subjective interpretation of probability theory; several of them—Borel's "Apropos of a theory on probability" and de Finetti's "Foresight: its logical laws, its subjective sources"—have never appeared before in English. Other articles include Venn's pioneering study as well as the more recent work of Ramsey, Koopman, and Savage. The editors provide an introduction which presents the three basic elements of any subjectivistic theory: probability (...)
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  25. added 2016-08-22
    Probability and Direct Reference: Three Puzzles of Probability Theory: The Problem of the Two Boys, Freund's Problem and the Problem of the Three Prisoners.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (1):51 - 78.
    I discuss three puzzles of probability theory which seem connected with problems of direct reference and rigid designation. The resolution of at least one of them requires referential use of definite descriptions in probability statements. I argue that contrary to common opinion all these puzzles are in a way still unsolved: They seem to exemplify cases in which a change of probabilities is rationally required, even though any specific change presupposes unjustified assumptions.
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  26. added 2016-04-18
    Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...)
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  27. added 2016-02-27
    Should Bayesians Bet Where Frequentists Fear to Tread?Max Albert - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (4):584-593.
  28. added 2016-02-27
    Objective Probability as a Guide to the World.Michael Strevens - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):243-275.
    According to principles of probability coordination, such as Miller's Principle or Lewis's Principal Principle, you ought to set your subjective probability for an event equal to what you take to be the objective probability of the event. For example, you should expect events with a very high probability to occur and those with a very low probability not to occur. This paper examines the grounds of such principles. It is argued that any attempt to justify a principle of probability coordination (...)
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  29. added 2016-02-26
    Resurrecting Logical Probability.J. Franklin - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):277-305.
    The logical interpretation of probability, or ``objective Bayesianism''''– the theory that (some) probabilitiesare strictly logical degrees of partial implication – is defended.The main argument against it is that it requires the assignment ofprior probabilities, and that any attempt to determine them by symmetryvia a ``principle of insufficient reason'''' inevitably leads to paradox.Three replies are advanced: that priors are imprecise or of little weight, sothat disagreement about them does not matter, within limits; thatit is possible to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable priorson (...)
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  30. added 2016-02-26
    The Rationality of Induction.D. C. Stove - 1986 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Writing on the justification of certain inductive inferences, the author proposes that sometimes induction is justified and that arguments to prove otherwise are not cogent. In the first part he defends the argument of D.C. Williams' The Ground of Induction that induction is justified as a matter of logic by the proportional syllogism: "The vast majority of large samples match the population, therefore (probably) this sample matches the population"). In the second part he deals with such topics as deductive logic (...)
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  31. added 2016-02-26
    Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher.L. J. Cohen - 1981 - Arizona State Law Journal 2 (2).
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  32. added 2016-02-26
    The Ground of Induction.Donald Cary Williams - 1947 - New York: Russell & Russell.
    A classic defense of the rationality of induction. Williams argues that induction (conceived as inference from sample to population in general) is justified by the proportional syllogism (direct inference), the argument form "Probably if most As are Bs and this is an A, then this is a B." It is a necessary mathematical fact that the vast majority of large samples of a population nearly match the population in composition (e.g. if they have an unknown proportion of black and white). (...)
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  33. added 2016-02-10
    On the Preference for More Specific Reference Classes.Paul Thorn - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2025-2051.
    In attempting to form rational personal probabilities by direct inference, it is usually assumed that one should prefer frequency information concerning more specific reference classes. While the preceding assumption is intuitively plausible, little energy has been expended in explaining why it should be accepted. In the present article, I address this omission by showing that, among the principled policies that may be used in setting one’s personal probabilities, the policy of making direct inferences with a preference for frequency information for (...)
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  34. added 2016-01-25
    Three Doors, Two Players, and Single-Case Probabilities.Peter Baumann - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):71 - 79.
    The well known Monty Hall-problem has a clear solution if one deals with a long enough series of individual games. However, the situation is different if one switches to probabilities in a single case. This paper presents an argument for Monty Hall situations with two players (not just one, as is usual). It leads to a quite general conclusion: One cannot apply probabilistic considerations (for or against any of the strategies) to isolated single cases. If one does that, one cannot (...)
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  35. added 2015-12-07
    Kyburg and Fiducial Inference.Stephen Leeds - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):78-91.
  36. added 2015-11-02
    The Inheritance of Defaults in the Case of Exceptional Subclasses.Paul D. Thorn - 2015 - The Reasoner 9 (11):93.
  37. added 2015-10-02
    The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):axv030.
    We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.
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  38. added 2015-08-25
    Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.
    There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the other kinds (...)
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  39. added 2015-04-06
    Levi and the Defense of Bayesianism.Howard Hugh Harriott - 1988 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    Bayesianism as an intellectual movement promises much, if the views of some statisticians and some philosophers are to be believed. But increasingly, the pat answers to the problems raised by the critics cannot stand up to philosophical scrutiny. While the formalism of Bayesianism is easy to understand, its interpretation is less clear. I take Professor Isaac Levi's work The Enterprise of Knowledge to be the most philosophically satisfactory defense of Bayesianism which remains faithful to an objective view of scientific practice. (...)
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  40. added 2015-04-06
    Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):165-187.
    A general form is proposed for epistemological theories, the relevant factors being: the family of epistemic judgments, the epistemic state, the epistemic commitment, and the family of possible epistemic inputs. First a simple theory is examined in which the states are probability functions, and the subject of probability kinematics introduced by Richard Jeffrey is explored. Then a second theory is examined in which the state has as constituents a body of information and a recipe that determines the accepted epistemic judgments (...)
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  41. added 2015-03-30
    The Lottery Paradox and the Pragmatics of Belief.Igor Douven - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):351-373.
    The thesis that high probability suffices for rational belief, while initially plausible, is known to face the Lottery Paradox. The present paper proposes an amended version of that thesis which escapes the Lottery Paradox. The amendment is argued to be plausible on independent grounds.
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  42. added 2015-03-30
    The Sequential Lottery Paradox.I. Douven - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):55-57.
    The Lottery Paradox is generally thought to point at a conflict between two intuitive principles, to wit, that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability, and that rational acceptability is closed under logical derivability. Gilbert Harman has offered a solution to the Lottery Paradox that allows one to stick to both of these principles. The solution requires the principle that acceptance licenses conditionalization. The present study shows that adopting this principle alongside the principle that high probability is sufficient for rational (...)
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  43. added 2015-02-17
    Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.
    the symmetry of our evidential situation. If our confidence is best modeled by a standard probability function this means that we are to distribute our subjective probability or credence sharply and evenly over possibilities among which our evidence does not discriminate. Once thought to be the central principle of probabilistic reasoning by great..
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  44. added 2015-02-17
    A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
  45. added 2015-02-17
    Objectifying Subjective Probabilities: Dutch Book Arguments for Principles of Direct Inference.Timothy Childers - 2012 - In Probabilities, Laws, and Structures.
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  46. added 2014-10-13
    Law, Statistics, and the Reference Class Problem.Edward K. Cheng - 2009 - Columbia Law Review, Sidebar 109.
    Preview of: Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec. 2009).
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  47. added 2014-10-13
    A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem.Edward K. Cheng - 2009 - Columbia Law Review 109 (8).
    The “reference class problem” is a serious challenge to the use of statistical evidence that arises in a wide variety of cases, including toxic torts, property valuation, and even drug smuggling. At its core, it observes that statistical inferences depend critically on how people, events, or things are classified. As there is (purportedly) no principle for privileging certain categories over others, statistics become manipulable, undermining the very objectivity and certainty that make statistical evidence valuable and attractive to legal actors. In (...)
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  48. added 2014-06-05
    ,,Shonubi" revisited: Begründet die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Referenzklasse einen Schadensersatzanspruch?Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou - 2013 - Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie 99 (2):241-251.
    Nearly 20 years after the Shonubi case and an extended discussion in the Anglophone world on the admissibility and probative force of statistical evidence, the labour courts of Germany seem not to have learned a simple lesson: aleatory probabilities are not informative for the individual in question. In this paper I argue that innumeracy (that is the lack of ability to understand and apply simple numerical concepts) is underestimated – if not ignored – both within the German jurisprudence and legal (...)
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  49. added 2014-06-05
    Double Standards, Racial Equality and the Right Reference Class.Jonathan E. Adler - 1991 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 8 (1):69-82.
  50. added 2014-06-05
    Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction.John L. Pollock - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
    In this book Pollock deals with the subject of probabilistic reasoning, making general philosophical sense of objective probabilities and exploring their ...
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