Related categories

85 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 85
  1. Double Standards, Racial Equality and the Right Reference Class.Jonathan E. Adler - 1991 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 8 (1):69-82.
  2. Should Bayesians Bet Where Frequentists Fear to Tread?Max Albert - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (4):584-593.
  3. Three Doors, Two Players, and Single-Case Probabilities.Peter Baumann - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):71 - 79.
    The well known Monty Hall-problem has a clear solution if one deals with a long enough series of individual games. However, the situation is different if one switches to probabilities in a single case. This paper presents an argument for Monty Hall situations with two players (not just one, as is usual). It leads to a quite general conclusion: One cannot apply probabilistic considerations (for or against any of the strategies) to isolated single cases. If one does that, one cannot (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  4. 'More Likely Than Not' - Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - forthcoming - In Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First,. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    The paper takes a closer look at the role of knowledge and evidence in legal theory. In particular, the paper examines a puzzle arising from the evidential standard Preponderance of the Evidence and its application in civil procedure. Legal scholars have argued since at least the 1940s that the rule of the Preponderance of the Evidence gives rise to a puzzle concerning the role of statistical evidence in judicial proceedings, sometimes referred to as the Problem of Bare Statistical Evidence. While (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.
    Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 2:1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  7. Statistical Thought: A Perspective and History.Chatterjee Shoutir Kishore - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    In this unique monograph, based on years of extensive work, Chatterjee presents the historical evolution of statistical thought from the perspective of various approaches to statistical induction. Developments in statistical concepts and theories are discussed alongside philosophical ideas on the ways we learn from experience.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem.Edward K. Cheng - 2009 - Columbia Law Review 109 (8).
    The “reference class problem” is a serious challenge to the use of statistical evidence that arises in a wide variety of cases, including toxic torts, property valuation, and even drug smuggling. At its core, it observes that statistical inferences depend critically on how people, events, or things are classified. As there is (purportedly) no principle for privileging certain categories over others, statistics become manipulable, undermining the very objectivity and certainty that make statistical evidence valuable and attractive to legal actors. In (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Law, Statistics, and the Reference Class Problem.Edward K. Cheng - 2009 - Columbia Law Review, Sidebar 109.
    Preview of: Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec. 2009).
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Objectifying Subjective Probabilities: Dutch Book Arguments for Principles of Direct Inference.Timothy Childers - 2012 - In Probabilities, Laws, and Structures.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher.L. J. Cohen - 1981 - Arizona State Law Journal 2 (2).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Legal Decisions and the Reference-Class Problem.Mark Colyvan - unknown
    There has been a long history of discussion on the usefulness of formal methods in legal settings.1 Some of the recent debate has focussed on foundational issues in statistics, in particular, how the reference-class problem affects legal decisions based on certain types of statistical evidence.2 Here we examine aspects of this debate, stressing why the reference-class problem presents serious difficulties for the kinds of statistical inferences under consideration and the relevance of this for the use of statistics in the courtroom. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. Is It a Crime to Belong to a Reference Class.Mark Colyvan, Helen M. Regan & Scott Ferson - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2):168–181.
    ON DECEMBER 10, 1991 Charles Shonubi, a Nigerian citizen but a resident of the USA, was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport for the importation of heroin into the United States.1 Shonubi's modus operandi was ``balloon swallowing.'' That is, heroin was mixed with another substance to form a paste and this paste was sealed in balloons which were then swallowed. The idea was that once the illegal substance was safely inside the USA, the smuggler would pass the balloons and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  14. The Sequential Lottery Paradox.I. Douven - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):55-57.
    The Lottery Paradox is generally thought to point at a conflict between two intuitive principles, to wit, that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability, and that rational acceptability is closed under logical derivability. Gilbert Harman has offered a solution to the Lottery Paradox that allows one to stick to both of these principles. The solution requires the principle that acceptance licenses conditionalization. The present study shows that adopting this principle alongside the principle that high probability is sufficient for rational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. The Lottery Paradox and the Pragmatics of Belief.Igor Douven - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):351-373.
    The thesis that high probability suffices for rational belief, while initially plausible, is known to face the Lottery Paradox. The present paper proposes an amended version of that thesis which escapes the Lottery Paradox. The amendment is argued to be plausible on independent grounds.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism.Ian Evans, Don Fallis, Peter Gross, Terry Horgan, Jenann Ismael, John Pollock, Paul D. Thorn, Jacob N. Caton, Adam Arico, Daniel Sanderman, Orlin Vakerelov, Nathan Ballantyne, Matthew S. Bedke, Brian Fiala & Martin Fricke - 2007 - Analysis 68 (2):149-155.
    Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Reichenbach, Reference Classes, and Single Case 'Probabilities'.James H. Fetzer - 1977 - Synthese 34 (2):185 - 217.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  18. Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):165-187.
    A general form is proposed for epistemological theories, the relevant factors being: the family of epistemic judgments, the epistemic state, the epistemic commitment, and the family of possible epistemic inputs. First a simple theory is examined in which the states are probability functions, and the subject of probability kinematics introduced by Richard Jeffrey is explored. Then a second theory is examined in which the state has as constituents a body of information and a recipe that determines the accepted epistemic judgments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  19. Resurrecting Logical Probability.J. Franklin - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):277-305.
    The logical interpretation of probability, or ``objective Bayesianism''''– the theory that (some) probabilitiesare strictly logical degrees of partial implication – is defended.The main argument against it is that it requires the assignment ofprior probabilities, and that any attempt to determine them by symmetryvia a ``principle of insufficient reason'''' inevitably leads to paradox.Three replies are advanced: that priors are imprecise or of little weight, sothat disagreement about them does not matter, within limits; thatit is possible to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable priorson (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  20. Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.
    We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence or testimony providing causal information. Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):563--585.
    The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  22. Levi and the Defense of Bayesianism.Howard Hugh Harriott - 1988 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    Bayesianism as an intellectual movement promises much, if the views of some statisticians and some philosophers are to be believed. But increasingly, the pat answers to the problems raised by the critics cannot stand up to philosophical scrutiny. While the formalism of Bayesianism is easy to understand, its interpretation is less clear. I take Professor Isaac Levi's work The Enterprise of Knowledge to be the most philosophically satisfactory defense of Bayesianism which remains faithful to an objective view of scientific practice. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.J. Hawthorne, J. Landes, C. Wallmann & J. Williamson - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv030.
    We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation.Carl G. Hempel - 1968 - Philosophy of Science 35 (2):116-133.
    The article is a reappraisal of the requirement of maximal specificity (RMS) proposed by the author as a means of avoiding "ambiguity" in probabilistic explanation. The author argues that RMS is not, as he had held in one earlier publication, a rough substitute for the requirement of total evidence, but is independent of it and has quite a different rationale. A group of recent objections to RMS is answered by stressing that the statistical generalizations invoked in probabilistic explanations must be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  25. Modelling Uncertain Inference.Colin Howson - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):475-492.
    Kyburg’s opposition to the subjective Bayesian theory, and in particular to its advocates’ indiscriminate and often questionable use of Dutch Book arguments, is documented and much of it strongly endorsed. However, it is argued that an alternative version, proposed by both de Finetti at various times during his long career, and by Ramsey, is less vulnerable to Kyburg’s misgivings. This is a logical interpretation of the formalism, one which, it is argued, is both more natural and also avoids other, widely-made (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. A Logic For Inductive Probabilistic Reasoning.Manfred Jaeger - 2005 - Synthese 144 (2):181-248.
    Inductive probabilistic reasoning is understood as the application of inference patterns that use statistical background information to assign (subjective) probabilities to single events. The simplest such inference pattern is direct inference: from “70% of As are Bs” and “a is an A” infer that a is a B with probability 0.7. Direct inference is generalized by Jeffrey’s rule and the principle of cross-entropy minimization. To adequately formalize inductive probabilistic reasoning is an interesting topic for artificial intelligence, as an autonomous system (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Probability as a Guide in Life.Jr Henry E. Kyburg - 2001 - The Monist 84 (2):135 - 152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn't hard to see that empirical (frequency) views won't do, and many recent writers—for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is "the only game in town"—have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. The Problem of the Reference Class.Peter Kirschenmann - 1975 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 4 (5):289-299.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. ,,Shonubi" revisited: Begründet die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Referenzklasse einen Schadensersatzanspruch?Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou - 2013 - Archiv Fuer Rechts- Und Sozialphilosphie 99 (2):241-251.
    Nearly 20 years after the Shonubi case and an extended discussion in the Anglophone world on the admissibility and probative force of statistical evidence, the labour courts of Germany seem not to have learned a simple lesson: aleatory probabilities are not informative for the individual in question. In this paper I argue that innumeracy (that is the lack of ability to understand and apply simple numerical concepts) is underestimated – if not ignored – both within the German jurisprudence and legal (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Levi, Petersen, and Direct Inference.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):630-634.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. The Reference Class.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):374-397.
    The system presented by the author in The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference (Kyburg 1974) suffered from certain technical difficulties, and from a major practical difficulty; it was hard to be sure, in discussing examples and applications, when you had got hold of the right reference class. The present paper, concerned mainly with the characterization of randomness, resolves the technical difficulties and provides a well structured framework for the choice of a reference class. The definition of randomness that leads to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  32. Randomness and the Right Reference Class.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (9):501-521.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  33. More on Maximal Specificity.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (2):295-300.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. A Problem About Frequencies in Direct Inference-Reply to Leeds.He Kyburg - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):145-148.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Another Reply to Leeds.Henry E. Kyburg - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):145 - 148.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Probability and Randomness.Henry E. Kyburg - 1963 - Theoria 29 (1):27-55.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  37. A Note on Pollock's System of Direct Inference.Stephen Leeds - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (3):247-256.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Postscript to 'a Problem About Frequencies in Direct Inference'.Stephen Leeds - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):149 - 152.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Kyburg and Fiducial Inference.Stephen Leeds - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):78-91.
  40. A Problem About Frequencies in Direct Inference.Stephen Leeds, John L. Pollock & Henry E. Kyburg - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):137 - 140.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Objective Modality and Direct Inference.Isaac Levi - 2001 - The Monist 84 (2):179-207.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Direct Inference and Randomization.Isaac Levi - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:447 - 463.
    There are two uses of randomization in efforts to control systematic bias in experimental design: (a) Alchemical uses seek to convert unavoidable systematic errors into random errors. (b) Hygienic uses seek to reduce the prospect of the experimenter's involvement with the implementation of the experiment contributing to bias. A few remarks are made at the end of the paper about the hygienic use of randomization as a preventative against sticky fingers. The bulk of the discussion addresses the alchemical applications. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Direct Inference and Confirmational Conditionalization.Isaac Levi - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):532-552.
    The article responds to some of the points raised by B. van Fraassen concerning probability kinematics and direct inference within the framework of the approach to the revision of probability judgment proposed by Levi in The Enterprise of Knowledge. In particular, the critical importance of the question of direct inference is emphasized and explained.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44. Direct Inference.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):5-29.
  45. A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance.David Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press. pp. 83--132.
  46. A Geo-Logical Solution to the Lottery Paradox, with Applications to Conditional Logic.Hanti Lin & Kevin T. Kelly - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):531-575.
  47. Direct Inference and the Problem of Induction.Timothy McGrew - 2001 - The Monist 84 (2):153-178.
  48. KYBURG, HENRY E., Jr: "Epistemology and Inference". [REVIEW]D. H. Mellor - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35:175.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. On Subjective Probability and Related Problems.GÜnter Menges - 1970 - Theory and Decision 1 (1):40.
  50. Sleeping Beauty and the Forgetful Bayesian.Bradley Monton - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):47–53.
    1. Consider the case of Sleeping Beauty: on Sunday she is put to sleep, and she knows that on Monday experimenters will wake her up, and then put her to sleep with a memory-erasing drug that causes her to forget that waking-up. The researchers will then flip a fair coin; if the result is Heads, they will allow her to continue to sleep, and if the result is Tails, they will wake her up again on Tuesday. Thus, when she is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
1 — 50 / 85