Disagreement

Edited by Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida)
About this topic
Summary Disagreement is ubiquitous. We disagree about everything from the most trivial matter to matters of the utmost importance. In the paradigm case, two people disagree when one believes a proposition, and the other disbelieves that same proposition. Other disagreements may involve suspending judgment, conflicting credences (or degrees of beliefs), and perhaps even other non-cognitive attitudes.  The phenomenon of disagreement has been used as an indication of many things. First, some take disagreement (at least of a certain sort) to indicate that there is no objective fact of the matter. For instance, if equally informed, intelligent, and open-minded individuals continue to disagree about which flavor of ice cream is the best, the best explanation of this may be that there is no fact of the matter -- that ice cream flavor preferences are simply a matter of taste. Such arguments have been used in meta-ethics to argue against kinds of moral realism. Second, some take disagreement to have significant epistemic effects. For instance, if we are committed to there being an objective fact of the matter regarding the nature of the quantum world, then the fact that one is aware of equally informed, intelligent, and open-minded individuals who disagree with them about the nature of the quantum world, might undermine the rationality (or epistemic justification) of the belief in question. Such arguments have been used in epistemology to advance skeptical conclusions. Much of the recent epistemological literature on disagreement concerns the evaluation of such arguments, and whether there can be rational grounds to 'stick to your guns' in the face of disagreement. The debate around the epistemic significance of disagreement has often focused on a particular kind of disagreement - peer disagreement. Epistemic peers are individuals who are in an equally good epistemic position on the matter at hand, they are equally likely to get it right. The central question, then is what is it rational for an individual to believe when they discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with them? Answers to this question divide into two main camps. According to conciliatory views, such a discovery comes with rational pressure to reduce your confidence in your belief. According to the most prominent conciliatory view, the equal weight view, such a discovery calls for 'splitting the difference' which in paradigm cases of disagreement calls for both parties to become skeptical. According to steadfast views, there are at least some cases where it can be rational to maintain one's view even once one has discovered a peer that disagrees.
Key works Central anthologies on the epistemology of disagreement include Feldman & Warfield 2010, and Christensen & Lackey 2013. There are also anthologies focused on particular types of disagreements. Regarding religious disagreement Benton & Kvanvig 2021, regarding moral disagreement Gowans 2000 Monographs surveying the epistemological issues of disagreement include Matheson 2015 and Frances 2014. An encyclopedia article summarizing the epistemological debates is Matheson & Frances 2018.
Introductions The following are early central works in the epistemology of disagreement:Feldman 2010; Christensen 2018; Kelly 2005; Elga 2007.
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  1. Epistemic Authority.Federica Isabella Malfatti - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup, The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    Sally is hiking in the forest with her dad. While she is about to pick what she takes to be a beautiful porcino mushroom, her dad warns her: “Careful, that is a poisonous boletus satanas!” Sally’s dad has decades of experience in picking mushrooms and is extremely skillful – much more skillful than Sally is – in recognizing edible ones. Sally is aware of this. She therefore readily comes to believe that what she was about to pick is a poisonous (...)
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  2. Certainty’s Bulwark at Rationality’s Edge? Reframing the Disagreement between Humean Skeptics and Constitutivist Hinge Epistemologists.Kwing-Yui Wong - 2025 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 18 (Certainty and Language (eds. A.):56-65.
    This paper critically examines Coliva and Palmira’s characterization of the disagreement between Humean skeptics and hinge epistemologists as a distinctive kind of conceptual disagreement. Humean skepticism requires evidential justification for all rational beliefs, presenting a narrower conception of rationality. This contrasts with constitutivist hinge epistemology, which posits that our unwarranted hinge propositions — the basic certainties which makes the justifications for ordinary empirical propositions possible — are constitutive of the concept of epistemic rationality, thus they are also rationally accepted by (...)
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  3. Inquiry and Higher-Order Evidence.Arianna Falbo - forthcoming - In Aaron Creller & Jonathan Matheson, Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge.
    What is the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence? Recently, philosophers have defended zetetic approaches to higher-order evidence, which appeal to factors related to inquiry. According to such views, in response to higher order evidence, one should open inquiry and deliberate on the question further. While it can often be productive to inquire in response to higher-order evidence, whether one should inquire is settled on primarily practical—not purely epistemic—grounds. I defend various cases where one can rationally respond to higher-order evidence without (...)
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  4. Desacordo e Deferência a Especialistas: Independência ou Números Qualificados?Eduardo Alves & Vinicius Felipe Posselt - 2024 - Peri 16 (2):21-47.
    O objetivo deste artigo é oferecer um panorama da discussão sobre se o princípio Independência de Crença é verdadeiro e investigar se a deferência do novato a um especialista defensor da posição majoritária é racional. Para isso, apresentaremos, na primeira seção, o princípio Independência de Crença e algumas noções de epistemologia da expertise. Na segunda seção, explicaremos o argumento de Alvin Goldman (2001) a favor de uma versão do princípio Independência de Crença. Na terceira seção, explicaremos as críticas de David (...)
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  5. Epistemology of Conversation: First essays.Waldomiro J. Silva-Filho (ed.) - 2024 - Cham: Springer.
    Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is also important to recognize that in contemporary philosophy, marked by the linguistic turn, there is a wealth of intellectual production on ethical, psycho-linguistic, logical-linguistic, and pragmatic aspects of the conversation. Despite all this, this is the first collection of texts dedicated exclusively to the strictly (...)
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  6. Determining Personal Falsity: A Gadamerian Critique of The Enlightenment.K. Varallo - manuscript
    This paper attempts to develop a criterion for determining when one’s own opinion is incorrect. I first establish a Gadamerian critique of Enlightenment objectivism and continue by stating that neither radical objectivism nor radical relativism are applicable standards within epistemology. There must be both some valid and some invalid opinions. In dialogue with Georgia Warnke, the discussion of right and wrong perception is based on the minimums of immediate illegitimizing of certain prejudices: part-whole incongruity and dogmatic opinions. Further, in conjunction (...)
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  7. (1 other version)Intellectual Humility without Limits: Magnanimous Humility, Disagreement and the Epistemology of Resistance.Brandon Yip - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (2):604-622.
    In this paper, I provide a characterisation of a neglected form of humility: magnanimous humility. Unlike most contemporary analyses of humility, magnanimous humility is not about limitations but instead presupposes that one possesses some entitlement in a context. I suggest that magnanimous intellectual humility (IH) consists in a disposition to appropriately refrain from exercising one’s legitimate epistemic entitlements because one is appropriately motivated to pursue some epistemic good. I then shown that Magnanimous IH has an important role to play in (...)
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  8. Disagreement and Progress in Philosophy and in Empirical Sciences.Işık Sarıhan - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    The fact that philosophy has not made much progress in finding answers to its big questions is often demonstrated with a comparison to natural sciences. Some have recently argued that the state of progress in philosophy is not so different than the sciences: there are many unresolved big questions in the sciences too, and philosophy has made progress on its smaller questions just like the sciences. I argue that this comparison is misleading: the situation in the two fields looks similar (...)
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  9. The Epistemic Import of Narratives.Merel Talbi - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    In situations of disagreement in a polarized social world, rational argument is not always successful in persuading those who do not share our beliefs. Narratives of personal experiences have empirically shown to help bridge divides between disagreeing interlocutors, though this raises the question of how particular, personal narratives relate to the universal appeal of argumentation. It also leads us to reflect upon the dangers of these narratives functioning as a type of propaganda that bypasses reason. In this paper, I discuss (...)
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  10. Corresponding Conspiracy Theorists.M. R. X. Dentith & Patrick Stokes - 2024 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 13 (5):15-32.
  11. Dynamic "Might" and Correct Belief.Patrick Skeels - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Veltman’s test semantics and developments thereof reject the canon about semantic contents and attitude ascriptions in favor of dynamic alternatives. According to these theories the semantic content of a sentence is not a proposition, but a context change potential (CCP). Similarly, beliefs are not taken to be relations between agents and propositions, but agents and CCPs. These deviations from the canon come at the cost of an elegant explanation about the correctness of belief. Standardly, it is taken that the content (...)
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  12. Some Noise for philosophers: Daniel Kahneman, Olivier Sibony, and Cass R. Sunstein: Noise: A flaw in human judgment. [A Note].Seyyed Mohsen Eslami - 2023 - Metascience 32:265-267.
  13. Public justification and expert disagreement over non-pharmaceutical interventions for the COVID-19 pandemic.Marcus Dahlquist & Henrik D. Kugelberg - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (1):9–13.
    A wide range of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) have been introduced to stop or slow down the COVID-19 pandemic. Examples include school closures, environmental cleaning and disinfection, mask mandates, restrictions on freedom of assembly and lockdowns. These NPIs depend on coercion for their effectiveness, either directly or indirectly. A widely held view is that coercive policies need to be publicly justified—justified to each citizen—to be legitimate. Standardly, this is thought to entail that there is a scientific consensus on the factual propositions (...)
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  14. Die subtile Kunst des Ist-mir-nicht-egal (was andere denken). [REVIEW]Tim Kraft - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (6):977-982.
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  15. Chaucer: A European Life. By MarionTurner. Pp. xvi, 599, Princeton/Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2019. 2 family trees, 3 maps and 19 color plates. $39.95/£30.00.Chaucer and Religious Controversies in the Medieval and Early Modern Period. By Nancy BradleyWarren. Pp. xiii, 213. Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 2019, $45.00. [REVIEW]John C. Hirsh - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (3):530-531.
  16. A modest response to empirical skepticism about intuitions.Philip Osborne - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):443-456.
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  17. What Is Talmud? The Art of Disagreement. [REVIEW]Alan Milchman & Alan Rosenberg - 2009 - Foucault Studies:226-229.
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  18. More Equal than Others: A View from the Grassroots.John Cable - 2013 - Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal 27.
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  19. Beyond anarchy: Self-organized topology for peer-to-peer networks.S. Fabrice & R. Ghanea-Hercock - 2004 - Complexity 9 (2):49-53.
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  20. Of 'aspect'is not the same, but this disagreement apart, his remarks have been relevant and have been taken into account.Robert Hetzron - 1982 - In Ferenc Kiefer, Hungarian General Linguistics. Benjamins. pp. 4--131.
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  21. Contextualismo y Semanticismo: Debate abierto en la filosofía del lenguaje contemporánea.Camós Francesc & María J. Frápolli - 2008 - Episteme (Porto Alegre) 28 (1):1-20.
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  22. On the Acrimoniousness of Intellectual Disputes.Randall Collins - 2002 - Common Knowledge 8 (1):47-70.
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  23. Doctoral Dissertations.William Nathan Ballantyne, Why We Disagree & Why It Matters - 2013 - Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):247-272.
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  24. Les « autres » applications des technologies Peer-to-Peer.Julien Laflaquière - 2005 - Multitudes 2 (2):59-68.
    In the flow of information concerning Peer-to-Peer, it is difficult to get away from the apparently inexhaustible topic of music file sharing. This article invites us to refocus our attention towards the vast diversity of possible uses of the P2P technologies. After a survey of a few examples, the article denounces the ongoing confusion between an innovative and promising technology and the uses to which it can be subjected.
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  25. Des vertus culturelles du piratage à l'ère numérique : ou comment le peer-to-peer peut contribuer à la circulation du patrimoine québécois et à la diversité culturelle.Martin Tétu - 2012 - Éthique Publique. Revue Internationale D’Éthique Sociétale Et Gouvernementale (vol. 14, n° 2).
    Ce texte traite de piratage en ligne à travers la pratique du peer-to-peer au Québec, c’est-à-dire une forme d’échange non autorisé de produits culturels sur Internet (pratique appelée « piratage culturel »). Une approche strictement juridique de la pratique y voit un simple détournement de copyright, tandis que d’autres approches (mouvement Copyleft, Parti pirate, etc.) postulent qu’un gain social est généré par une telle circulation de l’information à grande échelle. Peu de recherches empiriques ont documenté toutefois les contenus circulant réellement (...)
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  26. Too Soon to Say.Edward James - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (3):421-442.
    (1) Rupert Read charges that Rawls culpably overlooks the politicized Euthyphro: Do we accept our political perspective because it is right or is it right because we accept it? (2) This charge brings up the question of the deficiency dilemma: Do others disagree with us because of our failures or theirs? —where the two dilemmas appear to be independent of each other and lead to the questions of the logic of deficiency, moral epistemic deficiency, epistemic peers, and the hardness of (...)
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Deep Disagreement
  1. From deep disagreement to rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2024 - In Fabio Paglieri, The Cognitive Dimension of Social Argumentation. Proceedings of the 4th European Conference on Argumentation. pp. 97-110.
  2. Beyond belief: deep disagreement and conversion in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.Tomaso Pignocchi - 2025 - Synthese 205 (1):1-25.
    Following Robert Fogelin’s work, philosophers have traditionally analysed deep disagreements in Wittgenstein’s thought through the lens of “On Certainty.” This paper explores another fruitful avenue for understanding Wittgenstein’s views on deep disagreements: this avenue lies in examining the form of disagreement that arises between believers and non-believers, as documented in his “Lectures on Religious Belief”. Drawing on this text and others, I will try to demonstrate how deep disagreement, starting from a situation of incompatibility and mutual non-persuasiveness between the parties, (...)
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  3. Lyotard’s Wittgenstein: from deep disagreement to Differend.Philip Mills - 2024 - Synthese 205 (1):1-20.
    What can we learn from Lyotard’s reading of Wittgenstein regarding contemporary debates around deep disagreement? It has been shown that Lyotard’s notion of differend can offer a new perspective on deep disagreement, and I expand on this idea by looking at what we can take from Lyotard’s reading of Wittgenstein to reconsider the notion of hinge commitments or propositions. Rather than considering the way Lyotard misreads some of Wittgenstein’s ideas, as many scholars have shown, I focus on the positive dimension (...)
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  4. Moral Disagreement and Normative Ethics.Marcus Arvan - 2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 359-371.
    This chapter details three sources of normative moral disagreement and surveys 11 approaches to understanding its implications for normative ethics. Section 2 explains how normative moral disagreement can emerge from first-order commonsense moral disagreement, second-order metaethical disagreement over moral concepts and methods of ethics, and third-order metaphilosophical disagreement over the merits of different philosophical methods. Section 3 then details how moral disagreement has been argued to support either moral error theory (Section 3.1), moral skepticism (Section 3.2), moral relativism (Section 3.3), (...)
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  5. La guía (no realmente) definitiva de “La lógica de los desacuerdos profundos”.Victoria Lavorerio - 2024 - In Gustavo Arroyo, Desacuerdos profundos: debates y aproximaciones. Buenos Aires: UNGS. pp. 57-76.
    Este capítulo constituye una revisión crítica de “La lógica de los desacuerdos profundos” de Robert Fogelin, artículo fundante en la discusión contemporánea sobre desacuerdos profundos. Se discutirán las tesis de este artículo que han generado mayor discusión, controversia y, a mi entender, también mayor confusión en los casi cuarenta años desde su publicación. Me refiero a la concepción de Fogelin acerca de la argumentación, la naturaleza de los desacuerdos profundos y la posibilidad de su resolución racional.
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  6. Desacuerdos profundos: debates y aproximaciones.Gustavo Arroyo (ed.) - 2024 - Buenos Aires: UNGS.
  7. Uncovering the Roots of Disagreement.Greta Turnbull LaFore - 2019 - Dissertation, Boston College
    When you learn that you disagree with an epistemic peer, what should you believe about the proposition you disagree about? The epistemology of peer disagreement has made considerable progress in answering this question. But to this point, we have largely neglected a significant resource which can help us to determine how peers who disagree can rationally respond to their disagreement. Closely examining actual disagreements in scientific and nonscientific contexts can help us to understand why peers find themselves in disagreement. And (...)
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  8. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.
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  9. Bootstrapping and Persuasive Argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (2):225-246.
    That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S (...)
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  10. Meta‐regresses and the limits of persuasive argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Metaphilosophy 55 (2):196-213.
    This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta‐regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are (...)
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  11. How Can Constitutivism Account for the Persistence of Deep Disagreements?Enrico Galli - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    Exploring the metaphysics of deep disagreements, Ranalli identifies several essential features shared by all such disputes. These very features constitute a set of adequacy conditions that any satisfactory theory of deep disagreements must meet. The paper explains how Coliva’s Wittgensteinian hinge theory can satisfy Ranalli’s persistence desideratum. According to this condition, any appropriate theory must explain why deep disagreements tend to be persistent and thus unresolved without presupposing that they are rationally irresolvable. First, the work critically discusses how Coliva utilizes (...)
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  12. The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured (...)
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  13. Hidden Depths: Testimonial Injustice, Deep Disagreement, and Democratic Deliberation.Aidan McGlynn - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):361-381.
    .Deep disagreements are those involving a disagreement about (relatively) fundamental epistemic principles. This paper considers the bearing of testimonial injustice, in Miranda Fricker’s sense, on the depth of disagreements, and what this can teach us about the nature and significance of deep disagreements. I start by re-evaluating T. J. Lagewaard’s recent argument that disagreements about the nature, scope, and impact of oppression will often be deepened by testimonial injustice, since the people best placed to offer relevant testimony will be subject (...)
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  14. Taste Fragmentalism.Giuseppe Spolaore, Samuele Iaquinto & Giuliano Torrengo - 2025 - Erkenntnis 90 (4):1343-1361.
    This paper explores taste fragmentalism, a novel approach to matters of taste and faultless disagreement. The view is inspired by Kit Fine’s fragmentalism about time, according to which the temporal dimension can be constituted—in an absolute manner—by states that are pairwise incompatible, provided that they do not obtain together. In the present paper, we will apply this metaphysical framework to taste states. In our proposal, two incompatible taste states (such as the state of rhubarb’s being tasty and the state of (...)
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  15. Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited).Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (3):243-259.
    This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.
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  16. (1 other version)Recalcitrant Disagreement in Mathematics: An “Endless and Depressing Controversy” in the History of Italian Algebraic Geometry.Silvia De Toffoli & Claudio Fontanari - 2023 - Global Philosophy 33 (38):1-29.
    If there is an area of discourse in which disagreement is virtually absent, it is mathematics. After all, mathematicians justify their claims with deductive proofs: arguments that entail their conclusions. But is mathematics really exceptional in this respect? Looking at the history and practice of mathematics, we soon realize that it is not. First, deductive arguments must start somewhere. How should we choose the starting points (i.e., the axioms)? Second, mathematicians, like the rest of us, are fallible. Their ability to (...)
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  17. Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.
    The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of (...)
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  18. Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.
    Some disagreements concern our most fundamental beliefs, principles, values, or worldviews, such as those about the existence of God, society and politics, or the trustworthiness of science. These are ‘deep disagreements’. But what exactly are deep disagreements? This paper critically overviews theories of deep disagreement. It does three things. First, it explains the differences between deep and other kinds of disagreement, including peer, persistent, and widespread disagreement. Second, it critically overviews two mainstream theories of deep disagreement, the Wittgensteinian account and (...)
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  19. Political Hinge Epistemology.Christopher Ranalli - 2022 - In Constantine Sandis & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Extending Hinge Epistemology. Anthem Press. pp. 127-148.
    Political epistemology is the intersection of political philosophy and epistemology. This paper develops a political 'hinge' epistemology. Political hinge epistemology draws on the idea that all belief systems have fundamental presuppositions which play a role in the determination of reasons for belief and other attitudes. It uses this core idea to understand and tackle political epistemological challenges, like political disagreement, polarization, political testimony, political belief, ideology, and biases, among other possibilities. I respond to two challenges facing the development of a (...)
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  20. Lyotard, 'The Differend', and the Philosophy of Deep Disagreement.James Cartlidge - 2022 - Synthese 200 (359):1-19.
    This paper examines the philosophy of Jean-Francois Lyotard in relation to the analytic philosophy of deep disagreement. It argues not just that his work has relevance for this debate, but that it offers a challenge to the ‘epistemic paradigm’ present in its academic literature, represented by the two most prominent sets of theories within it – the ‘fundamental epistemic principle’ and ‘hinge epistemology’ views, arguably most strongly represented by Michael Lynch and Duncan Pritchard, respectively. Focussing on Lyotard’s text ‘The Differend’, (...)
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  21. Worldview disagreement and subjective epistemic obligations.Daryl Ooi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.
    In this paper, I provide an account of subjective epistemic obligations. In instances of peer disagreement, one possesses at least two types of obligations: objective epistemic obligations and subjective epistemic obligations. While objective epistemic obligations, such as conciliationism and remaining steadfast, have been much discussed in the literature, subjective epistemic obligations have received little attention. I develop an account of subjective epistemic obligations in the context of worldview disagreements. In recent literature, the notion of worldview disagreement has been receiving increasing (...)
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  22. Viewpoint Convergence as a Philosophical Defect.Grace Helton - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker, Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    What can we know? How should we live? What is there? Philosophers famously diverge in the answers they give to these and other philosophical questions. It is widely presumed that a lack of convergence on these questions suggests that philosophy is not progressing at all, is not progressing fast enough, or is not progressing as fast as other disciplines, such as the natural sciences. Call the view that ideal philosophical progress is marked by at least some degree of convergence on (...)
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  23. Introduction: Disagreement—Epistemological and Argumentation-Theoretic Perspectives.Patrick Bondy & David Godden - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):963-969.
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  24. The Compliment of Rational Opposition: Disagreement, Adversariality, and Disputation.David Godden - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):845-858.
    Disputational models of argumentation have been criticized as introducing adversariality into argumentation by mistakenly conceiving of it as minimally adversarial, and, in doing so, structurally incentivizing ancillary adversariality. As an alternative, non-adversarial models of argumentation like inquiry have been recommended. In this article I defend disputational, minimally adversarial models of disagreement-based argumentation. First, I argue that the normative kernel of minimal adversariality is properly located in the normative fabric of disagreement, not our practices of disputation. Thus, argumentation’s minimal adversariality is (...)
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