Discriminability

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. added 2020-06-23
    A modal theory of discrimination.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist theories of discrimination fail since there is no compelling correlation between discriminatory capacities and experiences. Moreover, statistical reliabilist theories are also flawed. Only a modal theory of discrimination is promising. Versions of sensitivity and adherence that take particular alternatives into account provide necessary and sufficient conditions on discrimination. Safety in (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-11
    Not So Phenomenal!Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Our main aims in this paper is to discuss and criticise the core thesis of a position that has become known as phenomenal conservatism. According to this thesis, its seeming to one that p provides enough justification for a belief in p to be prima facie justified (a thesis we label Standard Phenomenal Conservatism). This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this thesis, we embed it, first, in a (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-05
    Inexact Knowledge 2.0.Sven Rosenkranz & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    Many of our sources of knowledge only afford us knowledge that is inexact. When trying to see how tall something is, or to hear how far away something is, or to remember how long something lasted, we may come to know some facts about the approximate size, distance or duration of the thing in question but we don’t come to know exactly what its size, distance or duration is. In some such situations we also have some pointed knowledge of how (...)
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  4. added 2020-06-01
    The Inhuman Overhang: On Differential Heterogenesis and Multi-Scalar Modeling.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - la Deleuziana 11:202-235.
    As a philosophical paradigm, differential heterogenesis offers us a novel descriptive vantage with which to inscribe Deleuze’s virtuality within the terrain of “differential becoming,” conjugating “pure saliences” so as to parse economies, microhistories, insurgencies, and epistemological evolutionary processes that can be conceived of independently from their representational form. Unlike Gestalt theory’s oppositional constructions, the advantage of this aperture is that it posits a dynamic context to both media and its analysis, rendering them functionally tractable and set in relation to other (...)
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  5. added 2019-12-15
    On Schellenberg’s The Unity of Perception.Ayoob Shahmoradi - manuscript
    My general worry is that none of Schellenberg’s arguments against naive realism, generalism, and Russellian representationalism are successful. Thus her attempt at ruling these views out fails. Her main arguments rely on a shared premise whose plausibility, in the absence of an appropriate theory of particulars, is hard to assess (§2.1). Apart from that, these arguments rely on an under-specified notion of ‘constitution’; there seems to be no sense of the term that makes all the premises of her major arguments (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Phenomenal Similarity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Critica 7 (20):3-37.
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  7. added 2019-05-17
    An Ecological Approach to Disjunctivism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - forthcoming - Synthese (Radical Views on Cognition):1-22.
    In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by (...)
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  8. added 2019-04-28
    Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.
    According to a certain kind of naïve or folk understanding of physical matter, everyday ‘solid’ objects are composed of a homogeneous, gap-less substance, with sharply defined boundaries, which wholly fills the space they occupy. A further claim is that our perceptual experience of the environment represents or indicates that the objects around us conform to this sort of conception of physical matter. Were this further claim correct, it would mean that the way that the world appears to us in experience (...)
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  9. added 2019-04-11
    Sintonizando com o mundo: uma abordagem ecológica das habilidades sensoriomotoras.Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Neste capítulo, apresento e sustento uma articulação da noção de habilidade corporal ou sensoriomotora a partir da psicologia ecológica e mostro como ela é relevante para o debate entre Dreyfus e McDowell sobre a lida habilidosa e também para o debate sobre se saber-fazer se reduz ou não a conhecimento proposicional. A metáfora correta para compreender habilidades corporais não é a do computador, mas a do rádio. Essas habilidades resultam de um processo de sintonização do organismo com o seu ambiente.
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  10. added 2019-01-31
    Inexact Knowledge Without Improbable Knowing.Jeremy Goodman - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):30-53.
    In a series of recent papers, Timothy Williamson has argued for the surprising conclusion that there are cases in which you know a proposition in spite of its being overwhelmingly improbable given what you know that you know it. His argument relies on certain formal models of our imprecise knowledge of the values of perceptible and measurable magnitudes. This paper suggests an alternative class of models that do not predict this sort of improbable knowing. I show that such models are (...)
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  11. added 2018-11-06
    Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Pritchard (2010, 2012, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the “sufficiency problem”: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the (...)
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  12. added 2018-06-08
    On Silhouettes, Surfaces and Sorensen.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - In Clare Mac Cumhaill & Thomas Crowther (eds.), Perceptual Ephemera. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 194-218.
    In his book “Seeing Dark Things” (2008), Roy Sorensen provides many wonderfully ingenious arguments for many surprising, counter-intuitive claims. One such claim in particular is that when we a silhouetted object – i.e. an opaque object lit entirely from behind – we literally see its back-side – i.e. we see the full expanse of the surface facing away from us that is blocking the incoming light. Sorensen himself admits that this seems a tough pill to swallow, later characterising it as (...)
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  13. added 2018-04-17
    Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability.Chris Ranalli - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):183-205.
    According to Duncan Pritchard’s version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, one’s knowledge that p is grounded in one’s seeing that p, and one can, by reflection alone, come to know that they see that p. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability is incompatible with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. This has the consequence that theories of the nature of sensory experience which accept the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability—such as phenomenal character (...)
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  14. added 2018-03-21
    Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily.Craig French - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):393-413.
    Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a (...)
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  15. added 2018-03-08
    Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis.Bence Nanay - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
    According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any (...)
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  16. added 2018-02-18
    Identity and Discrimination.Timothy WILLIAMSON - 1990 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Identity and Discrimination_, originally published in 1990 and the first book by respected philosopher Timothy Williamson, is now reissued and updated with the inclusion of significant new material. Williamson here proposes an original and rigorous theory linking identity, a relation central to metaphysics, and indiscriminability, a relation central to epistemology.__ Updated and reissued edition of Williamson’s first publication, with the inclusion of significant new material Argues for an original cognitive account of the relation between identity and discrimination that has been (...)
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  17. added 2017-12-04
    Don’T Look Now.Bernhard Salow & Arif Ahmed - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):327-350.
    Good’s theorem is the apparent platitude that it is always rational to ‘look before you leap’: to gather information before making a decision when doing so is free. We argue that Good’s theorem is not platitudinous and may be false. And we argue that the correct advice is rather to ‘make your act depend on the answer to a question’. Looking before you leap is rational when, but only when, it is a way to do this.
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  18. added 2017-07-01
    Does the Debate About Cinematic Motion Rest on a Mistake?Rafael De Clercq - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):519-525.
    The debate about cinematic motion revolves around the question of whether the movement of cinematic images is real. That the movement we perceive in film should be construed as the movement of images is taken for granted. But this is a mistake. There is no reason to suppose that cinematic images of moving objects are themselves perceived to be moving. All that is necessary is to perceive these images as continuously changing images of one and the same object.
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  19. added 2017-03-15
    Matching Sensible Qualities: A Skeleton in the Closet for Representationalism.Robert Schroer - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):259-273.
    The intransitivity of matching sensible qualities of color is a threat not only to the sense-data theory, but to all realist theories of sensible qualities, including the current leading realist theory: representationalism. I save representationalism from this threat by way of a novel yet empirically plausible hypothesis about the introspective classification of sensible qualities of color. I argue that due to limitations of the visual system's ability to extract fine-grained information about color from the environment, introspective classification of sensible qualities (...)
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  20. added 2017-02-28
    Two Kinds of Discrimination.Adrian Piper - 1993 - In Bernard Boxill (ed.), Race and Racism. Oxford University Press.
    The two kinds of discrimination I want to talk about are political discrimination and cognitive discrimination. By political discrimination, I mean what we ordinarily understand by the term "discrimination" in political contexts: A manifest attitude in which a particular property of a person which is irrelevant to judgments of that person's intrinsic value or competence, for example his race, gender, class, sexual orientation, or religious or ethnic affiliation, is seen as a source of disvalue or incompetence; in general, as a (...)
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  21. added 2017-02-15
    Perceptual Indiscriminability and the Concept of a Color Shade.Leon Horsten - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
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  22. added 2016-12-24
    Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality.Rolla Giovanni - 2016 - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 39 (3):5-28.
    Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë’s actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement – (...)
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  23. added 2016-12-08
    Indiscriminability as Indiscernibility by Default.Ariel Cohen - 2008 - Studia Logica 90 (3):369-383.
    Most solutions to the sorites reject its major premise, i.e. the quantified conditional . This rejection appears to imply a discrimination between two elements that are supposed to be indiscriminable. Thus, the puzzle of the sorites involves in a fundamental way the notion of indiscriminability. This paper analyzes this relation and formalizes it, in a way that makes the rejection of the major premise more palatable. The intuitive idea is that we consider two elements indiscriminable by default, i.e. unless we (...)
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  24. added 2016-03-08
    The Individual Variability Problem.Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):533-554.
    Studies show that there are widespread intrasubjective and intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. These variations have serious ramifications in the debate about the nature and ontology of color. It is typical to think of the debate about color as a dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists hold that colors are perceiver-independent physical properties of objects while subjectivists hold that they are either projections onto external objects or dispositions objects have to look colored. I argue that individual color variations present (...)
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  25. added 2015-09-21
    2D Geometry Predicts Perceived Visual Curvature in Context-Free Viewing.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2015 - Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience 2015 (708759):1-9.
    Planar geometry was exploited for the computation of symmetric visual curves in the image plane, with consistent variations in local parameters such as sagitta, chordlength, and the curves’ height-to-width ratio, an indicator of the visual area covered by the curve, also called aspect ratio. Image representations of single curves (no local image context) were presented to human observers to measure their visual sensation of curvature magnitude elicited by a given curve. Nonlinear regression analysis was performed on both the individual and (...)
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  26. added 2015-03-19
    Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua.Diana Raffman - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.
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  27. added 2014-04-02
    Phenomenal Qualities and the Nontransitivity of Matching.John A. Burgess - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):206-220.
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  28. added 2014-03-31
    Learning From Experience: A Commentary on Baddeley and Weiskrantz (Eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control.Bill Brewer - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):181-193.
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  29. added 2014-03-29
    An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.
    Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-23
    Is Perceptual Indiscriminability Nontransitive?Diana Raffman - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):153-75.
    It is widely supposed that one family of sorites paradoxes, perhaps the most perplexing versions of the puzzle, owe at least in part to the nontransitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. To a first approximation, perceptual indiscriminability is the relationship obtaining among objects (stimuli) that appear identical in some perceptual respect—for example hue, or pitch, or texture. Indiscriminable objects look the same, or sound the same, or feel the same. Received wisdom has it that there are or could be series of objects (...)
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  31. added 2014-03-20
    Academic Arguments for the Indiscernibility Thesis.Casey Perin - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):493-517.
    The Academics offered an argument from twins or perceptually indiscernible objects and an argument from dreams or madness in support of the indiscernibility thesis: that every true perceptual impression is such that some false impression just like it is possible. I claim that these arguments, unlike modern sceptical arguments, are supposed to establish mere counterfactual rather than epistemic possibilities. They purport to show that for any true perceptual impression j, there are a number of alternative causal histories j might have (...)
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  32. added 2014-03-20
    Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability.Benj Hellie - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):481-508.
    Perception represents colours inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'.
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  33. added 2014-03-19
    Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discriminability1.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301-314.
    In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-19
    Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...)
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  35. added 2014-03-16
    The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.Susanna Siegel - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of (...)
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  36. added 2014-03-16
    Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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  37. added 2014-03-16
    Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
  38. added 2014-03-16
    Disjunctivism and Discriminability.A. D. Smith - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Disjunctivism is the focus of a lively debate spanning the philosophy of perception, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson present 17 specially written essays, which examine the different forms of disjunctivism and explore the connections between them.
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  39. added 2014-03-14
    Intentionalism and Intransitivity.Max Deutsch - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
    I argue in this paper that the existence of sorites series of color patches – series of color patches arranged so that the patches on each end look different in color though no two adjacent patches do – shows that the relation of same phenomenal charac­ter as is not a transitive relation. I then argue that the intransitivity of same phenomenal character as conflicts with certain versions of intentionalism, the view that an experiences phenomenal character is exhausted, or fully determined (...)
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  40. added 2014-03-12
    Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal.Susanna Siegel - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112.
    In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
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  41. added 2014-03-07
    Luminosity and Indiscriminability.Jonathan Vogel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.
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  42. added 2014-03-06
    Subjective Discriminability of Invisibility: A Framework for Distinguishing Perceptual and Attentional Failures of Awareness.Ryota Kanai, Vincent Walsh & Chia-Huei Tseng - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1045-1057.
    Conscious visual perception can fail in many circumstances. However, little is known about the causes and processes leading to failures of visual awareness. In this study, we introduce a new signal detection measure termed subjective discriminability of invisibility that allows one to distinguish between subjective blindness due to reduction of sensory signals or to lack of attentional access to sensory signals. The SDI is computed based upon subjective confidence in reporting the absence of a target . Using this new measure, (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-06
    Exactness, Inexactness, and the Non-Transitivity of Perceptual Indiscriminability.Charles Pelling - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):289 - 312.
    I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents ‘inexactly’, and that this results in violations of the transitivity of colour indiscriminability. I show that Hellie’s argument remains inconclusive, since he does not demonstrate conclusively that colour perception really does represent inexactly. My own argument for the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability uses inexactness instead as one horn of a (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-04
    Phenomenal Sorites Paradoxes and Looking the Same.Rosanna Keefe - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):327-344.
    Taking a series of colour patches, starting with one that clearly looks red, and making each so similar in colour to the previous one that it looks the same as it, we appear to be able to show that a yellow patch looks red. I ask whether phenomenal sorites paradoxes, such as this, are subject to a unique kind of solution that is unavailable in relation to other sorites paradoxes. I argue that they do not need such a solution, nor (...)
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  45. added 2012-03-12
    Color and Cognitive Penetrability.John Zeimbekis - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):167-175.
    Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290–293, 1965, Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367–1368, 2006, Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1–16, 2008). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even when the objects do not have those colors. Recently, these findings were used to argue that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable (Macpherson 2012). This interpretation of the experiments has far-reaching consequences: it implies that the (...)
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  46. added 2011-08-16
    Review of John McDowell, Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. [REVIEW]Tim Black - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  47. added 2011-06-22
    Mental Colors, Conceptual Overlap, and Discriminating Knowledge of Particulars.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):641-643.
    I respond to the separate commentaries by Jacob Berger, Charlie Pelling, and David Pereplyotchik on my paper, “Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.” I resist Berger’s suggestion that mental colors ever enter consciousness without accompaniment by deployments of concepts of their extra-mental counterparts. I express concerns about Pelling’s proposal that a more uniform conceptualist treatment of phenomenal sorites can be gained by a simple appeal to the partial overlap of the extensions of some concepts. I question the relevance to perceptual consciousness of the arguments (...)
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  48. added 2011-03-23
    Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness.René Jagnow - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57 - 74.
    According to the monitoring theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious in virtue of being represented in the right way by a monitoring state. David Rosenthal, William Lycan, and Uriah Kriegel have developed three different influential versions of this theory. In order to explain colour experiences, each of these authors combines his version of the monitoring theory of consciousness with a specific account of colour representation. Even though Rosenthal, Lycan, and Kriegel disagree on the specifics, they all hold that (...)
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  49. added 2011-03-16
    Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
    The goal of the present paper is to defend against a certain line of attack the view that conscious experience of color is no more fine-grained that the repertoire of non- demonstrative concepts that a perceiver is able to bring to bear in perception. The line of attack in question is an alleged empirical argument - the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument - based on pairs of colors so similar that they can be discriminated when simultaneously presented but not when presented across (...)
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  50. added 2011-03-16
    On the Persistence of Phenomenology.Diana Raffman - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 293–308.
    In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience, Schoningh Verlag. 1995. [ online ].
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