Related categories
Siblings:
173 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 173
  1. D. M. Armstrong (2001). Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):246-248.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. D. M. Armstrong (1988). Are Dispositions Ultimate? Reply to Franklin. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):84-86.
  3. David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):309-320.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. Christopher J. Austin (2016). Is Dispositional Causation Just Mutual Manifestation? Ratio 29 (3):235-248.
    Dispositional properties are often referred to as ‘causal powers’, but what does dispositional causation amount to? Any viable theory must account for two fundamental aspects of the metaphysics of causation – the causal complexity and context sensitivity of causal interactions. The theory of mutual manifestations attempts to do so by locating the complexity and context sensitivity within the nature of dispositions themselves. But is this theory an acceptable first step towards a viable theory of dispositional causation? This paper argues that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Joseph A. Baltimore (2015). Heil’s Two-Category Ontology and Causation. Erkenntnis 80 (5):1091-1099.
    In his recent book, The Universe As We Find It, John Heil offers an updated account of his two-category ontology. One of his major goals is to avoid including relations in his basic ontology. While there can still be true claims positing relations, such as those of the form “x is taller than y” and “x causes y,” they will be true in virtue of substances and their monadic, non-relational properties. That is, Heil’s two-category ontology is deployed to provide non-relational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. William A. Bauer (2016). Physical Intentionality, Extrinsicness, and the Direction of Causation. Acta Analytica 31 (4):397-417.
    The Physical Intentionality Thesis claims that dispositions share the marks of psychological intentionality; therefore, intentionality is not exclusively a mental phenomenon. Beyond the standard five marks, Alexander Bird introduces two additional marks of intentionality that he argues dispositions do not satisfy: first, thoughts are extrinsic; second, the direction of causation is that objects cause thoughts, not vice versa. In response, this paper identifies two relevant conceptions of extrinsicness, arguing that dispositions show deep parallels to thoughts on both conceptions. Then, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. William A. Bauer (2013). Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties. Disputatio 5 (35).
    Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses the relation between powers and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8. William A. Bauer (2012). Four Theories of Pure Dispositions. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge. pp. 139-162.
    The dispositional properties encountered in everyday experience seem to have causal bases in other properties, e.g., the microstructure of a vase is the causal basis of its fragility. In contrast, the Pure Dispositions Thesis maintains that some dispositions require no causal basis. This thesis faces the Problem of Being: without a causal basis, there appears to be no grounds for the existence of pure dispositions. This paper establishes criteria for evaluating the problem, critically examines four theories of the being of (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. William A. Bauer (2010). The Ontology of Pure Dispositions. Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
    This dissertation defends and develops the thesis that some instances, or tokens, of dispositional properties are pure. A pure disposition has no causal basis in any further properties beyond the disposition. A causal basis typically consists of some set of properties underlying a disposition that enables the disposition to manifest when stimulated in the appropriate circumstances. For example, a vase is fragile because it is disposed to break when a hammer or other suitable object strikes it, where the causal basis (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Nora Berenstain (2016). What a Structuralist Theory of Properties Could Not Be. In Anna Marmodoro & David Yates (ed.), The Metaphysics of Relations. OUP. Oxford University Press.
    Causal structuralism is the view that, for each natural, non-mathematical, non-Cambridge property, there is a causal profile that exhausts its individual essence. On this view, having a property’s causal profile is both necessary and sufficient for being that property. It is generally contrasted with the Humean or quidditistic view of properties, which states that having a property’s causal profile is neither necessary nor sufficient for being that property, and with the double-aspect view, which states that causal profile is necessary but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Nora Berenstain (2014). Necessary Laws and Chemical Kinds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):631-647.
    Contingentism, generally contrasted with law necessitarianism, is the view that the laws of nature are contingent. It is often coupled with the claim that their contingency is knowable a priori. This paper considers Bird's [2001, 2002, 2005, 2007] arguments for the thesis that, necessarily, salt dissolves in water; and it defends his view against Beebee's [2001] and Psillos's [2002] contingentist objections. A new contingentist objection is offered and several reasons for scepticism about its success are raised. It is concluded that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Gustav Bergmann (1955). Dispositional Properties and Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 6 (5):77-80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. Tomasz Bigaj (2010). Dispositional Monism and the Circularity Objection. Metaphysica 11 (1):39-47.
    Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that two distinct dispositional properties can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Alexander Bird (2012). Monastic Dispositional Essentialism. In Alexander Bird, B. D. Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge. pp. 35--41.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Alexander Bird (2010). Causation and the Manifestation of Powers. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
    It is widely agreed that many causal relations can be regarded as dependent upon causal relations that are in some way more basic. For example, knocking down the first domino in a row of one hundred dominoes will be the cause of the hundredth domino falling. But this causal relation exists in virtue of the knocking of the first domino causing the falling of the second domino, and so forth. In such a case, A causes B in virtue of there (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Alexander Bird (2009). Structural Properties Revisited. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Clarendon Press. pp. 215--41.
    Those who hold that all fundamental sparse properties have dispositional essences face a problem with structural (e.g. geometrical) properties. In this paper I consider a further route for the dispositional monist that is enabled by the requirement that physical theories should be background-free. If this requirement is respected then we can see how spatial displacement can be a causally active relation and hence may be understood dispositionally.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  17. Alexander Bird (2007). Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford University Press.
    Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   106 citations  
  18. Alexander Bird (2003). Structural Properties. In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge. pp. 155-68.
    Dispositional essentialists claim that dispositional properties are essentially dispositional: a property would not be the property it is unless it carried with it certain dispositional powers. Categoricalists about dispositional properties deny this, asserting that the same properties might have had different dispositional powers, had the contingent laws of nature been otherwise.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Alexander Bird, B. D. Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.) (2011). Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Routledge.
    While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principal areas covered are: (1) The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Simon W. Blackburn (1990). Filling in Space. Analysis 50 (2):62-5.
  21. Daniel Bonevac, Josh Dever & and David Sosa (2006). The Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Review 115 (3):273-316.
    To say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this sleeper knows French, is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates correctly into his own tongue.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  22. D. J. Bradley (2011). Functionalist Response-Dependence Avoids Missing Explanations. Analysis 71 (2):297-300.
    I argue that there is a flaw in the way that response-dependence has been formulated in the literature, and this flawed formulation has been correctly attacked by Mark Johnston’s Missing Explanation Argument (1993, 1998). Moving to a better formulation, which is analogous to the move from behaviourism to functionalism, avoids the Missing Explanation Argument.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. James M. Bucknell (2015). Dispositions. Dissertation, Univeristy of New South Wales
    This thesis proposes that key, competing theories of dispositions mistake and conflate how we identify, designate and talk about dispositions and dispositional terms for the nature of dispositions and the meaning of dispositional terms when they argue that: a) dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers (Boyle 1666) b) all properties are purely dispositional (Bird 2007) c) all properties are purely categorical (there are no dispositional properties) (Armstrong in AMP 1996) d) dispositional and categorical properties are separate and distinct properties (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. F. Buyse (2015). The Distinction Between Primary Properties and Secondary Qualities in Galileo's Natural Philosophy. Cahiers du Séminaire Québécois En Philosophie Moderne / Working Papers of the Quebec Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy 1:20-45.
    In Il Saggiatore (1623), Galileo makes a strict distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Although this distinction continues to be debated in philosophical literature up to this very day, Galileo's views on the matter, as well as their impact on his contemporaries and other philosophers, have yet to be sufficiently documented. The present paper helps to clear up Galileo's ideas on the subject by avoiding some of the misunderstandings that have arisen due to faulty translations of his work. In particular, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Francesco F. Calemi (2014). Le radici dell'essere: Metafisica e metaontologia in David Malet Armstrong. Armando Editore.
    Metafisica e metaontologia in David Malet Armstrong Francesco F. Calemi. CALEMI, Francesco F. Le radici dell'essere. Metafisica e metaontologia in David Malet Armstrong ; Prefazione di Stephen Mumford Roma : Armando, © 2013 160 p.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Chad Carmichael (2013). The Universe As We Find It, by John Heil. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013.
    In this ambitious work, John Heil presents a fundamental ontology (chapters 1-8) consisting of finitely many substances and their properties (which he thinks of as particular, trope-like things), together with an account of causation, truthmaking, and a chapter on relations generally. He then applies this ontology (chapters 9-12) to a number of outstanding problems about reductionism, kinds, essences, emergence, consciousness, cognition, and much else. A final chapter reprises the main points about fundamental ontology from the first chapters.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Anjan Chakravartty (2003). The Dispositional Essentialist View of Properties and Laws. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):393 – 413.
    One view of the nature of properties has been crystallized in recent debate by an identity thesis proposed by Shoemaker. The general idea is that there is for behaviour. Well-known criticisms of this approach, however, remain unanswered, and the details of its connections to laws nothing more to being a particular causal property than conferring certain dispositions of nature and the precise ontology of causal properties stand in need of development. This paper examines and defends a dispositional essentialist account of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  28. Sungho Choi, Purely Dispositional Worlds.
    In this paper I will discuss Richard Holton’s defence of dispositionalism that all properties are essentially dispositional. By way of countering the objection that dispositionalism generates an infinite regress, Holton attempts to advance a consistent model of possible worlds where all truths are dispositional truths. But I will argue that the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, on which Holton’s model is built, is so mistaken that Holton’s model fails to serve his goal. What is more, it is not likely that (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Sungho Choi (2008). The Incompleteness of Dispositional Predicates. Synthese 163 (2):157 - 174.
    Elizabeth Prior claims that dispositional predicates are incomplete in the sense that they have more than one argument place. To back up this claim, she offers a number of arguments that involve such ordinary dispositional predicates as ‘fragile’, ‘soluble’, and so on. In this paper, I will first demonstrate that one of Prior’s arguments that ‘is fragile’ is an incomplete predicate is mistaken. This, however, does not immediately mean that Prior is wrong that ‘fragile’ is an incomplete predicate. On the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Sungho Choi (2005). Do Categorical Ascriptions Entail Counterfactual Conditionals? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):495–503.
    Stephen Mumford, in his book on dispositions, argues that we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties in terms of entailing his 'conditional conditionals', which involve the concept of ideal conditions. I aim at defending Mumford's criterion for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties. To be specific, no categorical ascriptions entail Mumford's 'conditional conditionals'.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  31. David Chua, Metaphysical Accounts of Modality: A Comparative Evaluation of Lewisian and Neo-Aristotelian Modal Metaphysics.
    In this essay I comparatively evaluate two realist metaphysical accounts of modality: David Lewis’ (1986) genuine modal realism (GMR), and neo-Aristotelian modal realism (AMR) as put forth by Alexander Pruss (2011). GMR offers a reductive analysis of modal claims of possibility and necessity in terms of claims quantifying over concrete worlds and counterparts, and is in this way committed the existence of a plurality of concrete worlds other than the actual world; AMR, on the other hand, offers an analysis of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.
    Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been `finked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  33. Jonathan Cohen (2010). Sounds and Temporality. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:303-320.
    What is the relationship between sounds and time? More specifically, is there something essentially or distinctively temporal about sounds that distinguishes them from, say, colors, shapes, odors, tastes, or other sensible qualities? And just what might this distinctive relation to time consist in? Apart from their independent interest, these issues have a number of important philosophical repercussions. First, if sounds are temporal in a way that other sensible qualities are not, then this would mean that standard lists of paradigm secondary (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34. Jonathan Cohen (2002). On an Alleged Non-Equivalence Between Dispositions and Disjunctive Properties. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):77-81.
    This paper shows that grounded dispositions are necessarily coextensive with disjunctive properties. It responds to several objections against this thesis, and then shows how to construct a disjunctive property necessarily coextensive with an arbitrary grounded disposition.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Florian Cova (2014). Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):505-521.
    ‘Frankfurt-style cases’ (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy (J Philos 105:223–239, 2008) has recently argued that FSCs fail because we are not entitled to suppose that the agent is morally responsible, given that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener is enough to make an agent lose responsibility-grounding abilities. Here, I distinguish two (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  36. Sam Cowling (2010). Kantian Humility and Ontological Categories. Analysis 70 (4):659-665.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. J. W. Roxbee Cox (1975). Mackie on Dispositional Properties. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):232-234.
  38. Charles B. Cross (2016). Every Proposition is a Counterfactual. Acta Analytica 31 (2):117-137.
    I present and discuss two logical results. The first shows that a non-trivial counterfactual analysis exists for any contingent proposition that is false in at least two possible worlds. The second result identifies a set of conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the success of a counterfactual analysis. I use these results to shed light on the question whether disposition ascribing propositions can be analyzed as Stalnaker-Lewis conditional propositions. The answer is that they can, but, in order (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Troy Cross (2013). Review of Groff and Greco, Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  40. Troy Cross (2012). Goodbye, Humean Supervenience. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:129-153.
    Reductionists about dispositions must either say the natural properties are all dispositional or individuate properties hyperintensionally. Lewis stands in as an example of the sort of combination I think is incoherent: properties individuated by modal profile + categoricalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Troy Cross (2012). Review of Marmodoro, Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Troy Cross (2005). What is a Disposition? Synthese 144 (3):321-41.
    Attempts to capture the distinction between categorical and dispositional states in terms of more primitive modal notions – subjunctive conditionals, causal roles, or combinatorial principles – are bound to fail. Such failure is ensured by a deep symmetry in the ways dispositional and categorical states alike carry modal import. But the categorical/dispositional distinction should not be abandoned; it underpins important metaphysical disputes. Rather, it should be taken as a primitive, after which the doomed attempts at reductive explanation can be transformed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  43. Mauro Dorato (2015). Laws of Nature and the Reality of the Wave Function. Synthese 192 (10):3179-3201.
    In this paper I review three different positions on the wave function, namely: nomological realism, dispositionalism, and configuration space realism by regarding as essential their capacity to account for the world of our experience. I conclude that the first two positions are committed to regard the wave function as an abstract entity. The third position will be shown to be a merely speculative attempt to derive a primitive ontology from a reified mathematical space. Without entering any discussion about nominalism, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Mauro Dorato, Properties and Dispositions: Some Metaphysical Remarks on Quantum Ontology.
    After some suggestions about how to clarify the confused metaphysical distinctions between dispositional and non-dispositional or categorical properties, I review some of the main interpretations of QM in order to show that – with the relevant exception of Bohm’s minimalist interpretation – quantum ontology is irreducibly dispositional. Such an irreducible character of dispositions must be explained differently in different interpretations, but the reducibility of the contextual properties in the case of Bohmian mechanics is guaranteed by the fact that the positions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  45. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter.
    Farben sind für uns sowohl objektive, als auch phänomenale Eigenschaften. In seinem Buch argumentiert Fabian Dorsch, daß keine ontologische Theorie der Farben diesen beiden Seiten unseres Farbbegriffes gerecht werden k ann. Statt dessen sollten wir akzeptieren, daß letzterer sich auf zwei verschiedene Arten von Eigenschaften bezieht: die repräsentierten Reflektanzeigenschaften von Gegenständen und die qualitativen Eigenschaften unserer Farbwahrnehmungen, die als sinnliche Gegebenheitsweisen ersterer fungieren. Die Natur der Farben gibt einen detaillierten Überblick über die zeitgenössischen philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien der Farben und (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Antony Eagle (2009). Causal Structuralism, Dispositional Actualism, and Counterfactual Conditionals. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press. pp. 65--99.
    Dispositional essentialists are typically committed to two claims: that properties are individuated by their causal role (‘causal structuralism’), and that natural necessity is to be explained by appeal to these causal roles (‘dispositional actualism’). I argue that these two claims cannot be simultaneously maintained; and that the correct response is to deny dispositional actualism. Causal structuralism remains an attractive position, but doesn’t in fact provide much support for dispositional essentialism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  47. Jim Edwards (1992). Secondary Qualities and the a Priori. Mind 101 (402):263-272.
  48. Brian Ellis (2010). Causal Powers and Categorical Properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that there are categorical properties as well as causal powers, and that the world would not exist as we know it without them. For categorical properties are needed to define the powers—to locate them, and to specify their laws of action. These categorical properties, I shall argue, are not dispositional. For their identities do not depend on what they dispose their bearers to do. They are, as Alexander Bird would say, ’quiddities’. But (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49. Brian Ellis (2005). Katzav on the Limitations of Dispositionalism. Analysis 65 (285):90–92.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50. Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse (1994). Dispositional Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   56 citations  
1 — 50 / 173