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  1. Science and Metaphysics Confronting Nature.Evandro Agazzi - 1977 - Dialectics and Humanism 4 (3):127-136.
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  2. Dispositions and Occurrences.William P. Alston - 1971 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):125 - 154.
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  3. Dispositions, Occurrences, and Ontology.William P. Alston - 1971 - In R. Tuomela (ed.), Dispositions. Reidel. pp. 359-88.
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  4. Ryle on Motives and Dispositions.Maria Alvarez - 2015 - In D. Dolby (ed.), Ryle on Mind and Language. Palgrave. pp. 74-96.
  5. A Dispositional Theory of Possibility.Neil E. Williams Andrea Borghini - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):21-41.
    The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysically possible is determined by dispositions found in the actual world. We argue that there is just one world – this one – and that all genuine possibilities are grounded in the dispositions exemplified in it. This is the case whether or not those dispositions are manifested. As long as the possibility is one that would obtain were the relevant disposition manifested, it is a genuine possibility. (...)
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  6. Powers as Causal Truthmakers.Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford - 2014 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 3 (4):5--31.
    [EN]Most theories of causation assume that it must involve some kind of necessity, or that the cause must be entirely sufficient for the effect. Others have already suggested that it should be possible to get a theory of causation from a theory of powers or dispositions. Such a project is far from complete but even here we find that the key point in a dispositional theory of causation has been lacking. This paper attempts to establish some of the most important (...)
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  7. What We Tend to Mean.Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford - 2011 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 46 (1):20-33.
    In this paper a dispositional account of meaning is offered. Words might dispose towards a particular or ‘literal’ meaning, but whether this meaning is actually conveyed when expressed will depend on a number of factors, such as speaker’s intentions, the context of the utterance and the background knowledge of the hearer. It is thus argued that no meaning is guaranteed or necessitated by the words used.
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  8. Causality and Properties.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1971 - In Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  9. Reply to Bird.D. M. Armstrong - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):264–265.
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  10. Dispositions by Stephen Mumford.D. M. Armstrong - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):246-248.
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  11. In T. Crane.D. Armstrong, C. B. Martin & U. T. Place - 1996 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge.
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  12. Dispositions as Categorical States.David M. Armstrong - 1996 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge. pp. 15--18.
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  13. Properties.David M. Armstrong - 1992 - In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 14--27.
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  14. The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others.David Malet Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  15. Dispositions Are Causes.David Malet Armstrong - 1969 - Analysis 30 (1):23-26.
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  16. A Debate on Dispositions Their Nature and Their Role in Causation.Dm Armstrong, Ut Place & Cb Martin - 1992 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 26 (68-69):3-58.
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  17. Function, Role and Disposition in Basic Formal Ontology.Robert Arp & Barry Smith - 2008 - Proceedings of Bio-Ontologies Workshop, Intelligent Systems for Molecular Biology (ISMB), Toronto.
    Numerous research groups are now utilizing Basic Formal Ontology as an upper-level framework to assist in the organization and integration of biomedical information. This paper provides elucidation of the three existing BFO subcategories of realizable entity, namely function, role, and disposition. It proposes one further sub-category of tendency, and considers the merits of recognizing two sub-categories of function for domain ontologies, namely, artifactual and biological function. The motivation is to help advance the coherent ontological treatment of functions, roles, and dispositions, (...)
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  18. The Metaphysics of Desire and Dispositions.Lauren Ashwell - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (7):469-477.
    There seems to be some kind of close relationship between desires and behavioral dispositions. While a popular view about the nature of desire is that it essentially involves dispositions towards action, there do seem to be pressing objections to this view. However, recent work on dispositional properties potentially undermines some of the metaphysical assumptions that lie beneath these objections.
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  19. Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization.Paul Audi - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
    According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. (...)
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  20. Aristotelian Essentialism: Essence in the Age of Evolution.Christopher J. Austin - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2539-2556.
    The advent of contemporary evolutionary theory ushered in the eventual decline of Aristotelian Essentialism (Æ) – for it is widely assumed that essence does not, and cannot have any proper place in the age of evolution. This paper argues that this assumption is a mistake: if Æ can be suitably evolved, it need not face extinction. In it, I claim that if that theory’s fundamental ontology consists of dispositional properties, and if its characteristic metaphysical machinery is interpreted within the framework (...)
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  21. Structural Powers and the Homeodynamic Unity of Organisms.Christopher J. Austin & Anna Marmodoro - 2017 - In William M. R. Simpson, Robert C. Koons & Nicholas J. Teh (eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science. Routledge. pp. 169-184.
    Although they are continually compositionally reconstituted and reconfigured, organisms nonetheless persist as ontologically unified beings over time – but in virtue of what? A common answer is: in virtue of their continued possession of the capacity for morphological invariance which persists through, and in spite of, their mereological alteration. While we acknowledge that organisms‟ capacity for the “stability of form” – homeostasis - is an important aspect of their diachronic unity, we argue that this capacity is derived from, and grounded (...)
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  22. Bird of Passage: Recollections of a Physicist. Rudolf Peierls.Lawrence Badash - 1986 - Isis 77 (2):332-333.
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  23. Are Specific Heats Dispositions?Anouk Barberousse - 2007 - In Gnassounou Bruno & Kistler Max (eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate. pp. 271--282.
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  24. Dispositional Monism, Relational Constitution and Quiddities.Stephen Barker - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):242-250.
    Let us call dispositional monism the view that all natural properties have their identities fixed purely by their dispositional features, that is, by the patterns of stimulus and response in which they participate. DM implies that natural properties are pure powers: things whose natures are fully identified by their roles in determining the potentialities of events to cause or be caused. As pure powers, properties are meant to lack quiddities in Black's sense. A property possesses a quiddity just in case (...)
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  25. Why Metrical Properties Are Not Powers.Andreas Bartels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2001-2013.
    What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the effects of spacetime on (...)
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  26. Epiphenomenal Properties.Umut Baysan - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):419-431.
    What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we can decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterisation of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, and these similarities (...)
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  27. The Role of Dispositions in Explanations.Agustín Vicente Benito - 2004 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (51):301-310.
    ABSTRACT: According to a model defended by some authors, dispositional predicates, or concepts, can be legiti- mately used in causal explanations, but such a use is not necessary. For every explanation couched in dispo- sitional terms, there is always a better, and complete, explanation that makes use of a different vocabulary, that of categorial bases. In what follows, I will develop this view, and then argue that there is a kind of use of dispositions in explanations that does not fall (...)
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  28. Perfect Powers with Few Binary Digits and Related Diophantine Problems.Michael A. Bennett, Yann Bugeaud & Maurice Mignotte - 2013 - Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa 12 (4):941-953.
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  29. Critical Notice of Tim Crane, Ed. Dispositions: A Debate by D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):619-633.
  30. Properties, Powers, and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism.Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.) - 2013 - Routledge.
    While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principle areas covered are: The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, (...)
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  31. Mr. Hampshire on Dispositions.G. N. Bird - 1953 - Analysis 14 (4):100 - 102.
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  32. MUMFORD, S.-Dispositions.T. Bittner - 2001 - Philosophical Books 42 (1):61-62.
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  33. Dispositions and Their Intentions.Andrea Borghini - 2009 - In G. Damschen, R. Schnepf & K. Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 204-219.
    Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of reality – i.e., dispositions – are properties, that may exist in the natural world and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen Mumford, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I defend a fresh (...)
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  34. A Dispositional Theory of Possibility.Andrea Borghini & Neil E. Williams - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):21–41.
    – The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysically possible is determined by dispositions found in the actual world. We argue that there is just one world—this one—and that all genuine possibilities are anchored by the dispositions exemplified in this world. This is the case regardless of whether or not those dispositions are manifested. As long as the possibility is one that would obtain were the relevant disposition manifested, it is a genuine possibility. (...)
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  35. In Defence of Pan-Dispositionalism.Simon Bostock - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):139-157.
    Pan-Dispositionalism – the view that all properties (and relations) are irreducibly dispositional – currently appears to have no takers amongst major analytic metaphysicians. There are those, such as Mumford, who are open to the idea but remain uncommitted. And there are those, such as Ellis and Molnar, who accept that some properties are irreducibly dispositional but argue that not all are. In this paper, I defend Pan-Dispositionalism against this ‘Moderate’ Dispositionalism.
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  36. Dispositions and Ontology.Denny Bradshaw - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):169-182.
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  37. Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind.Brendel Elke - 2009 - Walter de Gruyter.
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  38. Mumford, Stephen and Rani Lill Anjum. Getting Causes From Powers.José Sebastián Briceño - 2012 - Review of Metaphysics 65 (4):887-888.
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  39. Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):314-316.
    Tracking accounts of knowledge formulated in terms of counterfactuals suffer from well known problems. Examples are provided, and it is shown that moving to a dispositional tracking theory of knowledge avoids three of these problems.
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  40. Epistemic Dispositions.Rachel Briggs & Daniel Nolan - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):629-636.
    We reply to recent papers by John Turri and Ben Bronner, who criticise the dispositionalised Nozickian tracking account we discuss in “Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.” We argue that the account we suggested can handle the problems raised by Turri and Bronner. In the course of responding to Turri and Bronner’s objections, we draw three general lessons for theories of epistemic dispositions: that epistemic dispositions are to some extent extrinsic, that epistemic dispositions can have manifestation conditions concerning circumstances where (...)
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  41. Dispositional and Teleological Statements.Robert Brown - 1952 - Philosophical Studies 3 (5):73 - 80.
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  42. “Paul And ‘the Powers That Be’,”.F. Bruce - 1984 - Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 66 (2):78-96.
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  43. Dispositional Statements.Arthur W. Burks - 1955 - Philosophy of Science 22 (3):175-193.
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  44. Arthur Pap on Dispositions'.R. Carnap - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill., Open Court. pp. 947--52.
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  45. HARRÉ, R. And MADDEN, E. H. "Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity". [REVIEW]B. Carr - 1978 - Mind 87:305.
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  46. The Explication of Dispositions.Spencer Carr - 1976 - Journal of Critical Analysis 6 (2):47-54.
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  47. Review of Alexander Bird, Nature's Metaphysics. [REVIEW]J. W. Carroll - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  48. Dispositions. [REVIEW]J. W. Carroll - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):82-84.
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  49. Review of S. Mumford, Dispositions. [REVIEW]John Carroll - 2001 - Philosophical Review 100:82-4.
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  50. Causal Laws, Policy Predictions, and the Need for Genuine Powers.Nancy Cartwright - 2007 - In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
    Knowledge of causal laws is expensive and hard to come by. But we work hard to get it because we believe that it will reduce contingency in planning policies and in building new technologies: knowledge of causal laws allows us to predict reliably what the outcomes will be when we manipulate the factors cited as causes in those laws. Or do they? This paper will argue that causal laws have no special role here. As economists from JS Mill to Robert (...)
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