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  1. L. Alpert Judith (1995). Trauma, Dissociation, and Clinical Study as a Responsible Beginning. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1):125-129.
  2. Susan Leigh Anderson (1974). A Philosophical Analysis of the Phenomenon of Multiple Personality in Connection with the Problem of Personal Identity. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
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  3. Andrew Apter (1991). The Problem of Who: Multiple Personality, Personal Identity, and the Double Brain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):219-48.
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  4. Bernard J. Baars & Katharine McGovern (1995). Steps Toward Healing: False Memories and Traumagenic Amnesia May Coexist in Vulnerable Populations. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1):68-74.
    Child abuse is surely the most agonizing psychological issue of our time. We decry the tendency to polarize around the either-or dichotomy of "recovered versus false memories," when both are likely to occur. Memory researchers seem to generalize from the mild, one-shot stressors of the laboratory to the severe repeated traumas reported by abused populations, an inferential leap that is scientifically dubious. Naturalistic studies show some post-traumatic memory impairment ; dissociativity, such as emotional numbing, detachment, and the like; but also (...)
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  5. William P. Banks & Kathy Pezdek (1994). The Recovered Memory/False Memory Debate. Consciousness and Cognition 3 (3-4):265-268.
  6. Y. Michael Barilan (2003). One or Two: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins From Malta. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (1):27 – 44.
    The article questions the assumption that conjoined twins are necessarily two people or persons by employing arguments based on different points of view: non-personal vitalism, the person as a sentient being, the person as an agent, the person as a locus of narrative and valuation, and the person as an embodied mind. Analogies employed from the cases of amputation, multiple personality disorder, abortion, split-brain patients and cloning. The article further questions the assumption that a conjoined twin's natural interest and wish (...)
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  7. Michael Bavidge (1996). Commentary on "Minds, Memes, and Multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):29-30.
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  8. Timothy J. Bayne (2002). Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.
    Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the psychological approach (...)
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  9. J. O. Beahrs (1983). Co-Consciousness: A Common Denominator in Hypnosis, Multiple Personality, and Normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.
  10. Piers Benn (2003). The Responsibility of the Psychiatric Offender: Commentary on Ciocchetti. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):189-192.
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  11. D. G. Benner & C. Stephen Evans (1984). Unity and Multiplicity in Hypnosis, Commissurotomy, and Multiple Personality Disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 5 (4):423-431.
  12. Petr Bob & George A. Mashour (2011). Schizophrenia, Dissociation, and Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1042-1049.
    Current thinking suggests that dissociation could be a significant comorbid diagnosis in a proportion of schizophrenic patients with a history of trauma. This potentially may explain the term “schizophrenia” in its original definition by Bleuler, as influenced by his clinical experience and personal view. Additionally, recent findings suggest a partial overlap between dissociative symptoms and the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, which could be explained by inhibitory deficits. In this context, the process of dissociation could serve as an important conceptual framework (...)
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  13. Margaret A. Boden (1994). Multiple Personality and Computational Models. Philosophy 37:103-114.
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  14. Margaret A. Boden (1994). Multiple Personality and Computational Models. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 37:103-114.
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  15. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen (1994). Who's Who? Introducing Multiple Personality. In Joan Copjec (ed.), Supposing the Subject. Verso. pp. 45--63.
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  16. Erika Bourguignon (1989). Multiple Personality, Possession Trance, and the Psychic Unity of Mankind. Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 17 (3):371-384.
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  17. Erika Bourguignon (1989). Multiple Personality, Possession Trance, and the Psychic Unity of Mankind. Ethos 17 (3):371-384.
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  18. Stephen E. Braude, Mediumship and Multiple Personality.
    mainstream academicians. Perhaps the major common area of interest was that of dissociation — in particular, the study of hypnosis and multiple personality, The founders of the S.P.R. believed, along with many others, that dissociative phenomena promised insights into the nature of the mind generally, including..
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  19. Stephen E. Braude (2003). Counting Persons and Living with Alters: Comments on Matthews. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):153-156.
    KEYWORDS: dissociation; multiple personality, person, responsibility.
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  20. Stephen E. Braude (1996). Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.
    The philosophical literature on multiple personality has focused primarily on problems about personal identity and psychological explanation. But multiple personality and other dissociative phenomena raise equally important and even more urgent questions about moral responsibility, in particular: In what respect(s) and to what extent should a multiple be held responsible for the actions of his/her alternate personalities? Cases of dreaming help illustrate why attributions of responsibility in cases of dissociation do not turn on putative changes in identity, as some have (...)
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  21. Stephen E. Braude (1996). Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.
  22. Stephen E. Braude (1995). First-Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Rowman & Littlefield.
    INTRODUCTION Back in the good old days of philosophy — say, around 400 BC, philosophers played a rather prominent role in the community at large. ...
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  23. John Briere (1995). Child Abuse, Memory, and Recall: A Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1):83-87.
  24. Mark T. Brown (2001). Multiple Personality and Personal Identity. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):435 – 447.
    If personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, then the sharp breaks in psychological connectedness characteristic of Multiple Personality Disorder implicitly commit psychological continuity theories to a metaphysically extravagant reification of alters. Animalist theories of personal identity avoid the reification of alternate personalities by interpreting multiple personality as a failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the normal case, autobiographical memory cross-classifies a human life, and in so doing provides access to a variety of interpretative frameworks with their associated (...)
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  25. Christopher Buford (2011). Review of Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality – Logi Gunnarsson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):418-420.
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  26. Stephen Clark (1993). First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Books 34 (2):109-112.
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  27. Stephen R. L. Clark (1996). Minds, Memes, and Multiples. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):21-28.
  28. Stephen R. L. Clark (1996). Commentary on "Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):55-57.
  29. Stephen R. L. Clark (1991). How Many Selves Make Me? Philosophy 29:213-33.
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  30. Ron de Weijze, Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application.
    Finding truth is an art that was learned and unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for independent confirmation of our beliefs, by reality. This methodology is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. A completely different social order is implied and the one keeps running the other into the ground like a tectonic plate. Philosophical Modernism showed us how dualism works, before Post-Modernism challenged it, regressing (...)
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  31. Peter Q. Deeley (2003). Social, Cognitive, and Neural Constraints on Subjectivity and Agency: Implications for Dissociative Identity Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):161-167.
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  32. H. J. Eysenck (1970). Explanation and the Concept of Personality'. In Robert Borger (ed.), Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences. Cambridge University Press. pp. 387--410.
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  33. X. Fargeas & E. Andreewsky (1994). Schizophrenic Troubles of Personal Identity: A Cognitive Model. World Futures 42 (1):119-124.
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  34. Owen J. Flanagan (1994). Multiple Identity, Character Transformation, and Self-Reclamation. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
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  35. K. A. Forrest (2001). Toward an Etiology of Dissociative Identity Disorder: A Neurodevelopmental Approach. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):259-293.
    This article elaborates on Putnam's ''discrete behavioral states'' model of dissociative identity disorder (Putnam, 1997) by proposing the involvement of the orbitalfrontal cortex in the development of DID and suggesting a potential neurodevelopmental mechanism responsible for the development of multiple representations of self. The proposed ''orbitalfrontal'' model integrates and elaborates on theory and research from four domains: the neurobiology of the orbitalfrontal cortex and its protective inhibitory role in the temporal organization of behavior, the development of emotion regulation, the development (...)
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  36. Grant Gillett (1991). Multiple Personality and Irrationality. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):103-118.
    Abstract The phenomenology of Multiple Personality (MP) syndrome is used to derive an Aristotelian explanation of the failure to achieve rational integration of mental content. An MP subject is best understood as having failed to master the techniques of integrating conative and cognitive aspects of her mental life. This suggests that in irrationality the subject may lack similar skills basic to the proper articulation and use of mental content in belief formation and control of action. The view that emerges centres (...)
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  37. Grant R. Gillett (1997). A Discursive Account of Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (3):213-22.
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  38. Grant R. Gillett (1986). Multiple Personality and the Concept of a Person. New Ideas in Psychology 4:173-84.
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  39. James M. Glass (1993). Shattered Selves Multiple Personality in a Postmodern World.
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  40. George Graham (1999). Fuzzy Fault Lines: Selves in Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):159-174.
    This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of multiple (...)
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  41. George Graham (1996). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Ian Hacking. [REVIEW] Ethics 106 (4):845-.
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  42. George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1995). Book Review:First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Stephen F. Braude. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (3):655-.
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  43. George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1994). Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
  44. Edward Andrew Greetis (2011). Dissociative Identity: An Objection to Baker's Constitution Theory. Acta Analytica 26 (4):329-341.
    One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially . In response to this problem, Lynne Rudder Baker espouses a psychological criterion, that is, she claims that persons are essentially psychological. Baker’s theory purports to bypass the problems of other psychological theories such as Dissociative Identity Disorder and the problem of individuating persons synchronically. I argue that the theory’s treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder leads to untenable results, is invalid, and consequently fails to individuate (...)
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  45. Logi Gunnarsson (2013). Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality. Routledge.
    As witnessed by recent films such as _Fight Club_ and _Identity_, our culture is obsessed with multiple personality—a phenomenon raising intriguing questions about personal identity. This study offers both a full-fledged philosophical theory of personal identity and a systematic account of multiple personality. Gunnarsson combines the methods of analytic philosophy with close hermeneutic and phenomenological readings of cases from different fields, focusing on psychiatric and psychological treatises, self-help books, biographies, and fiction. He develops an original account of personal identity and (...)
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  46. Logi Gunnarsson (2009). Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality. Routledge.
    As witnessed by recent films such as _Fight Club_ and _Identity_, our culture is obsessed with multiple personality—a phenomenon raising intriguing questions about personal identity. This study offers both a full-fledged philosophical theory of personal identity and a systematic account of multiple personality. Gunnarsson combines the methods of analytic philosophy with close hermeneutic and phenomenological readings of cases from different fields, focusing on psychiatric and psychological treatises, self-help books, biographies, and fiction. He develops an original account of personal identity and (...)
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  47. Ian Hacking (1995). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton University Press.
    Here the distinguished philosopher Ian Hacking uses the MPD epidemic and its links with the contemporary concept of child abuse to scrutinize today's moral...
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  48. Ian Hacking (1991). Two Souls in One Body. Critical Inquiry 17 (4):838-67.
    Bernice R. broke down so badly, when she turned nineteen, and behaved so much like a retarded child that she was committed to the Ohio State Bureau of Juvenile Research. Its director, Henry Herbert Goddard, a psychologist of some distinction, recognized that she suffered from multiple personality disorder. She underwent a course of treatment lasting nearly five years, after which “the dissociation seems to be overcome and replaced by a complete synthesis. [She] is working regularly a half day and seems (...)
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  49. Valerie Gray Hardcastle & Owen J. Flanagan (1999). Multiplex Vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders. The Monist 82 (4):645-657.
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  50. Markus L. A. Heinimaa (2005). Past Personal Identity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):25-26.
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