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  1. On the Everydayness of Trauma.Ryan Wasser - manuscript
    Shaili Jain's The Unspeakable Mind (2019) is an impressive examination of the stress experienced by a veteran community that too often is handled with a sense of clinical sterility that borders on inhumanity, or a that of pandering condescension. However, what is striking about Jain's text is the lack of analysis of how trauma manifests in what Heidegger would refer to as average everydayness. This, to me, seems like a missed opportunity, especially as it pertains to trauma-based ethics since all (...)
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  2. Revisiting False-Positive and Imitated Dissociative Identity Disorder.Igor Jacob Pietkiewicz, Anna Bańbura-Nowak, Radosław Tomalski & Suzette Boon - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    ICD-10 and DSM-5 do not provide clear diagnosing guidelines for DID, making it difficult to distinguish ‘genuine’ DID from imitated or false-positive cases. This study explores meaning which patients with false-positive or imitated DID attributed to their diagnosis. 85 people who reported elevated levels of dissociative symptoms in SDQ-20 participated in clinical assessment using the Trauma and Dissociation Symptoms Interview, followed by a psychiatric interview. The recordings of six women, whose earlier DID diagnosis was disconfirmed, were transcribed and subjected to (...)
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  3. German Disease.Andrej Poleev - 2019
  4. 'He Only Comes Out When I Drink My Gin’: DID, Personal Identity, and Moral Responsibility.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2016 - In Rocco J. Gennaro & Casey Harison (eds.), The Who and Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield: Lexington Press. pp. 121-134.
    This essay explores the topic of Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly called “Multiple Personality Disorder”) with special attention to such Quadrophenia masterpieces as “Dr. Jimmy” and “The Real Me.” A number of major philosophical questions arise: Can two or more “persons” really inhabit the same body? How can we hold Dr. Jimmy morally responsible for the reprehensible actions of Mr. Jim? Wouldn’t it be wrong to do so if they are really different people? What is it to be the “same” person (...)
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  5. The Who and Philosophy.Rocco J. Gennaro & Casey Harison (eds.) - 2016 - Lexington Books.
    The Who was one of the most influential of the 1960s British Invasion bands—not just because of their loud and occasionally destructive stage presence—but also because of its smart songs and albums such as “My Generation,” Who’s Next, Tommy, and Quadrophenia, in which they explored themes such as frustration, angst, irony, and a youthful inclination to lash out. This collection explores the remarkable depth and breadth of the Who’s music through a philosophical lens.
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  6. Dissociative Identity Disorder and Ambivalence.Michelle Maiese - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):223-237.
    While many theorists have argued that dissociative identity disorder is a case of multiple selves or persons in a single body, I maintain that DID instead should be understood as involving a single self who suffers from significant disruptions to self-consciousness. Evidence of overlapping abilities and memories, as well as the very logic of dissociation, supports the claim that DID results from internal conflict endured by a single self. Along these lines, I will maintain that alter-formation should be understood as (...)
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  7. Dissociative Identity Disorder, Ambivalence, and Responsibility.Michelle Maiese - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    If someone with dissociative identity disorder commits a wrongful act, is she responsible? If one adopts the Multiple Persons Thesis, it may seem that one alter cannot be responsible for the actions of another alter. Conversely, if one regards the subject as a single person, it may seem that she is responsible for any actions she performs. I will argue that this subject is a single person, but one who suffers from delusions of disownership and therefore does not fulfill ordinary (...)
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  8. Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New Perspectives.Daniel D. Moseley & Gary Gala - 2016 - Routledge.
    This groundbreaking volume of original essays presents fresh avenues of inquiry at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry. Contributors draw from a variety of fields, including evolutionary psychiatry, phenomenology, biopsychosocial models, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, neuroethics, behavioral economics, and virtue theory. Philosophy and Psychiatry’s unique structure consists of two parts: in the first, philosophers write five lead essays with replies from psychiatrists. In the second part, this arrangement is reversed. The result is an interdisciplinary exchange that allows for direct discourse, and a (...)
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  9. P-Hacking by Post Hoc Selection with Multiple Opportunities: Detectability by Skewness Test?: Comment on Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons.Rolf Ulrich & Jeff Miller - 2015 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144 (6):1137-1145.
  10. On the Personal, the One and the Many.Panagiotis Oulis - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (2):137-140.
    Gloria Ayob Begins her commentary with the main metaphysical and ethical motivations for including the personal perspective in psychopathological assessments. The metaphysical motivation: human actions are performed for a reason. Thus, from the personal perspective, explaining human actions amounts to justifying them by appeal to individual’s reasons. However, does it follow from this peculiarity that “explanations of human behavior that appeal to empirical generalizations and those that consist in justifying an action by appeal to reasons are of entirely different logical (...)
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  11. Comparision of Personality Features of People Involved in Sexual Identity Disorder and Normal Persons.Javid Mehravar Momeni & Kazemi Mehrangiz Shoaa - 2012 - Social Research (Islamic Azad University Roudehen Branch) 4 (13):81-94.
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  12. Schizophrenia, Dissociation, and Consciousness.Petr Bob & George A. Mashour - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1042-1049.
    Current thinking suggests that dissociation could be a significant comorbid diagnosis in a proportion of schizophrenic patients with a history of trauma. This potentially may explain the term “schizophrenia” in its original definition by Bleuler, as influenced by his clinical experience and personal view. Additionally, recent findings suggest a partial overlap between dissociative symptoms and the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, which could be explained by inhibitory deficits. In this context, the process of dissociation could serve as an important conceptual framework (...)
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  13. Review of Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality – Logi Gunnarsson. [REVIEW]Christopher Buford - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):418-420.
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  14. Dissociative Identity: An Objection to Baker’s Constitution Theory.Edward Andrew Greetis - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):329-341.
    One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially . In response to this problem, Lynne Rudder Baker espouses a psychological criterion, that is, she claims that persons are essentially psychological. Baker’s theory purports to bypass the problems of other psychological theories such as Dissociative Identity Disorder and the problem of individuating persons synchronically. I argue that the theory’s treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder leads to untenable results, is invalid, and consequently fails to individuate (...)
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  15. Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology.Bruce Maxwell - 2011 - Journal of Moral Education 40 (1):136-138.
  16. Furries and the Limits of Species Identity Disorder: A Response to Gerbasi Et Al.Fiona Probyn-Rapsey - 2011 - Society and Animals 19 (3):294-301.
    This is a response to an article published inSociety & Animals in 2008 that argued for the existence of a “species identity disorder” in some furries. Species identity disorder is modeled on gender identity disorder, itself a highly controversial diagnosis that has been criticized for pathologizing homosexuality and transgendered people. This response examines the claims of the article and suggests that the typology it constructs is based on unexamined assumptions about what constitutes “human” identity and regulatory fictions of gender identity.
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  17. Review of Logi Gunnarsson, Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality[REVIEW]John P. Lizza - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
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  18. Philosophy of Psychiatry.Dominic Murphy - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  19. Gender Identity Disorder in Childhood: Inconclusive Advice to Parents.Alice Dreger - 2009 - Hastings Center Report 39 (1):26-29.
  20. Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality.Logi Gunnarsson - 2009 - Routledge.
    As witnessed by recent films such as _Fight Club_ and _Identity_, our culture is obsessed with multiple personality—a phenomenon raising intriguing questions about personal identity. This study offers both a full-fledged philosophical theory of personal identity and a systematic account of multiple personality. Gunnarsson combines the methods of analytic philosophy with close hermeneutic and phenomenological readings of cases from different fields, focusing on psychiatric and psychological treatises, self-help books, biographies, and fiction. He develops an original account of personal identity and (...)
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  21. Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality.Logi Gunnarsson - 2009 - Routledge.
    As witnessed by recent films such as _Fight Club_ and _Identity_, our culture is obsessed with multiple personality—a phenomenon raising intriguing questions about personal identity. This study offers both a full-fledged philosophical theory of personal identity and a systematic account of multiple personality. Gunnarsson combines the methods of analytic philosophy with close hermeneutic and phenomenological readings of cases from different fields, focusing on psychiatric and psychological treatises, self-help books, biographies, and fiction. He develops an original account of personal identity and (...)
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  22. Out on a Limb: The Ethical Management of Body Integrity Identity Disorder.Christopher James Ryan - 2009 - Neuroethics 2 (1):21-33.
    Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), previously called apotemnophilia, is an extremely rare condition where sufferers desire the amputation of a healthy limb because of distress associated with its presence. This paper reviews the medical and philosophical literature on BIID. It proposes an evidenced based and ethically informed approach to its management. Amputation of a healthy limb is an ethically defensible treatment option in BIID and should be offered in some circumstances, but only after clarification of the diagnosis and consideration of (...)
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  23. Derealization, Depersonalization and the Question of ´Realness´.Somogy Varga - 2008 - Archives of Philosophy and Mental Health 1 (1):42-51.
  24. What Can the Samoan "Fa'afafine" Teach Us About the Western Concept of Gender Identity Disorder in Childhood?Paul L. Vasey & Nancy H. Bartlett - 2007 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 50 (4):481-490.
  25. Past Personal Identity.Markus L. A. Heinimaa - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):25-26.
  26. Personal Identity and the Past.Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):9-22.
    In the second edition of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke argues that personal identity over time consists in sameness of consciousness rather than the persistence of any substance, material or immaterial. Something about this view is very compelling, but as it stands it is too vague and problematic to provide a viable account of personal identity. Contemporary "psychological continuity theorists" have tried to amend Locke's view to capture his insights and avoid his difficulties. This paper argues that the (...)
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  27. Some Epistemological Concerns About Dissociative Identity Disorder and Diagnostic Practices in Psychology.Michael J. Shaffer & Jeffery Oakley - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):1-29.
    In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of good causal modeling. (...)
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  28. Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. By Ian Hacking.E. Taylor - 2005 - The European Legacy 10 (5):550.
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  29. Misprision of Identity.Harold Merskey - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4):351-355.
  30. Differentiating Dissociation and Repression.John Morton - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):670-671.
    Now that consciousness is thoroughly out of the way, we can focus more precisely on the kinds of things that can happen underneath. A contrast can be made between dissociation and repression. Dissociation is where a memory record or set of autobiographical memory records cannot be retrieved; repression is where there is retrieval of a record but, because of the current task specification, the contents of the record, though entering into current processing, are not allowed into consciousness. I look at (...)
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  31. One or Two: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins From Malta.Y. Michael Barilan - 2003 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (1):27 – 44.
    The article questions the assumption that conjoined twins are necessarily two people or persons by employing arguments based on different points of view: non-personal vitalism, the person as a sentient being, the person as an agent, the person as a locus of narrative and valuation, and the person as an embodied mind. Analogies employed from the cases of amputation, multiple personality disorder, abortion, split-brain patients and cloning. The article further questions the assumption that a conjoined twin's natural interest and wish (...)
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  32. The Responsibility of the Psychiatric Offender: Commentary on Ciocchetti.Piers Benn - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):189-192.
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  33. Counting Persons and Living with Alters: Comments on Matthews.Stephen E. Braude - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):153-156.
    KEYWORDS: dissociation; multiple personality, person, responsibility.
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  34. Social, Cognitive, and Neural Constraints on Subjectivity and Agency: Implications for Dissociative Identity Disorder.Peter Q. Deeley - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):161-167.
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  35. Delusion, Dissociation and Identity.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.
    The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and (...)
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  36. Establishing Personal Identity in Cases of DID.Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):143-151.
  37. Blaming Agents and Excusing Persons: The Case of DID.Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):169-74.
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  38. Establishing Personal Identity in Cases of DID.Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):143-51.
  39. Was Jekyll Hyde?Eric T. Olson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328 - 348.
    Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split-personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split-personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental unity and disunity determine how many people there are. I suggest (...)
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  40. Discontinuity in Personal Narrative: Some Perspectives of Patients.Lloyd A. Wells - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):297-303.
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  41. Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder.Timothy J. Bayne - 2002 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.
    Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the psychological approach (...)
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  42. Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.
    Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (typically delusional); (...)
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  43. Feelings of Unreality: A Conceptual and Phenomenological Analysis of the Language of Depersonalization.Filip Radovic & Susanna Radovic - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (3):271-279.
    The paper offers a conceptual and phenomenological analysis of the language of depersonalization. The depersonalization syndrome or disorder has no known common pathogenesis and shows no characteristic behavioral manifestations. A conceptual analysis of the key terms in the subjective complaints would therefore have consequences for clinical research into the phenomenon of depersonalization.
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  44. Multiple Personality and Personal Identity.Mark T. Brown - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):435 – 447.
    If personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, then the sharp breaks in psychological connectedness characteristic of Multiple Personality Disorder implicitly commit psychological continuity theories to a metaphysically extravagant reification of alters. Animalist theories of personal identity avoid the reification of alternate personalities by interpreting multiple personality as a failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the normal case, autobiographical memory cross-classifies a human life, and in so doing provides access to a variety of interpretative frameworks with their associated (...)
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  45. The Butler(s) DID It - Dissociative Identity Disorder in Cinema.P. Byrne - 2001 - Medical Humanities 27 (1):26-29.
    Beginning with classic Hollywood melodramas of the 1940s, cinema has maintained a prolific output of films with their own take on mental illnesses–none more so than the rare syndrome of dissociative identity disorder (DID). DID films are a popular and enduring genre, whose influence can be seen throughout mainstream cinema. Exploration of DID in cinema is a useful exercise in that it touches on issues in film studies, psychiatry and the mythology around mental illness. Despite “detective story” narratives and conformity (...)
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  46. Toward an Etiology of Dissociative Identity Disorder: A Neurodevelopmental Approach.Kelly A. Forrest - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):259-293.
    This article elaborates on Putnam's ''discrete behavioral states'' model of dissociative identity disorder (Putnam, 1997) by proposing the involvement of the orbitalfrontal cortex in the development of DID and suggesting a potential neurodevelopmental mechanism responsible for the development of multiple representations of self. The proposed ''orbitalfrontal'' model integrates and elaborates on theory and research from four domains: the neurobiology of the orbitalfrontal cortex and its protective inhibitory role in the temporal organization of behavior, the development of emotion regulation, the development (...)
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  47. Multiple Personalities, Internal Controversies, and Invisible Marvels.Ian Hacking - 2000 - In Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 213.
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  48. Responsibility in Cases of Multiple Personality Disorder.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Stephen Behnke - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):301-323.
    Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), now also known as Dissociative Iden- tity Disorder, raises many questions about the nature of persons, the goals of treatment, the suggestibility of patients, and the reliability of defendant reports of their own mental states. These issues become crucial when courts need to decide whether or not to punish a person with MPD who has committed a crime. This paper will explore that issue and propose a test of when people with MPD should be held criminally (...)
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  49. Moral and Metaphysical Reflections on Multiple Personality Disorder.David C. Thomasma - 2000 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (3):235-260.
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  50. Dissociative Identity Disorder and Intrapersonal Justice.William Wilcox - 2000 - The Philosophers' Magazine 13.
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1 — 50 / 128