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  1. added 2018-06-29
    Peter Lombard on God’s Knowledge and Its Capacities: Sententiae, Book I, Distinctions 38-39.Rostislav Tkachenko - 2018 - Sententiae 37 (1):6-18.
    The global Peter Lombard research reinaugurated in 1990s has resulted in a number of recent publications, but the Master of the Sentences’ theology proper is partially underresearched. In particular, a more detailed exposition of the distinctions 35-41 of his Book of Sentences is needed in order to clarify his doctrine of God’s knowledge and its relation to the human free will. The article builds on the earlier established evidence that, for Peter Lombard in distinctions 35-38, God’s knowledge, in general, is (...)
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  2. added 2018-06-28
    The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account. [REVIEW]Elijah Hess - 2016 - Philosophia Christi 18 (1):251-255.
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  3. added 2018-02-23
    Providence in St. Albert the Great.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2016 - Revista Ciências da Religião: História E Sociedade 14:14-44.
    In these pages, we expose the main traits of St. Albert the Great’s doctrine of providence and fate, considered by Palazzo the keystone of his philosophical system. To describe it we examine his systematic works, primarily his Summa of Theology. His discussion follows clearly the guidelines of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, in order to delve into the set of problems faced over the centuries by theological tradition. Albert also restates the reflections of different authors like Boethius or Saint (...)
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  4. added 2018-02-17
    A New Foreknowledge Dilemma.Linda Zagzebski - 1989 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63:139.
  5. added 2018-02-15
    La noción de providencia según San Justino.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2018 - In Juan Antonio Álvarez-Pedrosa, Mercedes López Salvá, Nuria Sánchez Madrid & Ignacio Sanz Extremeño (eds.), Los orígenes del cristianismo en la filosofía, la literatura y el arte II. Madrid: Dykinson. pp. 271-290.
    This article examines the notion of providence in the thought of St Justin martyr. First, it is shown the relevance of the question for St Justin, since it was an important topic in his time. Secondly, the comparison to the philosophical context provides a more complete view of St Justin’s position. Thirdly, the notion of providence is considered in the whole of St Justins’ thought. So, the author can conclude that Christian philosophy requires a particular providence which nevertheless allows human (...)
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  6. added 2018-01-17
    ‘All is Foreseen, and Freedom of Choice is Granted’: A Scotistic Examination of God's Freedom, Divine Foreknowledge and the Arbitrary Use of Power.Liran Shia Gordon - 2017 - Heythrop Journal.
    Following an Open conception of Divine Foreknowledge, that holds that man is endowed with genuine freedom and so the future is not definitely determined, it will be claimed that human freedom does not limit the divine power, but rather enhances it and presents us with a barrier against arbitrary use of that power. This reading will be implemented to reconcile a well-known quarrel between two important interpreters of Duns Scotus, Allan B. Wolter and Thomas Williams, each of whom supports a (...)
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  7. added 2017-12-11
    The Impossibility of Middle Knowledge.Timothy O'Connor - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (2):139 - 166.
    A good deal of attention has been given in recent philosophy of religion to the question of whether we can sensibly attribute to God a form of knowledge which the 16th-century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina termed "middle knowledge". Interest in the doctrine has been spurred by a recognition of its intimate connection to certain conceptions of providence, prophecy, and response to petitionary prayer. According to defenders of the doctrine, which I will call "Molinism", the objects of middle knowledge are (...)
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  8. added 2017-11-15
    Foreknowledge Without Determinism.Nathan Rockwood - forthcoming - Sophia:1-11.
    A number of philosophers and theologians have argued that if God has knowledge of future human actions then human agents cannot be free. This argument rests on the assumption that, since God is essentially omniscient, God cannot be wrong about what human agents will do. It is this assumption that I challenge in this paper. My aim is to develop an interpretation of God’s essential omniscience according to which God can be wrong even though God never is wrong. If this (...)
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  9. added 2017-11-11
    On Molinism and Manipulation: Does Molinism Answer the Problems About Providence, Foreknowledge and Free Will?R. I. Anderson - unknown
    Molinism attempts to resolve the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human libertarian freedom by the inclusion of the divine will into the solution. Moreover, middle knowledge is providentially useful under the Molinist model because of the way God uses it. This speaks of an integral link between the divine will and intellect that works in such a way as to provide a foreknowledge solution and, allegedly, the best view of providence. Nevertheless, there have been several anti-Molinist arguments by analogy which (...)
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  10. added 2017-07-25
    Peter Lombard on God’s Knowledge: Sententiae, Book I, Distinctions 35-38, as the Basis for Later Theological Discussions.Rostislav Tkachenko - 2017 - Sententiae 36 (1):17-30.
    Since the mid-90’s the figure of Peter Lombard and his Book of Sentences has regained the importance in scholarly world and been studied from both historical-theological and historical-philosophical perspectives. But some aspects of his thinking, encapsulated in the written form, which was to become the material basis for the thirteenth- through the fifteenth-century theological projects, remained somewhat insufficiently researched. Therefore this article analyzes the select parts of the Book of Sentences with the purpose of looking at how Peter Lombard handled (...)
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  11. added 2017-06-05
    Omniscience and Time, One More Time.Edward Wierenga - 2004 - Faith and Philosophy 21 (1):90-97.
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  12. added 2017-06-05
    Omniscience and the Arrow of Time.Linda Zagzebski - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):503-519.
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  13. added 2017-06-05
    Omniprescience and Divine Determinism: RICHARD R. LA CROIX.Richard R. La Croix - 1976 - Religious Studies 12 (3):365-381.
    In this essay I will try to show that there are what would appear to be some unnoticed consequences of the doctrine of divine foreknowledge. For the purposes of this discussion I will simply assume that future events are possible objects of knowledge and, hence, that foreknowledge is possible. Accordingly, I will not be concerned with discussing such questions as the status of truth-values for future contingent propositions or whether knowledge is justified true belief. Furthermore, I will not be concerned (...)
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  14. added 2017-04-28
    An Analysis of Anselm’s Philosophical Theology and the Problem of Man’s Freedom in His De Concordia.Rostislav Tkachenko - 2015 - Sententiae 32 (1):6-35.
    The purpose of this study is to discover, present and analyze the key ideas of Anselm of Canterbury concerning the notions of knowledge, will and mode of divine-human relations in the context of this “knowledge-will” framework which is important due to (a) somewhat insufficient attention to the medieval insights on the issue and (b) the peculiarity that Anselm’s intuitions have. More specifically, the object of the given paper is Anselmian understanding of relations between God’s foreknowledge and will, on the one (...)
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  15. added 2017-04-05
    Fischer's Fate With Fatalism.Christoph Jäger - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 9 (2017).
    John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argument for logical fatalism. I then point (...)
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  16. added 2016-12-12
    Why Divine Foreknowledge?Michael Robinson - 2000 - Religious Studies 36 (3):251-275.
    Christian theism has traditionally claimed that God knows the future. But why is divine foreknowledge important? In this essay, I argue that divine foreknowledge is valuable to Christian theism and that a hefty theological price must be paid if it is rejected. I also attempt to show that the range of knowledge available to God in theological models that deny divine foreknowledge is significantly less than claimed by proponents of these views. In particular, I argue that the God of such (...)
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  17. added 2016-12-08
    The Truth About Freedom: A Reply to Merricks.J. M. Fischer & P. Todd - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):97-115.
    In his recent essay in the Philosophical Review, “Truth and Freedom,” Trenton Merricks contends (among other things) that the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom is question-begging. He relies on a “truism” to the effect that truth depends on the world and not the other way around. The present essay argues that mere invocation of this truism does not establish that the basic argument for incompatibilism is question-begging. Further, it seeks to clarify important elements of (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-08
    Personal Responsibility and Middle Knowledge: A Challenge for the Molinist.Joseph Shieber - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):61-70.
    In this paper, I develop and discuss an argument intended to demonstrate that the Molinist notion of middle knowledge, and in particular the concept of counterfactuals of freedom, is incompatible with the notion of personal responsibility (for created creatures). In Sect. 1, I discuss the Molinist concepts of middle knowledge and counterfactuals of freedom. In Sect. 2, I develop an argument (henceforth, the Transfer of Negative Responsibility Argument, or TNRA) to the effect that, due to their construal of the concepts (...)
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  19. added 2016-12-08
    Providence, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Loops: A Reply to Robinson.David P. Hunt - 2004 - Religious Studies 40 (4):485-491.
    In a number of earlier papers I have attempted to defend the providential utility of simple foreknowledge as a via media between the accounts of divine providence offered by Molinists, on the one hand, and ‘open theists’, on the other. In the current issue of this journal, Michael Robinson argues that my response to one of the standard difficulties for simple foreknowledge – that its providential employment would generate explanatory loops – is inadequate. In the following paper I answer Robinson's (...)
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  20. added 2016-12-08
    Divine Providence, Simple Foreknowledge, and the ‘Metaphysical Principle’.Michael D. Robinson - 2004 - Religious Studies 40 (4):471-483.
    In this essay, I challenge David P. Hunt's defence of the utility of simple foreknowledge for divine providence against the ‘Metaphysical Principle’. This principle asserts that circular causal loops are impossible. Hunt agrees with this principle but maintains that so long as the deity does not use simple foreknowledge in such a way that causal loops unfold, the Metaphysical Principle in not violated. I argue that Hunt's position still allows for the possibility of such causal loops and this itself is (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-08
    A New Anti-Molinist Argument.William Hasker - 1999 - Religious Studies 35 (3):291-297.
    An argument is given showing that, on the assumptions of Molinism, human beings must bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom that govern their actions. But, it is claimed, it is impossible for humans to do this, and so Molinism is involved in a contradiction. The Molinist must maintain, on the contrary, that we can indeed bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us. This question turns out to depend on whether the counterfactuals of freedom are, (...)
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  22. added 2016-12-08
    A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument.Thomas P. Flint - 1999 - Religious Studies 35 (3):299-305.
    This paper argues that William Hasker's 'A new anti-Molinist argument' offers a fascinating but ultimately unsuccessful new instalment in his continuing campaign to discredit the picture of providence based on the theory of middle knowledge. It is first shown that Hasker's argument, though suffering from a seemingly irreparable logical gap, does nicely highlight a significant (and hitherto unduly underemphasized) point of contention between Molinists and anti-Molinists -- the question whether or not Molinists are committed to viewing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (...)
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  23. added 2016-08-29
    Troubles with Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):462-480.
  24. added 2016-08-29
    Troubles with Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87:462-480.
  25. added 2016-05-25
    Jumalan ennaltatietäminen ja luotujen vapaus molinismin mukaan (in Finnish) [God's Foreknowledge and Creaturely Freedom according to Molinism].Ari Maunu - 2014 - Ajatus 71:143-172.
  26. added 2016-05-25
    Why God's Beliefs Are Not Hard-Type Soft Facts.David Widerker - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88.
    John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue (...)
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  27. added 2016-05-25
    Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.David Widerker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.
    In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, Icontest (...)
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  28. added 2016-05-25
    Contra Snapshot Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1996 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39 (2):95 - 102.
    Recently, John Fischer has proposed a novel account of the hard/soft distinction which is an entailment account. At its basis is the idea that a fact about a time T as a soft fact about T if it entails a fact about a time later than T; and a fact about a time T as a hard fact about T if it does not do so. Elsewhere, I have expressed serious doubts whether an entailment account of the hard/soft fact distinction (...)
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  29. added 2016-03-20
    God Knows the Future by Ordering the Times.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 5.
  30. added 2016-03-20
    Infallible Divine Foreknowledge Cannot Uniquely Threaten Human Freedom, but its Mechanics Might.T. Ryan Byerly - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):73-94.
    It is not uncommon to think that the existence of exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge uniquely threatens the existence of human freedom. This paper shows that this cannot be so. For, to uniquely threaten human freedom, infallible divine foreknowledge would have to make an essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions are not up to us. And infallible divine foreknowledge cannot do this. There remains, however, an important question about the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge. It is a (...)
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  31. added 2016-03-18
    The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Bloomsbury Academic.
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  32. added 2016-03-12
    It Depends on What One Means by “Eternal”: Why Boethius is Not an Eternalist.Michael Wiitala - 2010 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84:253-261.
    Objections to the traditional view that God knows all of time eternally stand or fall on what one means by “eternally.” The widely held supposition, shared by both eternalists and those who oppose them, such as Open Theists, is that to say God knows all of time eternally entails that he cannot know all of time from atemporal perspective. In this paper I show that Boethius’s characterization of God’s eternal knowledge employs a different meaning of “eternal,” which is incompatible with (...)
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  33. added 2016-03-11
    The Boethian Solution to the Problem of Future Contingents and its Unorthodox Rivals.Jonathan Roger Evans - 2001 - Dissertation, The University of Nebraska - Lincoln
    One concern bothering ancient and medieval philosophers is the logical worry discussed in Aristotle's De Interpretatione 9, that if future contingent propositions are true, then they are settled in a way that is incompatible with freedom. Another is if we grant God foreknowledge of future contingent events then God's foreknowledge will determine those events in a way precluding freedom. ;I begin by discussing the standard compatibilist solution to these problems as represented in Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy and then examine theories (...)
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  34. added 2016-01-12
    Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implication.Adeboye Godwin Oriyomi - manuscript
    Restating Augustinian Recipe to Divine Foreknowledge-Libertarian Freewill Dilemma and its Theodical Implications Abstract The divine foreknowledge-freewill dilemma has been the focus of much recent philosophico-theological discourse, even though the problem is centuries old. In the attempt to solve the dilemma, there have been some modifications on the traditional definition of divine foreknowledge. Some of the philosophical attempts to solve the dilemma include Molinism, Boethianism, Ochamism, Opentheism and others. While these attempts are noteworthy, their basic flaws lie in their methodologies which (...)
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  35. added 2015-10-14
    Mittleres Wissen und das Problem des Übels [Middle knowledge and the problem of evil].Robert Merrihew Adams & Vincent C. Müller - 1998 - In Christian Jäger (ed.), Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Ferdinand Schöningh. pp. 253-272.
    Wenn Präsident Kennedy nicht erschossen worden wäre, hätte er dann Nordvietnam bombardiert? Das weiß Gott allein. Oder doch nicht? Weiß wenigstens Er, was Kennedy getan hätte? ... Die Jesuiten behaupteten unter anderem, daß viele menschliche Handlungen in dem Sinne frei seien, daß die Ausführenden nicht logisch oder kausal gezwungen seien, sie auszuführen. („Frei“ wird im vorliegenden Aufsatz stets in diesem Sinne verwendet werden.) Wie behält Gott dann die Kontrolle über die menschliche Geschichte? Nicht dadurch, daß Er menschliche Handlungen kausal determiniert, (...)
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  36. added 2015-09-30
    Fatalism and Freedom.Bruce Reichenbach - 1988 - International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (3):271-285.
    I critique one recent argument for theological fatalism as confusing bringing about with altering the past. Questions remain concerning the basis for God's beliefs about the future. I evaluate two. One, which appeals to middle knowledge, faces several problems, including specifying how propositions of middle knowledge are true and how God can have this knowledge. The other, which contends that one can in certain cases bring about the past, I clarify and defend. Finally, I explore the implications of both views (...)
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  37. added 2015-09-30
    Hasker on Omniscience.Bruce Reichenbach - 1987 - Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):86-92.
    I contend that William Hasker’s argument to show omniscience incompatible with human freedom trades on an ambiguity between altering and bringing about the past, and that it is the latter only which is invoked by one who thinks they are compatible. I then use his notion of precluding circumstances to suggest that what gives the appearance of our inability to freely bring about the future (and hence that omniscience is incompatible with freedom) is that, from God’s perspective of foreknowledge, it (...)
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  38. added 2015-09-29
    The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. [REVIEW]Bruce R. Reichenbach - 1993 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1):133-135.
    Review of Zagzebski's book, which develops a defense of the position that freedom is compatible with divine foreknowledge. After critiquing previous attempts at reconciliation, including Boethius, Ockham, and Molina, she develops her own view that the relation between God's knowledge and human existence must accord with human models of knowing.
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  39. added 2015-06-08
    Molinism and Theological Compatibilism.Christoph Jäger - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):71-92.
    In a series of recent papers John Martin Fischer argues that the Molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, Molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical Molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that Molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since it employs (...)
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  40. added 2015-05-20
    Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):346-367.
    Several theorists (Merricks, Westphal, and McCall) have recently claimed to offer a novel way to respond to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, rooted in Molina's insight that God's beliefs depend on what we do, rather than the other way around. In this paper we argue that these responses either beg the question, or else are dressed-up versions of Ockhamism.
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  41. added 2015-04-22
    Fatalism.Patrick Todd - 2014 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    In contemporary philosophy, arguments for “fatalism” are arguments for the conclusion that no human actions are free. Such arguments typically come in two varieties: logical and theological. Arguments for logical fatalism proceed, roughly, from truths about future actions to the conclusion that those actions are unavoidable, and hence unfree. Arguments for theological fatalism, on the other hand, proceed, roughly, from divine beliefs about future actions to the conclusion that those actions are unavoidable, and hence unfree. What is characteristic of any (...)
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  42. added 2015-04-22
    Prepunishment and Explanatory Dependence: A New Argument for Incompatibilism About Foreknowledge and Freedom.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):619-639.
    The most promising way of responding to arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (in one way or another) invokes a claim about the order of explanation: God knew (or believed) that you would perform a given action because you would, in fact, perform it, and not the other way around. Once we see this result, many suppose, we'll see that divine foreknowledge ultimately poses no threat to human freedom. This essay argues that matters are not so (...)
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  43. added 2015-04-21
    The Works of Richard Campsall.Stephen Brown - 1986 - Review of Metaphysics 40 (2):403-406.
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  44. added 2015-04-20
    Eternity, Knowledge, and Freedom.Joseph Diekemper - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):45-64.
    This article addresses the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom by developing a modified version of Boethius' solution to the problem – one that is meant to cohere with a dynamic theory of time and a conception of God as temporal. I begin the article by discussing the traditional Boethian solution, and a defence of it due to Kretzmann and Stump. After canvassing a few of the objections to this view, I then go on to offer my own modified (...)
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  45. added 2015-04-20
    Freedom and the Necessity of the Present.Michael Rota - 2012 - Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):451-465.
    In a recent paper, William Hasker has responded to a paper of mine criticizing his argument for theological incompatibilism. In his response, Hasker makes a small but important amendment to his account of freedom. Here I argue that Hasker’s amended account of freedom is false, that there is a plausible alternative account of freedom, and that the plausibility of this alternative account shows that Hasker’s argument for theological incompatibilism relies on a dubious premise.
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  46. added 2015-04-17
    Introduction.Patrick Todd & John Martin Fischer - 2015 - In John Martin Fischer & Patrick Todd (eds.), Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 01-38.
    This Introduction has three sections, on "logical fatalism," "theological fatalism," and the problem of future contingents, respectively. In the first two sections, we focus on the crucial idea of "dependence" and the role it plays it fatalistic arguments. Arguably, the primary response to the problems of logical and theological fatalism invokes the claim that the relevant past truths or divine beliefs depend on what we do, and therefore needn't be held fixed when evaluating what we can do. We call the (...)
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  47. added 2015-04-17
    Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge.John Martin Fischer & Patrick Todd (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    We typically think we have free will. But how could we have free will, if for anything we do, it was already true in the distant past that we would do that thing? Or how could we have free will, if God already knows in advance all the details of our lives? Such issues raise the specter of "fatalism". This book collects sixteen previously published articles on fatalism, truths about the future, and the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human freedom, (...)
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  48. added 2015-04-07
    Why God's Beliefs Are Not Hard-Type Soft Facts.77 88 - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88.
    John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue with this (...)
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  49. added 2015-04-07
    Foreknowledge: Nelson Pike and Newcomb's Problem.Dennis M. Ahern - 1979 - Religious Studies 15 (4):475 - 490.
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  50. added 2015-04-07
    Foreknowledge: Nelson Pike and Newcomb's Problem: DENNIS M. AHERN.Dennis M. Ahern - 1979 - Religious Studies 15 (4):475-490.
    The problem of foreknowledge and freedom presents a challenge to the defender of traditional Western theism. Nelson Pike has argued that the existence of an essentially omniscient God who possesses foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. Pike's opponents in this matter, among whom is Alvin Plantinga, argue that no incompatibility has yet been shown. I shall develop the view that neither Pike nor his opponents have conclusively settled the question whether foreknowledge and freedom are compatible. Furthermore there is a reason (...)
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