Edited by Daniel Von Wachter (International Academy of Philosophy In The Principality of Liechtenstein)
|Summary||Theists usually hold that God exists necessarily. You could cease to exist, and you could have never come into existence. It even could have happend that no humans ever existed. By contrast, it is supposed to be impossible that there ever would have been or will be a time at which there exists no God. However, it is debated in which sense God exists necessarily. With the concept of necessity which was favoured by the linguistic turn and logical positivism, the claim that God exists necessarily becomes implausible.|
|Key works||Findlay 1948 argues, based on the positivist notion of necessity, that there is no God. Hick 1961 and 1960 argues that God's necessity should be understood as ‘factual necessity’. Leftow 2010 defends that God's existence is logically necessary, Swinburne 2010 objects. von Wachter 2009 (ch. 13) and 2002 argues that logical necessity is not properly called ‘necessity’ and that God exists necessarily in the proper sense.|
|Introductions||An encyclopedia entry: Davidson unknown.|
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