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  1. The Coherence of Omniscience: A Defense. [REVIEW]John E. Abbruzzese - 1997 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 41 (1):25-34.
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  2. An Anti-Molinist Argument.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:343-353.
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  3. Middle Knowledge.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):552-554.
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  4. T. Ryan Byerly: The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account.Michael Almeida - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):255-259.
    One major aim of the book is to articulate a view of the mechanics of infallible divine foreknowledge that avoids commitment to causal determinism, explains how infallible foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom, and explains how God’s divine providence is compatible with human freedom and indeterministic events. The modest epistemic goal is to articulate a view that enjoys a not very low epistemic status. But even with such modest goals, I think the view cannot credibly be said to offer or (...)
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  5. The Intelligibility of Abortive Omniscience.Alstrup Stig Rasmussen - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (48):315.
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  6. On Two Alleged Conflicts Between Divine Attributes.Torin Alter - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):47-57.
    Some argue that God’s omnipotence and moral perfection prevent God from being afraid and having evil desires and thus from understanding such states—which contradicts God’s omniscience. But, I argue, God could acquire such understanding indirectly, either by (i) perceiving the mental states of imperfect creatures, (ii) imaginatively combining the components of mental states with which God could be acquainted, or (iii) having false memory traces of such states. (i)–(iii) are consistent with the principal divine attributes.
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  7. Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, Edited by Ken Perszyk.Robert Anderson - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):627 - 628.
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  8. Omniscience and Divine Synchronization.John Robert Baker - 1972 - Process Studies 2 (3):201-208.
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  9. Divine Providence: The Molinist Account.D. Basinger - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):274-276.
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  10. ``Simple Foreknowledge and Providential Control&Quot.David Basinger - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):421-427.
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  11. Middle Knowledge and Divine Control: Some Clarifications. [REVIEW]David Basinger - 1991 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3):129 - 139.
    What then have we discovered? The general issue under discussion, remember, is whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous for the theist to affirm MK, especially as this form of knowledge relates to God's control over earthly affairs. As we have seen, both proponents and opponents of MK have claimed that this form of knowledge gives God significant power over earthly affairs, including control over the (indeterministically) free choices of humans.We have seen, though, that such a contention is dubious. There are (...)
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  12. Omniscience and Deliberation: A Response to Reichenbach. [REVIEW]David Basinger - 1986 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):169 - 172.
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  13. Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom.David Basinger - 1984 - Faith and Philosophy 1 (3):291-302.
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  14. Divine Omniscience and the Best of All Possible Worlds.David Basinger - 1982 - Journal of Value Inquiry 16 (2):143-148.
  15. Bibliography: Recent Work on Molinism.David Basinger & Human Freedom - 2011 - In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--303.
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  16. Omniscience and the Identification Problem.Robert Bass - 2007 - Florida Philosophical Review 7 (1):78-91.
    I discuss the propositional knowledge of an omniscient being, knowledge of facts that can be represented by that-clauses in sentences such as ‘John knows that the world is round.’ I shall focus upon questions about a supposedly omniscient being who propositionally knows the truth about all current states of affairs. I shall argue that there is no such being.
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  17. Professor Lucas on Omniscience.Robert W. Beard - 1986 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (1):37 - 43.
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  18. On the Cannot of Infallibility.Alex Blum - 2005 - Sophia 44 (1):125-127.
    We content that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We end by suggesting that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two.
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  19. Temporal Necessity and Divine Foreknowledge.Stephen Richard Boothe - 1978 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
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  20. Omniscience and Divine Foreknowledge.Tully Boreland - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  21. Two Ancient (and Modern) Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge to God: A Historic Overview and Critical Assessment.Gregory A. Boyd - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):41-59.
    The traditional Christian view that God foreknows the future exclusively in terms of what will and will not come to pass is partially rooted in two ancient Hellenistic philosophical assumptions. Hellenistic philosophers universally assumed that propositions asserting 'x will occur' contradict propositions asserting 'x will not occur' and generally assumed that the gods lose significant providential advantage if they know the future partly as a domain of possibilities rather than exclusively in terms of what will and will not occur. Both (...)
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  22. Two Ancient Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge to God: A Historic Overview and Critical Assessment.Gregory A. Boyd - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):41.
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  23. Neo-Molinism and the Infinite Intelligence of God.Gregory A. Boyd - 2003 - Philosophia Christi 5 (1):188-204.
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  24. Divine Omniscience, Immutability, Aseity and Human Free Will.Robert F. Brown - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (3):285-295.
  25. Complete Concept Molinism.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):93-108.
    A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of Molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called ‘grounding objection’ to Molinism raises a metaphysical problem. The most promising solution to it is a revised form of the traditional ‘essence solution’. Inspired by Leibniz’s idea of a ‘notio completa’ (complete concept), we propose a mathematical model of ‘possibilistic’ (...)
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  26. Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):137-154.
    Foreknowledge arguments attempt to show that infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. One particularly powerful foreknowledge argument employs the concept of accidental necessity. But an opponent of this argument might challenge it precisely because it employs the concept of accidental necessity. Indeed, Merricks (Philos Rev 118:29–57, 2009, Philos Rev 120:567–586, 2011a) and Zagzebski (Faith Philos 19(4):503–519, 2002, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011) have each written favorably of such a response. In this paper, I aim to show that (...)
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  27. Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Sophia 53 (4):427-434.
    Recently, several philosophers have moved from a classical account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all truths to a restricted account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all knowable truths. But an important objection offered by Alexander Pruss threatens to show that if God knows all knowable truths, God must also know all truths. In this paper, I show that there is a way out of Pruss’s objection for the advocate of restricted omniscience if she will (...)
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  28. Ockhamism Vs Molinism, Round 2: A Reply to Warfield.T. Ryan Byerly - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (4):503 - 511.
    Ted Warfield has argued that if Ockhamism and Molinism offer different responses to the problems of foreknowledge and prophecy, it is the Molinist who is in trouble. I show here that this is not so -indeed, things may be quite the reverse.
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  29. Ockhamism Vs Molinism, Round 2: A Reply to Warfield: T. Ryan Byerly.T. Ryan Byerly - 2010 - Religious Studies 47 (4):503-511.
    Ted Warfield has argued that if Ockhamism and Molinism offer different responses to the problems of foreknowledge and prophecy, it is the Molinist who is in trouble. I show here that this is not so – indeed, things may be quite the reverse.
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  30. Omniscience and Indexical Reference.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):203-210.
  31. Divine Sustenance and Theological Compatibilism.John Ross Churchill - unknown
    This thesis presents a case for theological compatibilism, the view that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. My attempt to support theological compatibilism is based chiefly upon two arguments, which appear in the second and third chapters of this thesis. While these arguments differ, they are united in one respect: each argument relies heavily upon the doctrine of divine sustenance, which is the doctrine that God is causally responsible for the continual existence of the universe. In chapter II, I (...)
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  32. The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism.David M. Ciocchi - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (1):45-61.
    In this paper I question the claim that the increasingly popular position known as ‘free-will theism’ or ‘the open view of God’ supports a rich religious life. To do this I advance a notion of ‘religious adequacy’, and then argue that free-will theism fails to be religiously adequate with respect to one of the principal practices of the religious life – petitionary prayer. Drawing on current work in libertarian free-will theory, I consider what are likely the only two lines of (...)
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  33. Dilemma di Newcomb, onniscienza e mondi possibili.Nicola Ciprotti - 2007 - In Gianfranco Pellegrino Ingrid Salvatore (ed.), Identità personale, libertà e realismo morale. Studi in onore di Robert Nozick. Luiss University Press.
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  34. The Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge Revisited.Steven B. Cowan - 2003 - Religious Studies 39 (1):93-102.
    The Molinist doctrine that God has middle knowledge requires that God knows the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom, propositions about what free agents would do in hypothetical circumstances. A well-known objection to middle knowledge, the grounding objection, contends that counterfactuals of freedom have no truth-value because there is no fact to the matter as to what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in counterfactual circumstances. Molinists, however, have offered responses to the grounding objection that they believe are adequate for (...)
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  35. Temporal Necessity; Hard Facts/Soft Facts.W. I. Craig - 1986 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):65.
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  36. ``On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism&Quot.William Lane Craig - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):236-240.
    In a pair of recent articles, William Hasker has attempted to defend Robert Adams’s new anti-Molinist argument. But I argue that the sense of explanatory priority operative in the argument is either equivocal or, if a univocal sense can be given to it, it is either so generic that we should have to deny its transitivity or so weak that it would not be incompatible with human freedom.
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  37. On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism.William Lane Craig - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):236-240.
    In a pair of recent articles, William Hasker has attempted to defend Robert Adams’s new anti-Molinist argument. But I argue that the sense of explanatory priority operative in the argument is either equivocal or, if a univocal sense can be given to it, it is either so generic that we should have to deny its transitivity or so weak that it would not be incompatible with human freedom.
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  38. Hasker on Divine Knowledge.William Lane Craig - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):89 - 110.
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  39. John Martin Fischer . God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom. Stanford Series in Philosophy. Pp. 351. [REVIEW]William Lane Craig - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (2):278.
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  40. “Lest Anyone Should Fall”: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on Perseverance and Apostolic Warnings. [REVIEW]William Lane Craig - 1991 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (2):65 - 74.
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  41. 'Nice Soft Facts': Fischer on Foreknowledge.William Lane Craig - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (2):235 - 246.
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  42. ‘Nice Soft Facts’: Fischer on Foreknowledge: William Lane Craig.William Lane Craig - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (2):235-246.
    During the last several years, philosophers of religion have witnessed a long-drawn debate between Nelson Pike and John Fischer on the problems of theological fatalism, Fischer claiming in his most recent contribution to have proved that even if God's past beliefs are ‘nice soft facts’, still theological fatalism cannot be averted. Unfortunately, this debate has not – at least it seems to this observer – served substantially either to clarify the issues involved or to move toward a resolution of the (...)
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  43. Tachyons, Time Travel, and Divine Omniscience.William Lane Craig - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):135-150.
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  44. William Ockham on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingency.William Lane Craig - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (2):117.
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  45. Process Theology's Denial of Divine Foreknowledge.William Lane Craig - 1987 - Process Studies 16 (3):198-202.
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  46. On Divine Foreknowledge and Newcomb’s Paradox.Thomas Crisp - 1999 - Philosophia Christi 1 (2):33-44.
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  47. Omniscience as a Dispositional State.Andrew Cullison - 2006 - Philosophia Christi 8 (1):151-160.
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  48. Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong in Advance.Arthur J. Cunningham - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
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  49. Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong.Arthur J. Cunningham - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):200-222.
    This paper is a response to William Hasker’s “bring about” argument against the Molinist theory of divine providence. Hasker’s argument rests on his claim that God’s middle knowledge must be regarded as part of the world’s past history; the primary Molinist response has been to resist this claim. This paper argues that even if this claim about middle knowledge is granted, the intended reductio does not go through. In particular, Hasker’s claim about middle knowledge is shown to undermine his proof (...)
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  50. II. The Existentialist Critique of Molinism.John Davenport - unknown
    Comparison of the preliminary objection to Haskar's and Adams's critiques of Molinism. The difficulty with Haskar's 'Power Inference Principle;' Adams's "New Anti-Molinist Argument;" William Lane Craig's recent response to Adams; Craig's defense of the 'emphemeral' Molinist logical possibility of doing otherwise; the two stages of the Existentialist's alternative strategy against Molinism.
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