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  1. Eternal God: Divine Atemporality in Thomas Aquinas.John H. Boyer - 2014 - In Darci N. Hill (ed.), News from the Raven: Essays from Sam Houston State University on Medieval and Renaissance Thought. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: pp. 262-285.
    The recent trend among many philosophers of religion has been to interpret divine eternity as an everlasting temporality in which an omnitemporal God exists in and throughout the whole of time. This is in contrast to the classical account of divine eternity as atemporal, immutable existence. In this paper, Aquinas' use of Boethius's definition of eternity as “the whole, perfect, and simultaneous possession of endless life” is analyzed and explained in contradistinction to Aristotle's definition of time. This analysis is then (...)
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  2. Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - manuscript
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
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  3. Molinism’s Freedom Problem in Advance.William Hasker - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
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  4. Recent Objections to Perfect Knowledge and Classical Approaches to Omniscience.Benjamin W. McCraw - 2016 - Philosophy and Theology 28 (1):259-270.
    Patrick Grim and Einar Duenger Bohn have recently argued that there can be no perfectly knowing Being. In particular, they urge that the object of omniscience is logically absurd or requires an impossible maximal point of all knowledge. I argue that, given a more classical notion of omniscience found in Aquinas and Augustine, we can shift the focus of perfect knowledge from what that being must know to the mode of that being’s understanding. Since Grim and Bohn focus on the (...)
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  5. Philosophical Arminianism: A Breakthrough in the Foreknowledge Controversy?William Hasker - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (3):333-344.
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  6. Augustine on Will, Freedom, and Foreknowledge: De Libero Arbitrio, III, 1–3.Christopher Hughes - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (3):315-332.
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  7. Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong.Arthur J. Cunningham - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):200-222.
    This paper is a response to William Hasker’s “bring about” argument against the Molinist theory of divine providence. Hasker’s argument rests on his claim that God’s middle knowledge must be regarded as part of the world’s past history; the primary Molinist response has been to resist this claim. This paper argues that even if this claim about middle knowledge is granted, the intended reductio does not go through. In particular, Hasker’s claim about middle knowledge is shown to undermine his proof (...)
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  8. Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong in Advance.Arthur J. Cunningham - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
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  9. Two Ancient Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge to God: A Historic Overview and Critical Assessment.Gregory A. Boyd - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):41.
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  10. Some Reflections on Predestination, Providence and Divine Foreknowledge.B. L. Hebblethwaite - 1979 - Religious Studies 15 (4):433.
    It might appear to be beyond question, for Christian theism, both that God is omniscient and that omniscience includes knowledge of future truth. For it seems obvious that if P is true, then an omniscient being knows that P. P , in this propositional function, is entirely general, and must therefore include propositions of the form: ‘it will be the case that X ’. If, truly, it will be the case that X , then God knows that truth.
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  11. A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument.Thomas P. Flint - 1999 - Religious Studies 35 (3):299-305.
    This paper argues that William Hasker's 'A new anti-Molinist argument' offers a fascinating but ultimately unsuccessful new instalment in his continuing campaign to discredit the picture of providence based on the theory of middle knowledge. It is first shown that Hasker's argument, though suffering from a seemingly irreparable logical gap, does nicely highlight a significant (and hitherto unduly underemphasized) point of contention between Molinists and anti-Molinists -- the question whether or not Molinists are committed to viewing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (...)
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  12. Complete Concept Molinism.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):93-108.
    A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of Molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called ‘grounding objection’ to Molinism raises a metaphysical problem. The most promising solution to it is a revised form of the traditional ‘essence solution’. Inspired by Leibniz’s idea of a ‘notio completa’ (complete concept), we propose a mathematical model of ‘possibilistic’ (...)
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  13. Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Aptamimamsa (Devāgamastotra) = Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord.Vijay K. Jain - 2016 - Vikalp Printers.
    Aptamimamsa by Ācārya Samantabhadra (2nd century CE) starts with a discussion, in a philosophical-cum-logical manner, on the Jaina concept of omniscience and the attributes of the Omniscient. The Ācārya questions the validity of the attributes that are traditionally associated with a praiseworthy deity and goes on to establish the logic of accepting the Omniscient as the most trustworthy and praiseworthy Supreme Being. Employing the doctrine of conditional predications (syādvāda) – the logical expression of reality in light of the foundational principle (...)
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  14. Review of T. Ryan Byerly, The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account. [REVIEW]Patrick Todd - 2015 - Sophia 54 (3):391-393.
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  15. Hume über Übel [Hume on evil].Nelson Pike & Vincent C. Müller - 1998 - In Christoph Jäger (ed.), Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Ferdinand Schöningh. pp. 227-244.
    In den Abschnitten X und XI der Dialoge über Natürliche Religion legt Hume seine Ansichten zum traditionellen theologischen Problem des Übels dar. Humes Anmerkungen zu diesem Thema scheinen mir eine reichhaltige Mischung aus Einsichten und Irrtümern zu enthalten. Mein Ziel in diesem Aufsatz besteht darin, diese entgegengesetzten Elemente seiner Diskussion zu entwirren.
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  16. Synchronic Contingency and the Problem of Freedom and Foreknowledge.Michael Rota - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (1):81-96.
    Does a free agent have the power to will otherwise even at the very moment she is making a particular free choice? That is, when one is freely making some choice at a time T, does one also have the power to refrain from so choosing at T? The diachronic account of contingency and freedom says “no,” while the synchronic account says “yes.” In this paper I first address William Hasker’s criticisms of my earlier presentation of the synchronic account, and (...)
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  17. T. Ryan Byerly: The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account. [REVIEW]Michael Almeida - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):255-259.
    One major aim of the book is to articulate a view of the mechanics of infallible divine foreknowledge that avoids commitment to causal determinism, explains how infallible foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom, and explains how God’s divine providence is compatible with human freedom and indeterministic events. The modest epistemic goal is to articulate a view that enjoys a not very low epistemic status. But even with such modest goals, I think the view cannot credibly be said to offer or (...)
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  18. Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Sophia 53 (4):427-434.
    Recently, several philosophers have moved from a classical account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all truths to a restricted account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all knowable truths. But an important objection offered by Alexander Pruss threatens to show that if God knows all knowable truths, God must also know all truths. In this paper, I show that there is a way out of Pruss’s objection for the advocate of restricted omniscience if she will (...)
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  19. Flint Re-Ignites the Temporal Taper: Molinism and the Human Future.Robert S. Heaney - 2002 - Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society:42-54.
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  20. Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom: A Note on a Problem of Language.R. W. Mulligan - 1972 - The Thomist 36 (2):293.
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  21. Luis de Molina: "On Divine Foreknowledge". [REVIEW]John P. Doyle - 1990 - The Thomist 54 (2):369.
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  22. Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views. [REVIEW]Daniel Hill - 2003 - Religious Studies 39 (2):241-246.
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  23. God, Knowledge and Time.William Hasker - 1990 - Religious Studies 26 (2):295-296.
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  24. Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents.William Ockham, Marilyn Mccord Adams & Norman Kretzmann - 1971 - Religious Studies 7 (3):285-287.
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  25. Providence and Evil: Three Theories: William Hasker.William Hasker - 1992 - Religious Studies 28 (1):91-105.
    The last two decades have seen an unprecedented amount of philosophical work on the topics of divine foreknowledge, middle knowledge, and timelessness in relation to human freedom. Most of this effort has been directed at logical and metaphysical aspects of these topics – the compatibility of foreknowledge with free will, the existence of true counterfactuals of freedom and the possibility of middle knowledge, the conceivability and metaphysical possibility of divine timelessness, and so on. Far less attention, in contrast, has been (...)
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  26. Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom: STEPHEN T. DAVIS.Stephen T. Davis - 1979 - Religious Studies 15 (3):303-316.
    Theists typically believe the following two propositions: God is omniscient, and Human beings are free. Are they consistent? In order to decide, we must first ask what they mean. Roughly, let us say that a being is omniscient if for any proposition he knows whether it is true or false. Since I have no wish to deny that there are true and false propositions about future states of affairs , omniscience includes foreknowledge, which we can say is knowledge of the (...)
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  27. Foreknowledge and Fatalism: RICHARD L. PURTILL.Richard L. Purtill - 1974 - Religious Studies 10 (3):319-324.
    In a recent book, J. R. Lucas presents an argument to show that if God has infallible knowledge of the future, our will is not free. Thus, Lucas concludes, like the medieval Jewish philosopher Gersonides, that God in creating beings with genuinely free will, abdicates some of his omniscience as well as some of his omnipotence. God could, but will not, determine our choices, since such an exercise of his power would rob us of free will. Similarly, Lucas holds, God (...)
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  28. Ockhamism Vs Molinism, Round 2: A Reply to Warfield: T. Ryan Byerly.T. Ryan Byerly - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (4):503-511.
    Ted Warfield has argued that if Ockhamism and Molinism offer different responses to the problems of foreknowledge and prophecy, it is the Molinist who is in trouble. I show here that this is not so – indeed, things may be quite the reverse.
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  29. ‘Nice Soft Facts’: Fischer on Foreknowledge: William Lane Craig.William Lane Craig - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (2):235-246.
    During the last several years, philosophers of religion have witnessed a long-drawn debate between Nelson Pike and John Fischer on the problems of theological fatalism, Fischer claiming in his most recent contribution to have proved that even if God's past beliefs are ‘nice soft facts’, still theological fatalism cannot be averted. Unfortunately, this debate has not – at least it seems to this observer – served substantially either to clarify the issues involved or to move toward a resolution of the (...)
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  30. Facts, Freedom and Foreknowledge: E. M. Zemach and D. Widerker.E. M. Zemach - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19-28.
    Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...)
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  31. Time and Foreknowledge: A Critique of Zagzebski: L. Nathan Oaklander.L. Nathan Oaklander - 1995 - Religious Studies 31 (1):101-103.
    One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge , Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a fourdimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of divine (...)
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  32. Reconciling Omniscience and Freedom: Ockhamist and Molinist Strategies.Mark Daniel Linville - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    The classical theistic concept of God includes the essential property of divine omniscience. To be omniscient is to know all true propositions. But it seems that propositions describing future events and actions are true. But then for every agent S, action A and time T, if S performs A at T, then God has always known that S would do A at T. But then it seems as though S is not free to do other than A at T since (...)
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  33. Temporal Necessity and Divine Foreknowledge.Stephen Richard Boothe - 1978 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
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  34. Divine Foreknowledge, Harry Frankfurt, and ‘Hyper-Incompatibilism’.David Werther - 2005 - Ars Disputandi 5.
    Linda Zagzebski refers to the denial of both determinism and PAP, the principle of alternate possibilities, as the newest solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and moral responsibility. William Lane Craig and David Hunt have appealed to Frankfurt cases in support of the claim that libertarian freedom and moral responsibility do not presuppose the truth of PAP: a person is morally responsible only if she could have done otherwise. I argue that this so-called hyper-incompatibilist perspective has an absurd implication: (...)
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  35. William Ockham on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingency.William Lane Craig - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (2):117.
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  36. The Intelligibility of Abortive Omniscience.Stig Rasmussen Alstrup - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (48):315.
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  37. The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge.Linda Trinkaus-Zagzebski - 1993 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (2):118-120.
    This original analysis examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will--those arising from Boethius, from Ockham, and from Molina. Though all three solutions are rejected in their best-known forms, three new solutions are proposed, and Zagzebski concludes that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom. The discussion includes the relation between the foreknowledge dilemma and problems about the nature of time and the causal relation; the logic of counterfactual conditionals; and the differences (...)
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  38. Temporal Necessity; Hard Facts/Soft Facts.W. I. Craig - 1986 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):65.
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  39. On Divine Foreknowledge and Newcomb’s Paradox.Thomas M. Crisp - 1999 - Philosophia Christi 1 (2):33-44.
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  40. Cowan on Molinism and Luck.Scott A. Davison - 2009 - Philosophia Christi 11 (1):170-174.
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  41. The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. [REVIEW]William Hasker - 1989 - Faith and Philosophy 6 (2):223-226.
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  42. Best Feasible Worlds: Divine Freedom and Leibniz’s Lapse.Justin Mooney - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):219-229.
    William L. Rowe’s argument against divine freedom has drawn considerable attention from theist philosophers. One reply to Rowe’s argument that has emerged in the recent literature appeals to modified accounts of libertarian freedom which have the result that God may be free even if he necessarily actualizes the best possible world. Though in many ways attractive, this approach appears to lead to the damning consequence of modal collapse i.e., that the actual world is the only possible world. But appearances can (...)
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  43. Values As A Political Metaframe.James Roper - 2007 - Florida Philosophical Review 7 (1):51-77.
    On the assumptions that omniscience is knowledge of all facts and that knowledge is some species of non-accidentally true belief, I construct an argument that no being is omniscient. Any omniscient being would have to know its own omniscience, but there appears to be no way for that to be known, whether for a being who is supposed merely to be omniscient, but otherwise unremarkable, or for a being with the full panoply of theistic attributes normally supposed to accompany omniscience. (...)
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  44. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience. [REVIEW]Thomas P. Flint - 1994 - International Studies in Philosophy 26 (1):107-107.
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  45. Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):137-154.
    Foreknowledge arguments attempt to show that infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. One particularly powerful foreknowledge argument employs the concept of accidental necessity. But an opponent of this argument might challenge it precisely because it employs the concept of accidental necessity. Indeed, Merricks (Philos Rev 118:29–57, 2009, Philos Rev 120:567–586, 2011a) and Zagzebski (Faith Philos 19(4):503–519, 2002, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011) have each written favorably of such a response. In this paper, I aim to show that (...)
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  46. Baudry, Leon. 7be Quarrel Over Future Contingents (Louvain 1465-1475), Unpublished Texts Collected by L. Baudry, Translated by Rota Guerlac,(Vert. Van La Querelle des Futurs Contingents, 1950),(Synthese. [REVIEW]Marie-Joseph Pierre - 1990 - Bijdragen, Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie En Theologie 51 (1).
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  47. Ockhamism and Molinism -- Foreknowledge and Prophecy.Ted A. Warfield - 2009 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.
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  48. Review of Kei Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience and Killing. A Critical Edition of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika Ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra). [REVIEW]Elisa Freschi - 2013 - International Journal of Asian Studies 10 (1):90--94.
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  49. Neo-Molinism and the Infinite Intelligence of God.Gregory A. Boyd - 2003 - Philosophia Christi 5 (1):188-204.
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  50. Defining Omniscience: A Feminist Perspective.Daniel Diederich Farmer - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):306.
    In contemporary philosophy of religion, the doctrine of omniscience is typically rendered propositionally, as the claim that God knows all true propositions. But feminist work makes clear what even the analytic tradition sometimes confesses, namely, that propositional knowledge is quite limited in scope. The adequacy of propositional conceptions of omniscience is therefore in question. This paper draws on the work of feminist epistemologists to articulate alternative renderings of omniscience which remedy the deficiencies of the traditional formulation.
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