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  1. Back From the Future: Divine Supercomprehension and Middle Knowledge as Ground for Retroactive Ontology.Andrew Hollingsworth - 2019 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 61 (4):516-532.
    In this article, I attempt to solve a problem in Wolfhart Pannenberg’s eschatology, which is best understood as a retroactive ontology. Pannenberg argues that the future exerts a retroactive causal and determinative power over the present, though he also claims that said future does not yet concretely exist. The problem can be posed thus: How does a non-concrete future hold retroactive power over the concrete present? I argue that the doctrines of middle knowledge and supercomprehension formulated by the Spanish Jesuit (...)
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  2. Eternal God: Divine Atemporality in Thomas Aquinas.John H. Boyer - 2014 - In Darci N. Hill (ed.), News from the Raven: Essays from Sam Houston State University on Medieval and Renaissance Thought. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: pp. 262-285.
    The recent trend among many philosophers of religion has been to interpret divine eternity as an everlasting temporality in which an omnitemporal God exists in and throughout the whole of time. This is in contrast to the classical account of divine eternity as atemporal, immutable existence. In this paper, Aquinas' use of Boethius's definition of eternity as “the whole, perfect, and simultaneous possession of endless life” is analyzed and explained in contradistinction to Aristotle's definition of time. This analysis is then (...)
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  3. Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Noûs.
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
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  4. Molinism’s Freedom Problem in Advance.William Hasker - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
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  5. A New Disproof of the Compatibility of Foreknowledge and Free Choice: DOUGLAS P. LACKEY.Douglas P. Lackey - 1974 - Religious Studies 10 (3):313-318.
    Old philosophical problems never die, but they can be reinterpreted. In this paper, I offer a reinterpretation of the problem of reconciling divine omniscience and human free will. Classical discussions of this problem concentrate on the nature of God and the concept of free will. The present discussion will focus attention on the concept of knowledge, drawing on developments in epistemology that resulted from the posing of a certain problem by Edmund Gettier in 1963.
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  6. Ockhamists and Molinists in Search of a Way Out: MARK D. LINVILLE.Mark D. Linville - 1995 - Religious Studies 31 (4):501-515.
    If libertarianism is true, then there is a sense in which agents have it within their power to bring it about that some world is actual. Against recent arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, I offer an account of power over the past which takes this implication of libertarianism into consideration. I argue that the resulting account is available to Ockhamists and that it is immune to recent criticisms of the notion of counterfactual power over the (...)
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  7. Two Ancient Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge to God: A Historic Overview and Critical Assessment: GREGORY A. BOYD.Gregory A. Boyd - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):41-59.
    The traditional Christian view that God foreknows the future exclusively in terms of what will and will not come to pass is partially rooted in two ancient Hellenistic philosophical assumptions. Hellenistic philosophers universally assumed that propositions asserting ‘ x will occur’ contradict propositions asserting ‘ x will not occur’ and generally assumed that the gods lose significant providential advantage if they know the future partly as a domain of possibilities rather than exclusively in terms of what will and will not (...)
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  8. Post’s Critiques of Omniscience and of Talk of All True Propositions.Alexander R. Pruss - 2003 - Philo 6 (1):49-58.
    John Post criticized Richard Gale’s work for neglecting to consider Patrick Grim style arguments against quantification over all propositions. Such arguments would throw into question the possibility of an omniscient being and destroy the Weak Principle of Sufficient reason that Gale and I have defended, the principle that each true or at least contingently true proposition is possibly explained. Post mounts a Grim-style argument against quantification over all propositions. However, I show that, despite assurances to the contrary, Post’s argument depends (...)
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  9. Between Hartshorne and Molina: A Whiteheadian Conception of Divine Foreknowledge.Derek Malone-France - 2010 - Process Studies 39 (1):129-148.
    The doctrine of inerrant divine “middle knowledge” of future contingent events, first developed by the sixteenth century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, has resurfaced as a prominent position within contemporary debates over divine foreknowledge, creaturely freedom, and the ontological status of possibilities. As yet, the only substantive response to the new Molinism from a process perspective has come in a brief section on “Hartshorne and the Challenge of Molinism,” in an essay on Hartshorne’s view of “The Logic of Future Contingents” (...)
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  10. Does Omniscience Imply Foreknowledge?: Craig on Hartshorne.Donald Wayne Viney - 1989 - Process Studies 18 (1):30-37.
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  11. Process Theology’s Denial of Divine Foreknowledge.William Lane Craig - 1987 - Process Studies 16 (3):198-202.
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  12. Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence In Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives. [REVIEW]Neil A. Stubbens - 1988 - Idealistic Studies 18 (2):185-186.
    This collection of thirteen previously unpublished essays arose from a conference in 1982 entitled “Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Future Contingents in Medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought.” The book is divided into four sections: two essays provide an introduction to the subject; four give an account of various Islamic views; a further four concern Jewish writers; and the last three focus on Christian thought.
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  13. Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!William Hasker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):126-131.
    William Craig has recently objected to my defense of Robert Adams’ anti-Molinist argument. I argue that all of Craig’s objections fail, and anti-Molinism stands undefeated.
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  14. On Hasker’s Defense of Anti-Molinism.William Lane Craig - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):236-240.
    In a pair of recent articles, William Hasker has attempted to defend Robert Adams’s new anti-Molinist argument. But I argue that the sense of explanatory priority operative in the argument is either equivocal or, if a univocal sense can be given to it, it is either so generic that we should have to deny its transitivity or so weak that it would not be incompatible with human freedom.
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  15. Foreknowledge and Freedom: A Reply to Gale.John Martin Fischer - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):89-93.
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  16. Simple Foreknowledge and Providential Control: A Response to Hunt.David Basinger - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):421-427.
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  17. Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker-Fischer Debate.David P. Hunt - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):395-401.
    One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on Harry Frankfurt’s famous counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities to defend human freedom from divine foreknowledge. For those who endorse this line, “Frankfurt counterexamples” are supposed to show that PAP is false, and this conclusion is then extended to the foreknowledge case. This makes it critical to determine whether Frankfurt counterexamples perform as advertised, an issue recently debated in this journal via a pair of articles by David (...)
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  18. Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom: A ‘Middle Knowledge’ Perspective.David Basinger - 1984 - Faith and Philosophy 1 (3):291-302.
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  19. On Freedom and Foreknowledge: A Reply to Two Critics.Ted A. Warfield - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):255-259.
    William Hasker and Anthony Brueckner have critically discussed my argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. I reply to their commentaries.
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  20. Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2001 - Faith and Philosophy 18 (3):369-376.
  21. Divine Omniscience and Human Evil: Interpreting Leibniz Without Middle Knowledge.Jill Graper Hernandez - 2005 - Philosophy and Theology 17 (1/2):107-120.
    The ‘middle knowledge’ doctrine salvages free will and divine omniscience by contending that God knows what agents will freely choose under any possible circumstances. I argue, however, that the Leibnizian problem of divine knowledge of human evil is best resolved by applying a Theodicy II distinction between determined, foreseen, and resolved action. This move eliminates deference to middle knowledge. Contingent action is indeed free, but not all action is contingent, and so not all action is free. For Leibniz, then, God’s (...)
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  22. On Divine Foreknowledge . By Luis de Molina. [REVIEW]John P. Doyle - 1990 - Modern Schoolman 67 (4):308-310.
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  23. Recent Objections to Perfect Knowledge and Classical Approaches to Omniscience.Benjamin W. McCraw - 2016 - Philosophy and Theology 28 (1):259-270.
    Patrick Grim and Einar Duenger Bohn have recently argued that there can be no perfectly knowing Being. In particular, they urge that the object of omniscience is logically absurd or requires an impossible maximal point of all knowledge. I argue that, given a more classical notion of omniscience found in Aquinas and Augustine, we can shift the focus of perfect knowledge from what that being must know to the mode of that being’s understanding. Since Grim and Bohn focus on the (...)
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  24. Philosophical Arminianism: A Breakthrough in the Foreknowledge Controversy?William Hasker - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (3):333-344.
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  25. Augustine on Will, Freedom, and Foreknowledge: De Libero Arbitrio, III, 1–3.Christopher Hughes - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (3):315-332.
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  26. Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong.Arthur J. Cunningham - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):200-222.
    This paper is a response to William Hasker’s “bring about” argument against the Molinist theory of divine providence. Hasker’s argument rests on his claim that God’s middle knowledge must be regarded as part of the world’s past history; the primary Molinist response has been to resist this claim. This paper argues that even if this claim about middle knowledge is granted, the intended reductio does not go through. In particular, Hasker’s claim about middle knowledge is shown to undermine his proof (...)
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  27. Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong in Advance.Arthur J. Cunningham - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
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  28. Some Reflections on Predestination, Providence and Divine Foreknowledge.B. L. Hebblethwaite - 1979 - Religious Studies 15 (4):433.
    It might appear to be beyond question, for Christian theism, both that God is omniscient and that omniscience includes knowledge of future truth. For it seems obvious that if P is true, then an omniscient being knows that P. P , in this propositional function, is entirely general, and must therefore include propositions of the form: ‘it will be the case that X ’. If, truly, it will be the case that X , then God knows that truth.
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  29. A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument.Thomas P. Flint - 1999 - Religious Studies 35 (3):299-305.
    This paper argues that William Hasker's 'A new anti-Molinist argument' offers a fascinating but ultimately unsuccessful new instalment in his continuing campaign to discredit the picture of providence based on the theory of middle knowledge. It is first shown that Hasker's argument, though suffering from a seemingly irreparable logical gap, does nicely highlight a significant (and hitherto unduly underemphasized) point of contention between Molinists and anti-Molinists -- the question whether or not Molinists are committed to viewing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (...)
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  30. Complete Concept Molinism.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):93-108.
    A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of Molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called ‘grounding objection’ to Molinism raises a metaphysical problem. The most promising solution to it is a revised form of the traditional ‘essence solution’. Inspired by Leibniz’s idea of a ‘notio completa’ (complete concept), we propose a mathematical model of ‘possibilistic’ (...)
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  31. Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Aptamimamsa (Devāgamastotra) = Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord.Vijay K. Jain - 2016 - Vikalp Printers.
    Aptamimamsa by Ācārya Samantabhadra (2nd century CE) starts with a discussion, in a philosophical-cum-logical manner, on the Jaina concept of omniscience and the attributes of the Omniscient. The Ācārya questions the validity of the attributes that are traditionally associated with a praiseworthy deity and goes on to establish the logic of accepting the Omniscient as the most trustworthy and praiseworthy Supreme Being. Employing the doctrine of conditional predications (syādvāda) – the logical expression of reality in light of the foundational principle (...)
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  32. Review of T. Ryan Byerly, The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account: Bloomsbury, 2014, ISBN: 978-1623565596, HB, 131 Pp. [REVIEW]Patrick Todd - 2015 - Sophia 54 (3):391-393.
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  33. Hume über Übel [Hume on evil].Nelson Pike & Vincent C. Müller - 1998 - In Christoph Jäger (ed.), Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Ferdinand Schöningh. pp. 227-244.
    In den Abschnitten X und XI der Dialoge über Natürliche Religion legt Hume seine Ansichten zum traditionellen theologischen Problem des Übels dar. Humes Anmerkungen zu diesem Thema scheinen mir eine reichhaltige Mischung aus Einsichten und Irrtümern zu enthalten. Mein Ziel in diesem Aufsatz besteht darin, diese entgegengesetzten Elemente seiner Diskussion zu entwirren.
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  34. T. Ryan Byerly: The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account: Bloomsbury Publishing, New York, 2014, 131 Pages, $100. [REVIEW]Michael Almeida - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):255-259.
    One major aim of the book is to articulate a view of the mechanics of infallible divine foreknowledge that avoids commitment to causal determinism, explains how infallible foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom, and explains how God’s divine providence is compatible with human freedom and indeterministic events. The modest epistemic goal is to articulate a view that enjoys a not very low epistemic status. But even with such modest goals, I think the view cannot credibly be said to offer or (...)
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  35. Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Sophia 53 (4):427-434.
    Recently, several philosophers have moved from a classical account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all truths to a restricted account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all knowable truths. But an important objection offered by Alexander Pruss threatens to show that if God knows all knowable truths, God must also know all truths. In this paper, I show that there is a way out of Pruss’s objection for the advocate of restricted omniscience if she will (...)
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  36. Flint Re-Ignites the Temporal Taper: Molinism and the Human Future.Robert S. Heaney - 2002 - Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society:42-54.
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  37. Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom: A Note on a Problem of Language.R. W. Mulligan - 1972 - The Thomist 36 (2):293.
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  38. Luis de Molina: "On Divine Foreknowledge". [REVIEW]John P. Doyle - 1990 - The Thomist 54 (2):369.
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  39. Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views. [REVIEW]Daniel Hill - 2003 - Religious Studies 39 (2):241-246.
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  40. God, Knowledge and Time.William Hasker - 1990 - Religious Studies 26 (2):295-296.
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  41. Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents.William Ockham, Marilyn Mccord Adams & Norman Kretzmann - 1971 - Religious Studies 7 (3):285-287.
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  42. Providence and Evil: Three Theories: William Hasker.William Hasker - 1992 - Religious Studies 28 (1):91-105.
    The last two decades have seen an unprecedented amount of philosophical work on the topics of divine foreknowledge, middle knowledge, and timelessness in relation to human freedom. Most of this effort has been directed at logical and metaphysical aspects of these topics – the compatibility of foreknowledge with free will, the existence of true counterfactuals of freedom and the possibility of middle knowledge, the conceivability and metaphysical possibility of divine timelessness, and so on. Far less attention, in contrast, has been (...)
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  43. Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom: STEPHEN T. DAVIS.Stephen T. Davis - 1979 - Religious Studies 15 (3):303-316.
    Theists typically believe the following two propositions: God is omniscient, and Human beings are free. Are they consistent? In order to decide, we must first ask what they mean. Roughly, let us say that a being is omniscient if for any proposition he knows whether it is true or false. Since I have no wish to deny that there are true and false propositions about future states of affairs , omniscience includes foreknowledge, which we can say is knowledge of the (...)
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  44. Foreknowledge and Fatalism: RICHARD L. PURTILL.Richard L. Purtill - 1974 - Religious Studies 10 (3):319-324.
    In a recent book, J. R. Lucas presents an argument to show that if God has infallible knowledge of the future, our will is not free. Thus, Lucas concludes, like the medieval Jewish philosopher Gersonides, that God in creating beings with genuinely free will, abdicates some of his omniscience as well as some of his omnipotence. God could, but will not, determine our choices, since such an exercise of his power would rob us of free will. Similarly, Lucas holds, God (...)
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  45. Ockhamism Vs Molinism, Round 2: A Reply to Warfield: T. Ryan Byerly.T. Ryan Byerly - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (4):503-511.
    Ted Warfield has argued that if Ockhamism and Molinism offer different responses to the problems of foreknowledge and prophecy, it is the Molinist who is in trouble. I show here that this is not so – indeed, things may be quite the reverse.
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  46. ‘Nice Soft Facts’: Fischer on Foreknowledge: William Lane Craig.William Lane Craig - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (2):235-246.
    During the last several years, philosophers of religion have witnessed a long-drawn debate between Nelson Pike and John Fischer on the problems of theological fatalism, Fischer claiming in his most recent contribution to have proved that even if God's past beliefs are ‘nice soft facts’, still theological fatalism cannot be averted. Unfortunately, this debate has not – at least it seems to this observer – served substantially either to clarify the issues involved or to move toward a resolution of the (...)
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  47. Facts, Freedom and Foreknowledge: E. M. Zemach and D. Widerker.E. M. Zemach - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19-28.
    Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...)
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  48. Time and Foreknowledge: A Critique of Zagzebski: L. Nathan Oaklander.L. Nathan Oaklander - 1995 - Religious Studies 31 (1):101-103.
    One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge , Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a fourdimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of divine (...)
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  49. Reconciling Omniscience and Freedom: Ockhamist and Molinist Strategies.Mark Daniel Linville - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    The classical theistic concept of God includes the essential property of divine omniscience. To be omniscient is to know all true propositions. But it seems that propositions describing future events and actions are true. But then for every agent S, action A and time T, if S performs A at T, then God has always known that S would do A at T. But then it seems as though S is not free to do other than A at T since (...)
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  50. Temporal Necessity and Divine Foreknowledge.Stephen Richard Boothe - 1978 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
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