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  1. Problems for Omniscience.Patrick Grim - 2013 - In J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister & Khaldoun A. Sweis (eds.), Debating Christian Theism. Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 169-180.
    A survey of logical problems for the concept of omniscience.
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  2. The Kalam Cosmological Argument and Divine Omniscience: an Evaluation of Recent Discussions in Sophia.Andrew Ter Ern Loke - 2020 - Sophia 59 (4):651-656.
    This article evaluates the discussion concerning the relationship between the Kalām Cosmological Argument and Divine Omniscience in recent articles in Sophia, 263–272, 2016; Erasmus Sophia, 57, 151–156, 2018a). I argue that, in his latest article, Erasmus is guilty of shifting the focus of the discussion from the KCA to the Infinity Argument. I contribute to the discussion by replying to the four difficulties Erasmus Sophia, 57, 151–156, mentions against my defence of the notion that God has an undivided intuition of (...)
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  3. Does God Know that the Flower in My Hand Is Red? Avicenna and the Problem of God’s Perceptual Knowledge.Amirhossein Zadyousefi - 2020 - Sophia 59 (4):657-693.
    God is omniscient; therefore, He knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red.’ If God knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red,’ then He knows it perceptually. God does not know anything perceptually. It is clear that the set of propositions – form an inconsistent triad. This is one of four problems with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God's knowledge of particulars, which I call the problem of perceptual knowledge. In order to solve PPK and three other (...)
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  4. Le désir de Dieu pour l’homme. Une réponse au problème de l’indifférence.Jean-Baptiste Lecuit - 2017 - Paris: Éditions du Cerf.
    Si l’on peut parler d’un désir de Dieu inscrit dans le coeur de l’homme, qu’en est-il du côté de Dieu ? Dieu désire-t-il entrer en communion avec chacun de nous ? Y aurait-il du désir dans la Trinité sainte ? Après avoir élaboré une nouvelle conception du désir, Jean-Baptiste Lecuit s’interroge sur le désir de l’homme pour Dieu : en quoi consiste-t-il ? Quel exaucement lui est-il offert ? Par quelles voies ? Est-il naturel à tout être humain ? En (...)
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  5. A Zhuangzian Critique of John Hick’s Theodicy.Leo K. C. Cheung - 2020 - Sophia 59 (3):549-562.
    Hick’s soul-making theodicy defends the omnipotence, omniscience, and all-goodness of God in the face of evil. It holds that the end of the creation process is the development of human beings into children of God. In order to achieve the end, an evil-dependent soul-making process must be employed. It then concludes that, because the end is so valuable, the omnipotent and omniscient creator’s not having prevented the existence of evil is morally justified and thus not in conflict with her being (...)
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  6. Nature, God, and Creation: A Necessitarian Case.Yasin Ramazan Basaran - 2018 - Dissertation, Indiana University Bloomington
    The theistic doctrine of creation highlights the significance of the world's dependence on God. For this doctrine, a variety of justifications have been offered based on the ontological and epistemological commitments of a philosopher or theologian. In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that the theistic doctrine of creation is strongly justified when on the one hand the integrity of nature is established by affirming causal necessity while on the other hand the sovereignty of God is maintained by affirming divine (...)
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  7. Against the Fundamental‐Reading of Anselm's Account of Omnipresence.Matthew James Collier - forthcoming - Heythrop Journal.
  8. Back From the Future: Divine Supercomprehension and Middle Knowledge as Ground for Retroactive Ontology.Andrew Hollingsworth - 2019 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 61 (4):516-532.
    In this article, I attempt to solve a problem in Wolfhart Pannenberg’s eschatology, which is best understood as a retroactive ontology. Pannenberg argues that the future exerts a retroactive causal and determinative power over the present, though he also claims that said future does not yet concretely exist. The problem can be posed thus: How does a non-concrete future hold retroactive power over the concrete present? I argue that the doctrines of middle knowledge and supercomprehension formulated by the Spanish Jesuit (...)
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  9. What If God Makes Hard Choices?Paul Draper - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9:18-30.
    This paper explores the implications for classical theism of the possibility that God makes “hard choices.” A choice between two actions is hard if the chooser believes that each action is better than the other in some respects, but believes neither that one action is better overall than the other nor that the two actions are equally valuable overall. Even an omniscient God might be forced to make hard choices if, as seems plausible, “better than,” “worse than,” and “equal in (...)
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  10. Eternal God: Divine Atemporality in Thomas Aquinas.John H. Boyer - 2014 - In Darci N. Hill (ed.), News from the Raven: Essays from Sam Houston State University on Medieval and Renaissance Thought. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: pp. 262-285.
    The recent trend among many philosophers of religion has been to interpret divine eternity as an everlasting temporality in which an omnitemporal God exists in and throughout the whole of time. This is in contrast to the classical account of divine eternity as atemporal, immutable existence. In this paper, Aquinas' use of Boethius's definition of eternity as “the whole, perfect, and simultaneous possession of endless life” is analyzed and explained in contradistinction to Aristotle's definition of time. This analysis is then (...)
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  11. Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):102-127.
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
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  12. Molinism’s Freedom Problem in Advance.William Hasker - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
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  13. A New Disproof of the Compatibility of Foreknowledge and Free Choice: DOUGLAS P. LACKEY.Douglas P. Lackey - 1974 - Religious Studies 10 (3):313-318.
    Old philosophical problems never die, but they can be reinterpreted. In this paper, I offer a reinterpretation of the problem of reconciling divine omniscience and human free will. Classical discussions of this problem concentrate on the nature of God and the concept of free will. The present discussion will focus attention on the concept of knowledge, drawing on developments in epistemology that resulted from the posing of a certain problem by Edmund Gettier in 1963.
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  14. Ockhamists and Molinists in Search of a Way Out: MARK D. LINVILLE.Mark D. Linville - 1995 - Religious Studies 31 (4):501-515.
    If libertarianism is true, then there is a sense in which agents have it within their power to bring it about that some world is actual. Against recent arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, I offer an account of power over the past which takes this implication of libertarianism into consideration. I argue that the resulting account is available to Ockhamists and that it is immune to recent criticisms of the notion of counterfactual power over the (...)
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  15. Two Ancient Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge to God: A Historic Overview and Critical Assessment: GREGORY A. BOYD.Gregory A. Boyd - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):41-59.
    The traditional Christian view that God foreknows the future exclusively in terms of what will and will not come to pass is partially rooted in two ancient Hellenistic philosophical assumptions. Hellenistic philosophers universally assumed that propositions asserting ‘ x will occur’ contradict propositions asserting ‘ x will not occur’ and generally assumed that the gods lose significant providential advantage if they know the future partly as a domain of possibilities rather than exclusively in terms of what will and will not (...)
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  16. There is no set of all truths.Patrick Grim - 1984 - Analysis 44 (4):206.
    A Cantorian argument that there is no set of all truths. There is, for the same reason, no possible world as a maximal set of propositions. And omniscience is logically impossible.
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  17. Post’s Critiques of Omniscience and of Talk of All True Propositions.Alexander R. Pruss - 2003 - Philo 6 (1):49-58.
    John Post criticized Richard Gale’s work for neglecting to consider Patrick Grim style arguments against quantification over all propositions. Such arguments would throw into question the possibility of an omniscient being and destroy the Weak Principle of Sufficient reason that Gale and I have defended, the principle that each true or at least contingently true proposition is possibly explained. Post mounts a Grim-style argument against quantification over all propositions. However, I show that, despite assurances to the contrary, Post’s argument depends (...)
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  18. Between Hartshorne and Molina: A Whiteheadian Conception of Divine Foreknowledge.Derek Malone-France - 2010 - Process Studies 39 (1):129-148.
    The doctrine of inerrant divine “middle knowledge” of future contingent events, first developed by the sixteenth century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, has resurfaced as a prominent position within contemporary debates over divine foreknowledge, creaturely freedom, and the ontological status of possibilities. As yet, the only substantive response to the new Molinism from a process perspective has come in a brief section on “Hartshorne and the Challenge of Molinism,” in an essay on Hartshorne’s view of “The Logic of Future Contingents” (...)
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  19. Does Omniscience Imply Foreknowledge?: Craig on Hartshorne.Donald Wayne Viney - 1989 - Process Studies 18 (1):30-37.
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  20. Process Theology’s Denial of Divine Foreknowledge.William Lane Craig - 1987 - Process Studies 16 (3):198-202.
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  21. Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence In Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives. [REVIEW]Neil A. Stubbens - 1988 - Idealistic Studies 18 (2):185-186.
    This collection of thirteen previously unpublished essays arose from a conference in 1982 entitled “Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Future Contingents in Medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought.” The book is divided into four sections: two essays provide an introduction to the subject; four give an account of various Islamic views; a further four concern Jewish writers; and the last three focus on Christian thought.
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  22. Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!William Hasker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):126-131.
    William Craig has recently objected to my defense of Robert Adams’ anti-Molinist argument. I argue that all of Craig’s objections fail, and anti-Molinism stands undefeated.
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  23. On Hasker’s Defense of Anti-Molinism.William Lane Craig - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):236-240.
    In a pair of recent articles, William Hasker has attempted to defend Robert Adams’s new anti-Molinist argument. But I argue that the sense of explanatory priority operative in the argument is either equivocal or, if a univocal sense can be given to it, it is either so generic that we should have to deny its transitivity or so weak that it would not be incompatible with human freedom.
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  24. Foreknowledge and Freedom: A Reply to Gale.John Martin Fischer - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):89-93.
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  25. Simple Foreknowledge and Providential Control: A Response to Hunt.David Basinger - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):421-427.
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  26. Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker-Fischer Debate.David P. Hunt - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):395-401.
    One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on Harry Frankfurt’s famous counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities to defend human freedom from divine foreknowledge. For those who endorse this line, “Frankfurt counterexamples” are supposed to show that PAP is false, and this conclusion is then extended to the foreknowledge case. This makes it critical to determine whether Frankfurt counterexamples perform as advertised, an issue recently debated in this journal via a pair of articles by David (...)
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  27. Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom: A ‘Middle Knowledge’ Perspective.David Basinger - 1984 - Faith and Philosophy 1 (3):291-302.
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  28. On Freedom and Foreknowledge: A Reply to Two Critics.Ted A. Warfield - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):255-259.
    William Hasker and Anthony Brueckner have critically discussed my argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. I reply to their commentaries.
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  29. Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2001 - Faith and Philosophy 18 (3):369-376.
  30. Divine Omniscience and Human Evil: Interpreting Leibniz Without Middle Knowledge.Jill Graper Hernandez - 2005 - Philosophy and Theology 17 (1/2):107-120.
    The ‘middle knowledge’ doctrine salvages free will and divine omniscience by contending that God knows what agents will freely choose under any possible circumstances. I argue, however, that the Leibnizian problem of divine knowledge of human evil is best resolved by applying a Theodicy II distinction between determined, foreseen, and resolved action. This move eliminates deference to middle knowledge. Contingent action is indeed free, but not all action is contingent, and so not all action is free. For Leibniz, then, God’s (...)
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  31. On Divine Foreknowledge . By Luis de Molina. [REVIEW]John P. Doyle - 1990 - Modern Schoolman 67 (4):308-310.
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  32. Recent Objections to Perfect Knowledge and Classical Approaches to Omniscience.Benjamin W. McCraw - 2016 - Philosophy and Theology 28 (1):259-270.
    Patrick Grim and Einar Duenger Bohn have recently argued that there can be no perfectly knowing Being. In particular, they urge that the object of omniscience is logically absurd or requires an impossible maximal point of all knowledge. I argue that, given a more classical notion of omniscience found in Aquinas and Augustine, we can shift the focus of perfect knowledge from what that being must know to the mode of that being’s understanding. Since Grim and Bohn focus on the (...)
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  33. Philosophical Arminianism: A Breakthrough in the Foreknowledge Controversy?William Hasker - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (3):333-344.
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  34. Augustine on Will, Freedom, and Foreknowledge: De Libero Arbitrio, III, 1–3.Christopher Hughes - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (3):315-332.
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  35. Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong.Arthur J. Cunningham - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):200-222.
    This paper is a response to William Hasker’s “bring about” argument against the Molinist theory of divine providence. Hasker’s argument rests on his claim that God’s middle knowledge must be regarded as part of the world’s past history; the primary Molinist response has been to resist this claim. This paper argues that even if this claim about middle knowledge is granted, the intended reductio does not go through. In particular, Hasker’s claim about middle knowledge is shown to undermine his proof (...)
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  36. Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong in Advance.Arthur J. Cunningham - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
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  37. Some Reflections on Predestination, Providence and Divine Foreknowledge.B. L. Hebblethwaite - 1979 - Religious Studies 15 (4):433.
    It might appear to be beyond question, for Christian theism, both that God is omniscient and that omniscience includes knowledge of future truth. For it seems obvious that if P is true, then an omniscient being knows that P. P , in this propositional function, is entirely general, and must therefore include propositions of the form: ‘it will be the case that X ’. If, truly, it will be the case that X , then God knows that truth.
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  38. A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument.Thomas P. Flint - 1999 - Religious Studies 35 (3):299-305.
    This paper argues that William Hasker's 'A new anti-Molinist argument' offers a fascinating but ultimately unsuccessful new instalment in his continuing campaign to discredit the picture of providence based on the theory of middle knowledge. It is first shown that Hasker's argument, though suffering from a seemingly irreparable logical gap, does nicely highlight a significant (and hitherto unduly underemphasized) point of contention between Molinists and anti-Molinists -- the question whether or not Molinists are committed to viewing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (...)
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  39. Complete Concept Molinism.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):93-108.
    A theoretically rigorous approach to the key problems of Molinism leads to a clear distinction between semantic and metaphysical problems. Answers to semantic problems do not provide answers to metaphysical problems that arise from the theory of middle knowledge. The so-called ‘grounding objection’ to Molinism raises a metaphysical problem. The most promising solution to it is a revised form of the traditional ‘essence solution’. Inspired by Leibniz’s idea of a ‘notio completa’ (complete concept), we propose a mathematical model of ‘possibilistic’ (...)
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  40. Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Aptamimamsa (Devāgamastotra) = Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord.Vijay K. Jain - 2016 - Vikalp Printers.
    Aptamimamsa by Ācārya Samantabhadra (2nd century CE) starts with a discussion, in a philosophical-cum-logical manner, on the Jaina concept of omniscience and the attributes of the Omniscient. The Ācārya questions the validity of the attributes that are traditionally associated with a praiseworthy deity and goes on to establish the logic of accepting the Omniscient as the most trustworthy and praiseworthy Supreme Being. Employing the doctrine of conditional predications (syādvāda) – the logical expression of reality in light of the foundational principle (...)
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  41. Review of T. Ryan Byerly, The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account: Bloomsbury, 2014, ISBN: 978-1623565596, HB, 131 Pp. [REVIEW]Patrick Todd - 2015 - Sophia 54 (3):391-393.
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  42. Hume über Übel [Hume on evil].Nelson Pike & Vincent C. Müller - 1998 - In Christoph Jäger (ed.), Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Ferdinand Schöningh. pp. 227-244.
    In den Abschnitten X und XI der Dialoge über Natürliche Religion legt Hume seine Ansichten zum traditionellen theologischen Problem des Übels dar. Humes Anmerkungen zu diesem Thema scheinen mir eine reichhaltige Mischung aus Einsichten und Irrtümern zu enthalten. Mein Ziel in diesem Aufsatz besteht darin, diese entgegengesetzten Elemente seiner Diskussion zu entwirren.
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  43. T. Ryan Byerly: The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account: Bloomsbury Publishing, New York, 2014, 131 Pages, $100. [REVIEW]Michael Almeida - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):255-259.
    One major aim of the book is to articulate a view of the mechanics of infallible divine foreknowledge that avoids commitment to causal determinism, explains how infallible foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom, and explains how God’s divine providence is compatible with human freedom and indeterministic events. The modest epistemic goal is to articulate a view that enjoys a not very low epistemic status. But even with such modest goals, I think the view cannot credibly be said to offer or (...)
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  44. Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Sophia 53 (4):427-434.
    Recently, several philosophers have moved from a classical account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all truths to a restricted account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all knowable truths. But an important objection offered by Alexander Pruss threatens to show that if God knows all knowable truths, God must also know all truths. In this paper, I show that there is a way out of Pruss’s objection for the advocate of restricted omniscience if she will (...)
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  45. Flint Re-Ignites the Temporal Taper: Molinism and the Human Future.Robert S. Heaney - 2002 - Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society:42-54.
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  46. Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom: A Note on a Problem of Language.R. W. Mulligan - 1972 - The Thomist 36 (2):293.
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  47. Luis de Molina: "On Divine Foreknowledge". [REVIEW]John P. Doyle - 1990 - The Thomist 54 (2):369.
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  48. Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views. [REVIEW]Daniel Hill - 2003 - Religious Studies 39 (2):241-246.
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  49. God, Knowledge and Time.William Hasker - 1990 - Religious Studies 26 (2):295-296.
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  50. Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents.William Ockham, Marilyn Mccord Adams & Norman Kretzmann - 1971 - Religious Studies 7 (3):285-287.
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