Dogmatism

Edited by Chenwei Nie (University of Warwick)
About this topic
Summary

In everyday use, dogmatism refers to a person's rigid epistemic attitude toward certain doctrines—whether religious or secular—where they hold specific beliefs as unquestionable and resist considering alternative perspectives or evidence. In philosophy, the term dogmatism is sometimes used in a similar way. For example, the dogmatism paradox of knowledge, famously described by Kripke and Harman, states that if we know that P, then we are justified in disregarding any future evidence against P; this is paradoxical because we can never be in a position to completely disregard future evidence. More commonly, however, dogmatism is known as a philosophical position opposed to skepticism. Both skeptics and dogmatists are interested in philosophical questions about reality, knowledge, morality, etc. One notable difference between them is that, whereas skeptics raise doubts, dogmatists defend positive answers to these questions, often in response to skeptical challenges. For example, consider the question of whether perceptual experience can justify beliefs about the external world. While skeptics doubt that it can, dogmatists—such as Moore, Pryor, and Huemer—argue that our perceptual experience can provide immediate, albeit defeasible, justification. Taken together, it could be said that a philosophical dogmatist is not dogmatic at all in the everyday sense.

Key works Sextus Empiricus's (2nd century CE) work, e.g., Empiricus 1990, is a key source for discussions of ancient skepticism and dogmatism on a wide range of philosophical issues. More recently, Pryor 2000 reinvigorated the discussion of dogmatism in relation to perceptual justification.
Related

Contents
367 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 367
Dogmatist and Moorean Replies to Skepticism
  1. Deep Fake Out.Mihailis E. Diamantis, Sean Sullivan & Eli Alshanetsky - forthcoming - The George Washington Law Review.
    Deepfakes are visual and audio media that use artificial intelligence to portray people saying things they never said, doing things they never did, and experiencing events that never happened. They can be trivial (“Tom Cruise knows magic tricks?”), outlandish (“Why is Nancy Pelosi drunk on national television?”), or even dangerous (“Run, the Hollywood sign is burning!”). Because deepfakes can be both persuasive and pervasive, many commentators fear that humanity will soon take another step into the post-truth abyss. -/- This Article (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Metaphysical ecumenicalism and Moore’s proof.Chris Ranalli & Mark Walker - forthcoming - Episteme.
    You have hands, but does it follow that there’s an external material world? Moore thought so. However, we argue that this is a mistake. We defend the Ecumenical View, on which ordinary object terms like “hands” are metaphysically ecumenical, akin to the way that terms like “table” are physically ecumenical: just as there are wooden, metal, or plastic tables, so too there can be material, virtual, or immaterial hands. Moore’s position, however, is metaphysically sectarian: the semantics of “hands” requires a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Moore's Fourth Condition.Louis Doulas - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    It is widely assumed that G. E. Moore was either oblivious or indifferent to circularity worries surrounding his enigmatic proof of an external world. I argue that this assumption is false. Drawing on unpublished archival evidence and overlooked passages in Moore’s posthumously published lectures, I provide, for the first time, an account of Moore on circular proof. I show that, as early as 1928–29 and as late as 1938–39, Moore identified an “important” and “unimportant” sense of begging the question (epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Why better safe than sensitive.Haicheng Zhao - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (3):838-855.
    One interesting and potentially attractive feature of the sensitivity account of knowledge is that it not only preserves knowledge of ordinary propositions, but also concedes the skeptic's intuition that we do not know skeptical hypotheses do not obtain. This paper challenges the sensitivity‐based reply to the skeptic, advocated by Robert Nozick, among others. Sensitivity generates an implausibly bizarre result that although we do not know we are not brains in vats (because a belief to this effect is insensitive), a real (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Illusionism, Moore, and Chalmers.Evgeny V. Loginov - 2024 - Frontiers in Psychology 15:1449314.
    In 1939, G. E. Moore presented his famous proof of an external world. In 2018, David Chalmers published his Moorean argument against illusionism. In 2022, Chalmers argued that Moore’s original argument was wrong. In this paper, I will try to defend the original Moore’s argument against Chalmers-style criticism, and show that Chalmers’s Moorean argument against illusionism cannot refute illusionism. -/- .
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Faits mooréens et révision des croyances, ou le sceptique peut-il gagner?Thomas Kelly & Benoit Guilielmo - 2024 - Klesis 57. Translated by Benoit Guilielmo.
    Un fait Mooréen, selon l'expression de David Lewis, est « l'une des choses que nous savons mieux que toute prémisse d'une argumentation philosophique visant à é tablir le contraire. » Le sujet des faits Mooréens soulève des questions profondes, à la fois de méthode philosophique et d'épistémologie de premier ordre. Comment devrions-nous répondre aux arguments qui remettent en question des croyances dont nous sommes extrêmement confiants ? Dans quelle mesure ces arguments – ou plutôt ceux qui les avancent – peuvent-ils (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Bootstrapping and Persuasive Argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (2):225-246.
    That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. If presentism is false, then I don’t exist. On common-sense presentism.Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-36.
    For many presentist philosophers, e.g. Zimmerman (Contemp Debates Metaphys 10:211–225, 2008), a central motivation in favour of presentism is that it is supposed to be part of common sense. But the fact that common-sense intuitions are indeed presentist is usually taken for granted (and sometimes also conceded by eternalists). As has been shown in other domains of philosophy (e.g. free will), we should be careful when attributing some supposed intuitions to common sense, and Torrengo (Phenomenology and Mind 12: 50–55, 2017) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. (1 other version)Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 6. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–34.
  10. How to be a neo-Moorean.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg, Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 68--99.
    Much of the recent debate regarding scepticism has focussed on a certain template sceptical argument and a rather restricted set of proposals concerning how one might deal with that argument. Throughout this debate the ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism is often cited as a paradigm example of how one should not respond to the sceptical argument, so conceived. As I argue in this paper, however, there are ways of resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic. In particular, I consider the prospects (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  11. Trust Responsibly: Non-Evidential Virtue Epistemology.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2023 - New York City: Routledge.
    This book offers a defence of Wrightean epistemic entitlement, one of the most prominent approaches to hinge epistemology. It also systematically explores the connections between virtue epistemology and hinge epistemology. -/- According to hinge epistemology, any human belief set is built within and upon a framework of pre-evidential propositions – hinges – that cannot be justified. Epistemic entitlement argues that we are entitled to trust our hinges. But there remains a problem. Entitlement is inherently unconstrained and arbitrary: We can be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. Wright on Moore.José L. Zalabardo - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva, Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 304–322.
    To the sceptic's contention that I don't know that I have hands because I don't know that there is an external world, the Moorean replies that I know that there is an external world because I know that I have hands. Crispin Wright has argued that the Moorean move is illegitimate, and has tried to block it by limiting the applicability of the principle of the transmission of knowledge by inference—the principle that recognising the validity of an inference from known (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.
    This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three key issues. First, it starts by exploring how philosophers have recently challenged our understanding of radical skeptical arguments. It then unpacks and critically evaluates some influential reactions to radical skepticism: structuralism, knowledge-first epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, and hinge epistemology. Third, it explores some novel developments of pragmatism, like pragmatic skepticism, gauges its anti-skeptical import, and reflects on the ways in which radical skeptical epistemology and ethics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Moore's Anti‐Skeptical Arguments.Matthew Frise - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone, Just the Arguments. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 152–153.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Paradox of Stubbornness: The Epistemology of Stereotypes Regarding Women.Sagy Watemberg Izraeli - 2023 - In Synne Myrebøe, Valgerður Pálmadóttir & Johanna Sjöstedt, Feminist Philosophy: Time, History and the Transformation of Thought. Södertörn University. pp. 211-229.
    The discrepancy between individual women and the stereotypes attributed to the group as a ‎whole has become progressively greater and more explicit over the course of history. The stereotypes remain the same age-old ‎allegations whilst the ‎developments in the occupations of women and the traits they have opportunity to express have increased the distance between women and those ascribed traits. Stereotypes’ abstention from revision in light of contrary evidence constitutes an epistemic paradox for it entails conflict between the stereotypical knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition by Michael Bergmann. [REVIEW]Charles Goldhaber - 2023 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Michael Bergmann's Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition develops a response to radical skepticism inspired by commonsense philosophers, such as Reid and Moore. Bergmann argues against radical skepticism on the grounds of its conflicting with strongly-held "epistemic intuitions" about the "epistemic value or goodness” of our particular perceptual, recollective, introspective and a priori beliefs. I press concerns about whether Bergmann's "intuitionist particularist" response can diagnose the source of skepticism, and argue that his methodology turns out to itself be strikingly skeptical.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Reflective awareness, phenomenal conservatism, and phenomenal explanationism.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance's inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its antisceptical bite. This paper provides a novel (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. Replies to the Critics of Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):95-131.
    This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Précis on Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):1-13.
    In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Melchior 2019), which is subject to a book symposium organized by the University of Maribor. This volume in Acta Analytica contains contributions by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Robert Weston Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster along with my replies.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Buddhismo e senso comune. Filosofia della meditazione.Marco Simionato - 2022 - Padova PD, Italia: Padova University Press.
    In che cosa crede chi pratica la meditazione buddhista? Dare una risposta univoca e coerente è assai difficile; il Buddhismo infatti si concretizza in una molteplicità di scuole e dottrine caratterizzate da complesse logiche e metafisiche. Ci sono tuttavia delle indicazioni minimali che fungono da denominator comune per chi si accosta alla meditazione. Esse riguardano soprattutto l’assenza di punti di vista determinati, l’esperienza del tempo e la relazione di dipendenza reciproca di ogni cosa con ogni altra. Utilizzando gli strumenti della (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the Existence of an External World.Sebastian Sunday Grève - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1023-1031.
    This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that _cannot_ be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. The Dynamic Strategy of Common Sense Against Radical Revisionism.Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):141-162.
    Common-sense philosophers typically maintain that common-sense propositions have a certain kind of epistemic privilege that allows them to evade the threats of skepticism or radical revisionism. Butwhydo they have this special privilege? In response to this question, the “Common-Sense Tradition” contains many different strands of arguments. In this paper, I will develop a strategy that combines two of these strands of arguments. First, the “Dynamic Argument” (or the “starting-point argument”), inspired by Thomas Reid and Charles S. Peirce (but which will (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Concerns about Lycan's commonsensism.Michael Bergmann - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):573-582.
    Despite wholeheartedly endorsing Lycan's commonsensism on display in On Evidence in Philosophy, this paper raises concerns about three views Lycan defends in that book. The first view is compatibilism about free will and determinism. The paper argues that Lycan's Moorean defense of compatibilism fails and that it is plausible for commonsensists to think that, in their dispute with incompatibilists, the burden of proof is on compatibilists. The second view is Lycan's Principle of Humility, offered as an account of the conditions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. Christos Kyriacou and Kevin Wallbridge's Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. [REVIEW]Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (1):61-78.
    This is a critical notice of Christos Kyriacou and Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York and London: Routledge, 2021. Pp. x + 324. ISBN 978-0-367-37018-3. It discusses in some detail contributions by Nevin Climenhaga, Christos Kyriacou, Michael Hannon, Kevin Wallbridge, Annalisa Coliva, and Genia Schönbaumsfeld.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Conocimiento y escepticismo. Ensayos de epistemología.José Luis Zalabardo - 2014 - Mexico City, CDMX, Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas.
    El presente volumen recoge seis ensayos publicados originalmente en inglés en revistas especializadas y volúmenes colectivos a lo largo de la última década. Tratan de las consecuencias de desarrollos recientes en el análisis del conocimiento para la evaluación de los argumentos escépticos tradicionales. Los argumentos escépticos pretenden mostrar que es imposible conocer el mundo. Forman parte de la tradición filosófica occidental desde la antigüedad, y han tenido una influencia importantísima en el desarrollo de la filosofía desde entonces hasta nuestros días. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant.Tyler Burge - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-142.
  27. Le sens commun comme principe en métaphysique.Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2021 - In Alexandre Declos & Claudine Tiercelin, La Métaphysique du Temps: Perspectives Contemporaines. Collège de France.
  28. Moorean Arguments Against the Error Theory: A Defense.Eric Sampson - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage highly revisionary philosophical views, such as nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global). They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it’s true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in ethics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  29. Wittgenstein’s Wager: On [Absolute] Certainty.Noah Greenstein - 2022 - Southwest Philosophy Review 38 (1):51-57.
    Knowledge is analyzed in terms of the cost incurred when mistakes are made — things we should have known better, but didn’t. Following Wittgenstein at the end of On Certainty, an Epistemic Wager, similar to Pascal’s Wager, is set up to represent the cost differences not in belief vs. disbelief, but in knowledge vs. skepticism. This leads to a core class of absolutely certain knowledge, related to Moorean Facts, that is integrated into our everyday lives. This core knowledge is resistant (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Global Debunking Arguments.Andrew Moon - 2023 - In Diego E. Machuca, Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
    This chapter explores global debunking arguments, debunking arguments that aim to give one a global defeater. I defend Alvin Plantinga’s view that global defeaters are possible and, once gained, are impossible to escape by reasoning. They thereby must be extinguished by other means: epistemically propitious actions, luck, or grace. I then distinguish between three types of global defeater—pure-undercutters, undercutters-because-rebutters, and undercutters-while-rebutters—and systematically consider how one can deflect such defeaters. Lastly, since I draw insights from the literature on perhaps the most (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. The Truth of Scepticism: on the varieties of epistemological doubt.Guido Tana - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
  32. An Ecumenical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2019-2040.
    The purpose of this paper is to get clear on how we should think about Mooreanism. I will argue that Mooreanism is best understood as a metaphilosophical response to skepticism rather than a particular position on specialized debates in first-order epistemology. This ecumenical understanding of Mooreanism implies that a broad array of epistemologists is free to be Moorean. In Sect. 2 I discuss several non-Moorean responses to skepticism. In Sect. 3 I provide an exposition of Mooreanism itself. In Sect. 4 (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. What We All Know: Community in Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense".Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (4):629-651.
    I defend an account of Moore's conception of Common Sense—as it figures in "A Defence of Common Sense"—according to which it is based in a vision of the community of human beings as bound and unified by a settled common understanding of the meaning of our words and statements. This, for Moore, is our inalienable starting point in philosophy. When Moore invokes Common Sense against idealist (and skeptical) philosophers, he is reminding them that they too are bound by this common (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1869-1893.
    This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  35. The Point of Moore’s Proof.Charles Raff - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):1-27.
    The current standard interpretation of Moore’s proof assumes he offers a solution to Kant’s famously posed problem of an external world, which Moore quotes at the start of his 1939 lecture “Proof of an External World.” As a solution to Kant’s problem, Moore’s proof would fail utterly. A second received interpretation imputes an aim of refuting metaphysical idealism that Moore’s proof does not at all achieve. This study departs from received interpretations to credit the aim Moore announced for the proof (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. On the Alleged Instability of Externalist Anti-skepticism.Matthew Jope - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (1):43-50.
    A certain brand of skeptical argument appeals to the thought that our inability to subjectively discriminate between competing hypotheses means that we are unwarranted in believing in either. Externalists respond by pointing out that such arguments depend on an internalist conception of warrant that we would do well to reject. This strategy has been criticised by Crispin Wright who argues that if we pursue the implications of externalism sufficiently far we find that it is ultimately unstable or incoherent. I first (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism.Nevin Climenhaga - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge, Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge.
    I present a cumulative case for the thesis that we only know propositions that are certain for us. I argue that this thesis can easily explain the truth of eight plausible claims about knowledge: -/- (1) There is a qualitative difference between knowledge and non-knowledge. (2) Knowledge is valuable in a way that non-knowledge is not. (3) Subjects in Gettier cases do not have knowledge. (4) If S knows that P, P is part of S’s evidence. (5) If S knows (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  38. Moore on the sceptical philosopher.Guy Longworth - 2021 - Think 20 (57):69-87.
    1. Since I don't know who you are, dear reader, and since I know that some people don't have hands, I don't know whether you have hands. Probably you do, but knowing that something is probable is rarely, if ever, a way of knowing that thing. By contrast, I know that I have hands. Let me check. Yes, here is one of my hands; and here is another. Since I know that here is one of my hands and that here (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. (1 other version)Précis of The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 2.Keith DeRose - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):1-3.
    The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. (1 other version)Replies to Commentators.Keith DeRose - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):68-104.
    Replies are given to comments, questions, and objections to The Appearance of Ignorance. The reply to Robin McKenna focuses mainly on his questions of whether, with the skeptical argument I’m focused on, a strong enough appearance of ignorance is generated to require an account of that appearance, and whether, to the extent that we do need to account for that appearance, we might do so without contextualism by adopting a solution proposed by Ernest Sosa. The reply to Michael Blome-Tillman focuses (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. DeRose on Lotteries.Peter Baumann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):44-67.
    This article discusses Keith DeRose’s treatment of the lottery problem in Chapter 5 of his recent The Appearance of Ignorance. I agree with a lot of it but also raise some critical points and questions and make some friendly proposals. I discuss different ways to set up the problem, go into the difference between knowing and ending inquiry, propose to distinguish between two different kinds of lotteries, add to the defense of the idea that one can know lottery propositions, give (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. What Shifts Epistemic Standards? DeRose on Contextualism, Safety, and Sensitivity.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):21-27.
    In The Appearance of Ignorance, Keith DeRose develops a version of epistemic contextualism that combines aspects of both safety and sensitivity theories of knowledge. This paper discusses some potential problems for DeRose’s account stemming from his Rule of Sensitivity, which is meant to model upwards shifts in epistemic standards.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43. Foundationalism.Berit Brogaard - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 296-309.
    Memory has eluded a unified philosophical analysis for millennia because memory isn’t a single type of mental state. On a standard classification, procedural memory is memory of how to do things, semantic memory is memory of facts or fact-like propositions and episodic memory is memory of events in which you partook. Autobiographical memory is memory of what happened in your past in real-life cases. Empirical studies suggest that autobiographical memory is a construction of pieces of past experiences. This points to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. Common Sense, Scepticism and Deep Epistemic Disagreements.Angélique Thébert - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (2):129-155.
    Considering the persisting disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics, it seems that they are faced with a deep epistemic disagreement. Taking stock from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, one generally thinks that deep epistemic disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Hinge epistemology, inherited from Wittgenstein, is also considered as an illuminating detour to understand common sense epistemology. But is there really a deep epistemic disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics? Could it not be considered that they share (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.Helen Steward - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (1):1-20.
    This paper considers the analogies and disanalogies between a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about free will and a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about the external world. In the case of free will, I offer the ancient Lazy Argument and an argument of my own, which I call the Agency Argument, as examples of the relevant genre; and in the case of the external world, I consider Moore’s alleged proof of an external world. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46. The persuasiveness puzzle about bootstrapping.Guido Melchior - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):27-36.
    This paper aims at resolving a puzzle about the persuasiveness of bootstrapping. On the one hand, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method of settling questions about the reliability of a source. On the other hand, our beliefs that our sense apparatus is reliable is based on other empirically formed beliefs, that is, they are acquired via a presumably complex bootstrapping process. I will argue that when we doubt the reliability of a source, bootstrapping is not a persuasive method for coming (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Antiscepticism and Easy Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.
    In this chapter I investigate epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose this justification simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Table of Contents and Acknowledgments.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.
  49. In Defense of a Critical Commonsensist Conception of Knowledge.Claudine Tiercelin - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):182-202.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  50. The Bayesian Account of the Defect in Moorean Reasoning.Byeong D. Lee - 2018 - Logique Et Analyse 241:43-55.
    Many Bayesians such as White and Silins have argued that Moorean reasoning is defective because it is a case where probabilistic support fails to transmit across the relevant entailment. In this paper, I argue against their claim. On the Bayesian argument, a skeptical hypothesis is that you are a brain in a vat that appears to have hands. To disclose the defect in Moorean reasoning, the Bayesian argument is supposed to show that its appearing to you as if you have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 367