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  1. Doxastic Innocence: Phenomenal Conservatism and Grounds of Justification.Robert Audi - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 181.
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  2. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 154.
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  3. Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the (...)
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  4. The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - Inquiry.
    First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
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  5. Review of Seemings and Justification. [REVIEW]Elijah Chudnoff - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  6. Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat. [REVIEW]Michael Depaul - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):205-212.
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  7. Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism.John M. DePoe - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.
    Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting Huemer’s account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer’s premise that all justified beliefs are formed on the basis of seemings. (...)
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  8. Middle Way Philosophy 4: The Integration of Belief.Robert M. Ellis - 2015 - Lulu.
    This fourth volume of the Middle Way Philosophy series uses cognitive psychology and balanced sceptical philosophy to explain both how we get stuck in dogmas, and how provisionality is possible. It is argued that we can make progress both in avoiding delusions and developing wisdom not by finding ‘truth’ or employing ‘rationality’, but rather through awareness of our assumptions. We need not ultimately true beliefs (as is often assumed), but judgements that are more adequate to each new set of conditions. (...)
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  9. Esigenza critica e resistenze dogmatiche.Ludovico Geymonat - 1954 - Nuovi Argomenti (11 giugno 1954).
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  10. Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Nathan Hanna - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
    Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases (...)
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  11. Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
    In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism (...)
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  12. Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe.Michael Huemer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.
    John DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges.
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  13. Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
    I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...)
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  14. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.Michael Huemer - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.
    Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.
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  15. What Is Conservatism?John Kekes - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):351 - 374.
    The voice of conservatism is not much heard in contemporary political philosophy. There is no shortage of conservatives, but there is a shortage of systematic, articulate, and reasonable attempts to defend conservatism. The aim of this paper is to provide the outlines of such a defence. It is not possible, in a paper, to provide more than an outline. The argument proceeds by identifying several features of what is taken to be thestrongest version of conservatism. These features jointly define it (...)
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  16. On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation.Peter Kung - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17.
    Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes' and Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you're unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences based (...)
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  17. Epistemic conservatism.Rodrigo Laera - 2014 - Filosofia Unisinos 14 (3):176-188.
    The present paper aims to revisit the virtues and disadvantages of epistemic conservatism, which claims that it is rational to adhere to a belief until there is evidence to the contrary. Two main theses are put forward: first, while conservatism presents several epistemological flaws, from a contextualist point of view it is not only desirable but also is essential to knowledge accumulation in everyday life; second, conservatism provides a solution to sceptical challenges and to the problem of easy knowledge.
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  18. Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.
    According to the phenomenal conservatives, beliefs are justified by non-doxastic states we might speak of as ‘appearances’ or ‘seemings’. Those who defend the view say that there is something self-defeating about believing that phenomenal conservatism is mistaken. They also claim that the view captures an important internalist insight about justification. I shall argue that phenomenal conservatism is indefensible. The considerations that seem to support the view commit the phenomenal conservatives to condoning morally abhorrent behavior. They can deny that their view (...)
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  19. Critical Notice: Seemings and Justification, Ed. Chris Tucker. [REVIEW]Jack Lyons - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):153-164.
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  20. Skeptical Theism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Trent Dougherty Justin McBrayer (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. pp. 3-20.
    Recently there has been a good deal of interest in the relationship between common sense epistemology and Skeptical Theism. Much of the debate has focused on Phenomenal Conservatism and any tension that there might be between it and Skeptical Theism. In this paper I further defend the claim that there is no tension between Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism. I show the compatibility of these two views by coupling them with an account of defeat – one that is friendly to (...)
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  21. An Isolation Objection to Phenomenal Conservatism.Kevin McCain - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-10.
    Phenomenal conservatism as developed by some philosophers faces a previously unnoticed problem. The problem stems from the fact that, as some develop the view, phenomenal conservatism holds that seemings alone justify—sensations have no justificatory impact. Given this, phenomenal conservatism faces a problem analogous to the isolation objection to coherentism. As foundationalists, supporters of phenomenal conservatism will want to allow that the isolation objection is effective against coherentism, and yet claim that a similar objection is not effective against their view. Unfortunately, (...)
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  22. Explanationist Aid for Phenomenal Conservatism.Kevin McCain - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    Phenomenal conservatism is a popular theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity and the fact that some think that phenomenal conservatism can provide a complete account of justification, it faces several challenges. Among these challenges are the need to provide accounts of defeaters and inferential justification. Fortunately, there is hope for phenomenal conservatism. Explanationism, the view on which justification is a matter of explanatory considerations, can help phenomenal conservatism with both of these challenges. The resulting view is one that respects (...)
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  23. Are Seemings Trustworthy? A Reply to Piazza.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - The Reasoner 8 (9):100-101.
    I reply to Piazza's objection to my reductio against phenomenal conservatism.
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  24. Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Huemer.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):343-350.
    In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer’s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original objection.
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  25. Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-Defeat.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):103-110.
    In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to (...)
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  26. Against Phenomenal Conservatism: A Reply to Moretti.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - The Reasoner 8 (3):26.
    In this paper, I reply to Moretti's objection to my reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism.
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  27. Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (10):117-118.
    In this paper, I outline a reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism. If sound, this reductio shows that the phenomenal conservative is committed to the claim that appealing to appearances is not a trustworthy method of fixing belief.
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  28. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by (...)
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  29. In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our rational credences. (...)
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  30. Chris Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, NY: OUP (2013). [REVIEW]Luca Moretti - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):364-366.
  31. Mizrahi’s Argument Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (12):137-139.
    I show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious.
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  32. Review of Unweaving The Rainbow (by Richard Dawkins). [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1999 - Science Spectra.
  33. Dynamic Conservatism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    According to a family of views under the label of epistemic conservatism, the fact that one already believes something can make it rational to continue to believe it. A number of philosophers have found conservatism attractive, but traditional views are vulnerable to several powerful criticisms. In this paper, I develop an alternative to standard views by identifying a widespread assumption shared by conservatives and their critics - that rational norms govern states of mind like belief, and showing how rejecting this (...)
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  34. Difficult Conservatism. Definitions, Theories, Portraits.Helmut Rumpler - 1978 - Philosophy and History 11 (1):25-28.
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  35. A Partial Defense of Permissivism.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):57-71.
    Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q, where P and Q are contradictories. Uniqueness is the denial of Permissivism. Permissivism has recently come under attack on several fronts. If these attacks are successful, then we may be forced to accept an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality. In this essay I clarify the debate by (...)
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  36. On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs.Paul Silva Jr - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955.
    According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one’s belief in P on one’s source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work Turri argues that this thesis fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri’s novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common epistemological positions that (...)
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  37. Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification.Matthew Skene - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.
    Abstract I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for belief characterized by their role (...)
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  38. Conditions of Cognitive Sanity and the Internalist Credo.Andrew D. Spear - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):300-321.
    BonJour has proposed background conditions on internalist justification, which Kornblith argues are inconsistent with a core internalist ‘credo’ – that subjects internally alike are justificationally alike – signaling the ‘death’ of internalism. The funeral arrangements are premature, though more systematic consideration of background conditions is needed. The majority of BonJour's conditions are not background conditions as their failure makes an epistemically relevant internal difference. This neutralizes Kornblith's criticisms and reveals how the proposed conditions are not departures from internalism. BonJour's background (...)
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  39. Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Chris Tucker (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. It also addresses a number of other issues, including the nature of seemings, cognitive penetration, Bayesianism, and the epistemology of morality and disagreement.
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  40. Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.
    It is natural to think that many of our beliefs are rational because they are based on seemings, or on the way things seem. This is especially clear in the case of perception. Many of our mathematical, moral, and memory beliefs also appear to be based on seemings. In each of these cases, it is natural to think that our beliefs are not only based on a seeming, but also that they are rationally based on these seemings—at least assuming there (...)
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  41. Movin' on Up: Higher-Level Requirements and Inferential Justification.Chris Tucker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.
    Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, (...)
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  42. Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology.Chris Tucker - 2011 - In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 52--73.
    Phenomenal conservatism holds, roughly, that if it seems to S that P, then S has evidence for P. I argue for two main conclusions. The first is that phenomenal conservatism is better suited than is proper functionalism to explain how a particular type of religious belief formation can lead to non-inferentially justified religious beliefs. The second is that phenomenal conservatism makes evidence so easy to obtain that the truth of evidentialism would not be a significant obstacle to justified religious belief. (...)
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  43. Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
    Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because it allows a seeming to (...)
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  44. The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169 - 185.
    There is a lot of philosophically interesting work being done in the borderlands between traditional and formal epistemology. It is easy to think that this would all be one-way traffic. When we try to formalise a traditional theory, we see that its hidden assumptions are inconsistent or otherwise untenable. Or we see that the proponents of the theory had been conflating two concepts that careful formal work lets us distinguish. Either way, the formalist teaches the traditionalist a lesson about what (...)
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  45. Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.
    The bootstrapping problem poses a general challenge, afflicting even strongly internalist theories. Even if one must always know that one’s source is reliable to gain knowledge from it, bootstrapping is still possible. I survey some solutions internalists might offer and defend the one I find most plausible: that bootstrapping involves an abuse of inductive reasoning akin to generalizing from a small or biased sample. I also argue that this solution is equally available to the reliabilist. The moral is that the (...)
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