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1 — 50 / 59
  1. added 2020-03-11
    Dogmatism, Probability, and Logical Uncertainty.David Jehle & Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 95--111.
    Many epistemologists hold that an agent can come to justifiably believe that p is true by seeing that it appears that p is true, without having any antecedent reason to believe that visual impressions are generally reliable. Certain reliabilists think this, at least if the agent’s vision is generally reliable. And it is a central tenet of dogmatism (as described by Pryor (2000) and Pryor (2004)) that this is possible. Against these positions it has been argued (e.g. by Cohen (2005) (...)
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  2. added 2020-01-28
    Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.
    This article addresses and resolves an epistemological puzzle that has attracted much attention in the recent literature—namely, the puzzle arising from Moorean anti-sceptical reasoning and the phenomenon of transmission failure. The paper argues that an appealing account of Moorean reasoning can be given by distinguishing carefully between two subtly different ways of thinking about justification and evidence. Once the respective distinctions are in place we have a simple and straightforward way to model both the Wrightean position of transmission failure and (...)
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  3. added 2019-09-10
    "Table of Contents and Acknowledgments" of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
  4. added 2019-08-19
    "Phenomenal Conservatism" - Ch 2 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    In this chapter I introduce and analyse the tenets of phenomenal conservatism, and discuss the problem of the nature of appearances. After that, I review the asserted epistemic merits phenomenal conservatism and the principal arguments adduced in support of it. Finally, I survey objections to phenomenal conservatism and responses by its advocates. Some of these objections will be scrutinised and appraised in the next chapters.
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  5. added 2019-06-05
    The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):520-542.
    First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper, I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
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  6. added 2019-06-04
    On Synchronic Dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.
    Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.
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  7. added 2019-04-25
    Studies of Catholicism in the journal “Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii”.Liudmyla Pastushenko - 2018 - Наукові Записки Наукма. Філософія Та Релігієзнавство 2:79-97.
    The article contains first complete and systematic analysis of the studies devoted to dogmatics and liturgy, the history and the modern state of Catholicism published by Kyiv Theological Academy professors and pupils in the journal “Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii” starting from the 1860s to the beginning of 1900s. This paper considers the main problems, themes, ideas which became the subject of interest of the Kyiv thinkers in studying this Christian denomination as well as highlights the specificity of the approach of (...)
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  8. added 2019-04-24
    Utopia and nihilism: Leszek Kolakowski’s philosophical lessons.Iryna Bondarevska - 2018 - Наукові Записки Наукма. Філософія Та Релігієзнавство 1:35-42.
    The article analyzes the main aspects of the interpretation of philosophical thinking by the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowskі (1927–2009). He is more known as a brilliant disputant on the history of Marxism and the prospects for the further development of Marxist theory, but his thoughts on the nature and functions of philosophical thinking in the broadest sense are of no less importance, since they address the painful issue of the autonomy of thinking. The purpose of the article is to reconstruct (...)
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  9. added 2018-12-29
    Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs.Luca Moretti - 2020 - Cham: Springer.
    This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has (...)
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  10. added 2018-09-20
    Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification.Christos Georgakakis & Luca Moretti - 2019 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Perceptual experience is one of our fundamental sources of epistemic justification—roughly, justification for believing that a proposition is true. The ability of perceptual experience to justify beliefs can nevertheless be questioned. This article focuses on an important challenge that arises from countenancing that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. -/- The thesis of cognitive penetrability of perception states that the content of perceptual experience can be influenced by prior or concurrent psychological factors, such as beliefs, fears and desires. Advocates of this (...)
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  11. added 2018-08-19
    Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...)
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  12. added 2018-08-09
    Strong Internalism, Doxastic Involuntarism, and the Costs of Compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Epistemic deontology maintains that our beliefs and degrees of belief are open to deontic evaluations—evaluations of what we ought to believe or may not believe. Some philosophers endorse strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology on which agents can always access what determines the deontic status of their beliefs and degrees of belief. This paper articulates a new challenge for strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology. Any version of epistemic deontology must face William Alston’s argument. Alston combined a broadly voluntarist conception (...)
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  13. added 2018-02-17
    The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
    Dogmatism is sometimes thought to be incompatible with Bayesian models of rational learning. I show that the best model for updating imprecise credences is compatible with dogmatism.
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  14. added 2017-10-31
    Experience and Epistemic Structure: Can Cognitive Penetration Result in Epistemic Downgrade?Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Inference and Consciousness.
    Reflection on the possibility of cases in which experience is cognitively penetrated has suggested to many that an experience's etiology can reduce its capacity to provide prima facie justification for believing its content below a baseline. This is epistemic downgrade due to etiology, and its possibility is incompatible with phenomenal conservatism. I develop a view that explains the epistemic deficiency in certain possible cases of cognitive penetration but on which there is no epistemic downgrading below a baseline and on which (...)
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  15. added 2017-08-05
    Winning the Argument?Danny Frederick - manuscript
    Theft is win-lose: the thief gains benefits at the expense of the victim. War is lose-lose: no-one comes out better off. Trade is win-win: both parties gain. Altercations are lose-lose. When a person talks about ‘winning the argument,’ she is talking about winning a debate and she sees debate as win-lose. But if we partake of debates with an open mind, they can be win-win: even without agreeing, each party may learn. Unfortunately, contemporary philosophers seem to see debate as win-lose (...)
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  16. added 2017-05-24
    Inferential Seemings and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271.
    Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem (...)
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  17. added 2017-05-03
    Dogmatism Without Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):195-211.
    One common way of attacking dogmatism is to attack its alleged Mooreanism. The thought is that dogmatism includes (or perhaps entails) Mooreanism, but that Mooreanism is false and thus so is dogmatism. One way of responding to this charge is to defend Mooreanism. Another strategy is to articulate a version of dogmatism without Mooreanism. This paper is an attempt to articulate the latter view.
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  18. added 2017-03-02
    An Isolation Objection to Phenomenal Conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1381-1390.
    Phenomenal conservatism as developed by some philosophers faces a previously unnoticed problem. The problem stems from the fact that, as some develop the view, phenomenal conservatism holds that seemings alone justify—sensations have no justificatory impact. Given this, phenomenal conservatism faces a problem analogous to the isolation objection to coherentism. As foundationalists, supporters of phenomenal conservatism will want to allow that the isolation objection is effective against coherentism, and yet claim that a similar objection is not effective against their view. Unfortunately, (...)
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  19. added 2017-02-27
    A Partial Defense of Permissivism.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):57-71.
    Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q, where P and Q are contradictories. Uniqueness is the denial of Permissivism. Permissivism has recently come under attack on several fronts. If these attacks are successful, then we may be forced to accept an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality. In this essay I clarify the debate by (...)
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  20. added 2017-02-07
    What Is Conservatism?John Kekes - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):351 - 374.
    The voice of conservatism is not much heard in contemporary political philosophy. There is no shortage of conservatives, but there is a shortage of systematic, articulate, and reasonable attempts to defend conservatism. The aim of this paper is to provide the outlines of such a defence. It is not possible, in a paper, to provide more than an outline. The argument proceeds by identifying several features of what is taken to be thestrongest version of conservatism. These features jointly define it (...)
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  21. added 2017-01-20
    Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat. [REVIEW]Michael DePaul - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):205-212.
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  22. added 2016-09-04
    Dynamic Conservatism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    According to a family of views under the label of epistemic conservatism, the fact that one already believes something can make it rational to continue to believe it. A number of philosophers have found conservatism attractive, but traditional views are vulnerable to several powerful criticisms. In this paper, I develop an alternative to standard views by identifying a widespread assumption shared by conservatives and their critics - that rational norms govern states of mind like belief, and showing how rejecting this (...)
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  23. added 2016-09-01
    Explanationist Aid for Phenomenal Conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3035-3050.
    Phenomenal conservatism is a popular theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity and the fact that some think that phenomenal conservatism can provide a complete account of justification, it faces several challenges. Among these challenges are the need to provide accounts of defeaters and inferential justification. Fortunately, there is hope for phenomenal conservatism. Explanationism, the view on which justification is a matter of explanatory considerations, can help phenomenal conservatism with both of these challenges. The resulting view is one that respects (...)
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  24. added 2016-08-15
    Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the (...)
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  25. added 2016-07-07
    Review of Unweaving The Rainbow (by Richard Dawkins). [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1999 - Science Spectra.
  26. added 2016-04-23
    Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by (...)
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  27. added 2016-03-16
    Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.
    The bootstrapping problem poses a general challenge, afflicting even strongly internalist theories. Even if one must always know that one’s source is reliable to gain knowledge from it, bootstrapping is still possible. I survey some solutions internalists might offer and defend the one I find most plausible: that bootstrapping involves an abuse of inductive reasoning akin to generalizing from a small or biased sample. I also argue that this solution is equally available to the reliabilist. The moral is that the (...)
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  28. added 2016-02-10
    Esigenza critica e resistenze dogmatiche.Ludovico Geymonat - 1954 - Nuovi Argomenti (11 giugno 1954).
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  29. added 2016-01-17
    Conditions of Cognitive Sanity and the Internalist Credo.Andrew D. Spear - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):300-321.
    BonJour has proposed background conditions on internalist justification, which Kornblith argues are inconsistent with a core internalist ‘credo’ – that subjects internally alike are justificationally alike – signaling the ‘death’ of internalism. The funeral arrangements are premature, though more systematic consideration of background conditions is needed. The majority of BonJour's conditions are not background conditions as their failure makes an epistemically relevant internal difference. This neutralizes Kornblith's criticisms and reveals how the proposed conditions are not departures from internalism. BonJour's background (...)
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  30. added 2015-07-09
    Critical Notice: Seemings and Justification, Ed. Chris Tucker. [REVIEW]Jack Lyons - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):153-164.
    A review of Chris Tucker's collection of papers on phenomenal conservatism.
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  31. added 2015-06-13
    Skeptical Theism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Trent Dougherty Justin McBrayer (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. pp. 3-20.
    Recently there has been a good deal of interest in the relationship between common sense epistemology and Skeptical Theism. Much of the debate has focused on Phenomenal Conservatism and any tension that there might be between it and Skeptical Theism. In this paper I further defend the claim that there is no tension between Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism. I show the compatibility of these two views by coupling them with an account of defeat – one that is friendly to (...)
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  32. added 2015-06-10
    Middle Way Philosophy 4: The Integration of Belief.Robert M. Ellis - 2015 - Lulu.
    This fourth volume of the Middle Way Philosophy series uses cognitive psychology and balanced sceptical philosophy to explain both how we get stuck in dogmas, and how provisionality is possible. It is argued that we can make progress both in avoiding delusions and developing wisdom not by finding ‘truth’ or employing ‘rationality’, but rather through awareness of our assumptions. We need not ultimately true beliefs (as is often assumed), but judgements that are more adequate to each new set of conditions. (...)
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  33. added 2015-03-23
    Doxastic Innocence: Phenomenal Conservatism and Grounds of Justification.Robert Audi - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 181.
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  34. added 2015-03-23
    Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 154.
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  35. added 2014-09-21
    Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Huemer.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):343-350.
    In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer’s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original objection.
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  36. added 2014-09-02
    Are Seemings Trustworthy? A Reply to Piazza.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - The Reasoner 8 (9):100-101.
    I reply to Piazza's objection to my reductio against phenomenal conservatism.
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  37. added 2014-08-04
    On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs.Paul Silva - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955.
    According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one’s belief in P on one’s source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work Turri argues that this thesis fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri’s novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common epistemological positions that (...)
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  38. added 2014-05-10
    Review of Seemings and Justification. [REVIEW]Elijah Chudnoff - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  39. added 2014-04-13
    Epistemic conservatism.Rodrigo Laera - 2013 - Filosofia Unisinos 14 (3):176-188.
    The present paper aims to revisit the virtues and disadvantages of epistemic conservatism, which claims that it is rational to adhere to a belief until there is evidence to the contrary. Two main theses are put forward: first, while conservatism presents several epistemological flaws, from a contextualist point of view it is not only desirable but also is essential to knowledge accumulation in everyday life; second, conservatism provides a solution to sceptical challenges and to the problem of easy knowledge.
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  40. added 2014-03-31
    Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-Defeat.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):103-110.
    In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-27
    Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology.Chris Tucker - 2011 - In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 52--73.
    Phenomenal conservatism holds, roughly, that if it seems to S that P, then S has evidence for P. I argue for two main conclusions. The first is that phenomenal conservatism is better suited than is proper functionalism to explain how a particular type of religious belief formation can lead to non-inferentially justified religious beliefs. The second is that phenomenal conservatism makes evidence so easy to obtain that the truth of evidentialism would not be a significant obstacle to justified religious belief. (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-15
    Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
    I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-07
    Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
    Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because it allows a seeming to (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-04
    Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Nathan Hanna - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
    Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases (...)
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  45. added 2014-02-28
    Against Phenomenal Conservatism: A Reply to Moretti.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - The Reasoner 8 (3):26.
    In this paper, I reply to Moretti's objection to my reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism.
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  46. added 2014-02-25
    In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our rational credences. (...)
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  47. added 2014-02-03
    Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Chris Tucker (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. It also addresses a number of other issues, including the nature of seemings, cognitive penetration, Bayesianism, and the epistemology of morality and disagreement.
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  48. added 2013-11-30
    Chris Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, NY: OUP (2013). [REVIEW]Luca Moretti - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):364-366.
  49. added 2013-11-01
    Mizrahi’s Argument Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (12):137-139.
    I show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious.
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  50. added 2013-09-30
    Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (10):117-118.
    In this paper, I outline a reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism. If sound, this reductio shows that the phenomenal conservative is committed to the claim that appealing to appearances is not a trustworthy method of fixing belief.
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1 — 50 / 59