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  1. Abstractions and Implementations.Russ Abbott - manuscript
    Fundamental to Computer Science is the distinction between abstractions and implementations. When that distinction is applied to various philosophical questions it yields the following conclusions. -/- • EMERGENCE. It isn’t as mysterious as it’s made out to be; the possibility of strong emergence is not a threat to science. -/- • INTERACTIONS BETWEEN HIGHER-LEVEL ENTITIES. Physical interaction among higher-level entities is illusory. Abstract interactions are the source of emergence, new domains of knowledge, and complex systems. -/- • PHYSICS and the (...)
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  2. Downward Causation.P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen (eds.) - 2000 - University of Aarhus Press.
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  3. Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism.Michael Baumgartner - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
    The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical exclusion arguments. The second part then discusses a weakening of interventionism that Woodward suggests. This weakened version of interventionism turns out either to be inapplicable (...)
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  4. Explicating Top-­‐Down Causation Using Networks and Dynamics.Williiam Bechtel - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2).
    In many fields in the life sciences investigators refer to downward or top-down causal effects. Craver and Bechtel defended the view that such cases should be understood in terms of a constitution relation between levels in a mechanism and causation as solely an intra-level relation. Craver and Bechtel, however, provided insufficient specification as to when entities constitute a higher-level mechanism. In this paper I appeal to graph-theoretic representations of networks that are now widely employed in systems biology and neuroscience to (...)
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  5. Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - De Gruyter.
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  6. Is Weak Emergence Just in the Mind?Mark A. Bedau - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (4):443-459.
    Weak emergence is the view that a system’s macro properties can be explained by its micro properties but only in an especially complicated way. This paper explains a version of weak emergence based on the notion of explanatory incompressibility and “crawling the causal web.” Then it examines three reasons why weak emergence might be thought to be just in the mind. The first reason is based on contrasting mere epistemological emergence with a form of ontological emergence that involves irreducible downward (...)
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  7. Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence.Mark A. Bedau - 2002 - Principia 6 (1):5-50.
    Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence.
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  8. Emergence, Emergentism and Pragmatism.Guy Bennett-Hunter - 2015 - Theology and Science 13 (3).
    In this paper, I argue for the usefulness of pragmatism as a framework within which to develop the theological application of emergentist theory. I consider some philosophical issues relevant to the recent revival of interest, across various disciplines, in the concept of emergence and clarify some of the conceptual issues at stake in the attempts to formulate the philosophical position of emergentism and to apply it theologically. After highlighting some major problems arising from the main existing ways of formulating emergentism, (...)
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  9. « Fundamentals of Ecology » de E.P. Odum : Véritable « Approche Holistique » Ou Réductionnisme Masqué ?Donato Bergandi - 1993 - Bulletin d'Écologie, 24 24 (1):57-68.
  10. Overdetermination Underdetermined.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):17-40.
    Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.
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  11. Downward Causation in Fluid Convection.Robert C. Bishop - 2005 - Synthese 160 (2):229 - 248.
    Recent developments in nonlinear dynamics have found wide application in many areas of science from physics to neuroscience. Nonlinear phenomena such as feedback loops, inter-level relations, wholes constraining and modifying the behavior of their parts, and memory effects are interesting candidates for emergence and downward causation. Rayleigh–Bénard convection is an example of a nonlinear system that, I suggest, yields important insights for metaphysics and philosophy of science. In this paper I propose convection as a model for downward causation in classical (...)
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  12. Downward Causation Without Foundations.Michel Bitbol - 2012 - Synthese 185 (2):233-255.
    Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between the higher and basic levels of organization is supposed, but only a duality of modes of access. Moreover, these modes of access are not construed as mere ways of revealing intrinsic patterns of organization: They are supposed to be constitutive of them, in Kant’s sense. The emergent levels of organization, and the inter-level causations as well, are therefore neither illusory nor ontologically real: They are objective in the (...)
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  13. Laws, Causation and Dynamics at Different Levels.Jeremy Butterfield - 2012 - Interface Focus 2 (1):101-114.
    I have two main aims. The first is general, and more philosophical. The second is specific, and more closely related to physics. The first aim is to state my general views about laws and causation at different ”levels’. The main task is to understand how the higher levels sustain notions of law and causation that ”ride free’ of reductions to the lower level or levels. I endeavour to relate my views to those of other symposiasts. The second aim is to (...)
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  14. Downward Causation.Donald T. Campbell - 1974 - In F. Ayala & T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology. University of California Press. pp. 179--186.
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  15. 11.'Downward Causation'in Hierarchically Organised Biological Systems.Donald T. Campbell - 1974 - In Francisco Jose Ayala & Theodosius Grigorievich Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems. University of California Press. pp. 179.
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  16. Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation.Richard Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (1):33-56.
    The development of a defensible and fecund notion of emergence has been dogged by a number of threshold issues neatly highlighted in a recent paper by Jaegwon Kim. We argue that physicalist assumptions confuse and vitiate the whole project. In particular, his contention that emergence entails supervenience is contradicted by his own argument that the ‘microstructure’ of an object belongs to the whole object, not to its constituents. And his argument against the possibility of downward causation is question-begging and makes (...)
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  17. Can 'Downward Causation' Save Free Will?Justin A. Capes - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):131-142.
    Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free will, together with (...)
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  18. How Does Downward Causation Exist?—A Comment on Kim's Elimination of Downward Causation.Chen Xiaoping - 2010 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (4):652-665.
    The importance of downward causation lies in showing that it shows that functional properties such as mental properties are real, although they cannot be reduced to physical properties. Kim rejects nonreductive physicalism, which includes leading functionalism, by eliminating downward causation, and thereby returns to reductionism. In this paper, I make a distinction between two aspects of function—functional meaning and functional structure and argue that functional meaning cannot be reduced to the physical level whereas functional structure can. On this basis, I (...)
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  19. The Emergence and Development of Causal Representations.Xiang Chen - 2015 - In Woosuk Park, Ping Li & Lorenzo Magnani (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science Ii. Springer Verlag.
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  20. Counterfactuals and Downward Causation: A Reply to Zhong.Jonas Christensen & Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):513-517.
    Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
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  21. Happy Couplings: Emergence and Explanatory Interlock.Andy Clark - 1996 - In Margaret A. Boden (ed.), The Philosophy of Artificial Life. Oxford University Press. pp. 262--281.
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  22. Emergence, Supervenience, and Personal Knowledge.Philip Clayton - 2002 - Tradition and Discovery 29 (3):8-19.
    Michael Polanyi was perhaps the most important emergence theorist of the middle of the 20th century. As the key link between the British Emergentists of the 1920s and the explosion of emergence theory in the 1990s, he played a crucial role in resisting reductionist interpretations of science and keeping the concept of emergence alive. Polanyi’s position on emergence is described and its major strengths and weaknesses are analyzed. Using Polanyi as the foundation, the article surveys the major contemporary options in (...)
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  23. The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis From Science to Religion.Philip Clayton & P. C. W. Davies (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume introduces readers to emergence theory, outlines the major arguments in its defence, and summarizes the most powerful objections against it. It provides the clearest explication yet of this exciting new theory of science, which challenges the reductionist approach by proposing the continuous emergence of novel phenomena.
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  24. Emergent Properties.Timothy O' Connor - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31:91.
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  25. The Emergence of Mind. A Dualistic Understanding.Antonella Corradini - unknown
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  26. Emerging From the Causal Drain.Richard Corry - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.
    For over 20 years, Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument has stood as the major hurdle for non-reductive physicalism. If successful, Kim’s argument would show that the high-level properties posited by non-reductive physicalists must either be identical with lower-level physical properties, or else must be causally inert. The most prominent objection to the Causal Exclusion Argument—the so-called Overdetermination Objection—points out that there are some notions of causation that are left untouched by the argument. If causation is simply counterfactual dependence, for example, (...)
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  27. The Emergence of the Mind.Tim Crane - 2001 - Fondazione Carlo Erba.
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  28. Top-Down Causation Without Top-Down Causes.Carl F. Craver & William Bechtel - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):547-563.
    We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes. When interlevel (...)
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  29. Downward Paths. An Inquiry Into the Causes Which Contribute to the Making of the Prostitute.J. D'Ewart - 1917 - The Eugenics Review 9 (3):253.
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  30. Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance.Anthony Dardis - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):577-598.
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  31. The Physics of Downward Causation.Paul Cw Davies - 2006 - In P. Davies & P. Clayton (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  32. The Physics of Downward Causation.Paul Sheldon Davies - 2006 - In Philip Clayton & Paul Sheldon Davies (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.
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  33. Hylomorphism, New Mechanisms, and Explanations in Biology, Neuroscience, and Psychology.Daniel De Haan - forthcoming - In Robert Charles Koons, Nicholas J. Teh & Wiliam M. R. Simpson (eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science. Routledge.
  34. The Super-Overdetermination Problem.John Donaldson - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to (...)
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  35. Causação Descendente, Emergência de Propriedades E Modos Causais Aristotélicos (Downward Causation, Property Emergence, and Aristotelian Causal Modes).Charbel Niño Ei-Hani & Antonio Augusto Passos Videira - 2001 - Theoria 16 (2):301-329.
    O problema da causação descendente é um ponto central na formulação do fisicalismo não-redutivo e na compreensão da emergência de propriedades. Duas interpretações possíveis da causação descendente, nas quais a contribuição do pensamento aristotélico é importante, são examinadas. Os requisitos do programa de matematização da natureza na mecanica clássica, que levaram ao abandono de três dos modos causais aristotélicos, nao parecem igualmente importantes nas ciencias especiais. Isto sugere que a contribuição de Aristóteles pode ser, de certa maneira, retomada. Uma definição (...)
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  36. Emergence and Downward Causation.Charbel Niño El-Hani - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):1-4.
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  37. Downward Determination.Charbel Niño El-Hani - 2005 - Abstracta 1 (2):162-192.
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  38. Higher-Level Descriptions: Why Should We Preserve Them.Charbel Nino El-Hani & Antonio Marcos Pereira - 2000 - In P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. University of Aarhus Press.
  39. Emergence and the Realist Account of Cause.Dave Elder-Vass - 2005 - Journal of Critical Realism 4 (2):315-338.
    This paper aims to improve critical realism's understanding of emergence by discussing, first, what emergence is and how it works; second, the need for a compositional account of emergence; and third, the implications of emergence for causation. It goes on to argue that the theory of emergence leads to the recognition of certain hitherto neglected similarities between real causal powers and actual causation. (edited).
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  40. Levels, Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation.Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe & Frederick Stjernfelt - 2000 - In P.B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann & P.V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. Aarhus, Denmark: University of Aarhus Press. pp. 322-348.
    The idea of a higher level phenomenon having a downward causal influence on a lower level process or entity has taken a variety of forms. In order to discuss the relation between emergence and downward causation, the specific variety of the thesis of downward causation (DC) must be identified. Based on some ontological theses about inter-level relations, types of causation and the possibility of reduction, three versions of DC are distinguished. Of these, the `Strong' form of DC is held to (...)
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  41. Mental Causation is Not Just Downward Causation.Jeff Engelhardt - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):31-46.
    According to a popular model of mental causation, an irreducible mental cause M1 brings about an irreducible mental effect M2 by bringing about M2's supervenience base, P2. Call this ‘the Downward Causation View’. This paper raises doubts about the Downward Causation View on grounds that M1 does not cause M2 immediately and there is no causal chain from M1 to M2. Prima facie, then, M1 does not cause M2 on this view. But a theory of mental causation ought to account (...)
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  42. The Problem of Secondary Effects.Jeff Engelhardt - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):247-266.
    This paper argues that two principles held by many metaphysicians and philosophers of mind are inconsistent: there is no systematic overdetermination, and some causal effects are also determined by their metaphysical grounds. Call this “The Problem of Secondary Effects.” After introducing the problem and noting philosophical theories that face it, the paper offers further clarification by considering three potential strategies for solving it. All fail. An approach that sacrifices ‘secondary effects’ is briefly sketched as a solution.
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  43. Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations.Jeff Engelhardt - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1125-1146.
    This paper proposes that if individual X ‘inherits’ property F from individual Y, we should be leery of explanations that appeal to X’s being F. This bears on what I’ll call “emergent substance dualism”, the view that human persons or selves are metaphysically fundamental or “new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers” even though they depend in some sense on physical particulars :5–23, 2006; Personal agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Two of the most prominent advocates of (...)
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  44. Property Reductive Emergent Dualism.Jeff Engelhardt - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):63-75.
    This paper sketches and motivates a metaphysics of mind that is both substance dualist and, to a large extent, property reductive. Call it “property reductive emergent dualism”. Section “Emergent Dualism” gives the broad outlines of the view. Sections “Problems of Mental Causation” and “Theoretical Virtues” argue that it can claim several advantages over non-reductive physicalist theories of mind. Section “Problems of Mental Causation” considers metaphysical challenges to mental causation in detail. Section “Theoretical Virtues” considers overall theoretical virtues: ontological and ideological (...)
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  45. Levels of Organization: A Deflationary Account.Markus I. Eronen - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (1):39-58.
    The idea of levels of organization plays a central role in the philosophy of the life sciences. In this article, I first examine the explanatory goals that have motivated accounts of levels of organization. I then show that the most state-of-the-art and scientifically plausible account of levels of organization, the account of levels of mechanism proposed by Bechtel and Craver, is fundamentally problematic. Finally, I argue that the explanatory goals can be reached by adopting a deflationary approach, where levels of (...)
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  46. No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience.Markus I. Eronen - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1042-1052.
    I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that (...)
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  47. Interventionism and Supervenience: A New Problem and Provisional Solution.Markus I. Eronen & Daniel S. Brooks - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):185-202.
    The causal exclusion argument suggests that mental causes are excluded in favour of the underlying physical causes that do all the causal work. Recently, a debate has emerged concerning the possibility of avoiding this conclusion by adopting Woodward's interventionist theory of causation. Both proponents and opponents of the interventionist solution crucially rely on the notion of supervenience when formulating their positions. In this article, we consider the relation between interventionism and supervenience in detail and argue that importing supervenience relations into (...)
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  48. Themes and Issues: Reply to Shelia Dow and Paul Downward.Steve Fleetwood - 2006 - Journal of Critical Realism 5 (1):158-165.
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  49. Themes and Issues: Rejoinder to Sheila Dow and Paul Downward.Steve Fleetwood - 2006 - Journal of Critical Realism 5 (1):169-182.
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  50. Author's Response: Systems as Realities Sui Generis with Eigenbehavior?M. Füllsack - 2012 - Constructivist Foundations 8 (1):114-116.
    Upshot: The differentiation between society being emergent or sui generis seems to correspond to the question of whether the development of interaction, in particular communication, should better be considered bottom-up, top-down or as a sort of circular concurrency of bottom-up and top-down causes. This is reminiscent of the philosophical debate about the implications of the terms emergence and downward causation.
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