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  1. Cartesian Epistemology Without Cartesian Dreams? Commentary on Jennifer Windt's Dreaming.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (5-6):30-43.
    Jennifer Windt’s Dreaming is an enormously rich and thorough book, developing illuminating connections between dreaming, the methodology of psychology, and various philosophical subfields. I’ll focus on two epistemological threads that run through the book. The first has to do with the status of certain assumptions about dreams. Windt argues that the assumptions that dreams involve experiences, and that dream reports are reliable — are methodologically necessary default assumptions, akin to Wittgensteinian hinge propositions. I’ll suggest that Windt is quietly pre-supposing some (...)
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  2. 1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):271-290.
    A 1% skeptic is someone who has about a 99% credence in non-skeptical realism and about a 1% credence in the disjunction of all radically skeptical scenarios combined. The first half of this essay defends the epistemic rationality of 1% skepticism, appealing to dream skepticism, simulation skepticism, cosmological skepticism, and wildcard skepticism. The second half of the essay explores the practical behavioral consequences of 1% skepticism, arguing that 1% skepticism need not be behaviorally inert.
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  3. Dreams in a Vat.Danilo Suster - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (2):89-105.
    Putnam’s semantic argument against the BIV hypothesis and Sosa’s argument against dream skepticism based on the imagination model of dreaming share some important structural features. In both cases the skeptical option is supposed to be excluded because preconditions of its intelligibility are not fulfilled (affirmation and belief in the dream scenario, thought and reference in the BIV scenario). Putnam’s reasoning is usually interpreted differently, as a classic case of deception, but this feature is not essential. I propose to interpret BIV’s (...)
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  4. Whose Dream Is It Anyway?Avner Baz - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (3-4):263-287.
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  5. The Self-Knowledge Gambit.Berislav Marušić - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):1977-1999.
    If we hold that perceiving is sufficient for knowing, we can raise a powerful objection to dreaming skepticism: Skeptics assume the implausible KK-principle, because they hold that if we don’t know whether we are dreaming or perceiving p, we don’t know whether p. The rejection of the KK-principle thus suggests an anti-skeptical strategy: We can sacrifice some of our self-knowledge—our second-order knowledge—and thereby save our knowledge of the external world. I call this strategy the Self-Knowledge Gambit. I argue that the (...)
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  6. The Regress Argument Against Cartesian Skepticism.Jessica M. Wilson - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):668-673.
    I argue that Cartesian skepticism about the external world leads to a vicious regress of skeptical attitudes, the only principled and unproblematic response to which requires refraining from taking the very first skeptical step.
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  7. Dream Skepticism and the Conditionality Problem.Kristoffer Ahlstrom - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):45-60.
    Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in this case, if x, then I am awake, x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we can know that the antecedent holds, and (...)
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  8. The Cartesian Dreaming Argument for External-World Skepticism.Stephen Hetherington - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  9. Reality: A Very Short Introduction.Jan Westerhoff - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Is matter real? Are persons real? Is time real? This Very Short Introduction discusses what, if anything, is "real" by looking at a variety of arguments from philosophy, physics, and cognitive science. The book shows that the question "what is real?" is not some esoteric puzzle that only philosophers ponder. Scientists also ask this question when they investigate whether candidates for the fundamental constituents of matter are actually "out there" or just a mere abstraction from a successful theory and cognitive (...)
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  10. Sosa’s Dream.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):249-252.
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  11. Descartes' Resolution of the Dreaming Doubt.Brad Chynoweth - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):153-179.
    After resolving the dreaming doubt at the end of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concedes to Hobbes that one could apply the criterion for waking experience in a dream and thus be deceived, but he no longer considers this possibility to have skeptical force. I argue that this is a legitimate response by Descartes since 1) the dreaming doubt in the Sixth Meditation is no longer a global skeptical hypothesis as it is in the First, and 2) the level of certainty (...)
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  12. Sosa's Responses to Dreaming Skepticism.Claudia Lorena García - 2010 - Critica 42 (125):3-25.
    Ernest Sosa has proposed two different ways to respond to dreaming skepticism. In this paper I argue that Sosa's first response —which centers on holding that we have no beliefs in dreams— does not appear to be successful against either the hyperbolic or the realistic dreaming skeptic. I also argue that his second attempt to respond to the dreaming skeptic by arguing that perceptual knowledge indeed counts as what he calls "animal knowledge", may succeed but requires us to perform what (...)
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  13. Review: Sosa on Scepticism. [REVIEW]Jessica Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397 - 405.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
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  14. Sosa on Scepticism. [REVIEW]Jessica Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397--405.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
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  15. Sosa on Skepticism.Otávio Bueno - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (2):195-202.
    Abstract: Ernest Sosa has recently articulated an insightful response to skepticism and, in particular, to the dream argument. The response relies on two independent moves. First, Sosa offers the imagination model of dreaming according to which no assertions are ever made in dreams and no beliefs are involved there. As a result, it is possible to distinguish dreaming from being awake, and the dream argument is blocked. Second, Sosa develops a virtue epistemology according to which in appropriately normal conditions our (...)
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  16. Security and Dreams in the Epistemology of Sosa.Juan Comesana - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):75-81.
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  17. A Refutation of Global Scepticism.Ken Gemes - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):218-219.
    Various possibilities, that one is dreaming, that one is being deceived by a deceitful demon, that one is a brain in the vat being stimulated to think one has a body and is in a regular world, have been invoked to show that all one's experience-based beliefs might be false. Descartes in Meditation I advises that in order not to lapse into his careless everyday view of things he, or at least his meditator, should pretend that all his experience-based beliefs, (...)
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  18. Skepticism and Internalism.Halvor Nordby - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 35-54.
    The skeptical Dream argument appeals to the possibility of dreaming. The skeptic holds that states of being awake are subjectively indistinguishable from possible dream states and that this means that we do not know that we are awake. This, the skeptic then claims, means that we have to accept that we do not have external world knowledge.It is natural to assume that there must be a connection between the Dream argument and epistemic internalism, the view that a belief is justified (...)
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  19. McDowell on Skepticism, Disjunctivism, and Transcendental Arguments.Paul F. Snowdon - 2009 - Philosophical Topics 37 (1):133-152.
  20. Dreaming, Philosophical Issues.Ernest Sosa & Jonathan Ichikawa - 2009 - In Tim Bayne, Patrick Wilken & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Having fascinated some of the greatest philosophers from the earliest times, dreaming figures importantly in the history of philosophy, as in Plato’s Theaetetus, Augustine’s Confessions, and, perhaps most famously, Descartes’s Mediations. By far the greatest philosophical focus on dreaming has been epistemic: Socrates suggests to Theaetetus that since he cannot tell whether he is dreaming, he cannot trust his senses to know contingent facts about the world around him. And a similar worry drives Descartes’s radical doubt in the First Meditation. (...)
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  21. Wittgenstein and the Dream Hypothesis.Avrum Stroll - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):681-690.
    The paper deals with Wittgenstein’s treatment of radical skepticism. He holds from his earliest work to his last that skepticism is senseless and therefore no rebuttal, such as G.E. Moore offered, is necessary.
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  22. The Internal Problem of Dreaming: Detection and Epistemic Risk.George Botterill - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):139 – 160.
    There are two epistemological problems connected with dreaming, which are of different kinds and require different treatment. The internal problem is best seen as a problem of rational consistency, of how we can maintain all of: Dreams are experiences we have during sleep. Dream-experiences are sufficiently similar to waking experiences for the subject to be able to mistake them for waking experiences. We can tell that we are awake. (1)-(3) threaten to violate a requirement on discrimination: that we can only (...)
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  23. Scepticism and the Imagination Model of Dreaming.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):519–527.
    Ernest Sosa has argued that the solution to dream scepticism lies in an understanding of dreams as imaginative experiences – when we dream, on this suggestion, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Sosa rebuts scepticism thus: dreams don’t cause false beliefs, so my beliefs cannot be false, having been caused by dreams. I argue that, even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dreaming, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically (...)
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  24. The Empirical Basis To Skepticism.Robert Hudson - 2007 - Minerva 11:101-112.
    Broadly speaking, there are two different ways in which one might defend skepticism – an a priori wayand an empirical way. My first task in this paper is to defend the view that the preferred way to defendskepticism is empirical. My second task is to explain why this approach actually makes sense. Iaccomplish this latter task by responding to various criticisms one might advance against the possibilityof empirically defending skepticism. In service of this response, I distinguish between two differentkinds of (...)
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  25. On Dreaming and Being Lied To.Paul Faulkner - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):149-159.
    As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfied in the way the Moorean would suggest. This has (...)
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  26. What Descartes' Demon Can Do and His Dream Cannot.Ruth Weintraub - 2006 - Theoria 72 (4):319-335.
    The reason Descartes cites for invoking the demon argument in addition to the dream argument is that the demon argument is intended to broaden the scope of Descartes’ scepticism, to subsume additional beliefs under it. I present an additional, unfamiliar reason. There is, I argue, an important difference between the two sceptical arguments. It pertains not to their scope, but to their “depth”, to the kind of scepticism they are capable of inducing.
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  27. Jay Rosenberg: Thinking About Knowing, OUP 2002. [REVIEW]Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):453–456.
  28. The Twisted Matrix: Dream, Simulation, or Hybrid?Andy Clark - 2005 - In C. Grau (ed.), Philosophical Essays on the Matrix. Oxford University Press New York.
    “The Matrix is a computer-generated dreamworld built to keep us under control” Morpheus, early in The Matrix. “ In dreaming, you are not only out of control, you don’t even know it…I was completely duped again and again the minute my pons, my amygdala, my perihippocampal cortex, my anterior cingulate, my visual association and parietal opercular cortices were revved up and my dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was muffled” ” J. Allan Hobson, The Dream Drugstore, p.64 The Matrix is an exercise in (...)
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  29. Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix.Christopher Grau - 2005 - In Philosophers Explore The Matrix. Oxford University Press.
  30. Das Ende vom Problem des methodischen Anfangs: Descartes' antiskeptisches Argument.Hans Rott & Verena Wagner - 2005 - In Gereon Wolters & Martin Carrier (eds.), Homo Sapiens Und Homo Faber. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 133–145.
    Descartes' Meditations do not end up sceptical at all. In fact, the sixth meditation displays an intriguing epistemological optimism. Descartes affirms without reservation that knowledge of the external world is possible. The antisceptical argument at the end of the Meditations is often interpreted as a refutation of dream scepticism, with the conclusion that a person in the waking state can also determine that he or she is awake. We examine the logic of the argument in detail and find that this (...)
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  31. Dreams and Philosophy.Ernest Sosa - 2005 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):7 - 18.
    That conception is orthodox in today’s common sense and also historically. Presupposed by Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, it underlies familiar skeptical paradoxes. Similar orthodoxy is also found in our developing science of sleep and dreaming.[2] Despite such confluence.
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  32. Natural Doubts: Williams's Diagnosis Of Scepticism.Reid Buchanan - 2002 - Synthese 131 (1):57-80.
    Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the external world seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thought to be "mere platitudes" about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence, that if it shown through a "theoretical diagnosis" that it does not rest upon such platitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound to accept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues that scepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, (...)
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  33. Die Struktur des Skeptischen Traumarguments.Thomas Grundmann - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):57-81.
    Skeptical dream-arguments are intended as general challenges to our epistemic claims concerning the world. They argue that we can never rule out the possibility of merely dreaming what we believe to perceive. In my paper I will scrutinize whether any kind of such argument is sound. On my view, many versions of this argument are defective. They are either too weak to challenge all kinds of our epistemic claims or they rely on implausibly strong epistemic principles. More plausible versions of (...)
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  34. Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming.Stephen Hetherington - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):83 - 102.
    Of course, if infallibilism about such knowledge is true, then it is true that one can never know that one is not dreaming. But, of course, if infallibilism is true, then there is also no special difficulty posed for one’s having knowledge in general by one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming: one would know either nothing or next to nothing anyway, regardless of one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming. Yet epistemologists have generally (...)
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  35. Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification.Michael Huemer - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:329--340.
    Richard Fumerton’s “Principle of Inferential Justification” holds that, in order to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, one must be justified in believing that E makes P probable. I argue that the plausibility of this principle rests upon two kinds of mistakes: first, a level confusion; and second, a fallacy of misconditionalisation. Furthermore, Fumerton’s principle leads to skepticism about inferential justification, for which reason it should be rejected. Instead, the examples Fumerton uses to motivate his principle (...)
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  36. Scepticism and Dreaming.Duncan Pritchard - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):373-390.
    In a recent, and influential, article, Crispin Wright maintains that a familiar form of scepticismwhich finds its core expression in Descartes’ dreaming argumentcan be defused (or, to use Wright’s own parlance, “imploded”), by showing how it employs self-defeating reasoning. I offer two fundamental reasons for rejecting Wright’s ‘implosion’ of scepticism. On the one hand, I argue that, even by Wright’s own lights, it is unclear whether there is a sceptical argument to implode in the first place. On the other, I (...)
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  37. Did I Dream That or Did It Really Happen? A Phenomenological Criterion for Distinguishing Remembered Dream Experiences From Remembered Waking Experiences.David Ward - 2001 - Manuscrito 24 (1):85-101.
    Is there a way to tell whether what you remember was something you dreamt or something that really happened without making reference to coherence criteria? I suggest contra Descartes that there is a certain sign ‘by means of which one can distinguish clearly between being awake and being asleep’. This certain sign is the intensive magnitude associated with every sensation.
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  38. Deflationary Approaches to Scepticism.Robert Reid Buchanan - 1999 - Dissertation, Mcmaster University (Canada)
    This dissertation examines a traditional philosophical problem within a novel framework. The so-called "problem of the external world" is a problem about how knowledge, and even reasonable belief, about the world are possible, and it is best characterized as the challenge to show how and why scepticism about the external world---the absurd view that such knowledge is impossible---is incorrect. My framework for the examination of this problem involves two major elements. ;The first element involves a general characterization of the nature (...)
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  39. Meditations on the Dream Argument.Yakir Levin - 1999 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 57 (1):7-15.
    According to one fairly standard reconstruction Descartes' Dream Argument has two crucial premises. The paper starts by analysing two important failed attempts, discussed by Barry Stroud and Mark Steiner, at justifying one of these premises. On this basis then an alternative is suggested to the line of interpretation assumed by these attempts which easily resolves the problems they face. It is shown that this alternative and its rivals are on a par with respect to the other crucial premise of the (...)
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  40. Only a Wet Dream? Hope and Skepticism in Horace, Satire 1.5.Kenneth J. Reckford - 1999 - American Journal of Philology 120 (4):525-554.
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  41. The Melon and the Dictionary: Reflections on Descartes's Dreams.Alan Gabbey - 1998 - Journal of the History of Ideas 59 (4):651-668.
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  42. The Birth of the Modern Mind.Alan Charles Kors - 1998 - Teaching Co..
    lecture 1. Introduction : intellectual history and conceptual change -- lecture 2. The dawn of the 17th century : Aristotelian scholasticism -- lecture 3. The new vision of Francis Bacon -- lecture 4. The new astronomy and cosmology -- lecture 5. Descartes's dream of perfect knowledge -- lecture 6. The specter of Thomas Hobbes -- lecture 7. Skepticism and Jansenism : Blaise Pascal -- lecture 8. Newton's discovery -- lecture 9. The Newtonian revolution -- lecture 10. John Locke, the revolution (...)
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  43. Problems with the Wright Route to Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):309-317.
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  44. Descartes and Dream Skepticism Revisited.Robert Hanna - 1992 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (3):377-398.
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  45. Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley on Whether We Can Dream Marks of the Waking State.Russell Wahl & Jonathan Westphal - 1992 - Studia Leibnitiana 24 (2):177-181.
    Dans la première méditation, Descartes a conclu, en regard des songes, « qu'il n'y a point d'indices concluants, ni de marques assez certaines par où l'on puisse distinguer nettement la veille d'avec la sommeil [...] » . À la fin de la sixième méditation, il a conclu qu'il y a de tels indices, mais qu'on a besoin de la garantie de Dieu pour savoir si ces indices sont réellement des indices de la veille. Cottingham a proposé une objection générale contre (...)
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  46. Radical Critique, Scepticism and Commonsense.Raimond Gaita - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29:157-171.
    Suppose that someone writes an argument on a blackboard which leads to the conclusion that he may, at that time, be dreaming. He goes over it, considers its validity, the truth of its premises, its assumptions and so on, and then to his dismay, he judges that he is compelled to conclude that he may be dreaming. He goes over the argument repeatedly and carefully, but finds the conclusion ‘inescapable’. If reviewing the argument on the blackboard may be taken as (...)
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  47. Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.Crispin Wright - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):205.
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  48. Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.Crispin Wright - 1991 - Mind 100 (1):87-116.
  49. Dreaming and Wakefulness: On the Possibility of Crossing Between Worlds.Jorge García-Gómez - 1990 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 21 (1):68-86.
  50. Stroud and Williams on Dreaming and Scepticism.Andrew Rein - 1990 - Ratio 3 (1):40-47.
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