Early Modern Scholasticism

Bernard McGinn was a great historian of Christianity. But in this book under review he fails to do justice to the history of the Summa. He fails to understand the ontologies of the economic theories of Bernard Lonergan and the theology of Karl Rahner, for examples. The book is patchy and seems under-researched. McGinn does not do justice to the influence of the Summa as a text which forms a bridge between St. Augustine of Hippo and Hannah Arendt and Jean (...) Lyotard. The review is marred by a typos which the proofreader(s) of Prabuddha Bharata overlooked. Of course, the onus of the error lies with the reviewer. (shrink)

The Scientific Revolution was far from the anti-Aristotelian movement traditionally pictured. Its applied mathematics pursued by new means the Aristotelian ideal of science as knowledge by insight into necessary causes. Newton’s derivation of Kepler’s elliptical planetary orbits from the inverse square law of gravity is a central example.

Parmi les différentes approches possibles de la matière historique, on observe souvent, dans la littérature, une tension entre les deux options suivantes : faire d’un auteur le précurseur d'une révolution dont notre modernité serait l'héritière directe, ou au contraire, et par réaction, se livrer à un travail de remise en contexte détaillé qui prend parfois le risque de gommer l'originalité possible de ce même auteur. Le Traité sur les signes de Jean Poinsot (appelé également Jean de Saint Thomas), dominicain du (...) début du XVIIe siècle, a ainsi d’abord été édité comme un texte annonciateur de la sémiotique de Peirce, la thèse de cette originalité révolutionnaire étant fondée sur le traitement de la catégorie de la relation. Le travail critique qui s’est effectué en réaction tempère, parfois de façon excessive, la nouveauté de cet auteur du point de vue de sa contribution à la pensée des signes. Cet article s’inscrit dans cette démarche de remise en contexte en proposant une comparaison entre le texte de Poinsot et les Quaestiones sur les signes, que l'on doit à Sebastião do Couto, commentateur de l'université de Coimbra. Optant pour une contextualisation qui vise à mesurer l’originalité relative de Poinsot, cette étude porte sur les variations de la description du rapport du signe à l'intention. Nous montrerons ainsi que même si les contenus du discours sur les signes ne comportent que de maigres différences, on peut cependant constater une certaine originalité de Poinsot dans son traitement de la relation, qui l’amène à reconfigurer l’ordonnancement de la question des signes. (shrink)

Scotus’s account of the two affections of the will has received extensive attention from recent scholars, in part because this is often seen as one of Scotus’s key departures from Aquinas and from the eudaimonist tradition more generally. Curiously, however, the early modern followers of Scotus seem largely to ignore the two affections doctrine. This paper surveys the reception of the doctrine in Francisco Lychetus, Francisco Macedo, Juan de Rada, Sebastian Dupasquier, and Claude Frassen.

Descartes analysed the mind into various faculties or powers, including pure intellect, imagination, senses, and will. This article focuses on his account of the sensory power, in relation to its Aristotelian background. Descartes accepted from the Aristotelians that the senses serve to preserve the body by detecting benefits and harms. He rejected the scholastic Aristotelian sensory ontology of resembling species, or ‘forms without matter’. For the visual sense, Descartes offered a mechanistic ontology and a partially mechanized account of sensory processes, (...) including some previously ascribed to judgement. He did this in the context of his theory of brain signs that prompt sensations. The article contends that Descartes’s use of the sign-relation was modelled on standard discussions of non-resembling signs in commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione. It follows three uses of the sign-relation: brain states that cause colour sensations; brain states that cause experiences of spatialized contents, such as shapes; and brain states that realize a ‘natural geometry’. It argues that Descartes’s natural geometry does not involve mental operations but physiological mechanisms that co-vary with the distance to seen objects. While retaining the language of sensory powers, Descartes offered a partial mechanization of those powers. (shrink)

Стаття присвячена трактатам «Про виникнення і зникнення» викладеними у Києво-Могилянській академії у XVII–XVIIІ ст. як складова філософського курсу. Ці трактати мають історичну і тематичну прив’язку до однойменної книги Аристотеля і зосереджені на обговоренні виникнення, субстанційної і якісної зміни та зникнення. Однак деякі могилянські професори, як Стефан Яворський і Теофан Прокопович, включили сюди і теологічні питання. Яворський обговорює питання про транссубстанціацію св. Євхаристії, намагаючись з’ясувати, як ця субстанційна зміна відбувається і коли вона має місце на Божественній Літургії Східного обряду. Він доводить, (...) що транссубстанціація відбувається під час Слів Освячення, а не Епіклези. На його думку, так вчили найбільш авторитетні теологи Східної церкви. Обговорення цього питання у філософському курсі (1691–1693) найімовірніше було реакцією на Московський собор 1689 року, де було осуджено доктрину про транссубстанціацію під час Слів Освячення. Яворський, натомість, хотів захистити вчення, притаманне українській православній традиції (Петро Могила, Сильвестр Косов, Інокентівй Ґізель тощо). Інший професор, Теофан Прокопович, у своєю курсі (1707–09) звертається до питання про особливу збереженість мощей Києво-Печерських святих. Він доводить, що мощі, які покояться у Київських Печерах, зберігаються завдяки особливій Божій благодаті, і детально аналізує 16 аргументів противників, які це заперечують. На думку автора статті, введення теологічних тем у філософські курси було пов’язане з особливою соціальною значущістю цих питань у той час. (shrink)

Статья представляет собой попытку обнаружить «испанский след» в богословской мысли Киевской митрополии XVII в. на примере наставлений об отправлении церковных таинств («Наука о седми тайнахъ церковных» в составе виленского Требника 1617–1618 гг.) и первого православного печатного пособия по моральному богословию («Мир с Богом человеку». Киев, 1669). Одним из источников для «Науки» стало сочинение испанского иезуита Франсиско де Толедо (1534–1596)) «Summa de Instructione Sacerdotum» (известное также как «Summa casuum conscientiae»), в основу которого был положен курс по моральной теологии в Collegium Romanum (...) в Риме. Составители виленской «Науки» прибегали не только к буквальному переводу значительных порций текста испанского иезуита и близкому к оригиналу пересказу отдельных фрагментов, но также дополнили заимствованные из де Толедо фрагменты рассуждениями о церковных ритуалах, цитатами из отеческой традиции, из канонов Вселенских и Поместных соборов, из гражданских правовых памятников. Несмотря на то, что виленская «Наука» вышла из униатских кругов, она получила широкое распространение и среди православных: именно посредством данного памятника отдельные фрагменты сочинения де Толедо попали в «Мир с Богом человеку». Но при этом совершенно очевидно, что в толковании семи смертных грехов и в рассуждениях о милостыни заметно прямое обращение составителей «Мира с Богом» к сочинению де Толедо. Оба памятника Киевской митрополии послужили впоследствии источником для рукописной компиляции о таинствах московского книжника Евфимия Чудовского, который, таким образом, способствовал распространению «Суммы» де Толедо и в московской традиции. (shrink)

У статті здійснено порівняльний аналіз концепцій ментального слова (verbum mentis) могилянських професорів Інокентія Ґізеля і Йосифа Волчанського. Аналіз спирається на латинськомовні рукописні трактати «De anima» Ґізеля (1646–1647 рр.) і «De corpore animato» Волчанського (1715–1717 рр.). Запропоновані тут концепції інтелектуального пізнання розглядаються у контексті західної схоластичної традиції. З’ясовано, що розуміння інтелектуального пізнання Інокентієм Ґізелем і Йосифом Волчанським суттєво відрізнялися. Концепція Ґізеля відзначається еклектичним характером і поєднує в собі елементи томістичної, скотистичної і суаресіанської інтерпретацій, тоді як Волчанський орієнтується на Франсиско Суареса та (...) Фансиско де Овієдо. (shrink)

The paper deals with Poinsot’s ontology of universals presented not only in the Material Logic but also in the volume devoted to the Natural Philosophy of his Thomistic Philosophical Course. Currently, it takes into account also the often neglected Theological Course. The author states that there are two different positions as far as the issue of the ontology of universals is concerned, which prima facie lead to the doctrinal tension in Poinsot’s corpus. On one hand, in the Ars Logica, the (...) extramental nature is said to be particularized and only virtually distinct from the individuating grade. On the other, in the Philosophia Naturalis and the Cursus Theologicus, it is supposed to be common to the numerically different singulars and thus really different from individuation. The authorsolves this seeming contradiction by referring to two different levels of the analysis implicit in Poinsot’s treatment of the issue. (shrink)

Spanish translation of Cajetan’s commentary on quaestiones 22 and 116 of the first part of the 'Summa'. The translator precedes the text of Cajetan with a broad introduction in which he compares the views of the author with the interpretation of the same problems by Báñez in the context of the 'De Auxiliis' controversy. According to the translator, Báñez would have been more faithful to the thought of Saint Thomas than Cajetan. However, the core of the contribution of this great (...) commentator will also be assumed by Báñez; it was so important for him that he implicitly quoted it in his last words. (shrink)

Contemporary scholars routinely cast Aquinas’s imperfect happiness of this life as one of only acquired virtue, yet the Scholastics of the Late Renaissance all saw this happiness as one of acquired or infused virtue. This dispute goes unspoken today, as does the question it raises, namely, whether the infused virtues, rather than offer supernatural happiness only in the afterlife, offer it now even in this life. Further unsettled is why this question is even worth asking. I argue it is worth (...) asking for several reasons: historical, doctrinal, and methodological. The problem has implications for Aquinas’s reception of the Nicomachean Ethics. It also bears, on the one hand, on two of Aquinas's doctrines on twofold beatitude and, on the other hand, on Aquinas's teaching on the relationship of philosophy and theology. Moreover, an answer could lend support to the use of Late Scholastic commentary in the interpretation of Aquinas. I first defend the importance of our question, illustrating in turn its historical, doctrinal, and methodological value. I then give some direction for a balanced study of the problem. Finally, I clarify the status of our question and propose some ideas for further discussion. (shrink)

Renaissance Thomists knew Thomas Aquinas spoke of natural happiness, but some believed this happiness is absolutely impossible; others impossible in a state of elevation. Most Thomists rejected both forms of skepticism. An example is the Dominican theologian Pedro de Godoy (1608–1677). This article reconstructs Godoy’s main arguments with a view toward uncovering his method and originality. While his arguments are diverse, they mostly depend on the relation of happiness to human psychology. Godoy repeatedly appeals to the natural abilities of intellect (...) and will, yet natural abilities can depend on God’s grace, which is natural or supernatural. Some natural abilities are even impossible without natural grace, like that of loving God above all things. For Godoy’s part, then, it is chiefly psychological considerations that explain why the Thomist School of his day held firm against rising doubts over natural happiness. Above all, it was considerations of knowing and loving God. (shrink)

There are several interpretations of how Aquinas views the moral virtues connected through prudence and possessed through our natural powers. One is the traditional view. As described by Thomas Osborne, the traditional view holds that two supernatural conditions are ‘necessary’ for united acquired virtue. One is ingratiating grace (gratia gratum faciens), which heals and elevates the soul. Another is supernatural finality, that is, an orientation to God through charity. My main objective is to show how we can meet an objection (...) to the traditional view, one that uses Aquinas’s own words on necessary and per se predication: eodem modo praedicantur necessario quo per se. I proceed with three distinctions from Scholastic metaphysics. The first is between absolute and moral necessity; the next two are between per se and per accidens efficient causes and between intrinsic and extrinsic finality. Failing to make any of these distinctions risks repeating the error of the objection I address, which is to misunderstand how Thomists have historically related the supernatural order to the virtues united in the natural order. The overall purpose of these distinctions is to help us avoid doing this. (shrink)

The Scientific Revolution was far from the anti-Aristotelian movement traditionally pictured. Its applied mathematics pursued by new means the Aristotelian ideal of science as knowledge by insight into necessary causes. Newton’s derivation of Kepler’s elliptical planetary orbits from the inverse square law of gravity is a central example.

The late scholastics, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, contributed to many fields of knowledge other than philosophy. They developed a method of conceptual analysis that was very productive in those disciplines in which theory is relatively more important than empirical results. That includes mathematics, where the scholastics developed the analysis of continuous motion, which fed into the calculus, and the theory of risk and probability. The method came to the fore especially in the social sciences. In legal theory (...) they developed, for example, the ethical analyses of the conditions of validity of contracts, and natural rights theory. In political theory, they introduced constitutionalism and the thought experiment of a “state of nature”. Their contributions to economics included concepts still regarded as basic, such as demand, capital, labour, and scarcity. Faculty psychology and semiotics are other areas of significance. In such disciplines, later developments rely crucially on scholastic concepts and vocabulary. (shrink)

The pendulum clock was one of the most important metaphors for early modern philosophers. Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695) discovered his pendulum clock in 1656 based on the principle of isochronism discovered by Galileo (1564-1642). This paper aims at exploring the broad historical context of this invention, showing the role of some key figures such as Andreas Colvius (1594-1671), Elia Diodati (1576-1661), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Constantijn Huygens, the father of Christiaan Huygens. Secondly, it suggests - based on this context - that (...) it is hard to believe that Huygens did not know about Galileo’s idea to construct a pendulum regulated clock. Finally, this article illustrates how the Dutch philosopher Spinoza (1632-1677) might have been inspired by Huygens’ discovery of the synchronization of the pendulum clocks in his views on the agreement between bodies in the universe. -/- Resumo: O relógio de pêndulo foi uma das metáforas mais importantes para os filósofos modernos. Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695) inventou o relógio de pêndulo em 1656 baseado no princípio do isocronismo descoberto por Galileo (1564-1642). Este artigo busca explorar o amplo contexto histórico dessa invenção, demonstrando o papel de algumas figuras-chave como Andreas Colvius (1594-1671), Elia Diodati (1576-1661), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) e Constantijn Huygens, o pai de Christiaan Huygens. Em segundo lugar, sugere-se - baseado nesse contexto - que é difícil acreditar que Huygens não sabia da ideia de Galileo de construir um relógio regulado por um pêndulo. Por fim, este artigo ilustra como o filósofo holandês Espinosa (1632-1677) pode ter se inspirado nessa invenção de Huygens da sincronização do relógio de pêndulo em suas visões sobre o acordo entre os corpos no universo. -/- Palavras-chave: Galileo; Relógio de pêndulo; Huygens; República holandesa; Espinosa. -/- . (shrink)

In 1597 Francisco Suárez published a comprehensive treatise on beings of reason as part of his Disputationes metaphysicae. Subsequent scholastic philosophers vigorously debated various aspects of Suárez’s theory. The aim of this paper is to identify some of the most controversial points of these debates, as they developed in the first half of the seventeenth century. In particular, I focus on the intension and the extension of ‘ens rationis’, its division and its causes. Additionally, I will discuss how Suárez’s views (...) sparked a number of debates within the classical view, debates which ultimately led to the emergence of various alternative theories, especially among the Jesuits. These non-classical views radically revise the previous classical conception of beings of reason. (shrink)

I argue that Diego Alvarez and Thomas de Lemos through their participation in the De auxiliis controversy developed and defended Cajetan’s view of the causation of sin in such a way that they were able to defend the predetermination of the material aspect of sin while at the same time assimilating important aspects from his critics. It is important to recognize that Lemos and his associates hold both that the premotion of sin’s material aspect is not necessarily connected with the (...) Catholic faith and that it is knowable by natural reason. Even though they argued that other Molinist theses should be condemned as heretical, they held that this rejection of the Dominican thesis concerning sin is simply wrong but not heretical. First, I consider Cajetan’s position. Second, I consider the reception of this position by Medina, Zumel, and Báñez. Third, I show that Alvarez and Lemos make distinctions that allow them to incorporate the insights of both Cajetan and his critics. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 31 This paper analyzes the theories of three representatives of Second Scholasticism, namely Francisco Suárez, SJ, John Poinsot, OP, and Francisco de Oviedo, SJ, on the issue of the intuitive and abstractive cognition of the external senses. Based on a comparison of their theories, linked to the historical starting point of the debate in the first decades of the fourteenth century, the paper argues that the doctrinal and argumentative matrix of these authors’ texts is significantly ‘present’ (...) in the Second Scholastics as well. 1) As far as naturally produced sensation is concerned, all these authors, including Poinsot, follow the Scotistic justification of the natural infallibility of the external senses; 2) regarding the possibility of supernaturally caused objectless perception, Poinsot’s position can be labelled, surprisingly, Scotistic; 3) Suárez’s theory, although partly similar to the doctrine of the late Ockham, is an idiosyncratic stance; 4) Oviedo’s conception, even more distant from that of Ockham, can be characterized as ‘Auriolian’ and ‘Chattonian’. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the theories of three representatives of Second Scholasticism, namely Francisco Suárez, sj, John Poinsot, op, and Francisco de Oviedo, sj, on the issue of the intuitive and abstractive cognition of the external senses. Based on a comparison of their theories, linked to the historical starting point of the debate in the first decades of the fourteenth century, the paper argues that the doctrinal and argumentative matrix of these authors’ texts is significantly ‘present’ in the Second Scholastics as (...) well. 1) As far as naturally produced sensation is concerned, all these authors, including Poinsot, follow the Scotistic justification of the natural infallibility of the external senses; 2) regarding the possibility of supernaturally caused objectless perception, Poinsot’s position can be labelled, surprisingly, Scotistic; 3) Suárez’s theory, although partly similar to the doctrine of the late Ockham, is an idiosyncratic stance; 4) Oviedo’s conception, even more distant from that of Ockham, can be characterized as ‘Auriolian’ and ‘Chattonian’. (shrink)

The paper deals with the issue of the common nature (extramental universal) and universal unity (logical universal) in the theories of two of the foremostScotists in the Baroque Era, the Italian Conventual Bartholomew Mastrius and the Irish Observant John Punch. They are in the scholarly community well-known for their antagonistic interpretations of the teaching of Duns Scotus. On the basis of the exposition of two representative places from Scotus’s Ordinatio and Questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, I claim that it is Mastrius’s (...) theory, which follows Scotus’s model more tightly. Punch’s theories are doctrines which are syncretically inspired by un-Scotist’s sources (above all “Suarezian,” “Thomistic,” and “Ockhamistic”). The hermeneutical advantage of Punch’s theory is that it remarkably mirrors the “Zeitgeist” of early modern academic philosophy, substantially determined by the Jesuit’s exposition of Aquinas. (shrink)

During the seventeenth century the major cognitive faculties--sense, imagination, memory, and understanding or intellect--became the central focus of argument in metaphysics and epistemology to an extent not seen before. The theory of the intellect, long an important auxiliary to metaphysics, became the focus of metaphysical dispute, especially over the scope and powers of the intellect and the existence of a `pure' intellect. Rationalist metaphysicians such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche claimed that intellectual knowledge, gained independently of the senses, provides the (...) framework for constructing a new theory of nature. Other writers, including Hobbes and the early Gassendi, denied the existence of a distinct intellectual faculty, and so challenged the metaphysicians' abilities directly to perceive the essences of substances. The theory of the senses, which had long been a part of philosophical discussion, took on a new urgency, for adherents of the new corpuscularian philosophy needed to replace the dominant Aristotelian theory of real sensory qualities and sensible species. The revival of skepticism and a renewed interest in method also brought the faculties into prominence, for skeptical challenges typically were directed toward the faculties of sense and understanding, and the theory of method was conceived as providing instructions for the proper use of one's cognitive equipment. The theory of the faculties, then, is an important key to theories of knowledge in the seventeenth century. Indeed, rather than speaking of seventeenth century epistemology, it would be less anachronistic and more informative to speak of theories of cognition. The familiar (and over-stated) point that epistemology became fundamental to metaphysics during that century can then be restated as the point that the theory of faculties became central in metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

In this groundbreaking book, Daniel D. Novotny explores one of the most controversial topics of Suarez's philosophy: "beings of reason." Beings of reason are impossible intentional objects, such as blindness and square-circle.

This essay presents Descartes’s anti-hylomorphism in The Meteors published in 1637 and in the unpublished works that precede it, The World (Treatise on Light) and the Rules for the Direction of the Mind.

A few months before his death, Leibniz wrote to Des Bosses, My doctrine of composite substance seems to be the very doctrine of the Peripatetic school, except that their doctrine does not recognize monads. But I add them, with no detriment to the doctrine itself. You will hardly find another difference, even if you are bent on doing so.1 It is tempting to take Leibniz’s profession of Aristotelian orthodoxy as circumstantial: the entire correspondence he had with the Jesuit Father Bartholomew (...) Des Bosses is based on a project of reconciliation between his “system” and the dogmas of the Catholic Church, mediated by Aristotelian philosophy.2 But even so, this circumstantial... (shrink)

Special issue of the Journal for Early Modern Studies (4.1., Spring 2005) Guest Editor: Lucian Petrescu. -/- .

The problem of the Cartesian circle, as it is called, has sparked ongoing debate, which intersects several important themes of the Meditations. Discussions of the circle must address questions about the force and scope of the famous method of doubt introduced in Meditation I, and they must examine the intricate arguments for the existence of God and the avoidance of error in Meditations III to V. These discussions raise questions about the possibility of overturning skepticism, once a skeptical doubt has (...) been introduced. More generally, the problem of the circle resonates with recent questions about the foundations of knowledge: Must we be able to validate our methods of reasoning or of knowing before using them? If we must, wouldn't we be forever stuck at the beginning, unable to use our methods of reasoning or of knowing in their own validation? The problem of the Cartesian circle raises general questions about the validation of reason and the possibility of knowledge. This chapter examines the Cartesian circle in the context of Descartes' central project in the Meditations, to secure the foundations of metaphysics. In carrying out this project, Descartes felt the need, or adopted the strategy, of examining the possibility of human knowledge more generally. Such an examination can be interpreted in various ways. Depending on the interpretation given, the roles assigned to the method of doubt and the proofs about God may differ, thereby altering how we see the problem of the circle. We therefore need first to consider Descartes' metaphysical project along with the methods and strategies he adopted in carrying it out. Subsequently, I explain and evaluate several main approaches to the problem of the circle. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the relation of Descartes' metaphysics of knowledge to other prominent positions in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

This review-article examines Daniel Novotny’s new book on entia rationis in Baroque-Age scholasticism. Novotný’s presentation of Francisco Suárez’, Pedro Hurtado’s, Bartolomeo Mastri’s and Bonaventura Belluto’s as well as Juan Caramuel’s theories of beings of reason is discussed. Beyond Novotný’s results, it is pointed out 1) that Suárez’ theory of the causation of beings of reason is anticipated by his explanation of the relationship between formal and objective concepts, and 2) that the traditional division of distinctions of reason lies in the (...) background of some scholastic authors’ differentiation between entia rationis ratiocinatae and entia rationis ratiocinantis; this latter motif is echoed in German Enlightenment metaphysics. (shrink)

One characteristic feature of Spanish society, from the symbolic year 1492, is the progressive adoption of the purity-of-blood laws by various administrations. The Society of Jesus, however, declined during most of the sixteenth century to apply these statutes, claiming to do the will expressed in this regard by Ignatius of Loyola himself. However, in 1593 the Fifth General Congregation decided to implement the purity test for the admission to the Colleges of the Company. This article describes the tenacious opposition against (...) this decision made by the Spanish Jesuit Pedro de Ribadeneyra, of Jewish origin, in his letters to the then General, Claudio Aquaviva. Also contextualizes Jesuit controversy around statutes of purity of blood within the profound change the Company suffered after the rise to generalship of Everard Mercurian and then with Aquaviva, and whose main characteristic is the removal of the converso jesuits from the Italian directive positions. (shrink)

An early modern scholastic conception of moral possibility helps make sense of Descartes's own perplexing use of that concept and solves the exegetical puzzles surrounding Descartes's conflicting remarks about free will.

A seventeenth-century scholastic attempt to restrict the truthmaker principle to positive truths.

Seventeenth century scholastics had a rich debate about the ontological status and nature of lacks, negations, and privations. Realists in this debate posit irreducible negative entities responsible for the non-existence of positive entities. One of the first scholastics to develop a realist position on negative entities was Thomas Compton Carleton. In this paper I explain Carleton's theory of negative entities, including what it is for something to be negative, how negative entities are individuated, whether they are abstract or concrete, and (...) how they affect their subjects. I argue that for Carleton, negative entities are conceived as spatially extended simples that affect their subjects by means of spatial overlap. I also show how Carleton responds to some theological worries about his realism concerning negative entities. (shrink)

17th-century Iberian and Italian scholastics had a concept of a truthmaker [verificativum] similar to that found in contemporary metaphysical debates. I argue that the 17th-century notion of a truthmaker can be illuminated by a prevalent 17th-century theory of truth according to which the truth of a proposition is the mereological sum of that proposition and its intentional object. I explain this theory of truth and then spell out the account of truthmaking it entails.

Arriaga is an early modern scholastic who recognizes the importance of relations to philosophical discussions. He offers a classification of different kinds of relations, focusing on the distinction between categorial relations and transcendental relations. I suggest that this distinction might be seen as akin to one version of the modern distinction between external and internal relations. Like Suárez, whom he characterizes as a “giant among the scholastics,” Arriaga offers a reductionist account of categorial relations. He criticises Suárez’s account, however, for (...) formally identifying a relation with the foundation in one relatum, something Suárez does in order to preserve a real distinction between converse relations. Arriaga, in contrast, argues that a categorial relation is formally identical to the foundation and terminus. Arriaga gives less attention to transcendental relations, even though he thinks they are real relations, but I offer some suggestions for how he may be thinking about them. (shrink)