Edmund Husserl

Husserl's proposed method for knowing the essences of universals, which he calls “free variation,” has been widely criticized for involving viciously circular reasoning. In this paper, I review existing attempts to resolve this problem, and I argue that they all fail. I then show that extant accounts are all guilty of a common mistake: they assume that circularity is inevitable as long as the exercise of free variation presupposes the ability to identify the universal whose essence is in question, that (...) is, the ability to recognize entities as instances of it. I reject this assumption: I argue on both Husserlian and independent philosophical grounds that knowledge of a universal's essence is not required for identifying it, but only for re‐identifying it at every possible world in which it is instantiated. I then defend a reading on which free variation's purpose is to move its practitioner from non‐essentialistic knowledge of a universal's identity (its actual instantiation‐pattern) to essentialistic knowledge of its transworld identity (its instantiation‐pattern in every possible world in which it is present). And I show that such a transformation is a non‐circular progression from non‐modal to modal knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on Edmund Husserl’s analyses of the act of approval and the role he attributes to it in his ethics. I show that we can deepen our understanding of both if we rely on his critical reflections on Shaftesbury’s theory of affections in his lecture course Einleitung in die Ethik. The sections of this course devoted to Shaftesbury are the only place in Husserl’s later philosophical production where he addresses the need to clarify the nature of (...) approval from a phenomenological point of view and provides precise indications about the role that such emotions play in our life. I thereby examine Husserl’s criticisms of Shaftesbury’s account of reflective emotions, and I compare these criticisms with Husserl’s account of approval in the texts from the Konvolut über Billigung collected in the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. I argue that, according to Husserl, approval is an essential but not sufficient component in the pursuit of virtue. The upshot is that crucial parts of Husserl’s ethics come from a radical and original reworking of central notions of the early modern sentimentalist tradition. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is a distinctly philosophical approach that emphasizes the significance of direct observation and the description of conscious experience. Unlike traditional approaches that concentrate on abstract concepts and theories, phenomenology seeks to understand the concrete and immediate nature of experience. The concept of intentionality, which refers to how consciousness is directed towards an object or phenomenon, is a key feature of Husserl's phenomenology. The notion of intentionality carries profound implications for how we comprehend perception, as it suggests that (...) perception is not a mere passive process, but rather an active and engaged interaction with the world around us. By emphasizing the significance of lived experiences, Husserl's thoughts provide a nuanced and profound understanding of the complexities of human consciousness. Phenomenology sheds light on the finer details and subtleties of our subjective reality by careful analysis and reflection on these experienced experiences. This paper delves into the emphasis on present consciousness, offering a potent prism through which to examine the intricate interplay between the subject and the outside world, all while considering the notion of intentionality. (shrink)

This article considers the contribution of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology to the scientific realism debate by thematizing the problem of dubitability. After first considering the rigorous standards for apodictic evidence in phenomenology, particularly in terms of the intuitive givenness of evidence, I consider how scientific theory is open, in principle, to doubt. I argue that phenomenology has both a critical and descriptive function for scientific theory: it clarifies what scientific theory can or cannot tell us about the world, both possibly and (...) necessarily; and it describes the meaningfulness that scientific theory can have for us in our experience of the world—that is, in the living flow of conscious experience that is indubitably real. As such, I explain how phenomenology can take scientific theory as a serious field of investigation. (shrink)

If you have enjoyed any of the 7 (seven) other books I have published over 20 years, including literally thousands of pages of mathematical and topological concepts, Python programs and conceptually expanding papers, please consider buying this book for $20.00 on google play books. -/- Introduction: -/- Though the following pages provide extensive exposition and dedicated descriptions of the phenomenological velocity formulas, theory and mystery, I thought it appropriate to write this introduction as a partial explanation for what phenomenal velocity (...) is, and describe, briefly its theory and applications. Phenomenological Velocity is a method for solving for something that ought cancel out with itself, but there are specific implicit forms for this thing that, “ought cancel out with itself,” namely the Lorentz coefficient ought cancel out with itself when applied to the height of a cone derived from the difference between the circumferences of two circles applied to the Pythagorean Theorem, or, more generally, the height implied by application of the Pythagorean theorem to the difference between two arc lengths’ equaling a third arc length. These difference equations are essential to conceptualizing differentiation, and in these further chapters, I demonstrate that the phenomenological velocity is, indeed the conditional derivative in the chapter, “Conditional Integral of Phenomenological Velocity.” The phenomenological velocity algebraic solution to the velocity within the Lorentz coefficient when applied to the height function in such a way that it ought cancel out with itself is both constructive mathematics and it employs the concept of, “bracketing,” - first introduced by Edmund Husserl in his writings on the phenomenological reduction. Phenomenological Velocity’s algebraic solution from the difference between two arc lengths applied to the Pythagorean Theorem to solve for a theoretical height (which is a projected distance in space), employs bracketing, because we, “set aside,” the existence of an undefined solution, namely due to the presence of necessitated complex analytical forms by the architecture of the equation, or the “mathetecture,” of the algebraic form. -/- With respect to theology, the phenomenological velocity is somehow symbolic of the creation itself; symbolic of creation due to the fact that we find the canceling out of the Lorentz coefficient as, “impotent,” non-existent or non-effecting to the mathetecture of the height function. However, via the modus-ponens work around to phenomenological velocity, which in itself does not require the complex field, but embeds implied complex field solutions to the equation while maintaining logical consistency, we find existence from non-existence. This is directly linguistically applicable to the concept of the big-bang, the resurrection of Yeshua the Messiah, and opens analogies for us to draw relationships between the, “fall,” of Adam and Eve as the generation of error, or the introduction of paradox, as we see the phallus representing paradox topologically. -/- The phenomenological velocity is a gestalt concept, relevant to cosmology, because we find that it is the perfect language-form for discussing dark matter. It does, however, require the reader to re-conceive or re-frame rather, some of the fundamental aspects of assumed physical reality like time, experience, solidity of dark matter, etc. We find the hidden dimension of phenomenological velocity to have been an overlooked aspect of mathematical physics by the researchers of Bell’s theorem and undoubtedly a host of other theorems. Thus, raising awareness about the real existence and necessitated reality of phenomenological velocity is in no way an endeavor deserving further procrastination by the scientific community, for doing so would be intellectually dishonest and further the propagation of incomplete or misleading theories on reality. -/- This work details how the Lorentz coefficient, when applied to the height of a cone in such a way as to cancel out with itself, permits the velocity variable to have a solution to it anyway, even though it ought cancel out with itself. This mathe-tecture, so to speak has consequences for complex analysis, and pave the way for, "transcendental relativity," building an adaptive framework for consciousness and physical reality. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an important, yet hitherto neglected, development within Husserl’s phenomenological formal ontology. The first sixteen paragraphs of Ideas 1 serve as the point of departure for my presentation. In these paragraphs, Husserl presents the category of “concretum”, or concrete individual, as the cornerstone of his whole formal-ontological framework. The aim of this paper is to present and discuss a revision of the account of the concrete individual Husserl develops in his Ideas 1 in 1918 in a (...) text that is now published as text 11 in Husserliana 41. I will also draw out some further implications from a text of the same year published as Appendix XVII of Husserliana 41. No adequate treatment of the 1918 account of “concrete individual” has been provided so far, however, and my paper aims at filling this gap in the scholarship. The relevance of the 1918 revision is phenomenological and philosophical, rather than just historical. In that text Husserl solves some ambiguities in the Ideas 1 treatment of concrete individuals, and, in doing so, he introduces an original distinction between two types of genera, self-individuating and other-individuating. He also provides elements to a phenomenological doctrine of the principle of individuation and takes a stance on the question of the individuation of essence. (shrink)

Why do we need a theory of constitution? -- The history of the notion of constitution : two case studies -- Towards a theory of constitution -- The social foundation of the mind -- Constitution and idealism.

We recall, "a priori," numeric energy expression: -/- Energy Numbers -/- $\begin{gathered}\mathcal{V}=\left\{f \mid \exists\left\{e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n\right\} \in E \cup R\right\} \\ \mathcal{V}=\left\{f \mid \exists\left\{e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n\right\} \in E, \text { and }: E \mapsto r \in R\right\} \\ \mathcal{V}=\left\{E \mid \exists\left\{a_1, \ldots, a_n\right\} \in E, E \not \neg r \in R\right\}\end{gathered}$ -/- We now introduce the set of optimized energy numbers: -/- ($H_a \in \mathcal{H}$ or $P^n = NP$ or $(P,\mathcal{L},F) = NP$). -/- Based on our formulation of (...) the bi-objective optimization task, we can make the following mathematical inferences: -/- 1. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is equal to the original energy numbers set $\mathcal{E}$, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H = \mathcal{E}$, then the maximum optimization score is achieved, i.e. the bi-objective optimization task is solved. This implies that there exists at least one solution to the optimization problem and $H_a \in \mathcal{H}$, where $H_a$ is the hypothesis that states the existence of an efficient algorithm to solve the problem. -/- 2. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is a subset of the original energy numbers set $\mathcal{E}$, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H \subset \mathcal{E}$, then the optimization score is less than the maximum score. This indicates that there may exist more efficient algorithms to solve the problem, and the hypothesis $H_a$ is still possible. -/- 3. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is a superset of the original energy numbers set $\mathcal{E}$, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H \supset \mathcal{E}$, then the optimization score is higher than the maximum score. This implies that the optimization problem may be easier than initially thought, and $P^n = NP$, or at least some form of $NP$-completeness. -/- 4. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is a strict subset of the original energy numbers set $\mathcal{E}$, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H \subsetneq \mathcal{E}$, and $P^n \neq NP$, then it can be concluded that the optimization problem is complex but there may exist algorithms that can efficiently approximate the solution. -/- 5. If the optimized energy numbers set $\mathcal{N}_H$ is empty, i.e. $\mathcal{N}_H = \emptyset$, then it can be inferred that the optimization problem is infeasible, i.e. no efficient algorithm exists to solve it, and $H_a$ is false. -/- 6. Comparing the two objectives in the bi-objective optimization task, we can make the following statements: -/- - The first objective, $\frac{\delta_{v(f)}(\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w_{max}})} {\langle \mathbf{v_f}, \mathbf{1_f}\rangle}$, measures the efficiency of the algorithm and its ability to find low energy numbers. - The second objective, $\rho(\mathcal{N}_H)$, measures the accuracy of the algorithm in terms of loss and perplexity on the HyperLanguageModel. - Therefore, by optimizing both objectives simultaneously, we aim to find an efficient algorithm that also minimizes the loss and perplexities on the HyperLanguageModel. - If the optimization task is successfully solved, then the algorithm achieves both high efficiency and high accuracy. This would imply that the algorithm is able to find low energy numbers effectively and also generalize well on the HyperLanguageModel. -/- The optimized energy numbers aim to find a set of numbers $\mathbf{v}$ that maximize the bi-objective optimization task, while also minimizing the loss and perplexity of the HyperLanguageModel. This is achieved by finding the set of numbers that have the highest delta value and the lowest perplexity, resulting in a more optimized and efficient set of energy numbers. -/- By comparing the optimized energy numbers to the original set, we can see that the optimized set may have a higher delta value and a lower perplexity, indicating that it is a better set of numbers for the given task. This shows that the optimized energy numbers have successfully achieved their goal of maximizing efficiency while minimizing loss and perplexity. (shrink)

In this article I will use Husserlian tools in order to elaborate a phenomenology of ludic experience. Following Fink, my aim here is to present what Husserl could have elaborated in a more systematic manner concerning the specificity of what he calls the ludic praxis (Spielpraxis) and the ludic construct (Spielgebilde). Firstly, I analyze the temporality of ludic experience. Play has a dilative temporal structure: it involves a momentary captivation in the present and a momentary suspension of the architectonic goals (...) of the agent. Secondly, play has its own artifacts. I begin by analyzing what I call the impermanent construct, i.e., the object whose elaboration is motivated by a self-referential interest of the poietic subject. Thirdly, play does not only erect singular entities, but also ludic worlds as a whole. My objective is to scrutinize the mode of being of these normative spaces. I conclude with a description of the ludic object par excellence, namely the toy (Spielzeug). (shrink)

In this paper, we provide an overview of the main stages in the development of Edmund Husserl’s conception of metaphysics, highlighting its most significant characteristics. We propose that Husserl’s views on metaphysics traversed three main stages: (1) from the early 1890s until his so-called “transcendental turn” around 1906/07; (2) from his transcendental turn until the late 1920s, and (3) the metaphysical conceptualization during the 1930s, aptly characterized as—following the interpretation of László Tengelyi—a “metaphysics of primal facts” (Urfakta, Urtatsache). We further (...) demonstrate that Husserl’s considerations concerning metaphysics—throughout his entire opus—span three essential levels: (1) the epistemological level, in particular, phenomenological preparations to establish a foundation for metaphysics; (2) a level concerning metaphysics as the universal and ultimate science of reality, and (3) a level addressing metaphysics as a proper field of phenomenological investigations into the highest and ultimate questions (such as God and immortality). We argue in detail that Husserl attempted to render this field—which radically transcends the domain of possible intuitions (Anschauungen) and direct experience—accessible to a legitimate phenomenological treatment via the method of phenomenological constructions, prior to the efforts of Eugen Fink. (shrink)

In the texts collected in the second volume of the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, Husserl extensively discusses experiences of joy (Freude). By considering Husserl’s examples related to joy not as mere illustrations, but as a guiding thread for the identification of experiential structures, this article shows how these examples are not only significant for the general theory of intentionality of affective and emotional non-objectifying acts, but also provide valuable insights into the specific phenomenon of joy itself. Specifically, the article (...) demonstrates how the distinction between joy, sensory pleasure, and liking provides insights into the intentional structure of joy as a responsive affect. On the basis of these distinctions, the article raises the normative question about the appropriateness of affective and emotional responses. It argues that the appropriateness of joy should be assessed from two perspectives: in relation to the value that justifies an affective response and in relation to a personal motivational nexus. From the former perspective, joy can be normatively assessed. However, when only considering the latter perspective, joy cannot be assessed according to objective normative standards. Finally, building on these findings, the article explores how the phenomenology of joy and motivation may be connected to the specific experience of depth and discusses the role of joy for a phenomenological investigation of the personal self. (shrink)

This article investigates Husserl’s arguments for the constitutive role of memory in producing the awareness of objective time. Husserl explicitly connects his thoughts on time and memory to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, while developing an original understanding of the syntheses of recognition and reproduction. This offers a novel avenue for considering what is transcendental about Husserl’s phenomenology of memory. I contend that Husserl developed three transcendental functions of memory with a quasi-Kantian cast in writings from 1917 to 1926. These (...) three functions concern the re-identifiability of objects over time, the objectuality (Gegenständlichkeit) of moments in time, and the rigidity of the relations between moments. An exposition of these three transcendental functions and a comparison with Kant’s critical philosophy of time establish what sort of legitimacy objective time had for Husserl and how memory served as its subjective condition of possibility. This article also offers an account of the connection between individuation and memory and a novel comparison between Husserl and Kant on the topic of memory in transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

In the vast landscape of Edmund Husserl’s investigations, the theme of attention has long been neglected: the dispersal of his treatment of the topic across works from various years, the use of a diversified lexicon, and an intrinsic difficulty in identifying the attentional phenomenon itself have all contributed to the long-standing underestimation of this theme. Following a line of study that – especially after the publication of volume XXXVIII of the Husserliana (Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit) – has renewed interest in this (...) topic, this article aims to contribute to the historical as well as theoretical reconstruction of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of attention. In particular, we will focus on the contribution of a figure who had a crucial impact on Husserl’s development and the framing of the phenomenological method itself, namely Carl Stumpf, concentrating especially on the engagement that the father of phenomenology had with him, starting from the treatment of attention through the concept of interest. This debate will be reconstructed from the examination of (1) part of the Göttingen Lectures of 1904-05, explicitly dedicated to attention; (2) a very early but theoretically significant Husserlian manuscript, “Noten zur Lehre von Aufmerksamkeit und Interesse” (1893); and (3) Stumpf’s own work, particularly Tonpsychologie, where the interpretation of attention as “Lust am Bemerken” is formulated and with which Husserl engages in a rigorous critical dialogue. On the basis of this confrontation, we will highlight from an original perspective Husserl’s significant debt to the psychology of the time, from which he not only borrowed certain themes and a general interest in the simplest levels of experience, but also the basic outlines of notions that would serve as the foundation for the development of some crucial concepts of transcendental phenomenology such as that of intentionality. Moreover, it is through the examination of attention that the profound continuity of Husserl’s reflection becomes apparent, evidenced by the extraordinarily early emergence of crucial and typical notions of his later phase (known as “genetic phenomenology”) during these formative years, even before the phenomenological method was fully developed. (shrink)

The phenomenological notion of attitude has gained new traction in recent years, as it proliferates beyond its initial distinction between natural and phenomenological attitudes, notably to describe multiple meanings to critique and reflection. In this paper, I present an account of the concept of an ethical attitude in Husserlian phenomenology. First, I argue that the ethical attitude is best understood as a practical orientation toward personal life as a whole: someone strives to become the best possible person through self-reflection, self-variation, (...) the renewal of values and ends, and resolve. Second, I interpret Husserl’s accounts of the ethical reduction and the practical neutrality modification through the notion of the ethical attitude. This allows me to elaborate on questions of motivation for striving to be a good person, even if the world seems inhospitable to that effort. The question of the motivation for the ethical attitude reveals that Husserl grappled with existential and theological issues, including the valuelessness of existence, the problem of contingency, and the idea of God. Ultimately, interpreting Husserl’s ethical writings through the notion of the ethical attitude brings together several aspects of his ethics, thereby clarifying the many senses of critique and reflection at play in ethical and social life. (shrink)

As a fervent rationalist, Husserl placed considerable emphasis on the delineation of the different levels of reason. Its highest form, he contends, is position-taking (Stellungnahme) understood as a critical stance towards a positional act P. Specifically, such a Stellungnahme is a three-step procedure: the subject, possibly motivated by a passive discordance, starts by questioning P (active doubt); she then seeks to validate P by returning to its originary fulfillment (active search for evidence); finally, she ratifies such a fulfillment in an (...) act of acknowledgment (active decision), thereby making P a permanent personal conviction. In the literature, the role of position-taking in the formation of persons has been aptly emphasized, but insufficient attention has been paid to its intrinsic structure and concrete functioning; furthermore, the few existing studies on this topic are limited to the theoretical domain. The aim of this paper is to fill this twofold gap by providing a comprehensive account of critical Stellungnahme in both the intellectual and the axiological spheres, drawing especially on the manuscripts from the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. The first part examines Stellungnahme in the theoretical realm, underscoring its teleological orientation towards justification and the active role played by the subject in it. The second part shows how this procedure can be extended to rationalize value-experiences, by elucidating the nature of affective evidence and approval (Billigung). Finally, the third part demonstrates how a particular value, that of knowledge, can concretely pass the axiological position-taking and thus be recognized as an actual value. (shrink)

Known as the founder of the phenomenological movement, this book examines Husserl's various phases of phenomenology during his realist, transcendental, static, genetic, and post-Crisis (of European Sciences) periods. Consisting of ten carefully researched and thoroughly examined essays, this book describes Husserl's concepts and ideas through numerous examples and diagrammatic representations, in a bid to elucidate the nuances of phenomenology for its readers. Valuable insights into Husserl's realist phase are made in the chapter on Meaning, and the chapters on Natural Attitude, (...) Epoché and Phenomenological Reduction, while the chapter on Noesis & Noema symbolizes the transcendental phase. Thomas points out Husserl's transition from static to genetic phenomenology in the chapter on Lived Body, with the chapters on Lifeworld, and the Notion of the Other, later focusing on this perspective. Husserl's entire phenomenological space, including his pre-phenomenological period, are covered in the chapter on Lived Time. However, the chapters on Phenomenology: The Study of Self and Beyond, and Consciousness and Intentionality are the fulcrums upon which the edifice of phenomenology turns. The final chapter on Presuppositionlessness in phenomenology expresses Thomas' personal enquiries into Husserl's contention that phenomenology is a presuppositionless science. This book will be of particular interest to research scholars and post-graduate students in the areas of Philosophy and Social Sciences, as well as those interested in contemporary Western Philosophy, and the history and development of Ideas. (shrink)

Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy, Second Edition contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has more than 600 cross-referenced entries on his key concepts and major writings as well as entries on his most important predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.

After the attempt at collaboration between the Frankfurt School and the Vienna Circle failed in the late 1930s, Adorno stood at the forefront of critical theory’s polemics against ‘positivism’. Given these later polemical exchanges, some of the tendencies common to both movements have remained overlooked. Among these is their opposition to the phenomenological tradition. This paper focusses on certain features common to Schlick’s and Adorno’s critical responses to Husserl. The Machians, including Adorno’s supervisor Hans Cornelius, were targeted by Husserl’s onslaught (...) against psychologism in 1900. The young Schlick’s Machian background had motivated his contribution to the Psychologismusstreit, in the context of which he launched a series of objections against Husserl’s ‘independence theory of truth’. Adorno’s later doctoral dissertation under Cornelius was also motivated by the effort to defend his master against Husserl’s objections. Schlick’s criticisms intensified in later works, where Husserl’s epistemology of intuition is seen as yet another instance of the widespread confusion between knowledge and acquaintance. Schlick’s warnings against Husserl’s turn towards the irrationalist fashions of his day find their echo in Adorno’s ‘Metakritik’. Apart from their broad agreement in how they understand Husserl’s positioning within his context, Schlick and Adorno also develop a similar criticism of Husserl’s account of intuition as failing in its aspiration to discover unmediated givenness, which it confuses with mediated conceptual knowledge. Unfortunately, while Adorno explicitly acknowledges Schlick’s critique of Husserl, he also misconstrues it as a scientistic rejection of metaphysical nonsense, thus failing to acknowledge the proximity to his approach. (shrink)

Laura Jane Nanni is a postdoctoral researcher working and specializing in the area of phenomenology. She is currently located in the UCD Centre for Ethics in Public Life, in the School of Philosophy at University College Dublin, where she undertakes research and assists with Centre activities. Dr. Nanni was a nominee for the Dr. Máire de Paor PhD Award 2023 for best PhD thesis in the College of Social Sciences and Law, University College Dublin.

This book shows, for the first time in its full spectrum, the interconnectedness and topicality of two historically and philosophically significant developments of philosophical theories of the study of mind: that of phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and phaneroscopy of Charles S. Peirce. The chapters in this book put the two thinkers in a novel discourse while engaging in mutual scholarship on the large overlaps between the historically two largely independently developed but converging ideas of mind, cognition, consciousness, being, and experience. (...) It is the second volume in a projected series of three, the first of which is Peirce and Husserl: Mutual Insights on Logic, Mathematics, and Cognition (2019). This book consists of three parts. Part I contains studies on the basic elements and the methodological themes of both “phenomenologies” vis-à-vis each other. Part II of the book is dedicated to metaphysical and existential themes. Finally, this book contains a hitherto unpublished selection of connected texts from Charles Peirce concerning phaneroscopy, the theory of definitions, and other related historical, philosophical, and religious themes from 1910, transcribed and introduced by one of the editors of the volume. This book is of interest to scholars in phenomenology, phaneroscopy, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Dieser Artikel ist eine Rezension des Sammelbandes Faustino Fabbianelli und Sebastian Luft (Hg.): Husserl und die klassische deutsche Philosophie. Husserl and Classical German Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht 2014, 346 S. Erschienen in Phänomenologische Forschungen 2020/1, Meiner.

Eine der grundlegenden Fragen der Philosophie ist die Frage, wie sich die Sprache zur Wirklichkeit verhält. Was steht bei dieser Frage auf dem Spiel? Es geht darum, wie wir über unsere Erfahrungen sprechen und sie anderen Menschen mitteilen können. So mitteilen, dass die Anderen das Gesagte nachvollziehen und verstehen können. Es geht dabei auch um die Frage, ob das, was wir sagen, dem Worüber unserer Rede angemessen ist. Was Martin Heidegger die "formale Anzeige" nennt, ist für ihn die Art und (...) Weise, wie sich die Philosophie mitteilen muss. Nur mithilfe der formalen Anzeige könne das, worüber diese Philosophie spricht, als es selbst unverdeckt in den Blick gebracht werden. Für Heidegger zählt dabei primär das, was etwas ist: dessen Sein. Dieses Sein könne nur formalanzeigend zur Sprache gebracht werden. Heidegger würde sogar behaupten, dass vom Verständnis der formalen Anzeige auch das Verständnis der Philosophie abhinge. Heideggers formale Anzeige wurde deshalb auch als "Geheimwaffe", als "Schlüssel" zum Verständnis Heideggers Philosophie (Kisiel) und als etwas "für sein ganzes Denken Gültiges" (Gadamer) beschrieben. In diesem Buch wird geklärt, was die formale Anzeige ist und wie sie funktioniert. Gefragt wird nach dem Verhältnis zwischen Wort und Sache. (shrink)

Im Zentrum meines Beitrages steht der Begriff einer „höheren Erfahrung“, wie Benjamin ihn in seiner 1917/18 entstanden Schrift Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie entwickelt. Mithilfe einer ideengeschichtlichen Situierung zwischen und gegen den Neukantianismus Hermann Cohens und die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls nähere ich mich insbesondere der Denkfigur einer „Sphäre totaler Neutralität“, die es Benjamin zufolge jenseits von Subjekt und Objekt „auszumitteln“ gilt, um einen Begriff höherer Erfahrung gewinnen zu können. Ausgehend von dieser ideengeschichtlichen Verortung wende ich mich Benjamins von Johann (...) Georg Hamann inspirierter „Metaphysik der Sprache“ zu, um dafür zu argumentieren, dass die göttliche Sprache das ontologische Fundament bildet, in dem sowohl Erkenntnisobjekt als auch -subjekt in Benjamins frühem Denken gründen. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Die Brentanoschule -- Bd. 2. Die Münchener Phänomenologen -- Bd. 3. Die Göttinger Schule -- Bd. 4. Die Freiburger Schüler -- Bd. 5. Die Neukantianer -- Bd. 6. Philosophenbriefe -- Bd. 7. Wissenschaftlerkorrespondenz -- Bd. 8. Institutionelle Schreiben -- Bd. 9. Familienbriefe -- Bd. 10. Einführung und Register.

The aim of this intervention is to briefly advance an interpretation of the post- COVID19 digitalisation processes as to be recognised within the philosophical framework of Vorstellung Metaphysik, “metaphysics of representation”. I would maintain that the formula, firstly indicated by Martin Heidegger, can provide us with a tool to interpret contemporary culture as founded on an “iteration” of individual and collective consciousness into non-existent digital realities. Moreover, I will argue that these concepts are philosophically relatable to those of alienation and (...) reification that come from Marxist traditions. Ultimately, the analysis will try to use the above mentioned tools to delve into an interpretation of remote working and education as potential carriers of alienation. (shrink)

Widely regarded as the father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl's Ideas puts forth his revolutionary argument for phenomenology as the foundation of all philosophy and for experience as the source of all knowledge. His work has heavily influenced some of the greatest contemporary thinkers of all time including Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, and has dramatically altered the course of Western Philosophy.

This stimulating introduction demonstrates Husserl's influence on philosophy of mind and language, on ontology and epistemology, and on philosophy of logic, mathematics and science. Essential reading for anyone interested in phenomenology, twentieth-century philosophy, and the continuing influence of this eminent philosopher.

When Derrida translated and commented on Husserl’s manuscript The Origin of Geometry in 1962, he gave a central place to what Husserl called the Idea “in the Kantian sense”. This article reflects on the use and function of this Idea in Derrida’s reading of Husserl. It critically interrogates the relationship between the Idea in the Kantian sense and mathematical ideality, as well as the use of this Idea in the interpretation of the Thing (Ding) and the stream of experience (Erlebnisstrom). (...) In the centre of the discussion stands what Derrida calls “pure thinking”, on which he tries to ground the Idea in the Kantian sense. (shrink)

I argue that Husserl’s manuscripts on intersubjectivity discover a decisive role for self-movement in the constitution of the shared world. I explore two complementary constitutive functions. The first enables empathetic apperception by closing the divergence in sense between the original ego, which does not find itself at a location, and the alter ego, which is found over there. By traversing distances with its organically articulated Leibkörper, the original ego establishes an analogy between self-movement and thing-movement that guides the recognition of (...) another ego in space. The second accounts for the exchangeability of perspectives between differently located subjects. The restricted motility of the Leibkörper is discovered against the background of ideal but motivated possibilities of going to any distant perspective. These possibilities are rooted in the purely kinaesthetic potential of the Leib. To inhabit another perspective need not involve changing the world. This evidence underlies the Weltanschauung according to which what appears from the other’s perspective is a possible appearance for me. Taken together, these two constitutive functions show how self-movement discloses a definite but accidental location from which the ego shares the world. (shrink)

In a recent series of important papers, Søren Overgaard has defended a disjunctivist reading of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perception. According to Overgaard, Husserl commits to disjunctivism when arguing that hallucination intrinsically differs from perception because only experiences of the latter kind carry singular content and, thereby, pick out individuals. This paper rejects that interpretation by invoking the theory of intentionality developed by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. It is claimed that this theory not only lacks the notion of singular (...) content, but it also entails the idea that perceptions and hallucinations belong to the same kind of experience. If that is correct, a commitment to conjuctivism on Husserl’s end follows, pace Overgaard. (shrink)

In the present article, I address the issue of categorial representative contents, which, according to Husserl’s phenomenological theory, make knowledge possible by providing fullness to intuitive categorial acts. First, I discuss Husserl’s assertion that he no longer approves of his theory of categorial representation developed in Logical Investigations. I argue that the influential interpretation of Husserl’s self-criticism advanced by Dieter Lohmar is unfortunately misleading, as Husserl does not actually claim that categorial representatives are contents of reflection belonging to the realm (...) of inner sensibility, as Lohmar contends. After offering an alternative view of Husserl’s authentic position in Logical Investigations, I examine other possible reasons for his later dissatisfaction. These reasons relate to Husserl’s changing views on the role of categorial representatives in empty thinking acts—necessarily involved in cognition—and the necessity of spontaneously repeating the passive synthesis between the intentional matters that function as categorial representatives in the predicative activity yielding knowledge. (shrink)

Due to the reflective character of phenomenological approach (because consciousness inquires for itself as an object) the question related to the most basic self-experience that precedes any reflection and makes it possible acquires main importance to the phenomenology. The search of this experience throws us to a terrain to transit and with visible importance to Husserl: The passive dimension of consciousness. In that encounter, appears the phenomenon of self-affection as a sphere of experience worthy of been explored and described. This (...) research highlights the temporal character of consciousness, in specific, the self-awareness of the absolute flux of experiences due to his retentional aspect. This, however, brings a path to deepen in key concepts to Husserl’s phenomenology like hylé, affectivity, body, sensing [empfindniss], kinesthesia, and also to problematize the possibility and accuracy of this kind of search at a genetic level, the necessity to bring a prominent place to the living body in this transcendental investigation and at least to remember the interest in describe the experience of the living organism. The current thesis intends to defend, in general, the idea according to which any description of these original experience of itself must recognize, since the beginning, the basic principle of animation: Only understanding that the frame of self-affection is the animality can come to light aspects like his dynamic character and his instinctive origin.. (shrink)

Extensive and critical review of Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl and McDowell, written by van Mazijk, Corijn focussing on his discussion of McDowell.