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  1. How Can You Be so Sure? Illusionism and the Obviousness of Phenomenal Consciousness.François Kammerer - manuscript
    Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be obviously false. David Chalmers has articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a “Moorean” argument against illusionism. This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have phenomenal experiences. I argue that this argument fails, by showing that its defenders cannot maintain that its crucial premise (properly understood) has the kind (...)
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  2. Undermining Belief in Consciousness.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):34-47.
    Does consciousness exist? In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness” (MPC) David Chalmers sketches an argument for illusionism, i.e., the view that it does not. The key premise is that it would be a coincidence if our beliefs about consciousness were true, given that the explanation of those beliefs is independent of their truth. In this article, I clarify and assess this argument. I argue that our beliefs about consciousness are peculiarly invulnerable to undermining, whether or not their contents are indubitable or (...)
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  3. Conscience et matière. Une solution matérialiste au problème de l'expérience consciente.François Kammerer - 2019 - Paris, France: Editions Matériologiques.
    Voir une tache rouge, éprouver une douleur soudaine à l’épaule, sentir l’odeur du café, entendre le son d’une trompette : voilà des exemples typiques de ce qu’on appelle des «expériences conscientes». Ces expériences conscientes intéressent les philosophes de l’esprit depuis longtemps, notamment car elles semblent poser un problème fondamental à la conception matérialiste du monde. Il semble en effet extrêmement difficile de comprendre comment une expérience consciente – un vécu subjectif, qualitatif, éprouvé en première personne – peut provenir du fonctionnement (...)
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  4. The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness.Francois Kammerer - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link between phenomenality and value. For example, some situations seem good or bad in virtue of the conscious experiences they feature. Illusionist views of phenomenal consciousness then face what I call the normative challenge. They have to say where they stand regarding the idea that there is a link between (...)
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  5. Meta-Illusionism and Qualia Quietism.Pete Mandik - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):140-148.
    Many so-called problems in contemporary philosophy of mind depend for their expression on a collection of inter-defined technical terms, a few of which are qualia, phenomenal property, and what-it’s-like-ness. I express my scepticism about Keith Frankish’s illusionism, the view that people are generally subject to a systematic illusion that any properties are phenomenal, and scout the relative merits of two alternatives to Frankish’s illusionism. The first is phenomenal meta-illusionism, the view that illusionists such as Frankish, in holding their view, are (...)
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  6. O livre-arbítrio e outras questões incômodas ao fisicalismo.Daniel P. Nunes & Everaldo Cescon - 2016 - Tábano 12 (1):61-70.
    Este artigo pretende caracterizar de forma geral os posicionamentos fisicalistas na filosofia da mente e indicar como a questão do livre-arbítrio surge e pode ser crucial para tal corrente de pensamento. Primeiramente pretende mostrar a diferença entre a posição reducionista e a não-reducionista e depois salientar suas potencialidades e dificuldades na abordagem da questão do livre-arbítrio. Enfim, mesmo que a questão ainda fique em aberto, verificar-se-á que o livre-arbítrio parece não encontrar espaço no cenário apresentado pelas correntes fisicalistas.
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  7. Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences. Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium.Hieke And Leitgeb (ed.) - 2008 - The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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  8. A Somewhat Eliminativist Proposal About Phenomenal Consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - In Hieke and Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper develops a proposal about phenomenal consciousness that is (somewhat) eliminativist in two respects. First, regarded in the light of some common ways of conceiving of consciousness, the proposal is "deflationary". Second, it opens up space for a development in which what we now naturally think about as consciousness turns out to be many different things.
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  9. Daniel Dennett on the Nature of Consciousness.Susan Schneider - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 313--24.
    One of the most influential philosophical voices in the consciousness studies community is that of Daniel Dennett. Outside of consciousness studies, Dennett is well-known for his work on numerous topics, such as intentionality, artificial intelligence, free will, evolutionary theory, and the basis of religious experience. (Dennett, 1984, 1987, 1995c, 2005) In 1991, just as researchers and philosophers were beginning to turn more attention to the nature of consciousness, Dennett authored his Consciousness Explained. Consciousness Explained aimed to develop both a theory (...)
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  10. Heterophenomenology Versus Critical Phenomenology.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):221-230.
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be (...)
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  11. Epiphenomenalism.William Robinson - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of (...)
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  12. Eliminativism and Indeterminate Consciousness.Glenn Braddock - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.
    One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective time. (...)
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  13. Exit Epiphenomenalism: The Demolition of a Refuge.Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen - 2001 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 57.
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  14. Toward a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience.Georges Rey - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 123--42.
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  15. Consciousness Explained.Sonia Sedivy - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):455-483.
    The paper argues that Daniel Dennett’s reductive account of consciousness in Consciousness Explained goes against theoretical commitments driving much of his previous work. I focus on considerations for the plurality of distinctive explanation of ourselves, as they have been articulated in Dennett's earlier work, and argue that Dennett's reductive framework is not adequately supported in the face of these considerations. The paper details tensions in Dennett’s work and shows how Consciousness Explained departs from the diagnoses of the mind/body problem offered (...)
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  16. Losing Consciousness.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
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  17. General Anesthesia, Consciousness, and the Skeptical Challenge.Drakon Nikolinakos - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):88-104.
  18. Activation Vectors Versus Propositional Attitudes: How the Brain Represents Reality.Paul M. Churchland - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):419-424.
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  19. What Concept of Consciousness?A. Allport - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
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  20. Yishi, Duh, Um and Consciousness.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
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  21. Perspectives On Mind.Herbert R. Otto (ed.) - 1987 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    INTRODUCTION Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. ...
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  22. Rey Cogitans: The Unquestionability of Consciousness.David Woodruff Smith - 1987 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  23. Brains Are Not Conscious.John L. Tienson - 1987 - Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93.
  24. A Question About Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1986 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  25. Is Consciousness Important?Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43.
    The paper discusses the utility of the notion of consciousness for the behavioural and brain sciences. It describes four distinctively different senses of 'conscious', and argues that to cope with the heterogeneous phenomena loosely indicated thereby, these sciences not only do not but should not discuss them in terms of 'consciousness'. It is thus suggested that 'the problem' allegedly posed to scientists by consciousness is unreal; one need neither adopt a realist stance with respect to it, nor include the term (...)
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  26. Consciousness: The Transmutation of a Concept.Patricia S. Churchland - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):80-95.
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  27. Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol. 3.Richard J. Davidson, Sophie Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.) - 1982 - New York: Plenum.
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  28. A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1982 - In Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. New York: Plenum. pp. 1--39.
  29. The Onus Re Experiences: A Reply to Emmett.Daniel C. Dennett - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (April):315-318.
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  30. Are Dreams Experiences?Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):151.
  31. Mind as a Matter of Fact.Donald Williams - 1959 - Review of Metaphysics 13 (2):205-25.
    The definitive principle of actualism is that the world is composed wholly of actual or factual entities, including concreta like a horse and abstracta like his neigh, and the sums and the sets thereof, all on the one plane of particular and definite existents. There are no substrata of potency or prime matter, no forces or virtues, no blur of indefiniteness or press of tendency; no superstructure of unexampled essences or disembodied possibilities or transcendental acts of Be-ing. Our actual entities, (...)
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  32. On the Illusion of Consciousness.Alf Ross - 1941 - Theoria 7 (3):171-202.
  33. Scientific Method and the Existence of Consciousness.Donald C. Williams - 1934 - Psychological Review 41 (5):461-79.
  34. The Belief in Consciousness.Eliott Park Frost - 1913 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (26):716-719.