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  1. What Concept of Consciousness?A. Allport - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
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  2. Eliminativism and Indeterminate Consciousness.Glenn Braddock - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.
    One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective time. (...)
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  3. Consciousness: The Transmutation of a Concept.Patricia S. Churchland - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):80-95.
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  4. Activation Vectors Versus Propositional Attitudes: How the Brain Represents Reality.Paul M. Churchland - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):419-424.
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  5. Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol. 3.Richard J. Davidson, Sophie Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.) - 1982 - New York: Plenum.
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  6. The Onus Re Experiences: A Reply to Emmett.Daniel C. Dennett - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (April):315-318.
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  7. Are Dreams Experiences?Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):151.
  8. The Belief in Consciousness.Frost Eliott Park - 1913 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (26):716-719.
  9. Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium.Hieke And Leitgeb (ed.) - 2008 - The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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  10. General Anesthesia, Consciousness, and the Skeptical Challenge.Drakon Nikolinakos - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):88-104.
  11. Perspectives On Mind.Herbert R. Otto (ed.) - 1988 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    INTRODUCTION Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. ...
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  12. Toward a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience.Georges Rey - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 123--42.
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  13. A Question About Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1986 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  14. A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1982 - In Richard J. Davidson, Sophie Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol. 3. New York: Plenum.
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  15. Exit Epiphenomenalism: The Demolition of a Refuge.Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen - 2001 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 57.
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  16. Epiphenomenalism.William S. Robinson - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of (...)
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  17. On the Illusion of Consciousness.Alf Ross - 1941 - Theoria 7 (3):171-202.
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  18. Daniel Dennett on the Nature of Consciousness.Susan Schneider - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 313--24.
    One of the most influential philosophical voices in the consciousness studies community is that of Daniel Dennett. Outside of consciousness studies, Dennett is well-known for his work on numerous topics, such as intentionality, artificial intelligence, free will, evolutionary theory, and the basis of religious experience. (Dennett, 1984, 1987, 1995c, 2005) In 1991, just as researchers and philosophers were beginning to turn more attention to the nature of consciousness, Dennett authored his Consciousness Explained. Consciousness Explained aimed to develop both a theory (...)
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  19. Rey Cogitans: The Unquestionability of Consciousness.David Woodruff Smith - 1987 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  20. A Somewhat Eliminativist Proposal About Phenomenal Consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - In Hieke and Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper develops a proposal about phenomenal consciousness that is (somewhat) eliminativist in two respects. First, regarded in the light of some common ways of conceiving of consciousness, the proposal is "deflationary". Second, it opens up space for a development in which what we now naturally think about as consciousness turns out to be many different things.
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  21. Brains Are Not Conscious.John L. Tienson - 1987 - Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93.
  22. Losing Consciousness.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
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  23. Yishi, Duh, Um and Consciousness.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
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  24. Is Consciousness Important?Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43.
    The paper discusses the utility of the notion of consciousness for the behavioural and brain sciences. It describes four distinctively different senses of 'conscious', and argues that to cope with the heterogeneous phenomena loosely indicated thereby, these sciences not only do not but should not discuss them in terms of 'consciousness'. It is thus suggested that 'the problem' allegedly posed to scientists by consciousness is unreal; one need neither adopt a realist stance with respect to it, nor include the term (...)
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  25. Mind as a Matter of Fact.Donald C. Williams - 1959 - Review of Metaphysics 13 (December):205-25.
  26. Scientific Method and the Existence of Consciousness.Donald C. Williams - 1934 - Psychological Review 41 (5):461-79.