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  1. Neo-Sellarsian Metaphilosophy.T. Parent - manuscript
    This draft now appears (in revised form) as the Preamble to _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
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  2. How Beliefs Are Like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - forthcoming - Synthese:1-30.
    Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between *attitudes* of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic *cognitive states* of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states (...)
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  3. The Science of Belief: A Progress Report.Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science 1.
    The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic (...)
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  4. How to Think About the Debate Over the Reality of Beliefs.Krzysztof Poslajko - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed, there is a possibility to reformulate the division in question. The background assumption of the proposal is the framework of deflationism about truth and existence: it will be (...)
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  5. Minds, Materials and Metaphors.Adam Toon - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    What is the relationship between mental states and items of material culture, like notebooks, maps or lists? The extended mind thesis (ExM) offers an influential and controversial answer to this question. According to ExM, items of material culture can form part of the material basis for our mental states. Although ExM offers a radical view of the location of mental states, it fits comfortably with a traditional, representationalist account of the nature of those states. I argue that proponents of ExM (...)
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  6. Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Present State of Connectionism.Vanja Subotić - 2021 - Theoria: Beograd 1 (64):173-196.
    Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul (...)
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  7. As If: Idealization and Ideals, by Kwame Anthony Appiah.Adam Toon - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):275-283.
    As If: Idealization and Ideals, by AppiahKwame Anthony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. Pp. xvi + 218.
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  8. Eliminative Materialism and Ordinary Language.Daniel Lorca & Eric LaRock - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):419-426.
    Advocates of eliminative materialism (EM) assure us that our current, ordinary approach to describing the mind will eventually be eliminated, instead of reduced, by a matured neuroscience. However, once we take into account the flexibility, explanatory power, and overall sophistication of ordinary language, then the promissory note offered by eliminative materialism loses all credibility. To bolster the preceding claim, we present three original problems for EM: the accountability problem, the substitution problem, and the discourse dependence problem.
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  9. Eliminativism: The Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):181-195.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a new reading of eliminative materialism concerning propositional attitudes, along the lines of broadly understood Carnapian metametaphysics. According to the proposed reading, eliminativism should be seen as a normative metalinguistic claim that we should dispose of terms like “beliefs” and associated linguistic rules. It will be argued that such reading allows a significant philosophical problem which besets eliminativism to be solved: the problem of representation. The general idea of the problem of representation, (...)
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  10. La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje revelada en los escritos de Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle (revisado en 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4TH Edición. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 2-102.
    Proporciono un estudio crítico de algunos de los principales hallazgos de Wittgenstein y Searle sobre la estructura lógica de la intencionalidad (mente, lenguaje, comportamiento), tomando como punto de partida el descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein, que todos los problemas verdaderamente ' filosóficos ' son los mismos — confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y por lo que todas las soluciones son las mismas — observando cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para que (...)
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  11. Davor Pećnjak and Tomislav Janović, Towards Dualism: Essays in Philosophy of Mind, Ibis Grafika: Zagreb, 2016. [REVIEW]Luca Malatesti - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (2):47-52.
    BOOK REVIEW: Davor Pećnjak, Tomislav Janović PREMA DUALIZMU. OGLEDI IZ FILOZOFIJE UMA (Towards Dualism: Essays in Philosophy of Mind) Ibis grafika: Zagreb, 2016.
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  12. Pučka psihologija: znanstvene perspektive realizma, eliminativizma i instrumentalizma.Marin Biondić - 2017 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 37 (3):559-578.
    U radu analiziram realisticki, eliminativisticki i instrumentalisticki pristup prema mental­nom diskursu pucke psihologije. Temeljna ideja razmatranje je pucke psihologije kao teorije koja objasnjava i predviđa ponasanje. Ako je pucka psihologija teorija, onda se mora moći reducirati na ili inkorporirati u dobro ucvrscene znanstvene fizikalne teorije, neuroznanost prvenstveno. Pitanje je, je li tako nesto barem principijelno moguce? Trebamo li ocekivati znanstvenu redukciju entiteta pucke psihologije ili je realno za ocekivati njenu eliminaciju iz znanstvenog objasnjenja i predviđanja ponasanja utoliko, ukoliko se ne (...)
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  13. Regulation, Normativity and Folk Psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Topoi 39 (1):57-67.
    Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those similarities, (...)
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  14. The Expressive Function of Folk Psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.
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  15. When Does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological?Eric Hochstein - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1125-1147.
    It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk and scientific psychology that (...)
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  16. Pain Eliminativism: Scientific and Traditional.Jennifer Corns - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).
    Traditional eliminativism is the view that a term should be eliminated from everyday speech due to failures of reference. Following Edouard Machery, we may distinguish this traditional eliminativism about a kind and its term from a scientific eliminativism according to which a term should be eliminated from scientific discourse due to a lack of referential utility. The distinction matters if any terms are rightly retained for daily life despite being rightly eliminated from scientific inquiry. In this article, I argue that (...)
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  17. The Belief Illusion.J. Christopher Jenson - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):965-995.
    I offer a new argument for the elimination of ‘beliefs’ from cognitive science based on Wimsatt’s concept of robustness and a related concept of fragility. Theoretical entities are robust if multiple independent means of measurement produce invariant results in detecting them. Theoretical entities are fragile when multiple independent means of detecting them produce highly variant results. I argue that sufficiently fragile theoretical entities do not exist. Recent studies in psychology show radical variance between what self-report and non-verbal behaviour indicate about (...)
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  18. Fictionalism and the Folk.Adam Toon - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):280-295.
    Mental fictionalism is the view that, even if mental states do not exist, it is useful to talk as if they do. Mental states are useful fictions. Recent philosophy of mind has seen a growing interest in mental fictionalism. To date, much of the discussion has concerned the general features of the approach. In this paper, I develop a specific form of mental fictionalism by drawing on Kendall Walton’s work on make-believe. According to the approach I propose, talk of mental (...)
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  19. The View From Vector Space: An Account of Conceptual Geography.Joshua Stein - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):71-91.
  20. Why We May Not Find Intentions in the Brain.Sebo Uithol, Daniel C. Burnston & Pim Haselager - 2014 - Neuropsychologia 56 (5):129-139.
    Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of ‘intention’ in neuroscientific explanations (...)
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  21. In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious.T. Parent - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):605-621.
    Here I explore the prospects for fictionalism about the mental, modeled after fictionalism about possible worlds. Mental fictionalism holds that the mental states posited by folk psychology do not exist, yet that some sentences of folk psychological discourse are true. This is accomplished by construing truths of folk psychology as “truths according to the mentalistic fiction.” After formulating the view, I identify five ways that the view appears self-refuting. Moreover, I argue that this cannot be fixed by semantic ascent or (...)
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  22. Challenges for Artificial Cognitive Systems.Antoni Gomila & Vincent C. Müller - 2012 - Journal of Cognitive Science 13 (4):452-469.
    The declared goal of this paper is to fill this gap: “... cognitive systems research needs questions or challenges that define progress. The challenges are not (yet more) predictions of the future, but a guideline to what are the aims and what would constitute progress.” – the quotation being from the project description of EUCogII, the project for the European Network for Cognitive Systems within which this formulation of the ‘challenges’ was originally developed (http://www.eucognition.org). So, we stick out our neck (...)
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  23. Minds, Models and Mechanisms: A New Perspective on Intentional Psychology.Eric Hochstein - 2012 - Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 24 (4):547-557.
    In this article, I argue that intentional psychology (i.e. the interpretation of human behaviour in terms of intentional states and propositional attitudes) plays an essential role in the sciences of the mind. However, this role is not one of identifying scientifically respectable states of the world. Rather, I argue that intentional psychology acts as a type of phenomenological model, as opposed to a mechanistic one. I demonstrate that, like other phenomenological models in science, intentional psychology is a methodological tool with (...)
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  24. Restrictive Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Bennett Holman - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):61-70.
    It has been argued that naturalizing the mind will result in the elimination of the ontology of folk psychology (e.g. beliefs and desires). This paper draws from a wide range of empirical literature, including from developmental and cross-cultural psychology, in building an argument for a position dubbed restrictive materialism . The position holds that while the ontology of folk psychology is overextended, there is a restricted domain in which the application of the folk ontology remains secure. From the evidence of (...)
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  25. Beyond Eliminative Materialism: Some Unnoticed Implications of Churchland’s Pragmatic Pluralism.Teed Rockwell - 2011 - Contemporary Pragmatism 8 (1):173-189.
    Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as his epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense; cannot (...)
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  26. Telling Tales.Kristin Andrews - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):227-235.
    In the twenty-five or so years since Paul Churchland proposed its elimination, defenders of folk psychology have argued for the ubiquity of propositional attitude attribution in human social cognition. If we didn’t understand others in terms of their beliefs and desires, we would see others as ‘‘baffling ciphers’’ and it would be ‘‘the end of the world’’. Because the world continues, and we seem to predict and explain what others do with a remarkable degree of accuracy, the advocates of folk (...)
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  27. Folk Psychology as Narrative Practice.Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6 - 8.
    There has been a long-standing interest in the putative roles that various so-called ‘theory of mind’ abilities might play in enabling us to understand and enjoy narratives. Of late, as our understanding of the complexity and diversity of everyday psychological capacities has become more nuanced and variegated, new possibilities have been articulated: (i) that our capacity for a sophisticated, everyday understanding of actions in terms of reason (our folk psychology) may itself be best characterized as a kind of narrative practice (...)
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  28. Eliminativism and the Theory of Reference.Frank Jackson - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 14--62.
  29. It’s in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and (...)
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  30. The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism.Paul M. Churchland - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  31. Diderot's Egg: Divorcing Materialism From Eliminativism.Isabelle Stengers - 2007 - Radical Philosophy 144:7-15.
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  32. Arguing for Eliminativism. Berm - 2006 - In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  33. Eliminative Materialism [Selection From Matter and Consciousness].Paul M. Churchland - 2006 - In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 115.
    The identity theory was called into doubt not because the prospects for a materialist account of our mental capacities were thought to be poor, but because it seemed unlikely that the arrival of an adequate materialist theory would bring with it the nice one-to-one match-ups, between the concepts of folk psychology and the concepts of theoretical neuroscience, that intertheoretic reduction requires. The reason for that doubt was the great variety of quite different physical systems that could instantiate the required functional (...)
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  34. The Overdetermination Argument Against Eliminativism.Charles M. Hermes - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):113-119.
  35. Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers.Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) - 2006 - Kluwer/Springer Press.
    This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze and question key assumptions about the nature, scope and function of folk psychology.
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  36. Mind As a Scientific Object.Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
  37. What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson - 2005 - In Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
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  38. The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture.D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    What holds together the various fields, which - considered together - are supposed to constitute the general intellectual discipline that people now call cognitive science? Some theorists identify the common subject matter as the mind, but scientists have not been able to agree on any single, satisfactory answer to the question of what the mind is. This book argues that all cognitive sciences are not equal, and that rather only neurophysiology and cultural psychology are suited to account for the mind's (...)
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  39. Paul Churchland.Brian L. Keeley (ed.) - 2005 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  40. A Particularly Compelling Refutation of Eliminative Materialism.William Lycan - 2005 - In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.
    The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations.
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  41. The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture.Christina E. Erneling (ed.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Clearly the Cartesian ontological commitments that have dominated the scientific study of the mind up to the present have not been helpful. ...
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  42. What Does It Take to Be a True Believer?David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2004 - In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press. pp. 211.
    Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological” state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such.
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  43. Commonsense Refutations of Eliminativism.Ausonio Marras - 2004 - In Christina E. Erneling (ed.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press. pp. 206.
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  44. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul Churchland - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  45. Transcendental Arguments Against Eliminativism.Robert Lockie - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):569-589.
    Eliminativism was targeted by transcendental arguments from the first. Three responses to these arguments have emerged from the eliminativist literature, the heart of which is that such arguments are question-begging. These responses are shown to be incompatible with the position, eliminativism, they are meant to defend. Out of these failed responses is developed a general transcendental argument against eliminativism (the "Paradox of Abandonment"). Eliminativists have anticipated this argument, but their six different attempts to counter it are shown to be separately (...)
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  46. Eliminative Materialism and the Integrity of Science.Michael M. Pitman - 2003 - South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):207-219.
    Eliminative Materialism holds that propositional attitude folk psychology is a radically false theory of human, cognition, communication and behaviour. The paper reviews the argument that Eliminative Materialism is self-defeating. Although the argument is unsuccessful, it is argued that Eliminative Materialism ought to be considered epistemically self-undermining. Eliminative Materialism's truth would undermine the epistemic warrant of the theories (from cognitive neuroscience) typically taken as motivating the eliminativist thesis. Eliminative materialism fails to recognise that, in the psychological sciences, the mind is both (...)
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  47. Folk Psychology and the Gauntlet of Irrealism.Jonathan A. Waskan - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):627-655.
  48. The Myth of the Mind.William W. Tait - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):65-74.
    Of course, I do not mean by the title of this paper to deny the existence of something called.
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  49. Can We Turn a Blind Eye to Eliminativism?Francisco Calvo Garzón - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):485-498.
    In this paper I shall reply to two arguments that Stephen Stich (1990; 1991; 1996) has recently put forward against the thesis of eliminative materialism. In a nutshell, Stich argues that (i) the thesis of eliminative materialism, according to which propositional attitudes don't exist, is neither true nor false, and that (ii) even if it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To support (i) and (ii) Stich relies on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of reference (...)
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  50. Računala, mozak i ljudski um.Nenad Miščević & Nenad Smokrović (eds.) - 2001 - Rijeka: Izdavački centar Rijeka.