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  1. Telling Tales.Kristin Andrews - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):227-235.
    In the twenty-five or so years since Paul Churchland proposed its elimination, defenders of folk psychology have argued for the ubiquity of propositional attitude attribution in human social cognition. If we didn’t understand others in terms of their beliefs and desires, we would see others as ‘‘baffling ciphers’’ and it would be ‘‘the end of the world’’. Because the world continues, and we seem to predict and explain what others do with a remarkable degree of accuracy, the advocates of folk (...)
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  2. It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and (...)
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  3. Eliminativism and an Argument From Science.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):180-188.
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  4. A Reply to Johnson's "Review of Saving Belief".Lynne Rudder Baker - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):67 - 68.
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  5. Cognitive Suicide.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press. pp. 401--13.
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  6. The Threat of Cognitive Suicide.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - In Saving Belief. Princeton University Press. pp. 134-148.
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  7. Arguing for Eliminativism. Berm - 2006 - In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  8. Saving Eliminativism.Rod Bertolet - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):87-100.
    This paper contests Lynne Rudder Baker's claim to have shown that eliminative materialism is bound to fail on purely conceptual grounds. It is argued that Baker's position depends on knowing that certain developments in science cannot occur, and that we cannot know that this is so. Consequently, the sort of argument Baker provides is question-begging. For similar reasons, the confidence that the proponents of eliminative materialism have in it is misplaced.
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  9. Revisionary Physicalism.John Bickle - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (4):411-30.
    The focus of much recent debate between realists and eliminativists about the propositional attitudes obscures the fact that a spectrum of positions lies between these celebrated extremes. Appealing to an influential theoretical development in cognitive neurobiology, I argue that there is reason to expect such an “intermediate” outcome. The ontology that emerges is a revisionary physicalism. The argument draws lessons about revisionistic reductions from an important historical example, the reduction of equilibrium thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and applies them to the (...)
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  10. Pučka psihologija: znanstvene perspektive realizma, eliminativizma i instrumentalizma.Marin Biondić - 2017 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 37 (3):559-578.
    U radu analiziram realisticki, eliminativisticki i instrumentalisticki pristup prema mental­nom diskursu pucke psihologije. Temeljna ideja razmatranje je pucke psihologije kao teorije koja objasnjava i predviđa ponasanje. Ako je pucka psihologija teorija, onda se mora moći reducirati na ili inkorporirati u dobro ucvrscene znanstvene fizikalne teorije, neuroznanost prvenstveno. Pitanje je, je li tako nesto barem principijelno moguce? Trebamo li ocekivati znanstvenu redukciju entiteta pucke psihologije ili je realno za ocekivati njenu eliminaciju iz znanstvenog objasnjenja i predviđanja ponasanja utoliko, ukoliko se ne (...)
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  11. A Defense of Folk Psychology.Paul K. Blunt - 1992 - International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):487-498.
  12. Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Common Sense Psychology.Radu J. Bogdan (ed.) - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    The contributors to this volume examine recent controversies about the importance of common sense psychology for our understanding of the human mind. Common sense provides a familiar and friendly psychological scheme by which to talk about the mind. Its categories tend to portray the mind as quite different from the rest of nature, and thus irreducible to physical matters and its laws. In this volume a variety of positions on common sense psychology from critical to supportive, from exegetical to speculative, (...)
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  13. Mental Attitudes and Common Sense Psychology: The Case Against Elimination.Radu J. Bogdan - 1988 - Noûs 22 (3):369-398.
    Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary and principles implicitly define what counts (...)
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  14. Elimination, Enlightenment and the Normative Content of Folk Psychology.Jane Braaten - 1988 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (3):251–268.
  15. Robert N. McCauley, Ed., The Churchlands and Their Critics Reviewed By.Selmer Bringsjord - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19 (1):39-41.
  16. Robert N. McCauley, Ed., The Churchlands and Their Critics. [REVIEW]Selmer Bringsjord - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19:39-41.
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  17. What Motivates Eliminativism?Keith Campbell - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):206-210.
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  18. The Falsity of Folk Theories: Implications for Psychology and Philosophy.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford - 1996 - In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. pp. 244--256.
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  19. Reduction, Elimination, and Firewalking.Colin Cheyne - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):349-357.
    Schwartz (1991) argues that the worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental is a needless worry. He examines cases of reduction from the natural sciences and claims that if reduction of the mental is like any of those cases then it would not be a case of elimination. I discuss other cases of scientific reduction which do involve elimination. Schwartz has not shown that reduction of the mental could not be like such cases, so his argument (...)
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  20. Language and Nature.Noam Chomsky - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):1-61.
  21. Replies From the Churchlands.P. M. Churchland & P. S. Churchland - 1996 - In Robert N. McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell. pp. 217--306.
  22. Clark's Connectionist Defense of Folk Psychology.P. M. Churchland & P. S. Churchland - 1996 - In Robert N. McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell. pp. 250--5.
  23. Language, Thought, and Information Processing.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1980 - Noûs 14 (2):147-70.
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  24. The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism.Paul M. Churchland - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  25. Eliminative Materialism [Selection From Matter and Consciousness].Paul M. Churchland - 2006 - In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 115.
    The identity theory was called into doubt not because the prospects for a materialist account of our mental capacities were thought to be poor, but because it seemed unlikely that the arrival of an adequate materialist theory would bring with it the nice one-to-one match-ups, between the concepts of folk psychology and the concepts of theoretical neuroscience, that intertheoretic reduction requires. The reason for that doubt was the great variety of quite different physical systems that could instantiate the required functional (...)
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  26. Theory, Taxonomy, and Methodology: A Reply to Haldane's Understanding Folk.Paul M. Churchland - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:313-19.
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  27. Evaluating Our Self-Conception.Paul M. Churchland - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):211-22.
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  28. A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - MIT Press.
    A Neurocomputationial Perspective illustrates the fertility of the concepts and data drawn from the study of the brain and of artificial networks that model the...
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  29. Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:225-241.
  30. On the Speculative Nature of Our Self-Conception.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:157-173.
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  31. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
    This article describes a theory of the computations underlying the selection of coordinated motion patterns, especially in reaching tasks. The central idea is that when a spatial target is selected as an object to be reached, stored postures are evaluated for the contributions they can make to the task. Weights are assigned to the stored postures, and a single target posture is found by taking a weighted sum of the stored postures. Movement is achieved by reducing the distance between the (...)
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  32. Dealing in Futures: Folk Psychology and the Role of Representations in Cognitive Science.Andy Clark - 1996 - In Robert N. McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell.
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  33. The Varieties of Eliminativism: Sentential, Intentional and Catastrophic.Andy Clark - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):223-233.
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  34. Beyond Eliminativism.Andy Clark - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (4):251-79.
  35. The Empirical Virtues of Belief.Andrew Cling - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):303-23.
    Abstract Meeting the eliminativist challenge to folk psychology requires showing that beliefs have explanatory virtues unlikely to be duplicated by non?cognitive accounts of behavior. The explanatory power of beliefs is rooted in their intentionality. That beliefs have a distinctive kind of intentionality is shown by the distinctive intensionality of the sentences which report them. Contrary to Fodor, the fundamental explanatory virtues of beliefs are not to be found in their capacity to make causally inactive properties relevant to the explanation of (...)
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  36. Eliminative Materialism and Self-Referential Inconsistency.Andrew Cling - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (May):53-75.
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  37. Disappearance and Knowledge.Andrew D. Cling - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):226-47.
    Paul Churchland argues that the continuity of human intellectual development provides evidence against folk psychology and traditional epistemology, since these latter find purchase only at the later stages of intellectual development. He supports this contention with an analogy from the history of thermodynamics. Careful attention to the thermodynamics analogy shows that the argument from continuity does not provide independent support for eliminative materialism. The argument also rests upon claims about continuity which do not support the claim that the continuity of (...)
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  38. Pain Eliminativism: Scientific and Traditional.Jennifer Corns - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).
    Traditional eliminativism is the view that a term should be eliminated from everyday speech due to failures of reference. Following Edouard Machery, we may distinguish this traditional eliminativism about a kind and its term from a scientific eliminativism according to which a term should be eliminated from scientific discourse due to a lack of referential utility. The distinction matters if any terms are rightly retained for daily life despite being rightly eliminated from scientific inquiry. In this article, I argue that (...)
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  39. Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons.Eric Dietrich (ed.) - 1994 - Academic Press.
  40. More on the Ineliminable Intentional: A Reply to Churchland.Richard Double - 1987 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (2):219–225.
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  41. Science, Folk Theory, and Popular Ignorance: The Case Against Eliminativism.Thomas Duddy - 1997 - The European Legacy 2 (7):1177-1184.
  42. The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture.Christina E. Erneling (ed.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Clearly the Cartesian ontological commitments that have dominated the scientific study of the mind up to the present have not been helpful. ...
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  43. Mind As a Scientific Object.Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
  44. The Expressive Function of Folk Psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.
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  45. The Elimination of Mental Defect.Ronald Aylmer Fisher - 1924 - The Eugenics Review 16 (2):114.
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  46. Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum.J. A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  47. Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science Reviewed By.Jeffrey Foss - 1990 - Philosophy in Review 10 (10):399-402.
  48. A Materialist's Misgivings About Eliminative Materialism.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:105-33.
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  49. The Threat of Eliminativism.Elizabeth Fricker - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.
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  50. Can We Turn a Blind Eye to Eliminativism?Francisco Calvo Garzón - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):485-498.
    In this paper I shall reply to two arguments that Stephen Stich (1990; 1991; 1996) has recently put forward against the thesis of eliminative materialism. In a nutshell, Stich argues that (i) the thesis of eliminative materialism, according to which propositional attitudes don't exist, is neither true nor false, and that (ii) even if it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To support (i) and (ii) Stich relies on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of reference (...)
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