Embodied Memory

Cognitive constructs are explored for clinical psychologists interested in cognitive phenomena in depression. Both traditional and modern memory constructs are outlined and described with attention to their contribution to understanding depression. In particular, the notions of memory construction, self-schemas, and autobiographical memory (per [Conway, M.A. (2001). Sensory–perceptual episodic memory and its context: Autobiographical memory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: Biological Sciences, 356, 1375–1384.]) are discussed. Then, the phenomenon of implicit memory is described as a way to bring (...) these constructs together to understand depression. The Rehm and Naus (1990) [Rehm, L.P., and Naus, M.J. (1990). A memory model of emotion. In Ingram, R.E. (Ed.), Contemporary Psychological Approaches to Depression (pp. 23–35). New York: Plenum Press.] memory model of emotion is updated and expanded to include these cognitive constructs, and depression is viewed from the perspective of understanding interactions between explicit and implicit memory processes. (shrink)

Is the memory of touching always disguised by senses that forget where they come from? Creating distancethrough a mastery that constitutes the object as a monument built in place of the subject’s disappearance.The memory of touching? The most insistent and the most difficult to enter into memory. The one that entailsreturning to a commitment whose beginning and end cannot be recovered.Memory of the flesh, where that which has not yet been written is inscribed, laid down? That which has a place,has (...) taken place, but has no language. The felt, which expresses itself for the first time. Declares itself to theother in silence.One must remember this and hope that the other remembers. Lodge it in a memory that serves as its bedand its nest, while waiting for the other to understand. Make a cradle for him inside and out while leaving himfree, and keep oneself in the memory of the strength that revealed itself, that acted. (Irigaray, 215–16). (shrink)

Do dissociations imply independent systems? In the memory field, the view that there are independent implicit and explicit memory systems has been predominantly supported by dissociation evidence. Here, we argue that many of these dissociations do not necessarily imply distinct memory systems. We review recent work with a single-system computational model that extends signal-detection theory (SDT) to implicit memory. SDT has had a major influence on research in a variety of domains. The current work shows that it can be broadened (...) even further in its range of application. Indeed, the single-system model that we present does surprisingly well in accounting for some key dissociations that have been taken as evidence for independent implicit and explicit memory systems. (shrink)

In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a major theoretical debate in the memory domain regarding the multiple memory systems and processing modes frameworks. The components of processing framework argued for a middle ground: Instead of neatly divided memory systems or processing modes, this framework proposed the existence of numerous processing components that are recruited in different combinations by memory tasks and yield complex patterns of associations and dissociations. Because behavioral evidence was not sufficient to decide among these three frameworks, (...) the debate was largely abandoned. However, functional neuroimaging evidence accumulated during the last two decades resolves the stalemate, because this evidence is more consistent with the components framework than with the other two frameworks. For example, functional neuroimaging evidence shows that brain regions attributed to one memory system can contribute to tasks associated with other memory systems and that brain regions attributed to the same processing mode (perceptual or conceptual) can be dissociated from each other. Functional neuroimaging evidence suggests that memory processes are supported by transient interactions between a few regions called process-specific alliances. These conceptual developments are an example of how functional neuroimaging can contribute to theoretical debates in cognitive psychology. (shrink)

The self, Joseph LeDoux tells us, is “the totality of the living organism”. Most disciplines in the natural sciences focus on only one or two levels of organization. Indeed, Dmitri Mendeleev figured out the periodic table of the elements without knowing any of the underlying quantum mechanics or stereochemistry. There are, however, at least a dozen levels of organization within the neurosciences — and, if we use a metaphor, we temporarily create yet another. This leads to considerable confusion and arguments (...) at cross purposes over whether learning is an alteration at the level of gene expression, ion channels, synapses, neurons or circuits. Each neuron has thousands of synapses, which produce currents that summate to form an impulse train. But only rarely is the activity of a single neuron sufficient to cause a perception or trigger an action. Neurons usually act as members of ‘committees’ — what Donald Hebb in 1949 called cellassemblies. Just as in academia, one individual may function in different committees on different occasions. A concept, including any explicit memory that we can talk about, is probably formed by such a committee. Implicit memories are less differentiated — they are part of the ‘feltwork’, together with motivations and emotions, that biases the choice of one’s next act. In this well-written 400-page appreciation of behavioural neuroscience, LeDoux argues that synapses are the seat of self. He says, in effect, that you are your memories; that it is the uniqueness of an array of synaptic strengths that distinguishes one twin from another. Fair enough, but why not instead focus on one’s unique array of ion channels? Or neurons, because a neuron is the closest thing we have to a computational unit? Or one’s unique arrangement of those overlapping, redundant hebbian committees? None of these make for a catchy book title, but relating other things to the synapses proves to be a good way of covering a lot of fascinating material at the overlying levels, including a few updates to LeDoux’s earlier book The Emotional Brain. (shrink)

Edward S. Casey provides a thorough description of the varieties of human memory, including recognizing and reminding, reminiscing and commemorating, body memory and place memory. The preface to the new edition extends the scope of the original text to include issues of collective memory, forgetting, and traumatic memory, and aligns this book with Casey's newest work on place and space. This ambitious study demonstrates that nothing in our lives is unaffected by remembering.

Recent research in cognitive science has demonstrated that there are differe nt types of memory processes. While declarative memory refers to memories for facts or events which can be recalled, procedural memories underlie skills yet encode information which cannot be recalled. This paper extends this distinction to the nature of emotions and emotional memories. Its implications for psychoanalytic theory are then examined, yielding fresh views of transference, defense, and treatment. Infantile amnesia is found to result partially from the immaturity of (...) the declarative memory system, yet procedural memories encode transference expectations and provide continuity in emotional functioning from early childhood onward. In this light, psychoanalytic treatment is conceptualized as the modification of emotional procedures. Two general methods for modifying procedures are then described, which provide a new model, grounded in current memory research, for understanding therapeutic change through insight and thrugh a new emotional experience with the psychoanalyst. (shrink)

Most studies of memory as a cultural faculty focus on written practices and how they are transmitted. This study concentrates on incorporated practices and provides an account of how these things are transmitted in and as traditions. The author argues that images and recollected knowledge of the past are conveyed and sustained by ritual performances, and that performative memory is bodily. This is an essential aspect of social memory that until now has been badly neglected.

We are sympathetic to most of what Glenberg says in his target article, but we consider it common wisdom rather than something radically new. Others have argued persuasively against the idea of abstraction in cognition, for example. On the other hand, Hebbian connectionism cannot get along without the idea of association, at least at the neural level.

The author reviews a contemporary cognitive psychology perspective on memory that views memory as being composed of multiple separate systems. Most researchers draw a fundamental distinction between declarative/explicit and non-declarative/implicit forms of memory. Declarative memory is responsible for the conscious recollection of facts and events - what is typically meant by the everyday and the common psychoanalytic use of the word ‘memory’. Non-declarative forms of memory, in contrast, are specialised processes that influence experience and behaviour without representing the past in (...) terms of any consciously accessible content. They operate outside of an individual's awareness, but are not repressed or otherwise dynamically unconscious. Using this theoretical framework, the question of how childhood relationship experiences are carried forward from the past to influence the present is examined. It is argued that incorporating a conceptualisation of non-declarative memory processing into psychoanalytic theory is essential. Non-declarative memory processes are capable of forming complex and sophisticated representations of the interpersonal world. These non-declarative memory processes exert a major impact on interpersonal experience and behaviour that needs to be analysed on its own terms and not mistakenly viewed as a form of resistance. (shrink)

(1) Non-projectable properties as opposed to the clamping of projectable properties play a primary role in triggering and guiding human action. (2) Embodiment in language-mediated memories should be qualified: (a) Language imposes a radical discretization on body constraints (second-order embodiment). (b) Metaphors rely on second-order embodiment. (c) Language users sometimes suspend embodiment.

Remembrance is constitutive of music. For music emerges not as an isolated physical stimulus. Rather, it is experienced, i.e., a present musical moment is tied to its temporal antecedents. It is tempting to conceive of remembrance as repetition and as thus opposed to oblivion. Yet to memory selectivity is crucial. What is not selected, falls into oblivion. Hence as we remember we have forgotten already. The present moment evokes remembrance, and exhibits what was then in the light of what is (...) now. Remembrance changes the past it recovers. Listening to music, we may experience anamnesis to be metamorphosis. (shrink)

Most cognitive scientists are committed to some version of representationalism, the view that intelligent behavior is caused by internal processes that involve computations over representations. Phenomenologists, however, argue that certain types of intelligent behavior, engaged coping skills, are nonrepresentational. Recent neuroscientific work on multiple memory systems indicates that while many types of intelligent behavior are representational, the types of intelligent behavior cited by phenomenologists are indeed nonrepresentational. This neuroscientific research thus vindicates a key phenomenological claim about the nature of intelligent (...) behaviour. It also provides a framework for the ongoing reconciliation of cognitive science and phenomenology. (shrink)

This paper explores the connection between body and memory for the people of the Lelet Plateau of central New Ireland. Through an examination of the processes by which memories of mortuary feasts are created and circulated, I draw attention to the embodied nature of memory as a central facet in the politics of feasting. The approach taken here differs from other prevailing approaches to the body and memory in its exploration of the ways in which memories are created through and (...) within the body, rather than seeing the body, or things representing the body, as signs that are utilised for remembering. In particular, I examine the forms of sorcery which target the participants' bodies, making them experience diarrhoea as a mnemonic process. It is through this that a significant memory of the feast is created, one which stands out notably from numerous other memories, and is the means by which remembrance of the event is transformed into fame for the host. (shrink)

New research findings of the development and organization of the mind, brain, and behavior bolster the ongoing relational- or intersubjective-field paradigmatic revision of psychoanalytic theory. A multisystems view of learning, memory, and knowledge provide us with a more complex picture of information processing that has fundamental implications for a psychoanalytic theory of therapeutic action. If the implicit and explicit learning/memory systems are viewed as parallel processes, not easily translatable from one to the other, then new implicit relational experience carries considerably (...) more power as compared to explicit/declarative processing in changing and establishing new implicit mental models. When these cognitive processing systems are viewed as more closely interconnected with a developmental emphasis on connecting them through language, then exploratory/interpretive work becomes more central. REM, dream, infant, and cognitive research evidence suggests that imagistic symbolic capacity exists at birth. Learning and remembering using imagistic symbolic processing could suggest a more easily translatable connection with later developed verbal symbolic processing and a closer, although varied, interconnection between implicit and explicit (symbolic) memory systems. Explicit attitudes are more directly modifiable through an explicit/declarative focus. Implicit mental models, it is proposed, are variably modifiable through two different change processes: (1) accommodation or transformation of expectancies through new implicit procedural experience (not requiring explicit focus) and (2) diminished activation and increased capacity to deactivate implicit mental models through explicit/declarative processing and the establishment of contrasting implicit models through new implicit procedural experience. (shrink)

In his oft-cited book Descartes' Error, Antonio Damasio claims that Descartes is responsible for having stifled the development of modern neurobiological science, in particular as regards the objective study of the physical and physiological bases for emotive and socially-conditioned cognition. Most of Damasio’s book would stand without reference to Descartes, so it is intriguing to ask why he launched this attack. What seems to fuel such claims is a desire for a more holistic understanding of the mind, the brain and (...) the self. For Descartes however, here allowed to answer back, the question of accounting for the whole diversity of human potential experiences was what could not be left out of sight. Concerning the question of his neglect of the mind said to be "abysmally" detached from the body, it is claimed here that, in the light of Descartes' move which was to break with the scholastic practice of putting more and more things under the control of the soul, the program of using the reality of embodiment to understand the mind was one he actually started. An answer is also suggested to counter the charge that Descartes failed to account for the interaction of the two substances, the mind and the material body, by showing why and how Descartes actually believed in the substantial union of mind and body. Yet, he kept in the picture an ingenium, a faculty of pure understanding overarching a cybernetic model of the body-mind, of which we also here seek to appreciate the significance. This project of accounting for the mind-body interaction ended-up in a study the "passions," as emotions were then called. (shrink)

A basic claim of the embodiment framework is that all psychological processes are influenced by body morphology, sensory systems, motor systems, and emotions. As such, the framework holds the promise of providing a unifying perspective for psychological research. This article begins with a sketch of several arguments, from evolution to philosophy, as to why the embodiment framework is a good bet. These arguments are followed by a review of approaches to embodiment, including those from cognitive linguistics, perceptual symbol theory, and (...) action-based theories. Finally, examples are provided for how a unifying perspective might work for cognition (including language and memory), cognitive and social development, social psychology, neuroscience, clinical psychology, and psychology applied to education. (shrink)

I address the commentators' calls for clarification of theoretical terms, discussion of similarities to other proposals, and extension of the ideas. In doing so, I keep the focus on the purpose of memory: enabling the organism to make sense of its environment so that it can take action appropriate to constraints resulting from the physical, personal, social, and cultural situations.

Standard models of cognition are built from abstract, amodal, arbitrary symbols, and the meanings of those symbols are given solely by their interrelations. The target article (Glenberg 1997t) argues that these models must be inadequate because meaning cannot arise from relations among abstract symbols. For cognitive representations to be meaningful they must, at the least, be grounded; but abstract symbols are difficult, if not impossible, to ground. As an alternative, the target article developed a framework in which representations are grounded (...) in perception and action, and hence are embodied. Recent work (Glenberg & Robertson 1999; 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak 2002; Kaschak & Glenberg 2000) extends this framework to language. (shrink)

In the history of external information systems, the World Wide Web presents a significant change in terms of the accessibility and amount of available information. Constant access to various kinds of online information has consequences for the way we think, act and remember. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently started to examine the interactions between the human mind and the Web, mainly focussing on the way online information influences our biological memory systems. In this article, we use concepts from the (...) extended cognition and distributed cognition frameworks and from transactive memory theory to analyse the cognitive relations between humans and the Web. We first argue that while neither of these approaches neatly capture the nature of human-Web interactions, both offer useful concepts to describe aspects of such interactions. We then conceptualize relations between the Web and its users in terms of cognitive integration, arguing that most current Web applications are not deeply integrated and are better seen as a scaffold for memory and cognition. Some highly personalised applications accessed on wearable computing devices, however, may already have the capacity for deep integration. Finally, we draw out some of the epistemic implications of our cognitive analysis. (shrink)

This section is concerned with the possibility of embodied memory -of memories that are carried in the body and that may be transmitted between bodies, even across generations.

In this paper an "unconscious" structure common to such altered psychological states as dreaming, schizophrenic disintegration, out-of body experiences, and creative acts is described. This description is accomplished by setting psychoanalytic, clinical, and empirical studies zuithin a phenomenological framework. Phenomenological self-reflection is first made a party to discussions which focus on memories and the experience of the lived body. The configurations of "unconsciousness" then take precedence in describing relationships between the "I" of waking consciousness and a transformative body image . (...) A unique experience of the self-as undergoing a process of ego "duplication" and body "doubling"-is highlighted. (shrink)

In a serial reaction time task, procedural memory was examined in Dissociative Identity Disorder . Thirty-one DID patients were tested for inter-identity transfer of procedural learning and their memory performance was compared with 25 normal controls and 25 controls instructed to simulate DID. Results of patients seemed to indicate a pattern of inter-identity amnesia. Simulators, however, were able to mimic a pattern of inter-identity amnesia, rendering the results of patients impossible to interpret as either a pattern of amnesia or a (...) pattern of simulation. It is argued that studies not including DID-simulators or simulation-free memory tasks, should not be taken as evidence for amnesia in DID. (shrink)

This chapter proposes a radically enactive account of remembering that casts it as creative, dynamic, and wide-reaching. It paints a picture of remembering that no longer conceives of it as involving passive recollections – always occurring wholly and solely inside heads. Integrating empirical findings from various sources, the chapter puts pressure on familiar cognitivist visions of remembering. Pivotally, it is argued, that we achieve a stronger and more elegant account of remembering by abandoning the widely held assumption that it is (...) rooted in the retrieval of stored information or content in order to represent past events. We demonstrate how a radically enactive account of the roots of remembering can successfully handle classic cases discussed in the extended memory literature while, at same time, accommodating experientially rich forms of episodic memory. (shrink)

In narrative research about persons with dementia, much research focuses on individual storytellers and their stories often stressing the discursive or textual aspects of stories. As persons with Alzheimer’s disease generally have difficulties in telling stories according to often implicit narrative norms, they may appear to be less competent and agentive than what is actually the case. In the article, I argue for a change of focus from the textual aspects of narratives and the story as a product, to a (...) focus on performative aspects and the embodied aspects of storytelling. A focus on the storytelling activity implies a change from the individual storyteller to the interaction with other participants in the storytelling situation. Drawing on two particular cases of storytelling, I stress the collaborative and embodied aspects of storytelling and argue that embodiment is less an individual expressive phenomenon than it is an interactive resource. (shrink)

A concert pianist the second author videotaped herself learning J.S. Bach's Italian Concerto Presto , and commented on the problems she encountered as she practised. Approximately two years later the pianist wrote out the first page of the score from memory. The pianist's verbal reports indicated that in the early sessions she identified and memorised the formal structure of the piece, and in the later sessions she practised using this organisation to retrieve the memory cues that controlled her playing. The (...) practice and recall data supported this account. Both were organised by the formal structure of the music. Practice segments were more likely to start and stop at boundaries of the formal structure than at other locations, and recall was higher for the beginnings of sections than for later portions. Like other forms of expert memory, pianistic memory appears to be based on use of a highly practised retrieval scheme which permits rapid retrieval of information from long-term memory. (shrink)

Learning and memory are inextricably intertwined. The capacity for learning presupposes an ability to retain the knowledge acquired through experience, while memory stores the background knowledge against which new learning takes place. During the dark years of radical behaviorism, when the concept of memory was deemed too mentalistic to be a proper subject of scientific study, research on human memory took the form of research on verbal learning (Anderson, 2000; Schwartz & Reisberg, 1991).

Whether in clinical or scientific contexts the phenomenon of body memory has become a central topic of interest within embodied and embedded theory approaches. Between 2000 and 2012, Prof. Dr. Thomas Fuchs, professor for philosophical foundations of psychiatry at the University of Heidelberg, has put forth a theory on the phenomenology of body memory (Fuchs, 2012). The professional mission of Prof. Fuchs is to combine a philosophical approach based on phenomenology with psychiatric experience. More specifically, his aim is to describe (...) the structures of subjective experience as an embodied way of being in the world and with others, and to investigate the disturbances that arise in this way of being. Based on an interview with Prof. Fuchs and Prof. Caldwell, who uses body memory in her clinical work, this article introduces the concept of body memory and connects it with applications in embodied psychotherapy. (shrink)

Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement is an interdisciplinary volume with contributions from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and movement therapists. Part one provides the phenomenologically grounded definition of body memory with its different typologies. Part two follows the aim to integrate phenomenology, conceptual metaphor theory, and embodiment approaches from the cognitive sciences for the development of appropriate empirical methods to address body memory. Part three inquires into the forms and effects of therapeutic work with body memory, based on the integration of theory, (...) empirical findings, and clinical applications. It focuses on trauma treatment and the healing power of movement. The book also contributes to metaphor theory, application and research, and therefore addresses metaphor researchers and linguists interested in the embodied grounds of metaphor. Thus, it is of particular interest for researchers from the cognitive sciences, social sciences, and humanities as well as clinical practitioners. (shrink)

An action-oriented theory of embodied memory is favorable for many reasons, but it will not provide a quick yet clean solution to the grounding problem in the way Glenberg (1997t) envisages. Although structural mapping via analogical representations may be an adequate mechanism of cognitive representation, it will not suffice to explain representation as such.