About this topic

Embodied and situated approaches have become increasingly popular in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognition. They tend to be scientifically informed responses to the cognitivism predominant in mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy of mind and psychology. Cognitivism in philosophy assumed - either explicitly or implicitly - that the non-neural body and the environment in which we live and act are best factored out in our investigations of mind and cognition. Embodied and situated approaches along with other related responses to philosophical cognitivism have collectively come to be known as “4EA”: Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective. While 4EA approaches are united in rejecting the conception of mind and cognition as supervenient only upon internal brain processes they each take a slightly different focus on the reasons why internalism should be rejected and the positions may be held independently. For example, what we might think of as orthodox embodied cognitive science makes little or no mention of the affective domain and it does not imply biological enactivism, which - by its very nature - is itself an inherently embodied approach to cognition. In a similar vein, some of these approaches may be thought to be extensions to twentieth century functionalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science, while in others there is a strong historical connection to the Phenomenologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (in particular Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) and/or the American Pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey. 

Key works

Clark 1996 captured the imagination of a generation of researchers in philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences by drawing on research from robotics to argue that the mind is embodied and embedded in important ways. Gallagher 2005 integrates phenomenology and neuroscience with artificial cognitive systems research to argue that the body shapes the mind. Haugeland 1993 is an early - but classic - paper introducing embodiment and situatedness to philosophy of mind, and Brooks 1991 is the key reference from robotics in the field. Hutchins 1995 is the go-to book on embeddedness, and Dreyfus 1972 still stands as one of the main critiques of traditional artificial intelligence approaches. Enactivism was introduced to the world through Varela et al 1991, developed in detail in regard to what might be thought of as ‘biological’ enactivism in Thompson 2007, in regard to ‘perceptual’ enactivism in Noë 2005, and in regard to perception, agency and consciousness in Hurley 1998. Affective cognition is still underrepresented in the embodiment paradigm but Damasio 1994 and Damasio 1999 have been strong influences on philosophers in this area, Griffiths & Scarantino 2005 presents a strongly situated theory of emotions, and Colombetti 2013 provides an in-depth consideration of affective and emotional embodiment.


An overview of most of the 4E approaches is presented in the second edition of Clark's Mindware, an introductory textbook for the philosophy of cognitive science. Clark's Natural Born Cyborgs is a very readable lay-introduction to embodiment and the extended mind, but for a more thorough investigation see Supersizing the Mind. A scientifically informed introduction to the phenomenological approach to these issues is presented in Gallagher and Zahavi's The Phenomenological Mind and Noe's Out of our Heads provides an accessible introduction to perceptual enactivism. A thorough consideration of embodied approaches and their relevance to philosophy of mind can be found in Shapiro's Embodied Cognition and his (2014) edited collection The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition collates cutting-edge articles from many of the key players in the discipline.

Related categories

1630 found
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  1. added 2019-07-19
    Extended Cognition, The New Mechanists’ Mutual Manipulability Criterion, and The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness.Beate Krickel - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Many authors have turned their attention to the notion of constitution to determine whether the hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) is true. One common strategy is to make sense of constitution in terms of the new mechanists’ mutual manipulability account (MM). In this paper I will show that MM is insufficient. The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness arises due to the fact that mechanisms for cognitive behaviors are extended in a way that should not count as verifying EC. This challenge can (...)
  2. added 2019-07-02
    Blended Cognition.Jordi Vallverdú & Vincent C. Müller (eds.) - 2019 - Cham: Springer.
    The central concept of this edited volume is "blended cognition", the natural skill of human beings for combining constantly different heuristics during their several task-solving activities. Something that was sometimes observed like a problem as “bad reasoning”, is now the central key for the understanding of the richness, adaptability and creativity of human cognition. The topic of this book connects in a significant way with the disciplines of psychology, neurology, anthropology, philosophy, logics, engineering, logics, and AI. In a nutshell: understanding (...)
  3. added 2019-06-14
    Diagrammatic Reasoning: Abstraction, Interaction, and Insight.Kristian Tylén, Riccardo Fusaroli, Johanne Stege Bjørndahl, Joanna Raczaszek-Leonardi, Svend Østergaard & Frederik Stjernfelt - 2014 - Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (2):264-283.
    Many types of everyday and specialized reasoning depend on diagrams: we use maps to find our way, we draw graphs and sketches to communicate concepts and prove geometrical theorems, and we manipulate diagrams to explore new creative solutions to problems. The active involvement and manipulation of representational artifacts for purposes of thinking and communicating is discussed in relation to C.S. Peirce’s notion of diagrammatical reasoning. We propose to extend Peirce’s original ideas and sketch a conceptual framework that delineates different kinds (...)
  4. added 2019-06-14
    Review of “Meaning and Cognition. A Multidisciplinary Approach” by Liliana Albertazzi. [REVIEW]Bert Bultinck - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):341-349.
  5. added 2019-06-06
    Actual and Non-Actual Motion: Why Experientialist Semantics Needs Phenomenology.Johan Blomberg & Jordan Zlatev - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):395-418.
    Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor, and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, on the basis of a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as “The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada.” Through a phenomenological reanalysis (...)
  6. added 2019-06-06
    Whatever: Making Sense of John Carey: Sheppard Whatever.D. J. Sheppard - 2008 - Think 6 (17-18):41-48.
    D.J. Sheppard reflects on Carey's controversial What Good are the Arts?
  7. added 2019-06-06
    Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
  8. added 2019-06-06
    From Cognition of the Other to Compassionate Wisdom.Olha Kotovska - 2006 - Dialogue and Universalism 16 (5/6):95-110.
    The paper defines dialogic rationality and shows a rational path and understanding from the individual point of view. A separate discipline or discourse should coordinate the urgent need of deeper emotional transformation and explore the appearance of inner spiritual connectedness. This will establish the importance of every unique creature in the universe. Consequently in postmodernism, epistemology can no longer be accomplished by a “clear” cognitive theory, separated from ontological and anthropological elements. Cognition can no longer progress to an unchangeable, non-falsifiable (...)
  9. added 2019-06-06
    The Embodied Mind: On Computational, Evolutionary, and Philosophical Interpretations of Cognition.Klaus Mainzer - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):389-406.
    Modern cognitive science cannot be understood without recent developments in computer science, artificial intelligence, robotics, neuroscience, biology, linguistics, and psychology. Classic analytic philosophy as well as traditional AI assumed that all kinds of knowledge must eplicitly be represented by formal or programming languages. This assumption is in contradiction to recent insights into the biology of evolution and developmental psychology of the human organism. Most of our knowledge is implicit and unconscious. It is not formally represented, but embodied knowledge which is (...)
  10. added 2019-06-06
    Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence. [REVIEW]G. J. Shipley - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):326-329.
  11. added 2019-06-06
    Doreen Kimura, Sex and Cognition. [REVIEW]Wendy Lee - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23 (1):39-41.
  12. added 2019-06-06
    The Necessity of Embodiment: The Dreyfus-Collins Debate.Evan Selinger - 2003 - Philosophy Today 47 (3):266-279.
  13. added 2019-06-06
    Écrits Anthropologiques. Philosophie de l'Esprit Et Cognition. [REVIEW]Florence Quinche - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (2):410-414.
    Les Écrits anthropologiques de Francis Jacques rassemblent treize articles publiés de 1978 à 2000. Ils retracent le parcours d'une recherche originale qui va d'une philosophie du dialogue à une philosophie du texte et de l'intersubjectivité. Parcours qui commence il y a plus de vingt ans avec les textes majeurs de Dialogiques. Recherches logiques sur le dialogue et L'espace logique de l'interlocution, qui ont profondément marqué la philosophie analytique française, et s'est poursuivi en parallèle dans de nombreux articles. Ces Écrits ont (...)
  14. added 2019-06-06
    The Bounds of Cognition.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):43-64.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
  15. added 2019-06-06
    A Social Understanding Of Delegation.Ingemar Bohlin - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (4):731-750.
  16. added 2019-06-06
    The Embodied and Transcendental Self: Toward a Synthesis and a Way of Knowing.Ralph D. Ellis - 1998 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (2/3):67-83.
    The ‘embodied self’ is the purposeful dimension of any organism capable of acting toward a unified motivation to maintain a self-organizing structure by appropriating, replacing, and reproducing material components to serve as substrata. We reflect on the ‘self’ in this sense when we direct attention away from the objects of experience and toward the way our bodies motivate our experiences in terms of emotional purposes of the organism, by looking, searching, shifting the focus of attention, etc.---actions rather than reactions of (...)
  17. added 2019-06-06
    The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. [REVIEW]T. L. E. - 1975 - Review of Metaphysics 28 (3):554-555.
    Roman Ingarden published his two major works in aesthetics in the 1930’s. The Literary Work of Art was published first in a German edition in 1931 and The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art was published first in a Polish edition in 1937. A revised and enlarged edition of the second book was published in Germany in 1968 and it is the German edition translated into English in 1973 which is the subject of this review. Ingarden’s two works, founded (...)
  18. added 2019-06-06
    Minds, Brains and People. [REVIEW]S. P. - 1974 - Review of Metaphysics 28 (2):360-361.
    The descriptivist and revisionist metaphysical accounts of persons are in apparent competition and conflict. Wilkerson analyzes both approaches to show the extent to which each account can be adequately applied. The basic advantage of the descriptivist view is that it clarifies the way we usually talk of persons, thus giving full attention to the status of first person knowledge claims. The physical or reductive picture explains much of the nature of persons in empirical terms.
  19. added 2019-06-06
    The Embodied Mind.Godfrey N. A. Vesey - 1965 - London: Routledge.
    Originally published in 1965. For hundreds of years the thinking of philosophers, psychologists, and theologians on the problem of the mind’s relation to the body was dominated by the Cartesian notion that mind and matter are distinct substances. That Descartes also held that there is a union of mind and matter, in a person, has largely been ignored. This may be because, as he admitted in his private correspondence, it is impossible to think of mind and matter both as being (...)
  20. added 2019-06-05
    From Mutual Manipulation to Cognitive Extension: Challenges and Implications.Michael Kirchhoff - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):863–878.
    This paper examines the application of the mutual manipulability criterion as a way to demarcate constituents of cognitive systems from resources having a mere causal influence on cognitive systems. In particular, it is argued that on at least one interpretation of the mutual manipulability criterion, the criterion is inadequate because the criterion is conceptualized as identifying synchronic dependence between higher and lower ‘levels’ in mechanisms. It is argued that there is a second articulation of the mutual manipulability criterion available, and (...)
  21. added 2019-06-05
    Cognitive Assembly: Towards a Diachronic Conception of Composition.Michael David Kirchhoff - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):33–53.
    In this paper, I focus on a recent debate in extended cognition known as “cognitive assembly” and how cognitive assembly shares a certain kinship with the special composition question advanced in analytical metaphysics. Both the debate about cognitive assembly and the special composition question ask about the circumstances under which entities (broadly construed) compose or assemble another entity. The paper argues for two points. The first point is that insofar as the metaphysics of composition presupposes that composition is a synchronic (...)
  22. added 2019-06-05
    Res Cogitans Extensa. A Book Review.Dawid Lubiszewski & Paweł Gładziejewski - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1).
  23. added 2019-06-05
    Of Wolves and Philosophers. Interview with Mark Rowlands.Mark Rowlands & Tadeusz Ciecierski - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):123-132.
  24. added 2019-06-05
    Sense-Making with a Little Help From My Friends.Tom Froese - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (2):143-146.
    The work of Ezequiel Di Paolo and Hanne De Jaegher has helped to transform the enactive approach from relative obscurity into a hotly debated contender for the future science of social cognition and cognitive science more generally. In this short introduction I situate their contributions in what I see as important aspects of the bigger picture that is motivating and inspiring them as well as the rest of this young community. In particular, I sketch some of the social issues that (...)
  25. added 2019-06-05
    With the Most Profound Misgivings. Interview with Anthony P. Chemero.Anthony P. Chemero, Witold Wachowski & Dawid Lubiszewski - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (2):17-27.
  26. added 2019-06-05
    A Critical History of the Embodied Cognitive Research Paradigm. A Book Review.Kevin Ryan - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1).
  27. added 2019-06-05
    Varieties of Presence. A Book Review.John Carvalho - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):162-167.
  28. added 2019-06-05
    Kognitywista W Supermarkecie.Łukasz Afeltowicz - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T).
    [ a cognitivist in the supermarket] The central area of David Kirsh’s interest is the various ways in which humans use elements of their environment as external components of computation processes or means enabling them to reduce the complexity of cognitive problems they face. in his research he performs field observations as well as laboratory experiments. Kirsh skillfully blends concepts developed in contemporary cognitive science, such as situated cognition or extended mind, with classic concepts including problem solving. A number of (...)
  29. added 2019-06-05
    Komentarze Do „Emulującego Wywiadu… Z Rickiem Grushem”.Aaron Sloman - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2).
    [Przekład] Author comments Rick Grush’s statements about emulation and embodied approach to representation. He proposes his modification of Grush’s definition of emulation, criticizing notion of “standing in for”. He defends of notion of representation. He claims that radical embodied theories are not applicable to all cognition.
  30. added 2019-06-05
    Descartes' Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption That Humans Are Intuitive Cartesian Substance Dualists.K. Mitch Hodge - 2008 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (3-4):387-415.
    This article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are diff erent substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally (...)
  31. added 2019-06-05
    Situated Learning in ‘This High-Technology World’.Mordechai Ben-Ari - 2005 - Science & Education 14 (3-5):367-376.
  32. added 2019-06-05
    Cognition in the Wild. Edwin Hutchins.Miriam Solomon - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):181-182.
  33. added 2019-06-05
    How Many Selves Make Me?1: Stephen R. L. Clark.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29:213-233.
    Cartesian accounts of the mental make it axiomatic that consciousness is transparent: what I feel, I know I feel, however many errors I may make about its cause. ‘I’ names a simple, unextended, irreducible substance, created ex nihilo or eternally existent, and only associated with the complete, extended, dissoluble substance or pretend-substance that is ‘my’ body by divine fiat. Good moderns take it for granted that ‘we’ now realize how shifting, foggy and deconstructible are the boundaries of the self; ‘we’ (...)
  34. added 2019-05-23
    What Is a Cognitive System?Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy's Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper's first section explores aspects of Talmy's view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer -- the conditional probability of co-contribution account (CPC) -- a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms of intelligent behavior. Central to (...)
  35. added 2019-05-17
    Human Thinking, Shared Intentionality, and Egocentric Biases.Uwe Peters - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (6):1-16.
    The paper briefly summarises and critiques Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Thinking. After offering an overview of the book, the paper focusses on one particular part of Tomasello’s proposal on the evolution of uniquely human thinking and raises two points of criticism against it. One of them concerns his notion of thinking. The other pertains to empirical findings on egocentric biases in communication.
  36. added 2019-05-14
    The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.
    Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...)
  37. added 2019-04-11
    Sintonizando com o mundo: uma abordagem ecológica das habilidades sensoriomotoras.Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Neste capítulo, apresento e sustento uma articulação da noção de habilidade corporal ou sensoriomotora a partir da psicologia ecológica e mostro como ela é relevante para o debate entre Dreyfus e McDowell sobre a lida habilidosa e também para o debate sobre se saber-fazer se reduz ou não a conhecimento proposicional. A metáfora correta para compreender habilidades corporais não é a do computador, mas a do rádio. Essas habilidades resultam de um processo de sintonização do organismo com o seu ambiente.
  38. added 2019-04-03
    Are Living Beings Extended Autopoietic Systems? An Embodied Reply.Mario Villalobos - 2019 - Adaptive Behavior:1-11.
    Building on the original formulation of the autopoietic theory (AT), extended enactivism argues that living beings are autopoietic systems that extend beyond the spatial boundaries of the organism. In this article, we argue that extended enactivism, despite having some basis in AT’s original formulation, mistakes AT’s definition of living beings as autopoietic entities. We offer, as a reply to this interpretation, a more embodied reformulation of autopoiesis, which we think is necessary to counterbalance the (excessively) disembodied spirit of AT’s original (...)
  39. added 2019-03-28
    Steering Away From Multiple Realization.Anco Peeters - 2019 - Adaptive Behavior:1-2.
    Mario Villalobos and Pablo Razeto-Barry argue that enactivists should understand living beings not as autopoietic systems, but as autopoietic bodies. In doing so, they surrender the principle of multiple realizability of the spatial location of living beings. By way of counterexample, I argue that more motivation is required before this principle is surrendered.
  40. added 2019-03-07
    Cielesna geneza czasu i przestrzeni.Marek Pokropski - 2013 - IFiS PAN.
  41. added 2019-02-28
    The Logical Structure of Human Behavior.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic (...)
  42. added 2019-02-06
    Enactivism, Other Minds, and Mental Disorders.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called "direct social perception" (DSP): the (...)
  43. added 2019-01-31
    Using Neural Response Properties to Draw the Distinction Between Modal and Amodal Representations.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):301-331.
    Barsalou has recently argued against the strategy of identifying amodal neural representations by using their cross-modal responses (i.e., their responses to stimuli from different modalities). I agree that there are indeed modal structures that satisfy this “cross-modal response” criterion (CM), such as distributed and conjunctive modal representations. However, I argue that we can distinguish between modal and amodal structures by looking into differences in their cross-modal responses. A component of a distributed cell assembly can be considered unimodal because its responses (...)
  44. added 2019-01-30
    Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and the Embodied Mind, by Andy Clark: New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, Pp. Xviii + 401, £19.99. [REVIEW]Daniel D. Hutto - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):186-189.
  45. added 2019-01-24
    From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social.Alejandro Arango - 2018 - Adaptive Behavior 27 (1):31-45.
    Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of action-perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception, and that the central enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because (...)
  46. added 2019-01-11
    Genetic Phenomenology and Empirical Naturalism.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2018 - Teoria 38 (2):149-160.
    Husserl’s phenomenology is developed in explicit contrast to naturalism. At the same time, various scholars have attempted to overcome this opposition by naturalizing consciousness and phenomenology. In this paper, I argue that, in order to confront the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism, we must distinguish between different forms of naturalism. In fact, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is developed in contrast to a metaphysical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as a mind-independent ontological domain that can be known (...)
  47. added 2019-01-07
    Making Too Many Enemies: Hutto and Myin’s Attack on Computationalism.Jesse Kuokkanen & Anna-Mari Rusanen - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):282-294.
    We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem (...)
  48. added 2019-01-05
    From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent Revolution.Marcin Miłkowski, Robert Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska, Aleksandra Przegalińska, Tadeusz Zawidzki, Joel Krueger, Adam Gies, Marek McGann, Łukasz Afeltowicz, Witold Wachowski, Fredrik Stjernberg, Victor Loughlin & Mateusz Hohol - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives towards building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the (...)
  49. added 2018-12-27
    Group Minds and Natural Kinds.Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    The claim is frequently made that structured collections of individuals who are themselves subjects of mental and cognitive states – such collections as courts, countries, and corporations – can be, and often are, subjects of mental or cognitive states. And, to be clear, advocates for this so-called group-minds hypothesis intend their view to be interpreted literally, not metaphorically. The existing critical literature casts substantial doubt on this view, at least on the assumption that groups are claimed to instantiate the same (...)
  50. added 2018-12-17
    Psychiatry Beyond the Brain: Externalism, Mental Health, and Autistic Spectrum Disorder.Tom Roberts, Joel Krueger & Shane Glackin - forthcoming - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology.
    Externalist theories hold that a comprehensive understanding of mental disorder cannot be achieved unless we attend to factors that lie outside of the head: neural explanations alone will not fully capture the complex dependencies that exist between an individual’s psychiatric condition and her social, cultural, and material environment. Here, we firstly offer a taxonomy of ways in which the externalist viewpoint can be understood, and unpack its commitments concerning the nature and physical realization of mental disorder. Secondly, we apply a (...)
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