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  1. Raymond D. Bradley (2015). Why Survival is Metaphysically Impossible. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 297-328.
    Human bodies have a totally different mode of existence from those collections of mental properties (intelligence, will power, consciousness, etc.) that we call minds. They belong to the ontological category of physical substances or entities, whereas mental properties belong to the ontological category of properties or attributes, and as such can exist only so long as their physical bearers exist. Mental properties “emerge” (in a sense that makes emergence ubiquitous throughout the natural world) when the constituent parts of a biological (...)
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  2. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2013). Consciousness as a Phenomenon in the Operational Architectonics of Brain Organization: Criticality and Self-Organization Considerations. Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 55:13-31.
    In this paper we aim to show that phenomenal consciousness is realized by a particular level of brain operational organization and that understanding human consciousness requires a description of the laws of the immediately underlying neural collective phenomena, the nested hierarchy of electromagnetic fields of brain activity – operational architectonics. We argue that the subjective mental reality and the objective neurobiological reality, although seemingly worlds apart, are intimately connected along a unified metastable continuum and are both guided by the universal (...)
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  3. Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith (2013). Social Cognition in the We-Mode. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
  4. Raymond W. Gibbs Jr & Nathaniel Clark (2012). No Need for Instinct: Coordinated Communication as an Emergent Self Organized Process. Pragmatics and Cognition 20 (2):241-262.
    Language serves many purposes in our individual lives and our varied interpersonal interactions. Daniel Everett's claim that language primarily emerges from an “interactional instinct“ and not a classic “language instinct“ gives proper weight to the importance of coordinated communication in meeting our adaptive needs. Yet the argument that language is a “cultural tool“, motivated by an underlying “instinct“, does not adequately explain the complex, yet complementary nature of both linguistic regularities and variations in everyday speech. Our alternative suggestion is that (...)
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  5. Fritz Rohrlich (1997). Cognitive Emergence. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):346-58.
    Examination of attempts at theory reduction (S to T) shows that a process of cognitive emergence is involved in which concepts of S, Cs, emerge from T. This permits the 'bridge laws' to be stated. These are not in conflict with incommensurability of the Cs with the CT. Cognitive emergence may occur asymptotically or because of similarities of mathematical expressions; it is not necessarily holistic. Mereologically and nonmereologically related theory pairs are considered. Examples are chosen from physics. An important distinction (...)
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  6. Jan Scheffel, Mind-Body problemets olösbarhet frigör viljan.
    Mind-body problemet analyseras i ett reduktionistiskt perspektiv. Genom att kombinera emergensbegreppet med algoritmisk informationsteori visas i ett tankeexperiment att ett starkt epistemiskt emergent system kan konstrueras utifrån en relativt enkel, ickelinjär process. En jämförelse med hjärnans avsevärt mer komplexa neurala nätverk visar att även medvetandet kan karakteriseras som starkt epistemiskt emergent. Därmed är reduktionistisk förståelse av medvetandet inte möjlig; mind-body problemet har alltså inte en reduktionistisk lösning. Medvetandets ontologiskt emergenta karaktär kan därefter konstateras utifrån en kombinatorisk analys; det är därmed (...)
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  7. Pierre Steiner (2013). Survenance, émergence et immersion. Le problème de la conscience d'un point de vue externaliste. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 111 (1):69-108.
  8. Georg Theiner & John Sutton (2014). The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition: Commentary on Paul E. Smaldino, "The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):277-278.
    We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision-making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
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  9. Gabriel Vacariu (2012). Cognitive Neuroscience Versus Epistemologically Different Worlds. University of Bucharest Publishing Company.
    From the “epistemologically different worlds” perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman’s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. The conclusion is that this “science” has “No ontology landscape” and, therefore, cognitive neuroscience is a pseudo-science.
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  10. Joel Walmsley (2010). Emergence and Reduction in Dynamical Cognitive Science. New Ideas in Psychology 28:274-282.
    This paper examines the widespread intuition that the dynamical approach to cognitive science is importantly related to emergentism about the mind. The explanatory practices adopted by dynamical cognitive science rule out some conceptions of emergence; covering law explanations require a deducibility relationship between explanans and explanandum, whereas canonical theories of emergence require the absence of such deducibility. A response to this problem – one which would save the intuition that dynamics and emergence are related – is to reconstrue the concept (...)
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